Trusted Platform Module Library

Part 3: Commands

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Work in Progress

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1 Scope

This TPM 2.0 Part 3 of the Trusted Platform Module Library specification contains the definitions of the TPM commands. These commands make use of the constants, flags, structures, and union definitions defined in TPM 2.0 Part 2.

The detailed description of the operation of the commands is written in the C language with extensive comments. The behavior of the C code in this TPM 2.0 Part 3 is normative but does not fully describe the behavior of a TPM. The combination of this TPM 2.0 Part 3 and TPM 2.0 Part 4 is sufficient to fully describe the required behavior of a TPM.

The code in parts 3 and 4 is written to define the behavior of a compliant TPM. In some cases (e.g., firmware update), it is not possible to provide a compliant implementation. In those cases, any implementation provided by the vendor that meets the general description of the function provided in TPM 2.0 Part 3 would be compliant.

The code in parts 3 and 4 is not written to meet any particular level of conformance nor does this specification require that a TPM meet any particular level of conformance.

2 Terms and Definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in TPM 2.0 Part 1 apply.

3 Symbols and abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the symbols and abbreviated terms given in TPM 2.0 Part 1 apply.
4 Notation

4.1 Introduction

For the purposes of this document, the notation given in TPM 2.0 Part 1 applies.

Command and response tables use various decorations to indicate the fields of the command and the allowed types. These decorations are specified in clause 4.2.

4.2 Table Decorations

4.2.1 Introduction

The symbols and terms in the Notation column of Table 1 are used in the tables for the command schematics. These values indicate various qualifiers for the parameters or descriptions with which they are associated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>A Type decoration – See clause 4.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@</td>
<td>A Name decoration - See clause 4.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+PP</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+(PP)</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{NV}</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F)</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Role</td>
<td>A Description modifier – See clause 4.2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Type Decoration +

When appended to a value in the Type column of a command, this symbol indicates that the parameter is allowed to use the “null” value of the data type (see in TPM 2.0 Part 2, Conditional Types). The null value is usually TPM_RH_NULL for a handle or TPM_ALG_NULL for an algorithm selector.

NOTE This decoration is not appended to response parameters

4.2.3 Name @

A Name decoration – When this symbol precedes a handle parameter in the “Name” column, it indicates that an authorization session is required for use of the entity associated with the handle. If a handle does not have this symbol, then an authorization session is not allowed.

4.2.4 Description Modifier +PP

This modifier may follow TPM_RH_PLATFORM in the “Description" column to indicate that Physical Presence is required when platformAuth/platformPolicy is provided.
4.2.5 Description Modifier \{PP\}

This modifier may follow TPM_RH_PLATFORM to indicate that Physical Presence may be required when `platformAuth/platformPolicy` is provided. The commands with this notation may be in the `setList` or `clearList` of TPM2_PP_Commands().

4.2.6 Description Modifier \{NV\}

This modifier may follow the `commandCode` in the “Description” column to indicate that the command may result in an update of NV memory and be subject to rate throttling by the TPM. If the command code does not have this notation, then a write to NV memory does not occur as part of the command actions.

Any command that uses authorization may cause a write to NV if there is an authorization failure. A TPM may use the occasion of command execution to update the NV copy of clock.

4.2.7 Description Modifier \{F\}

This modifier indicates that the “flushed” attribute will be SET in the TPMA_CC for the command. The modifier may follow the `commandCode` in the “Description” column to indicate that any transient handle context used by the command will be flushed from the TPM when the command completes. This may be combined with the \{NV\} modifier but not with the \{E\} modifier.

**EXAMPLE 1** \(\text{(NV F)}\)

**EXAMPLE 2** TPM2_SequenceComplete() will flush the context associated with the `sequenceHandle`.

4.2.8 Description Modifier \{E\}

This modifier indicates that the “extensive” attribute will be SET in the TPMA_CC for the command. This modifier may follow the `commandCode` in the “Description” column to indicate that the command may flush many objects and re-enumeration of the loaded context likely will be required. This may be combined with the \{NV\} modifier but not with the \{F\} modifier.

**EXAMPLE 1** \(\text{(NV E)}\)

**EXAMPLE 2** TPM2_Clear() will flush all contexts associated with the Storage hierarchy and the Endorsement hierarchy.

4.2.9 Auth Index

When a handle has a “@” decoration, the “Description” column will contain an “Auth Index:” entry for the handle. This entry indicates the number of the authorization session. The authorization sessions associated with handles will occur in the session area in the order of the handles with the “@” modifier. Sessions used only for encryption/decryption or only for audit will follow the handles used for authorization.

4.2.10 Auth Role

This will be in the “Description” column of a handle with the “@” decoration. It may have a value of USER, ADMIN or DUP.

If the handle has the Auth Role of USER and the handle is an Object, the type of authorization is determined by the setting of `userWithAuth` in the Object's attributes. If the handle is TPM_RH_OWNER, TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, or TPM_RH_PLATFORM, operation is as if `userWithAuth` is SET. If the handle references an NV Index, then the allowed authorizations are determined by the settings of the attributes of the NV Index as described in TPM 2.0 Part 2, “TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes).”
If the Auth Role is ADMIN and the handle is an Object, the type of authorization is determined by the setting of adminWithPolicy in the Object’s attributes. If the handle is TPM_RH_OWNER, TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, or TPM_RH_PLATFORM, operation is as if adminWithPolicy is SET. If the handle is an NV index, operation is as if adminWithPolicy is SET (see 5.6 e2).

If the DUP role is selected, authorization may only be with a policy session (DUP role only applies to Objects).

When either ADMIN or DUP role is selected, a policy command that selects the command being authorized is required to be part of the policy.

EXAMPLE 

TPM2_Certify requires the ADMIN role for the first handle (objectHandle). The policy authorization for objectHandle is required to contain TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(commandCode == TPM_CC_Certify). This sets the state of the policy so that it can be used for ADMIN role authorization in TPM2_Certify().

4.3 Handle and Parameter Demarcation

The demarcations between the header, handle, and parameter parts are indicated by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Separator</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the values immediately following are in the handle area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the values immediately following are in the parameter area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 AuthorizationSize and ParameterSize

Authorization sessions are not shown in the command or response schematics. When the tag of a command or response is TPM_ST_SESSIONS, then a 32-bit value will be present in the command/response buffer to indicate the size of the authorization field or the parameter field. This value shall immediately follow the handle area (which may contain no handles). For a command, this value (authorizationSize) indicates the size of the Authorization Area and shall have a value of 9 or more. For a response, this value (parameterSize) indicates the size of the parameter area and may have a value of zero.

If the authorizationSize field is present in the command, parameterSize will be present in the response, but only if the responseCode is TPM_RC_SUCCESS.

When authorization is required to use the TPM entity associated with a handle, then at least one session will be present. To indicate this, the command tag Description field contains TPM_ST_SESSIONS. Additional sessions for audit, encrypt, and decrypt may be present.

When the command tag Description field contains TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS, then no sessions are allowed and the authorizationSize field is not present.

When a command allows use of sessions when not required, the command tag Description field will indicate the types of sessions that may be used with the command.

4.5 Return Code Alias

For the RC_FMT1 return codes that may add a parameter, handle, or session number, the prefix TPM_RCS_is an alias for TPM_RC_.

TPM_RC_n is added, where n is the parameter, handle, or session number. In addition, TPM_RC_H is added for handle, TPM_RC_P for parameter, and TPM_RC_S for session errors.

NOTE 

TPM_RCS_ is a programming convention. Only add numbers to TPM_RCS_ return codes, never TPM_RC_ return codes. Only return codes that can have a number added have the TPM_RCS_
EXAMPLE 1
Since TPM_RC_VALUE can have a number added, TPM_RCS_VALUE is defined. A program can use the construct “TPM_RCS_VALUE + number”. Since TPM_RC_SIGNATURE cannot have a number added, TPM_RCS_SIGNATURE is not defined. A program using the construct “TPM_RCS_SIGNATURE + number” will not compile, alerting the programmer that the construct is incorrect.

By convention, the number to be added is of the form RC_CommandName_ParameterName where CommandName is the name of the command with the TPM2_prefix removed. The parameter name alone is insufficient because the same parameter name could be in a different position in different commands.

EXAMPLE 2
TPM2_HMAC_Start() with parameters that result in TPM_ALG_NULL as the hash algorithm will returns TPM_RC_VALUE plus the parameter number. Since hashAlg is the second parameter, This code results:

```
#define RC_HMAC_Start_hashAlg (TPM_RC_P + TPM_RC_2)
return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_HMAC_Start_hashAlg;
```

5 Command Processing

5.1 Introduction

Clause 5 defines the command validations that are required of any implementation and the response code returned if the indicated check fails. Unless stated otherwise, the order of the checks is not normative and different TPM may give different responses when a command has multiple errors.

