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# **Building Trustworthy Systems**

**Overview** 

**TRIAD** 

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Agenda

Challenge

**Defining Trustworthy Systems** 

**Supply Chain Security** 

Trustworthy Systems Technologies

### Challenge

Improve product security & integrity

AND


Reduce cost of development

**AND** 

Reduce cost of ownership for the customer



## ■nfrastructure Attacks on Reputation, Revenue, and Intellectual Property



## Defining Trustworthy Systems

- Control the Supply Chain
- Secure Development Life Cycle
- Implementing Open Standard Security Architectures



## Trustworthiness and Supply Chain Security



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## Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)


# SDL reduces development costs and increases product security:

- Conforms with the guidelines of ISO 27034
- Incorporate security requirements in Product Security Baseline
- Identify security threats and mitigations during design phase with Threat Modeling
- Prevent security defects using Safe Libraries and Static Analysis tools with appropriate security rules
- Defend against exploits using Runtime Defense techniques, while Validating system through Security Testing




Value Statement: Ensures consistent product security through proven techniques and technologies, reducing the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software

### Avoiding Defects Reduces Engineering Costs......



### Cost of Defect Correction for the Customer (patch management)



Servers

Database

Database

Servers

Patch Deployment Effort per System per Patching Event System per Patch 2.00 1.50 Patch Deployment 1.00 Reconfiguration per Help Desk Hours 0.50 Failure Resolution Assembly & Testing 0.00 Threat Assessment Windows oss oss oss Windows Windows Client Client Database Servers Servers Database Servers Servers

download.microsoft.com/download/1/7/b/17b54d06-1550-4011-9253-9484f769fe9f/TCO\_SPM\_Wipro.pdf

Client


Servers

Client

## Secure Boot

- Ensures only authentic OEM boots up on a the OEM's Platform
- Anchored in hardware, as the image is created, the signature is installed & signed with a secure private key
- As the software boots, the system checks to ensure the installed digital certificate is valid
- Subsequent hash checks provides continuous monitoring with runtime integrity







Value Statement: Ensures that only authentic OEM software is being used while verifying the software has not been altered or tampered since it was signed



### Hardware Root of Trust (HRoT)



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### **HRoTs, like Trusted Platform Modules**

- Provide Immutable Identity
- Standard Identity- IEEE 802.1AR (SUDI-X.509 cert)
- Storage to Secure Credentials
- Anti-Theft & Anti-Tamper Chip Design
- HW Random No. Generator

# Identity



#### **Product Security** HRoT

Features & Services

- Immutable Identity
- Secure Storage (Keys & Objects)
- Certifiable Entropy Source
- Secure Crypto Assist
- Secure Application Certificates

Value Statement: Provides trustworthy OEM products, offering immutable identity, secure storage, random number generator, and encryption



## Secure Identity

- Deployed in HRoT for immutable device identity (use a TPM, for example)
- A security credential installed on the device during manufacturing
- Provides a cryptographically secure unique identity for OEM products
- Communicate with the network, connection authenticated by the identity credential



Value Statement: Establishes a solution for device identity supporting authentication of the device's identity to the network

# Next Generation Encryption (NGE) via Common Modules

# **Cryptographic Technologies**

- New/upgraded algorithms (AES 128, 256 or greater, RSA 2048 or greater, ECC)
- Compatible with existing security architectures

# Secure and Efficient

- Algorithm efficiency enabling increased security
- Scales well to high/low throughput

# Compatible with Government Standards

- Suite B (US)
- FIPS-140 (US/Canada)
- NATO
- Germany, UK, AU
- HIPPA, PCI DSS



Authenticated Encryption





Key <u>Establi</u>shment

Digital Signatures





Hashing

# Standard Security Architectures

## Don't Confuse User-Facing Devices with IoT

User Facing: Android Phones	IoT Devices: Linux/Android Embedded
App writers for phones notorious for poor security practices	App writers can be trained to write secure code
App stores not policed well	No App stores
Phone users notorious for risky behavior	No users, or users can be constrained
Phone makers and carriers can't control any of those problems	Device makers can control all of these problems

The software in an IoT device is often static

That means security can be built in by the OEM

. . . .

and not maintained by the customer

# Access Control: Isolate process from each other and from the OS

- SE Linux and SE Android
  - "Security Enhanced" Linux and Android
    - Kernel mods, tools and configuration files
    - Initial work done by the NSA, then open sourced
  - SE Android is built on top of SE Linux



### SE Security Model:

- Mandatory Access Control <u>nothing</u> happens unless it is allowed to happen
- The basic security model: there are Subjects / Actions / Objects
  - Subjects are processes
  - Actions are anything a process might do to an object
  - Objects are anything a process might take action on
- The Security Server process must permit a Subject to take Action on an Object -
  - Subject="Stacy" Action=Write Object=Syslog ALLOW

# Virtualization Saves the OEM Money and Improves Platform Security

- Business value: Separate hardware from software
  - Saves software migration costs as HW evolves
  - Maximizes use of available resources
  - Virtualization saves the OEM \$\$\$\$

- Security value:
  - TPM (HRoT) attests integrity of hypervisor and guests
  - Process isolation
  - Ability to create a layered security model within the embedded device



Thank you.

