Trusted Platform Architecture
Hardware Requirements for a Device Identifier Composition Engine

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Hardware Requirements for a Device Identifier Composition Engine

1 Scope and Audience

This specification describes the hardware requirements and process for creating an identity value that is derived from a Unique Device Secret and the identity (a condensed cryptographic representation) of the first mutable code. This specification calls the derived value the Compound Device Identifier. The composition of the Compound Device Identifier may include hardware state or configuration that influences the execution of the first mutable code.

One of the possible uses of the Compound Device Identifier is to attest to the trustworthiness of an embedded device.

The intended audience for this document is designers of programmable components when they do not have access to a TPM.

The engine that performs the computation of the CDI may be updated, but those updates are not measured in the CDI and must be inherently trusted. First mutable code refers to the code that is executed after the Device Identifier Composition Engine and is not inherently trusted.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.


[2] TPM Library Specification; Family 2.0; Level 00; Revision 01.16 or later
3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3.1 CDI
the Compound Device Identifier is a value used to identify software and the system executing the software

3.2 digest
result of a hash operation

3.3 device
a platform that integrates a programmable component with other optional programmable components and peripherals

3.4 DICE
the Device Identifier Composition Engine is immutable according to this specification and creates the CDI

3.5 measurement
a cryptographic hash (or equivalent) of code or data

3.6 UDS
the Unique Device Secret is normally known only to the DICE, and is used in the creation of the CDI by the DICE. Depending on the provisioning process, it may be known to the manufacturer or owner.
4 Symbols and Abbreviated Terms

4.1 Symbols

For the purposes of this document, the following symbol definitions.

A || B  \hspace{1cm} \text{concatenation of } B \text{ to } A
F()  \hspace{1cm} \text{denotes a function } F
H()  \hspace{1cm} \text{denotes the hash function}
\text{HMAC}(k, m)  \hspace{1cm} \text{denotes the HMAC function over message } m \text{ using key } k

4.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of this document, the following abbreviations apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Trusted Computing Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM</td>
<td>Trusted Platform Module</td>
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</tbody>
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5 Introduction

The Compound Device Identifier (CDI) is derived using both the Unique Device Secret (UDS) and the measurement of the first mutable code that runs on the platform. It can optionally include measurements of hardware state information and configuration data that influences the execution of the first mutable code. The CDI is generated by the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE), which has exclusive access to the UDS after reset and before transferring control to the measured mutable code. The general process is shown in Figure 1 with an illustration of the computation of the CDI. The UDS is provisioned by the manufacturer in any way that is consistent with this specification. Any revision or change in the UDS or any of the measured components results in a different value for the CDI.

Figure 1: Compound Device Identifier Derivation Process

The UDS and the measurement of mutable code must be cryptographically mixed in a way that it is infeasible to use the CDI and the code measurement to recover the UDS. This may be accomplished by
the DICE using a secure hash algorithm to hash the concatenation of the two values. Alternatively, the two values could be used in an HMAC with the UDS as the HMAC key. An HMAC would provide a higher level of protection for the UDS than would a simple hash. The specific method to combine the values is the manufacturer’s choice, because it does not affect interoperability.

The secure hash function is:

\[ H(UDS \ || \ H(Mutable \ Code)) \]  

(1)

The secure HMAC function is:

\[ HMAC(UDS, H(Mutable \ Code)) \]  

(2)

Where:

- **UDS**: the Unique Device Secret
- **Mutable Code**: is code not in ROM that will be executed after all DICE operations (see Section 6.4) are finished (no mutable code is executed prior to DICE execution)

The HMAC operation takes a little more time but provides the UDS with twice the level of protection of the simple hash in (1), as described in NIST SP800-57.

The device is responsible, where required, to protect access (read, write, and modify) to the CDI. It may not be possible for the mutable code to protect the CDI. How protection of the CDI is achieved is outside the scope of this specification.

A benefit of the CDI is that the CDI has a different value when the first mutable code changes. For example, if the first mutable code was replaced by malware, the previous CDI is not available to malware. Likewise, if the first mutable code is updated with a security patch, a new CDI is generated. The first mutable code might use a secure update process that makes the code essentially immutable for end customers in the absence of assistance from the manufacturer. An example is if the mutable code update process verifies the cryptographic signature of updates before allowing them to be installed based on a public key for which the manufacturer owns the private key. Each successive version of the mutable code installed results in a different CDI value.

This specification has requirements for two different categories of immutability for the DICE. For simple devices, it might be possible for the DICE and all its dependencies to be invariant and not change after manufacturing. More complex systems might have a DICE that could be influenced directly or indirectly by the manufacturer, such as a CPU vendor or a baseboard management controller vendor. According to the requirements in this specification, modifications to the DICE engine or its dependencies are not reflected in the resulting CDI. The capability for a manufacturer or one of their suppliers to directly or indirectly influence the DICE is a cause for concern but may be necessary to balance risks associated with complex systems. The protection mechanisms for modifying the DICE or its dependencies are the basis for confidence when identifying changes in the UDS, the first mutable code or measured configuration changes via the resulting CDI. The protection mechanisms for modifying the DICE or its dependences must be inherently trusted. The strength of protections for the update process for the DICE or its dependences are central to a customer’s ability to trust the CDI.
6 Requirements

6.1 Unique Device Secret properties

UDS values MUST be uncorrelated and statistically unique.