In the description below, some statements that describe a check may be followed by a response code in parentheses. This is the normative response code should the indicated check fail. A normative response code may also be included in the statement.

5.2 Command Header Validation

Before a TPM may begin the actions associated with a command, a set of command format and consistency checks shall be performed. These checks are listed below and should be performed in the indicated order.

a) The TPM shall successfully unmarshal a TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG and verify that it is either TPM_ST_SESSIONS or TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS (TPM_RC_BAD_TAG).

b) The TPM shall successfully unmarshal a UINT32 as the commandSize. If the TPM has an interface buffer that is loaded by some hardware process, the number of octets in the input buffer for the command reported by the hardware process shall exactly match the value in commandSize (TPM_RC_COMMAND_SIZE).

   NOTE A TPM can have direct access to system memory and unmarshal directly from that memory.

c) The TPM shall successfully unmarshal a TPM_CC and verify that the command is implemented (TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE).

5.3 Mode Checks

The following mode checks shall be performed in the order listed:
a) If the TPM is in Failure mode, then the commandCode is TPM_CC_GetTestResult or TPM_CC_GetCapability (TPM_RC_FAILURE) and the command tag is TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS (TPM_RC_FAILURE).

NOTE 1  In Failure mode, the TPM has no cryptographic capability and processing of sessions is not supported.

b) The TPM is in Field Upgrade mode (FUM), the commandCode is TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData (TPM_RC_UPGRADE).

c) If the TPM has not been initialized (TPM2_Startup()), then the commandCode is TPM_CC_Startup (TPM_RC_INITIALIZE).

NOTE 2  The TPM can enter Failure mode during _TPM_Init processing, before TPM2_Startup(). Since the platform firmware cannot know that the TPM is in Failure mode without accessing it, and since the first command is required to be TPM2_Startup(), the expected sequence will be that platform firmware (the CRTM) will issue TPM2_Startup() and receive TPM_RC_FAILURE indicating that the TPM is in Failure mode.

There can be failures where a TPM cannot record that it received TPM2_Startup(). In those cases, a TPM in failure mode may process TPM2_GetTestResult(), TPM2_GetCapability(), or the field upgrade commands. As a side effect, that TPM may process TPM2_GetTestResult(), TPM2_GetCapability() or the field upgrade commands before TPM2_Startup().

This is a corner case exception to the rule that TPM2_Startup() must be the first command.

The mode checks may be performed before or after the command header validation.

5.4 Handle Area Validation

After successfully unmarshaling and validating the command header, the TPM shall perform the following checks on the handles and sessions. These checks may be performed in any order.

NOTE 1  A TPM is required to perform the handle area validation before the authorization checks because an authorization cannot be performed unless the authorization values and attributes for the referenced entity are known by the TPM. For them to be known, the referenced entity must be in the TPM and accessible.

a) The TPM shall successfully unmarshal the number of handles required by the command and validate that the value of the handle is consistent with the command syntax. If not, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

NOTE 2  The TPM is permitted to unmarshal a handle and validate that it references an entity on the TPM before unmarshaling a subsequent handle.

NOTE 3  If the submitted command contains fewer handles than required by the syntax of the command, the TPM is permitted to continue to read into the next area and attempt to interpret the data as a handle.

b) For all handles in the handle area of the command, the TPM will validate that the referenced entity is present in the TPM.

1) If the handle references a transient object, the handle shall reference a loaded object (TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0 + N where N is the number of the handle in the command).

NOTE 4  If the hierarchy for a transient object is disabled, then the transient objects will be flushed so this check will fail.

2) If the handle references a persistent object, then

   i) the hierarchy associated with the object (platform or storage, based on the handle value) is enabled (TPM_RC_HANDLE);
ii) the handle shall reference a persistent object that is currently in TPM non-volatile memory (TPM_RC_HANDLE);

iii) if the handle references a persistent object that is associated with the endorsement hierarchy, that the endorsement hierarchy is not disabled (TPM_RC_HANDLE); and

NOTE 5 The reference implementation keeps an internal attribute, passed down from a primary key to its descendents, indicating the object’s hierarchy.

iv) if the TPM implementation moves a persistent object to RAM for command processing then sufficient RAM space is available (TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY).

3) If the handle references an NV Index, then

i) an Index exists that corresponds to the handle (TPM_RC_HANDLE); and

ii) the hierarchy associated with the existing NV Index is not disabled (TPM_RC_HANDLE).

iii) If the command requires write access to the index data then TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED is not SET (TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED)

iv) If the command requires read access to the index data then TPMA_NV_READLOCKED is not SET (TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED)

4) If the handle references a session, then the session context shall be present in TPM memory (TPM_RC_REFERENCE_HO + N).

5) If the handle references a primary seed for a hierarchy (TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, TPM_RH_OWNER, or TPM_RH_PLATFORM) then the enable for the hierarchy is SET (TPM_RC_HIERARCHY).

6) If the handle references a PCR, then the value is within the range of PCR supported by the TPM (TPM_RC_VALUE)

NOTE 6 In the reference implementation, this TPM_RC_VALUE is returned by the unmarshaling code for a TPMI_DH_PCR.

5.5 Session Area Validation

a) If the tag is TPM_ST_SESSIONS and the command requires TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS, the TPM will return TPM_RC_AUTH_CONTEXT.

b) If the tag is TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS and the command requires TPM_ST_SESSIONS, the TPM will return TPM_RC_AUTH_MISSING.

c) If the tag is TPM_ST_SESSIONS, the TPM will attempt to unmarshal an authorizationSize and return TPM_RC_AUTHSIZE if the value is not within an acceptable range.

1) The minimum value is (sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(UINT16) + sizeof(TPM_A_SESSION) + sizeof(UINT16)).

2) The maximum value of authorizationSize is equal to commandSize – (sizeof(TPM_ST) + sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_CC) + (N * sizeof(TPM_HANDLE)) + sizeof(UINT32)) where N is the number of handles associated with the commandCode and may be zero.

NOTE 1 (sizeof(TPM_ST) + sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_CC)) is the size of a command header. The last UINT32 contains the authorizationSize octets, which are not counted as being in the authorization session area.

The TPM will unmarshal the authorization sessions and perform the following validations:

1) If the session handle is not a handle for an HMAC session, a handle for a policy session, or, TPM_RS_PW then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE.
2) If the session is not loaded, the TPM will return the warning TPM_RC_REFERENCE_S0 + N where N is the number of the session. The first session is session zero, N = 0.

NOTE 2 If the HMAC and policy session contexts use the same memory, the type of the context is required to match the type of the handle.

3) If the maximum allowed number of sessions have been unmarshaled and fewer octets than indicated in authorizationSize were unmarshaled (that is, authorizationSize is too large), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_AUTHSIZE.

4) The consistency of the authorization session attributes is checked.
   i) Only one session is allowed for:
      (a) session auditing (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES) – this session may be used for encrypt or decrypt but may not be a session that is also used for authorization (including a policy session);
      (b) decrypting a command parameter (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES) – this may be any of the authorization sessions, or the audit session, or a session may be added for the single purpose of decrypting a command parameter, as long as the total number of sessions does not exceed three; and
      (c) encrypting a response parameter (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES) – this may be any of the authorization sessions, or the audit session if present, or a session may be added for the single purpose of encrypting a response parameter, as long as the total number of sessions does not exceed three.

NOTE 3 A session used for decrypting a command parameter can also be used for encrypting a response parameter.

   ii) If a session is not being used for authorization, at least one of decrypt, encrypt, or audit must be SET. (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

5) An authorization session is present for each of the handles with the "@" decoration (TPM_RC_AUTH_MISSING).

5.6 Authorization Checks

After unmarshaling and validating the handles and the consistency of the authorization sessions, the authorizations shall be checked. Authorization checks only apply to handles if the handle in the command schematic has the "@" decoration. Authorization checks must be performed in this order.

a) The public and sensitive portions of the object shall be present on the TPM (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE).

b) If the associated handle is TPM_RH_PLATFORM, and the command requires confirmation with physical presence, then physical presence is asserted (TPM_RC_PP).

c) If the object or NV Index is subject to DA protection, and the authorization is with an HMAC or password, then the TPM is not in lockout (TPM_RC_LOCKOUT).

NOTE 1 An object is subject to DA protection if its noDA attribute is CLEAR. An NV Index is subject to DA protection if its TPMA_NV_NO_DA attribute is CLEAR.

