

# Trusted Storage

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# - TRUST -

## system behaves as designed

### Cryptographic **SIGNING**

- PlaintextMessage + Signed(Hash(PlaintextMessage))
  - **Hash** = Reduces message to 20 Bytes ( $2^{160}$ th number)
  - **Sign** = Encrypts with a private key that only the corresponding public key can decrypt and verify
- Microsoft signs the Microsoft software proving it is the software from Microsoft...
- X signs Y and Y signs Z -- **Chain of Trust**

**CREDENTIALS:** X.509 Certificate is a SIGNED attestation of a fact or claim

- Basis for Trust in ALL BANKING WORLDWIDE
- Basis for Trust in Windows and Linux and Web

# Root of Trust

**Hardware** that  
**cannot change**  
**can digitally sign**

and therefore can start off a chain of trust.

A TPM (trusted platform module) is a tiny processor on the motherboard that can sign and can't have its firmware modified.

Disk Drives can be roots of trust since you can't upload firmware to change them.

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**Peripherals WG**  
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**User Auth WG**  
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**Storage**  
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**Key Management**  
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

**BOLD outline: Relevant to Storage Work**

# Extending Trust to Platform Peripherals



# Trusted Peripheral with Trusted Platform

## Trusted Peripheral



**Life Cycle: Manufacture, Own, Enroll, PowerUp, Connect, Use, ...**

# Joint Work with ISO T10 (SCSI) and T13 (ATA)

**TRUSTED SEND/IN**

(Protocol ID = xxxx .....)



**TRUSTED RECEIVE/OUT**



T10/T13 defined the “**container commands**”

TCG/Storage defining the “**TCG payload**”

Protocol IDs assigned to TCG, T10/T13, or reserved

# TCG Storage WG Specification

## SPs (Security Partitions/Providers)

- Logical Groupings of Features
- SP = Tables + Methods + Access Controls

## Tables

- Like “registers”, primitive storage and control

## Methods

- Get, Set – Commands kept simple with many possible functions

## Access Control over Methods on Tables



# TCG Storage Work Group Use Cases

- **Published Storage WG White Paper and FAQ**
- **Illustrative Subset of Total Storage Device Use Cases**
- **Specification “Solving” Use Cases Expected 1Q/2007**

- **Enrollment and Connection:** trusted relationship – Storage Device and host

- **Protected Storage:** for storing sensitive data

- **Locking and Encryption:** mating SD and host; encrypting stored data

- **Logging:** for forensic purposes

- **Cryptographic Services:** supporting a variety of security services

- **Authorizing Storage Device Feature Sets to Hosts:** trusted/exclusive use

- **Secure Download of Firmware:** trusting firmware upgrades

\*\* See <https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home/> for Use Case paper and FAQ

# TCG Security Functions

## 3 Advantages in HDD's

- Arbitrarily large secrets storage
- Complete CPU for crypto operations
- Custom ASIC logic for high speed


## Components:

### Secret storage (SP's, or Security Providers)

- Inaccessible to standard Read/Write
- Multiple, separate spaces, each hidden from each other
- Impervious to reformat, OS load, virus attack

### Operations (Methods)

- Create, manage, deactivate SP's
- Create, store, retrieve information in SP's
- Perform cryptographic operations – encrypt, decrypt, sign, hash, etc
- Provide services: logging, secure clock, RNG
- All with access control – permitting only authorized operations



# Applying TCG Protocol - Momentum FDE\*

## Purposes

- Protect data from exposure due to equipment loss,
- Enable instant, cryptographic erase of drive

## TCG Security services provide key management interface

- Key and passwords cryptographically protected on media
- None accessible using ATA READ/WRITE commands
- Strong TCG defined access control governs access to passwords

## Closed, permanent encryption device

- Encryption key generated in drive during manufacturing
- Encryption key never leaves drive
- Encryption cannot be turned off

\*FDE = Full Disk Encryption

[www.trustedcomputinggroup.org](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org)

**THANK YOU!**