The UDS MUST NOT be used as an identity value by any other entity.

The device MUST have a UDS that has at least the same security strength as used in the attestation process of the device. The attestation process reports the software state and identity of the device.

When the attestation process is determined by software that is not under control of the device manufacturer, the size of the UDS SHOULD be at least 256 bits.

NOTE 1 The value of 256 bits is suggested because the use of SHA1 hashing algorithm has been deprecated. Using more bits for the UDS increase chances of longevity of the implementation.

The UDS SHOULD NOT be rewritable.

NOTE 2 Change of the UDS will change the identity of the device. In most cases, changes to the UDS will prevent proper device attestation and access to previously stored device secrets.

NOTE 3 A one-time programmable UDS is a possible implementation.

6.2 Device Identifier Composition Engine properties

This specification allows for two classifications of the DICE. One is a truly immutable (unchangeable) DICE. The other is a DICE that is immutable from a user point of view but might be securely updated by the manufacturer of the DICE.

NOTE 4 Every effort should be made to make the DICE truly immutable.

The DICE MUST have exclusive read access to a UDS.

NOTE 5 This means that the packaging of the programmable component that implements DICE will normally preclude use, reading, and observation of the UDS by an entity other than DICE.

NOTE 6 Typically, read access to the storage location containing the UDS will be enabled when a hardware event, such as a reset, causes the DICE to begin execution. Then read access of the storage location would be disabled by a software command. Other implementations are possible.

If the device has a debug port or debug mode:

• The debug port or debug mode SHALL only be enabled at reset or when explicitly enabled by software that executes after the DICE.

• When the debug port or debug mode is enabled, any attempt to read the UDS (including from the DICE) SHALL be denied or produce a value that is uncorrelated with the UDS.

NOTE 7 Any constant value such as all 0’s is an uncorrelated value.

6.2.1 Immutable DICE properties

The DICE implemented on the device SHALL be immutable (unchangeable).

An immutable DICE SHALL be immutable by the end of the manufacturing process of the device.
6.2.2 Updatable DICE properties

An updatable DICE SHALL only be updated through a process controlled by the manufacturer of the DICE. After updating through a manufacturer controlled process the DICE SHALL comply with this specification.

NOTE 8 One possible manufacturer controlled update process is outlined by NIST 800-147 (or ISO 19678).

NOTE 9 The manufacturer controlled update process should not change the CDI.

6.3 Compound Device Identifier properties

Specification of normative requirements for the CDI is outside the scope of this document.

NOTE 10 The device may need dedicated hardware to protect access (read, write, and modify) to the CDI.

NOTE 11 If hardware is unavailable to protect the CDI, then mutable code provided by the manufacturer is responsible for reducing opportunities for exposure of the CDI to unauthorized entities. Devices that leak a CDI produced from measurement of authorized mutable code may be vulnerable to a replay attack and impersonation.

NOTE 12 Device manufacturers are encouraged to use best practices (for example: ISO/IEC 27034) to prevent leakage of the CDI. Measures taken may include:

- Avoid design, coding, and logic errors.
- Erasure of the CDI immediately after its use (e.g. in RAM, registers, cache).

NOTE 13 A CDI that has been leaked by mutable code should be made obsolete in part by updating manufacturer mutable code. This will cause the DICE to produce a new CDI and in addition should remove the cause of the leak.

6.4 DICE Operation

The DICE SHALL execute without interference or alteration each time the device is reset, prior to the execution of any mutable code on the device.

Before execution of mutable code, the DICE SHALL combine the UDS with the measurement of the first mutable code to be executed in such a way that the UDS cannot be deduced from the CDI, even if the measurement is known.

The DICE SHALL create this CDI using a one-way function with at least the same cryptographic strength as the UDS.

NOTE 14 According to NIST SP800-57, Part 1; using a hash algorithm in an HMAC provides as many bits of security as the number of bits in a digest but the same algorithm used in a hash would only provide about half as many bits. Using the UDS as a HMAC key would make the security strength as strong as the UDS.

Before execution of mutable code access to the UDS SHALL be disabled until the next reset.

NOTE 15 Disablement can be achieved, for example, by placing the UDS into read-once memory, by an explicit software instruction, by hardware that recognizes whether the instruction pointer is inside the range of DICE instructions and only allows access to the UDS from that range, by executing only DICE on a secure coprocessor and allowing access to the UDS only from the secure coprocessor. Other implementations are possible.

Before execution of mutable code, the DICE SHALL securely erase any values that could be used to determine the UDS.
The DICE SHALL write the CDI to a location to which the measured mutable code has exclusive access as long as mutable code requires exclusive access.

NOTE 16  The mutable code is expected to use and erase the CDI and any values that could be used to determine the CDI. While mutable code uses the CDI, it needs the ability to prevent access to the CDI and disclosure of the value.

NOTE 17  Access includes read, write, and modify.

NOTE 18  Use of the CDI by the mutable code is outside the scope of this document.

The DICE SHALL cause the device to execute mutable code starting at an architecturally defined address in the range of the mutable code that was measured.