NOTE 2 An HMAC or password is required in a policy session when the policy contains TPM2_PolicyAuthValue() or TPM2_PolicyPassword().

d) If the command requires a handle to have DUP role authorization, then the associated authorization session is a policy session (TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE).

e) If the command requires a handle to have ADMIN role authorization:
1) If the entity being authorized is an object and its `adminWithPolicy` attribute is SET, or a hierarchy, then the authorization session is a policy session (TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE).

   NOTE 3 If `adminWithPolicy` is CLEAR, then any type of authorization session is allowed.

2) If the entity being authorized is an NV Index, then the associated authorization session is a policy session.

   NOTE 4 The only commands that are currently defined that require use of ADMIN role authorization are commands that operate on objects and NV Indices.

f) If the command requires a handle to have ADMIN or DUP role authorization and the entity is being authorized with a policy session, that TPM2_PolicyCommandCode is part of the policy. (TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL).

g) If the command requires a handle to have USER role authorization:

   1) If the entity being authorized is an object and its `userWithAuth` attribute is CLEAR, then the associated authorization session is a policy session (TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL).

      NOTE 5 There is no check for a hierarchy, because a hierarchy operates as if `userWithAuth` is SET.

   2) If the entity being authorized is an NV Index:

      i) if the authorization session is a policy session;

         (a) the TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE attribute of the NV Index is SET if the command modifies the NV Index data (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE);

         (b) the TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD attribute of the NV Index is SET if the command reads the NV Index data (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE);

      ii) if the authorization is an HMAC session or a password;

         (a) the TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE attribute of the NV Index is SET if the command modifies the NV Index data (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE);

         (b) the TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD attribute of the NV Index is SET if the command reads the NV Index data or is TPM2_PolicySecret (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE).

h) If the authorization is provided by a policy session, then:

   1) if `policySession→timeOut` has been set, the session shall not have expired (TPM_RC_EXPIRED);

   2) if `policySession→cpHash` has been set, it shall match the `cpHash` of the command (TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL);

   3) if `policySession→commandCode` has been set, then `commandCode` of the command shall match (TPM_RC_POLICY_CC);

   4) `policySession→policyDigest` shall match the `authPolicy` associated with the handle (TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL);

   5) if `policySession→pcrUpdateCounter` has been set, then it shall match the value of `pcrUpdateCounter` (TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED);

   6) if `policySession→commandLocality` has been set, it shall match the locality of the command (TPM_RC_LOCALITY);

   7) if `policySession→cpHash` contains a template, and the command is TPM2_Create(), TPM2_CreatePrimary(), or TPM2_CreateLoaded(), then the `inPublic` parameter matches the contents of `policySession→cpHash`; and
8) if the policy requires that an authValue be provided in order to satisfy the policy, then `session.hmac` is not an Empty Buffer.

i) If the authorization uses an HMAC, then the HMAC is properly constructed using the `authValue` associated with the handle and/or the session secret (TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL or TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH).

   NOTE 6 A policy session can require proof of knowledge of the authValue of the object being authorized.

j) If the authorization uses a password, then the password matches the `authValue` associated with the handle (TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL or TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH).

   If the TPM returns an error other than TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL then the TPM shall not alter any TPM state. If the TPM returns TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL, then the TPM shall not alter any TPM state other than `failedTries`.

   NOTE 7 The TPM is permitted to decrease `failedTries` regardless of any other processing performed by the TPM. That is, the TPM can exit Lockout mode, regardless of the return code.

5.7 Parameter Decryption

If an authorization session has the TPMA_SESSION.decrypt attribute SET, and the command does not allow a command parameter to be encrypted, then the TPM will return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. Otherwise, the TPM will decrypt the parameter using the values associated with the session before parsing parameters.

   NOTE The size of the parameter to be encrypted can be zero.

5.8 Parameter Unmarshaling

5.8.1 Introduction

The detailed actions for each command assume that the input parameters of the command have been unmarshaled into a command-specific structure with the structure defined by the command schematic. Additionally, a response-specific output structure is assumed which will receive the values produced by the detailed actions.

   NOTE An implementation is not required to process parameters in this manner or to separate the parameter parsing from the command actions. This method was chosen for the specification so that the normative behavior described by the detailed actions would be clear and unencumbered.

Unmarshaling is the process of processing the parameters in the input buffer and preparing the parameters for use by the command-specific action code. No data movement need take place but it is required that the TPM validate that the parameters meet the requirements of the expected data type as defined in TPM 2.0 Part 2.
5.8.2 Unmarshaling Errors

When an error is encountered while unmarshaling a command parameter, an error response code is returned and no command processing occurs. A table defining a data type may have response codes embedded in the table to indicate the error returned when the input value does not match the parameters of the table.

NOTE In the reference implementation, a parameter number is added to the response code so that the offending parameter can be isolated. This is optional.

In many cases, the table contains no specific response code value and the return code will be determined as defined in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC</td>
<td>a parameter that should be an asymmetric algorithm selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BAD_TAG</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a command tag selection has a value that is not supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a command code does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a hash algorithm selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT</td>
<td>the input buffer did not contain enough octets to allow unmarshaling of the expected data type;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a key derivation scheme (KDF) selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE</td>
<td>a parameter that is a key size has a value that is not supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MODE</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a symmetric encryption mode selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RESERVED</td>
<td>a non-zero value was found in a reserved field of an attribute structure (TPMA_)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>a parameter that should be signing or encryption scheme selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>the value of a size parameter is larger or smaller than allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a symmetric algorithm selection does not have a value that is supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TAG</td>
<td>a parameter that should be a structure tag has a value that is not supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>The type parameter of a TPMT_PUBLIC or TPMT_SENSITIVE has a value that is not supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>a parameter does not have one of its allowed values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some commands, a parameter may not be used because of various options of that command. However, the unmarshaling code is required to validate that all parameters have values that are allowed by the TPM 2.0 Part 2 definition of the parameter type even if that parameter is not used in the command actions.
5.9 Command Post Processing

When the code that implements the detailed actions of the command completes, it returns a response code. If that code is not TPM_RC_SUCCESS, the post processing code will not update any session or audit data and will return a 10-octet response packet.

If the command completes successfully, the tag of the command determines if any authorization sessions will be in the response. If so, the TPM will encrypt the first parameter of the response if indicated by the authorization attributes. The TPM will then generate a new nonce value for each session and, if appropriate, generate an HMAC.

If authorization HMAC computations are performed on the response, the HMAC keys used in the response will be the same as the HMAC keys used in processing the HMAC in the command.

NOTE 1 This primarily affects authorizations associated with a first write to an NV Index using a bound session. The computation of the HMAC in the response is performed as if the Name of the Index did not change as a consequence of the command actions. The session binding to the NV Index will not persist to any subsequent command.

NOTE 2 The authorization attributes were validated during the session area validation to ensure that only one session was used for parameter encryption of the response and that the command allowed encryption in the response.

NOTE 3 No session nonce value is used for a password authorization but the session data is present.

Additionally, if the command is being audited by Command Audit, the audit digest is updated with the cpHash of the command and rpHash of the response.
6 Response Values

6.1 Tag

When a command completes successfully, the tag parameter in the response shall have the same value as the tag parameter in the command (TPM_ST_SESSIONS or TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS). When a command fails (the responseCode is not TPM_RC_SUCCESS), then the tag parameter in the response shall be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS.

A special case exists when the command tag parameter is not an allowed value (TPM_ST_SESSIONS or TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS). For this case, it is assumed that the system software is attempting to send a command formatted for a TPM 1.2 but the TPM is not capable of executing TPM 1.2 commands. So that the TPM 1.2 compatible software will have a recognizable response, the TPM sets tag to TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND, responseSize to 00 00 00 0A16 and responseCode to TPM_RC_BAD_TAG. This is the same response as the TPM 1.2 fatal error for TPM_BADTAG.

6.2 Response Codes

The normal response for any command is TPM_RC_SUCCESS. Any other value indicates that the command did not complete and the state of the TPM is unchanged. An exception to this general rule is that the logic associated with dictionary attack protection is allowed to be modified when an authorization failure occurs.

Commands have response codes that are specific to that command, and those response codes are enumerated in the detailed actions of each command. The codes associated with the unmarshaling of parameters are documented Table 3. Another set of response code values are not command specific and indicate a problem that is not specific to the command. That is, if the indicated problem is remedied, the same command could be resubmitted and may complete normally.

The response codes that are not command specific are listed and described in Table 4.

The reference code for the command actions may have code that generates specific response codes associated with a specific check but the listing of responses may not have that response code listed.
## Table 4 — Command-Independent Response Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CANCELED</td>
<td>This response code may be returned by a TPM that supports command cancel. When the TPM receives an indication that the current command should be cancelled, the TPM may complete the command or return this code. If this code is returned, then the TPM state is not changed and the same command may be retried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP</td>
<td>This response code can be returned for commands that manage session contexts. It indicates that the gap between the lowest numbered active session and the highest numbered session is at the limits of the session tracking logic. The remedy is to load the session context with the lowest number so that its tracking number can be updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCKOUT</td>
<td>This response indicates that authorizations for objects subject to DA protection are not allowed at this time because the TPM is in DA lockout mode. The remedy is to wait or to execute TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockoutReset().</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MEMORY</td>
<td>A TPM may use a common pool of memory for objects, sessions, and other purposes. When the TPM does not have enough memory available to perform the actions of the command, it may return TPM_RC_MEMORY. This indicates that the TPM resource manager may flush either sessions or objects in order to make memory available for the command execution. A TPM may choose to return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY or TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY if it needs contexts of a particular type to be flushed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_RATE</td>
<td>This response code indicates that the TPM is rate-limiting writes to the NV memory in order to prevent wearout. This response is possible for any command that explicitly writes to NV or commands that incidentally use NV such as a command that uses authorization session that may need to update the dictionary attack logic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE</td>
<td>This response code is similar to TPM_RC_NV_RATE but indicates that access to NV memory is currently not available and the command is not allowed to proceed until it is. This would occur in a system where the NV memory used by the TPM is not exclusive to the TPM and is a shared system resource.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_HANDLES</td>
<td>This response code indicates that the TPM has exhausted its handle space and no new objects can be loaded unless the TPM is rebooted. This does not occur in the reference implementation because of the way that object handles are allocated. However, other implementations are allowed to assign each object a unique handle each time the object is loaded. A TPM using this implementation would be able to load $2^{24}$ objects before the object space is exhausted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>This response code can be returned by any command that causes the TPM to need an object 'slot'. The most common case where this might be returned is when an object is loaded (TPM2_Load, TPM2_CreatePrimary(), or TPM2_ContextLoad()). However, the TPM implementation is allowed to use object slots for other reasons. In the reference implementation, the TPM copies a referenced persistent object into RAM for the duration of the command. If all the slots are previously occupied, the TPM may return this value. A TPM is allowed to use object slots for other purposes and return this value. The remedy when this response is returned is for the TPM resource manager to flush a transient object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_REFERENCE_Hx</td>
<td>This response code indicates that a handle in the handle area of the command is not associated with a loaded object. The value of 'x' is in the range 0 to 6 with a value of 0 indicating the 1st handle and 6 representing the 7th. Upper values are provided for future use. The TPM resource manager needs to find the correct object and load it. It may then adjust the handle and retry the command. <strong>NOTE</strong> Usually, this error indicates that the TPM resource manager has a corrupted database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Code</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_REFERENCE_Sx</td>
<td>This response code indicates that a handle in the session area of the command is not associated with a loaded session. The value of 'x' is in the range 0 to 6 with a value of 0 indicating the 1st session handle and 6 representing the 7th. Upper values are provided for future use. The TPM resource manager needs to find the correct session and load it. It may then retry the command. NOTE Usually, this error indicates that the TPM resource manager has a corrupted database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RETRY</td>
<td>the TPM was not able to start the command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLES</td>
<td>This response code indicates that the TPM does not have a handle to assign to a new session. This response is only returned by TPM2_StartAuthSession(). It is listed here because the command is not in error and the TPM resource manager can remedy the situation by flushing a session (TPM2_FlushContext()).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY</td>
<td>This response code can be returned by any command that causes the TPM to need a session 'slot'. The most common case where this might be returned is when a session is loaded (TPM2_StartAuthSession() or TPM2_ContextLoad()). However, the TPM implementation is allowed to use object slots for other purposes. The remedy when this response is returned is for the TPM resource manager to flush a transient object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SUCCESS</td>
<td>Normal completion for any command. If the responseCode is TPM_RC_SUCCESS, then the rest of the response has the format indicated in the response schematic. Otherwise, the response is a 10 octet value indicating an error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TESTING</td>
<td>This response code indicates that the TPM is performing tests and cannot respond to the request at this time. The command may be retried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_YIELDED</td>
<td>the TPM has suspended operation on the command; forward progress was made and the command may be retried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See TPM 2.0 Part 1, “Multi-tasking.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NOTE This cannot occur on the reference implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 Implementation Dependent

The actions code for each command makes assumptions about the behavior of various sub-systems. There are many possible implementations of the subsystems that would achieve equivalent results. The actions code is not written to anticipate all possible implementations of the sub-systems. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the implementer to ensure that the necessary changes are made to the actions code when the sub-system behavior changes.
8 Detailed Actions Assumptions

8.1 Introduction

The C code in the Detailed Actions for each command is written with a set of assumptions about the processing performed before the action code is called and the processing that will be done after the action code completes.

8.2 Pre-processing

Before calling the command actions code, the following actions have occurred.

- Verification that the handles in the handle area reference entities that are resident on the TPM.
  
  NOTE If a handle is in the parameter portion of the command, the associated entity does not have to be loaded, but the handle is required to be the correct type.

- If use of a handle requires authorization, the Password, HMAC, or Policy session associated with the handle has been verified.

- If a command parameter was encrypted using parameter encryption, it was decrypted before being unmarshaled.

- If the command uses handles or parameters, the calling stack contains a pointer to a data structure (in) that holds the unmarshaled values for the handles and command parameters. If the response has handles or parameters, the calling stack contains a pointer to a data structure (out) to hold the handles and response parameters generated by the command.

- All parameters of the in structure have been validated and meet the requirements of the parameter type as defined in TPM 2.0 Part 2.

- Space set aside for the out structure is sufficient to hold the largest out structure that could be produced by the command.

8.3 Post Processing

When the function implementing the command actions completes,

- response parameters that require parameter encryption will be encrypted after the command actions complete;

- audit and session contexts will be updated if the command response is TPM_RC_SUCCESS; and

- the command header and command response parameters will be marshaled to the response buffer.
9  Start-up

9.1  Introduction

Clause 9 contains the commands used to manage the startup and restart state of a TPM.

9.2  _TPM_Init

9.2.1  General Description

_TPM_Init initializes a TPM.

Initialization actions include testing code required to execute the next expected command. If the TPM is in FUM, the next expected command is TPM2_FieldUpgradeData(); otherwise, the next expected command is TPM2_Startup().

NOTE 1 If the TPM performs self-tests after receiving _TPM_Init() and the TPM enters Failure mode before receiving TPM2_Startup() or TPM2_FieldUpgradeData(), then the TPM is permitted to accept TPM2_GetTestResult() or TPM2_GetCapability().

The means of signaling _TPM_Init shall be defined in the platform-specific specifications that define the physical interface to the TPM. The platform shall send this indication whenever the platform starts its boot process and only when the platform starts its boot process.

There shall be no software method of generating this indication that does not also reset the platform and begin execution of the CRTM.

NOTE 2 In the reference implementation, this signal causes an internal flag (s_initialized) to be CLEAR. While this flag is CLEAR, the TPM will only accept the next expected command described above.
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "_TPM_Init_fp.h"

// This function is used to process a _TPM_Init indication.
LIB_EXPORT void _TPM_Init(
    void
)
{
    g_powerWasLost = g_powerWasLost | _plat__WasPowerLost();

#if SIMULATION && DEBUG
    // If power was lost and this was a simulation, put canary in RAM used by NV
    // so that uninitialized memory can be detected more easily
    if (g_powerWasLost)
    {
        memset(&gc, 0xbb, sizeof(gc));
        memset(&gr, 0xbb, sizeof(gr));
        memset(&gp, 0xbb, sizeof(gp));
        memset(&go, 0xbb, sizeof(go));
    }
#endif

#if SIMULATION
    // Clear the flag that forces failure on self-test
    g_forceFailureMode = FALSE;
#endif

    // Disable the tick processing
    _plat__ACT_EnableTicks(FALSE);

    // Set initialization state
    TPMInit();

    // Set g_DRTMHandle as unassigned
    g_DRTMHandle = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;

    // No H-CRTM, yet.
    g_DrtmPreStartup = FALSE;

    // Initialize the NvEnvironment.
    g_nvOk = NvPowerOn();

    // Initialize cryptographic functions
    g_inFailureMode = (CryptInit() == FALSE);
    if (!g_inFailureMode)
    {
        // Load the persistent data
        NvReadPersistent();

        // Load the orderly data (clock and DRBG state).
        // If this is not done here, things break
        NvRead(&go, NV_ORDERLY_DATA, sizeof(go));

        // Start clock. Need to do this after NV has been restored.
        TimePowerOn();
    }
    return;
}
```
9.3 TPM2_Startup

9.3.1 General Description

TPM2_Startup() is always preceded by _TPM_Init, which is the physical indication that TPM initialization is necessary because of a system-wide reset. TPM2_Startup() is only valid after _TPM_Init. Additional TPM2_Startup() commands are not allowed after it has completed successfully. If a TPM requires TPM2_Startup() and another command is received, or if the TPM receives TPM2_Startup() when it is not required, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_INITIALIZE.

NOTE 1 See 9.2.1 for other command options for a TPM supporting field upgrade mode.

NOTE 2 _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data, and _TPM_Hash_End are not commands, and a platform-specific specification may allow these indications between _TPM_Init and TPM2_Startup().

If in Failure mode, the TPM shall accept TPM2_GetTestResult() and TPM2_GetCapability() even if TPM2_Startup() is not completed successfully or processed at all.

A platform-specific specification may restrict the localities at which TPM2_Startup() may be received.

A Shutdown/Startup sequence determines the way in which the TPM will operate in response to TPM2_Startup(). The three sequences are:

1) TPM Reset – This is a Startup(CLEAR) preceded by either Shutdown(CLEAR) or no TPM2_Shutdown(). On TPM Reset, all variables go back to their default initialization state.

   NOTE 3 Only those values that are specified as having a default initialization state are changed by TPM Reset. Persistent values that have no default initialization state are not changed by this command. Values such as seeds have no default initialization state and only change due to specific commands.

2) TPM Restart – This is a Startup(CLEAR) preceded by Shutdown(STATE). This preserves much of the previous state of the TPM except that PCR and the controls associated with the Platform hierarchy are all returned to their default initialization state;

3) TPM Resume – This is a Startup(STATE) preceded by Shutdown(STATE). This preserves the previous state of the TPM including the static Root of Trust for Measurement (S-RTM) PCR and the platform controls other than the phEnable.

If a TPM receives Startup(STATE) and that was not preceded by Shutdown(STATE), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

If, during TPM Restart or TPM Resume, the TPM fails to restore the state saved at the last Shutdown(STATE), the TPM shall enter Failure Mode and return TPM_RC_FAILURE.

On any TPM2_Startup(),
- phEnable shall be SET;
- all transient contexts (objects, sessions, and sequences) shall be flushed from TPM memory;

NOTE 4 See Part 1 Time for a description of the TPMS_TIME_INFO.time behaviour.

- use of lockoutAuth shall be enabled if lockoutRecovery is zero.

Additional actions are performed based on the Shutdown/Startup sequence.
On TPM Reset:

- `platformAuth` and `platformPolicy` shall be set to the Empty Buffer,
- change `nullProof` and `nullSeed`,
- For each NV Index with TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE CLEAR or TPMA_NV_WRITTEN CLEAR, TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED shall be CLEAR,
- For each NV Index with TPMA_NV_ORDERLY SET, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN shall be CLEAR unless the type is TPM_NT_COUNTER,
- On a disorderly reset, advance the orderly counters,
- For each NV Index with TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR SET, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN shall be CLEAR,
- tracking data for saved session contexts shall be set to its initial value,
- the object context sequence number is reset to zero,
- a new context encryption key shall be generated,
- TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.restartCount shall be reset to zero,
- TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.resetCount shall be incremented,
- the PCR Update Counter shall be clear to zero,

NOTE 5 Because the PCR update counter is permitted to be incremented when a PCR is reset, the PCR resets performed as part of this command can result in the PCR update counter being non-zero at the end of this command.

- `phEnableNV`, `shEnable` and `ehEnable` shall be SET, and
- PCR in all banks are reset to their default initial conditions as determined by the relevant platform-specific specification and the H-CRTM state (for exceptions, see TPM 2.0 Part 1, H-CRTM before TPM2_Startup() and TPM2_Startup without H-CRTM),
- For each ACT the timeout is reset to zero, the signaled attribute is set to CLEAR, its authPolicy is set to the Empty Buffer, and its hashAlg is set to TPM_ALG_NULL.

NOTE 6 PCR can be initialized any time between _TPM_Init and the end of TPM2_Startup(). PCR that are preserved by TPM Resume will need to be restored during TPM2_Startup().

NOTE 7 See "Initializing PCR" in TPM 2.0 Part 1 for a description of the default initial conditions for a PCR.
On TPM Restart:

- TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.restartCount shall be incremented,
- phEnableNV, shEnable and ehEnable shall be SET,
- platformAuth and platformPolicy shall be set to the Empty Buffer,
- For each NV index with TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE CLEAR or TPMA_NV_WRITTEN CLEAR, TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED shall be CLEAR,
- For each NV index with TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR SET, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN shall be CLEAR, and
- PCR in all banks are reset to their default initial conditions.

If an H-CRTM Event Sequence is active, extend the PCR designated by the platform-specific specification.

For each ACT the timeout is reset to zero, the signaled attribute is set to CLEAR, its authPolicy is set to the Empty Buffer and its hashAlg is set to TPM_ALG_NULL.

On TPM Resume:

- the H-CRTM startup method is the same for this TPM2_Startup() as for the previous TPM2_Startup(); (TPM_RC_LOCALITY)
- TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.restartCount shall be incremented; and
- PCR that are specified in a platform-specific specification to be preserved on TPM Resume are restored to their saved state and other PCR are set to their initial value as determined by a platform-specific specification. For constraints, see TPM 2.0 Part 1, H-CRTM before TPM2_Startup() and TPM2_Startup without H-CRTM.

- The ACT timeout, the ACT signaled attribute and the ACT specific authPolicy values are preserved. Other TPM state may change as required to meet the needs of the implementation.

If the startupType is TPM_SU_STATE and the TPM requires TPM_SU_CLEAR, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

NOTE 8 The TPM will require TPM_SU_CLEAR when no shutdown was performed or after Shutdown(CLEAR).

NOTE 9 If startupType is neither TPM_SU_STATE nor TPM_SU_CLEAR, then the unmarshaling code returns TPM_RC_VALUE.
9.3.2  Command and Response

Table 5 — TPM2_Startup Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Startup (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_SU</td>
<td>startupType</td>
<td>TPM_SU_CLEAR or TPM_SU_STATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 — TPM2_Startup Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Startup_fp.h"

#if CC_Startup  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCALITY</td>
<td>a Startup(STATE) does not have the same H-CRTM state as the previous Startup() or the locality of the startup is not 0 or 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED</td>
<td>the saved state cannot be recovered and a Startup(CLEAR) is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>startup type is not compatible with previous shutdown sequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Startup(
    Startup_In *in    // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    STARTUP_TYPE startup;
    BYTE locality = _plat__LocalityGet();
    BOOL OK = TRUE;

    // The command needs NV update.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Get the flags for the current startup locality and the H-CRTM.
    // Rather than generalizing the locality setting, this code takes advantage
    // of the fact that the PC Client specification only allows Startup() from
    // locality 0 and 3. To generalize this probably would require a
    // redo of the NV space and since this is a feature that is hardly ever used
    // outside of the PC Client, this code just support the PC Client needs.

    // Input Validation
    // Input Validation
    // Check that the locality is a supported value
    if(locality != 0 && locality != 3)
        return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
    if there was a H-CRTM, then treat the locality as being 3
    regardless of what the Startup() was. This is done to preserve the
    // H-CRTM PCR so that they don't get overwritten with the normal
    // PCR startup initialization. This basically means that g_StartupLocality3
    // and g_DrtmPreStartup can't both be SET at the same time.
    if(g_DrtmPreStartup)
        locality = 0;
    g_StartupLocality3 = (locality == 3);

    #if USE_DA_USED
    // If there was no orderly shutdown, then there might have been a write to
    // failedTries that didn't get recorded but only if g_daUsed was SET in the
    // shutdown state
    g_daUsed = (gp.orderlyState == SU_DA_USED_VALUE);
    if(g_daUsed)
        gp.orderlyState = SU_NONE_VALUE;
    #endif

    g_prevOrderlyState = gp.orderlyState;

    // If there was a proper shutdown, then the startup modifiers are in the
    // orderlyState. Turn them off in the copy.
    if(IS_ORDERLY(g_prevOrderlyState))
```
```c
    g_prevOrderlyState &= ~(PRE_STARTUP_FLAG | STARTUP_LOCALITY_3);
    // If this is a Resume,
    if((in->startupType == TPM_SU_STATE)
    {
        // then there must have been a prior TPM2_ShutdownState(STATE)
        if(g_prevOrderlyState != TPM_SU_STATE)
            return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_Startup_startupType;
        // and the part of NV used for state save must have been recovered
        // correctly.
        // NOTE: if this fails, then the caller will need to do Startup(CLEAR). The
        // code for Startup(Clear) cannot fail if the NV can’t be read correctly
        // because that would prevent the TPM from ever getting unstuck.
        if(g_nvOk == FALSE)
            return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED;
        // For Resume, the H-CRTM has to be the same as the previous boot
        if(g_DrtmPreStartup != ((gp.orderlyState & PRE_STARTUP_FLAG) != 0))
            return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_Startup_startupType;
        if(g_StartupLocality3 != ((gp.orderlyState & STARTUP_LOCALITY_3) != 0))
            return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
    }
    // Clean up the gp state
    gp.orderlyState = g_prevOrderlyState;

    // Internal Date Update
    if((gp.orderlyState == TPM_SU_STATE) && (g_nvOk == TRUE))
    {
        // Always read the data that is only cleared on a Reset because this is not
        // a reset
        NvRead(&gr, NV_STATE_RESET_DATA, sizeof(gr));
        if((in->startupType == TPM_SU_STATE)
        {
            // If this is a startup STATE (a Resume) need to read the data
            // that is cleared on a startup CLEAR because this is not a Reset
            // or Restart.
            NvRead(&gc, NV_STATE_CLEAR_DATA, sizeof(gc));
            startup = SU_RESUME;
        }
        else
            startup = SU_RESTART;
    }
    else
        startup = SU_RESET;
    // Startup for cryptographic library. Don't do this until after the orderly
    // state has been read in from NV.
    OK = OK && CryptStartup(startup);

    // When the cryptographic library has been started, indicate that a TPM2_Startup
    // command has been received.
    OK = OK && TPMRegisterStartup();

    // Read the platform unique value that is used as VENDOR_PERMANENT
    // authorization value
    g_platformUniqueDetails.t.size
        = (UINT16)_plat__GetUnique(1, sizeof(g_platformUniqueDetails.t.buffer),
        g_platformUniqueDetails.t.buffer);

    // Start up subsystems
    // Start set the safe flag
    OK = OK && TimeStartup(startup);

    // Start dictionary attack subsystem
    OK = OK && DAStartup(startup);

    // Enable hierarchies
```
OK = OK && HierarchyStartup(startup);

// Restore/Initialize PCR
OK = OK && PCRStartup(startup, locality);

// Restore/Initialize command audit information
OK = OK && CommandAuditStartup(startup);

// Restore the ACT
OK = OK && ActStartup(startup);

//// The following code was moved from Time.c where it made no sense
if (OK)
{
    switch (startup)
    {
    case SU_RESUME:
        // Resume sequence
        gr.restartCount++; break;
    case SU_RESTART:
        // Hibernate sequence
        gr.clearCount++;
        gr.restartCount++; break;
    default:
        // Reset object context ID to 0
        gr.objectContextID = 0;
        // Reset clearCount to 0
        gr.clearCount = 0;
        // Reset sequence
        // Increase resetCount
        gp.resetCount++;

        // Write resetCount to NV
        NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(resetCount);

        gp.totalResetCount++;
        // We do not expect the total reset counter overflow during the life
        // time of TPM, if it ever happens, TPM will be put to failure mode
        // and there is no way to recover it.
        // The reason that there is no recovery is that we don’t increment
        // the NV totalResetCount when incrementing would make it 0. When the
        // TPM starts up again, the old value of totalResetCount will be read
        // and we will get right back to here with the increment failing.
        if (gp.totalResetCount == 0)
            FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);

        // Write total reset counter to NV
        NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(totalResetCount);

        // Reset restartCount
        gr.restartCount = 0;

        break;
    }
    // Initialize session table
    OK = OK && SessionStartup(startup);

    // Initialize object table
    OK = OK && ObjectStartup();

    // Initialize index/evict data. This function clears read/write locks
    // in NV index
OK = OK && NvEntityStartup(startup);

// Initialize the orderly shut down flag for this cycle to SU_NONE_VALUE.
gp.orderlyState = SU_NONE_VALUE;

OK = OK && NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(orderlyState);

// This can be reset after the first completion of a TPM2_Startup() after
// a power loss. It can probably be reset earlier but this is an OK place.
if (OK)
    g_powerWasLost = FALSE;

return (OK) ? TPM_RC_SUCCESS : TPM_RC_FAILURE;

#endif // CC_Startup
9.4 **TPM2_Shutdown**

9.4.1 **General Description**

This command is used to prepare the TPM for a power cycle. The *shutdownType* parameter indicates how the subsequent TPM2_Startup() will be processed.

For a *shutdownType* of any type, the volatile portion of Clock is saved to NV memory and the orderly shutdown indication is SET. NV Indexes with the TPMA_NV_ORDERLY attribute will be updated.

For a *shutdownType* of TPM_SU_STATE, the following additional items are saved:

- tracking information for saved session contexts;
- the session context counter;
- PCR that are designated as being preserved by TPM2_Shutdown(TPM_SU_STATE);
- the PCR Update Counter;
- flags associated with supporting the TPMA_NV_WRITESTCLEAR and TPMA_NV_READSTCLEAR attributes;
- the counter value and authPolicy for each ACT; and

**NOTE** If a counter has not been updated since the last TPM2_Startup(), then the saved value will be one half of the current counter value.

- the command audit digest and count.

The following items shall not be saved and will not be in TPM memory after the next TPM2_Startup:

- TPM-memory-resident session contexts;
- TPM-memory-resident transient objects; or
- TPM-memory-resident hash contexts created by TPM2_HashSequenceStart().

Some values may be either derived from other values or saved to NV memory.

This command saves TPM state but does not change the state other than the internal indication that the context has been saved. The TPM shall continue to accept commands. If a subsequent command changes TPM state saved by this command, then the effect of this command is nullified. The TPM MAY nullify this command for any subsequent command rather than check whether the command changed state saved by this command. If this command is nullified, and if no TPM2_Shutdown() occurs before the next TPM2_Startup(), then the next TPM2_Startup() shall be TPM2_Startup(CLEAR).
9.4.2 Command and Response

Table 7 — TPM2_Shutdown Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Shutdown (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_SU</td>
<td>shutdownType</td>
<td>TPM_SU_CLEAR or TPM_SU_STATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 — TPM2_Shutdown Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Shutdown_fp.h"

#if CC_Shutdown // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>if PCR bank has been re-configured, a Shutdown(CLEAR) is required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Shutdown(
    Shutdown_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Input Validation
    if (g_pcrReConfig && in->shutdownType == TPM_SU_STATE)
        return TPM_RC_TYPE + RC_Shutdown_shutdownType;

    // Internal Data Update
    gp.orderlyState = in->shutdownType;

    #if USE_DA_USED
        // CLEAR g_daUsed so that any future DA-protected access will cause the
        // shutdown to become non-orderly. It is not sufficient to invalidate the
        // shutdown state after a DA failure because an attacker can inhibit access
        // to NV and use the fact that an update of `failedTries` was attempted as an
        // indication of an authorization failure. By making sure that the orderly state
        // is CLEAR before any DA attempt, this prevents the possibility of this 'attack.'
        g_daUsed = FALSE;
    #endif

    // PCR private date state save
    PCRStateSave(in->shutdownType);

    // Save the ACT state
    ActShutdown(in->shutdownType);

    // Save RAM backed NV index data
    NvUpdateIndexOrderlyData();

    #if ACCUMULATE_SELF_HEAL_TIMER
        // Save the current time value
        go.time = g_time;
    #endif

    // Save all orderly data
    NvWrite(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, sizeof(ORDERLY_DATA), &go);

    if (in->shutdownType == TPM_SU_STATE)
    {
        // Save STATE_RESET and STATE_CLEAR data
        NvWrite(NV_STATE_CLEAR_DATA, sizeof(STATE_CLEAR_DATA), &gc);
        NvWrite(NV_STATE_RESET_DATA, sizeof(STATE_RESET_DATA), &gr);

        // Save the startup flags for resume
    }

    // PCR private date state save
    PCRStateSave(in->shutdownType);

    // Save the ACT state
    ActShutdown(in->shutdownType);

    // Save RAM backed NV index data
    NvUpdateIndexOrderlyData();

    #if USE_DA_USED
        // CLEAR g_daUsed so that any future DA-protected access will cause the
        // shutdown to become non-orderly. It is not sufficient to invalidate the
        // shutdown state after a DA failure because an attacker can inhibit access
        // to NV and use the fact that an update of `failedTries` was attempted as an
        // indication of an authorization failure. By making sure that the orderly state
        // is CLEAR before any DA attempt, this prevents the possibility of this 'attack.'
        g_daUsed = FALSE;
    #endif

    // PCR private date state save
    PCRStateSave(in->shutdownType);

    // Save the ACT state
    ActShutdown(in->shutdownType);

    // Save RAM backed NV index data
    NvUpdateIndexOrderlyData();

    #if ACCUMULATE_SELF_HEAL_TIMER
        // Save the current time value
        go.time = g_time;
    #endif

    // Save all orderly data
    NvWrite(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, sizeof(ORDERLY_DATA), &go);

    if (in->shutdownType == TPM_SU_STATE)
    {
        // Save STATE_RESET and STATE_CLEAR data
        NvWrite(NV_STATE_CLEAR_DATA, sizeof(STATE_CLEAR_DATA), &gc);
        NvWrite(NV_STATE_RESET_DATA, sizeof(STATE_RESET_DATA), &gr);

        // Save the startup flags for resume
    }
```

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Level 00 Revision 01.64  
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December 24, 2020
if (g_DrtmPreStartup)
    gp.orderlyState = TPM_SU_STATE | PRE_STARTUP_FLAG;
else if (g_StartupLocality3)
    gp.orderlyState = TPM_SU_STATE | STARTUP_LOCALITY_3;

// only two shutdown options.
else if (in->shutdownType != TPM_SU_CLEAR)
    return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_Shutdown_shutdownType;

NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(orderlyState);

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

#endif // CC_Shutdown
10 Testing

10.1 Introduction

Compliance to standards for hardware security modules may require that the TPM test its functions before the results that depend on those functions may be returned. The TPM may perform operations using testable functions before those functions have been tested as long as the TPM returns no value that depends on the correctness of the testable function.

**EXAMPLE**

TPM2_PCR_Extend() can be executed before the hash algorithms have been tested. However, until the hash algorithms have been tested, the contents of a PCR cannot be used in any command if that command may result in a value being returned to the TPM user. This means that TPM2_PCR_Read() or TPM2_PolicyPCR() could not complete until the hashes have been checked but other TPM2_PCR_Extend() commands may be executed even though the operation uses previous PCR values.

If a command is received that requires return of a value that depends on untested functions, the TPM shall test the required functions before completing the command.

Once the TPM has received TPM2_SelfTest() and before completion of all tests, the TPM is required to return TPM_RC_TESTING for any command that uses a function that requires a test.

If a self-test fails at any time, the TPM will enter Failure mode. While in Failure mode, the TPM will return TPM_RC_FAILURE for any command other than TPM2_GetTestResult() and TPM2_GetCapability(). The TPM will remain in Failure mode until the next _TPM_Init.
10.2 TPM2_SelfTest

10.2.1 General Description

This command causes the TPM to perform a test of its capabilities. If the fullTest is YES, the TPM will test all functions. If fullTest = NO, the TPM will only test those functions that have not previously been tested. If any tests are required, the TPM shall either

- return TPM_RC_TESTING and begin self-test of the required functions, or

  NOTE 1 If fullTest is NO, and all functions have been tested, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SUCCESS.

- perform the tests and return the test result when complete. On failure, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_FAILURE.

If the TPM uses option a), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TESTING for any command that requires use of a testable function, even if the functions required for completion of the command have already been tested.

NOTE 2 This command can cause the TPM to continue processing after it has returned the response. So that software can be notified of the completion of the testing, the interface can include controls that would allow the TPM to generate an interrupt when the “background” processing is complete. This would be in addition to the interrupt that may be available for signaling normal command completion. It is not necessary that there be two interrupts, but the interface should provide a way to indicate the nature of the interrupt (normal command or deferred command).

NOTE 3 The PC Client platform specific TPM, in response to fullTest YES, will not return TPM_RC_TESTING. It will block until all tests are complete.
### 10.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 9 — TPM2_SelfTest Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SelfTest (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>fullTest</td>
<td>YES if full test to be performed, NO if only test of untested functions required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 10 — TPM2_SelfTest Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.2.3 Detailed Actions

1 #include "Tpm.h"
2 #include "SelfTest_fp.h"
3
4 #if CC_SelfTest // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CANCELED</td>
<td>the command was canceled (some incremental process may have been made)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TESTING</td>
<td>self test in process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 TPM_RC
6 TPM2_SelfTest(
7       SelfTest_In  *in  // IN: input parameter list
8     )
9     // Command Output
10    // Call self test function in crypt module
11    return CryptSelfTest(in->fullTest);
12 }
13 #endif // CC_SelfTest
10.3 TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest

10.3.1 General Description

This command causes the TPM to perform a test of the selected algorithms.

NOTE 1 The toTest list indicates the algorithms that software would like the TPM to test in anticipation of future use. This allows tests to be done so that a future commands will not be delayed due to testing.

The implementation may treat algorithms on the toTest list as either 'test each completely' or 'test this combination.'

EXAMPLE If the toTest list includes AES and CTR mode, it can be interpreted as a request to test only AES in CTR mode. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as a request to test AES in all modes and CTR mode for all symmetric algorithms.

If toTest contains an algorithm that has already been tested, it will not be tested again.

NOTE 2 The only way to force retesting of an algorithm is with TPM2_SelfTest(fullTest = YES).

The TPM will return in ToDoList a list of algorithms that are yet to be tested. This list is not the list of algorithms that are scheduled to be tested but the algorithms/functions that have not been tested. Only the algorithms on the toTest list are scheduled to be tested by this command.

NOTE 3 An algorithm remains on the ToDoList while any part of it remains untested.

EXAMPLE A symmetric algorithm remains untested until it is tested with all its modes.

Making toTest an empty list allows the determination of the algorithms that remain untested without triggering any testing.

If toTest is not an empty list, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SUCCESS for this command and then return TPM_RC_TESTING for any subsequent command (including TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest()) until the requested testing is complete.

NOTE 4 If ToDoList is empty, then no additional tests are required and TPM_RC_TESTING will not be returned in subsequent commands and no additional delay will occur in a command due to testing.

NOTE 5 If none of the algorithms listed in toTest is in the ToDoList, then no tests will be performed.

NOTE 6 The TPM cannot return TPM_RC_TESTING for the first call to this command even when testing is not complete because response parameters can only returned with the TPM_RC_SUCCESS return code.

If all the parameters in this command are valid, the TPM returns TPM_RC_SUCCESS and the ToDoList (which may be empty).

NOTE 7 An implementation is permitted to perform all requested tests before returning TPM_RC_SUCCESS, or it is permitted to return TPM_RC_SUCCESS for this command and then return TPM_RC_TESTING for all subsequent commands (including TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest()) until the requested tests are complete.
10.3.2 Command and Response

Table 11 — TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_IncrementalSelfTest (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ALG</td>
<td>toTest</td>
<td>list of algorithms that should be tested</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 — TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ALG</td>
<td>toDoList</td>
<td>list of algorithms that need testing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "IncrementalSelfTest_fp.h"

#if CC_IncrementalSelfTest  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CANCELED</td>
<td>the command was canceled (some tests may have completed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>an algorithm in the toTest list is not implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest(
  IncrementalSelfTest_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
  IncrementalSelfTest_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
) {
  TPM_RC result;
  // Command Output
  // Call incremental self test function in crypt module. If this function
  // returns TPM_RC_VALUE, it means that an algorithm on the 'toTest' list is
  // not implemented.
  result = CryptIncrementalSelfTest(&in->toTest, &out->toDoList);
  if (result == TPM_RC_VALUE)
    return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_IncrementalSelfTest_toTest;
  return result;
}
#endif // CC_IncrementalSelfTest
```
10.4 TPM2_GetTestResult

10.4.1 General Description

This command returns manufacturer-specific information regarding the results of a self-test and an indication of the test status.

If TPM2_SelfTest() has not been executed and a testable function has not been tested, testResult will be TPM_RC_NEEDS_TEST. If TPM2_SelfTest() has been received and the tests are not complete, testResult will be TPM_RC_TESTING.

If testing of all functions is complete without functional failures, testResult will be TPM_RC_SUCCESS. If any test failed, testResult will be TPM_RC_FAILURE.

This command will operate when the TPM is in Failure mode so that software can determine the test status of the TPM and so that diagnostic information can be obtained for use in failure analysis. If the TPM is in Failure mode, then tag is required to be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_FAILURE.

NOTE: The reference implementation can return a 32-bit value s_failFunction. This simply gives a unique value to each of the possible places where a failure could occur. It is not intended to provide a pointer to the function. __func__ is a pointer to a character string but the failure mode code can only return 32-bit values. It is expected that the manufacturer can disambiguate this value if a customer’s TPM goes into failure mode.
10.4.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetTestResult</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>outData</td>
<td>test result data contains manufacturer-specific information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>testResult</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "GetTestResult_fp.h"

#if CC_GetTestResult  // Conditional expansion of this file

In the reference implementation, this function is only reachable if the TPM is not in failure mode meaning that all tests that have been run have completed successfully. There is no test data and the test result is TPM_RC_SUCCESS.

TPM_RC
TPM2_GetTestResult(
    GetTestResult_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list
) {

    // Command Output

    out->testResult = CryptGetTestResult(&out->outData);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_GetTestResult
```
11 Session Commands

11.1 TPM2_StartAuthSession

11.1.1 General Description

This command is used to start an authorization session using alternative methods of establishing the session key (sessionKey). The session key is then used to derive values used for authorization and for encrypting parameters.

This command allows injection of a secret into the TPM using either asymmetric or symmetric encryption. The type of tpmKey determines how the value in encryptedSalt is encrypted. The decrypted secret value is used to compute the sessionKey.

NOTE 1 If tpmKey is TPM_RH_NULL, then encryptedSalt is required to be an Empty Buffer.

The label value of “SECRET” (see “Terms and Definitions” in TPM 2.0 Part 1) is used in the recovery of the secret value.

The TPM generates the sessionKey from the recovered secret value.

No authorization is required for tpmKey or bind.

NOTE 2 The justification for using tpmKey without providing authorization is that the result of using the key is not available to the caller, except indirectly through the sessionKey. This does not represent a point of attack on the value of the key. If the caller attempts to use the session without knowing the sessionKey value, it is an authorization failure that will trigger the dictionary attack logic.

The entity referenced with the bind parameter contributes an authorization value to the sessionKey generation process.

If both tpmKey and bind are TPM_RH_NULL, then sessionKey is set to the Empty Buffer. If tpmKey is not TPM_RH_NULL, then encryptedSalt is used in the computation of sessionKey. If bind is not TPM_RH_NULL, the authValue of bind is used in the sessionKey computation and policySession→bindEntity (policySession→cphash) is set.

If symmetric specifies a block cipher, then TPM_ALG_CFB is the only allowed value for the mode field in the symmetric parameter (TPM_RC_MODE).

This command starts an authorization session and returns the session handle along with an initial nonceTPM in the response.

If the TPM does not have a free slot for an authorization session, it shall return TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLES.

If the TPM implements a “gap” scheme for assigning contextID values, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP if creating the session would prevent recycling of old saved contexts (See “Context Management” in TPM 2.0 Part 1).

If tpmKey is not TPM_ALG_NULL then encryptedSalt shall be a TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET of the proper type for tpmKey. The TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE if the sensitive portion of tpmKey is not loaded. The TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE if:

a) tpmKey references an RSA key and

1) the size of encryptedSalt is not the same as the size of the public modulus of tpmKey,
2) encryptedSalt has a value that is greater than the public modulus of tpmKey,
3) encryptedSalt is not a properly encoded OAEP value, or
4) the decrypted salt value is larger than the size of the digest produced by the nameAlg of tpmKey; or

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NOTE 3  The asymScheme of the key object is ignored in this case and TPM_ALG_OAEP is used, even if asymScheme is set to TPM_ALG_NULL.

b) *tpmKey* references an ECC key and *encryptedSalt*

1) does not contain a TPMS_ECC_POINT or

2) is not a point on the curve of *tpmKey*;

NOTE 4  When ECC is used, the point multiply process produces a value (Z) that is used in a KDF to produce the final secret value. The size of the secret value is an input parameter to the KDF and the result will be set to be the size of the digest produced by the nameAlg of *tpmKey*.

The TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY if *tpmkey* does not reference an asymmetric key. The TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE if the scheme of the key is not TPM_ALG_OAEP or TPM_ALG_NULL. The TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if *tpmKey* does not have the *decrypt* attribute SET.

NOTE  While TPM_RC_VALUE is preferred, TPM_RC_SCHEME is acceptable.

If *bind* references a transient object, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE if the sensitive portion of the object is not loaded.

For all session types, this command will cause initialization of the *sessionKey* and may establish binding between the session and an object (the *bind* object). If *sessionType* is TPM_SE_POLICY or TPM_SE_TRIAL, the additional session initialization is:

- set *policySession*→*policyDigest* to a Zero Digest (the digest size for *policySession*→*policyDigest* is the size of the digest produced by *authHash*);
- authorization may be given at any locality;
- authorization may apply to any command code;
- authorization may apply to any command parameters or handles;
- the authorization has no time limit;
- an authValue is not needed when the authorization is used;
- the session is not bound;
- the session is not an audit session; and
- the time at which the policy session was created is recorded.

Additionally, if *sessionType* is TPM_SE_TRIAL, the session will not be usable for authorization but can be used to compute the *authPolicy* for an object.

NOTE 5  Although this command changes the session allocation information in the TPM, it does not invalidate a saved context. That is, TPM2_Shutdown() is not required after this command in order to re-establish the orderly state of the TPM. This is because the created context will occupy an available slot in the TPM and sessions in the TPM do not survive any TPM2_Startup(). However, if a created session is context saved, the orderly state does change.

The TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE if *nonceCaller* is less than 16 octets or is greater than the size of the digest produced by *authHash*. 
11.1.2 Command and Response

Table 15 — TPM2_StartAuthSession Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, decrypt, or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_StartAuthSession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>tpmKey</td>
<td>handle of a loaded decrypt key used to encrypt salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>may be TPM_RH_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_ENTITY+</td>
<td>bind</td>
<td>entity providing the authValue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>may be TPM_RH_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>nonceCaller</td>
<td>initial nonceCaller, sets nonceTPM size for the session shall be at least 16 octets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>encryptedSalt</td>
<td>value encrypted according to the type of tpmKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If tpmKey is TPM_RH_NULL, this shall be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_SE</td>
<td>sessionType</td>
<td>indicates the type of the session; simple HMAC or policy (including a trial policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SYM_DEF+</td>
<td>symmetric</td>
<td>the algorithm and key size for parameter encryption may select TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH</td>
<td>authHash</td>
<td>hash algorithm to use for the session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shall be a hash algorithm supported by the TPM and not TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 — TPM2_StartAuthSession Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION</td>
<td>sessionHandle</td>
<td>handle for the newly created session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>nonceTPM</td>
<td>the initial nonce from the TPM, used in the computation of the sessionKey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "StartAuthSession_fp.h"

#if CC_StartAuthSession // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>tpmKey does not reference a decrypt key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP</td>
<td>the difference between the most recently created active context and the oldest active context is at the limits of the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>input decrypt key handle only has public portion loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MODE</td>
<td>symmetric specifies a block cipher but the mode is not TPM_ALG_CFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLES</td>
<td>no session handle is available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY</td>
<td>no more slots for loading a session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>nonce less than 16 octets or greater than the size of the digest produced by authHash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>secret size does not match decrypt key type: or the recovered secret is larger than the digest size of the nameAlg of tpmKey or, for an RSA decrypt key, if encryptedSecret is greater than the public modulus of tpmKey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_StartAuthSession(
    StartAuthSession_In    *in,       // IN: input parameter buffer
    StartAuthSession_Out   *out       // OUT: output parameter buffer
)
{
    TPM_RC                   result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    OBJECT                  *tpmKey;       // TPM key for decrypt salt
    TPM2B_DATA               salt;        // TFM key for decrypt salt

    // Input Validation
    // Check input nonce size. It should be at least 16 bytes but not larger
    // than the digest size of session hash.
    if((in->nonceCaller.t.size < 16
        || in->nonceCaller.t.size > CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->authHash))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_StartAuthSession_nonceCaller;
    // If an decrypt key is passed in, check its validation
    if(in->tpmKey != TPM_RH_NULL)
    {
        // Get pointer to loaded decrypt key
        tpmKey = HandleToObject(in->tpmKey);

        // key must be asymmetric with its sensitive area loaded. Since this
        // command does not require authorization, the presence of the sensitive
        // area was not already checked as it is with most other commands that
        // use the sensitive are so check it here.
        if(!CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(tpmKey->publicArea.type))
            return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_StartAuthSession_tpmKey;

        if(in->encryptedSalt.t.size == 0)
            return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_StartAuthSession_encryptedSalt;

        // Decrypting salt requires accessing the private portion of a key.
    }
}
```

---

**Part 3: Commands**

**Trusted Platform Module Library**

**Family “2.0”**

**TCG PUBLIC REVIEW**

**Level 00 Revision 01.64**

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**December 24, 2020**
Therefore, tmpKey can not be a key with only public portion loaded

if(tpmKey->attributes.publicOnly)
return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_StartAuthSession_tpmKey;

// HMAC session input handle check.
// tpmKey should be a decryption key
if((IS_ATTRIBUTE(tpmKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
   return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_StartAuthSession_tpmKey;

// Secret Decryption.  A TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_KEY or Unmarshal errors
// may be returned at this point
result = CryptSecretDecrypt(tpmKey, &in->nonceCaller, SECRET_KEY,
   &in->encryptedSalt, &salt);
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_StartAuthSession_encryptedSalt;
}{
   // secret size must be 0
   if(in->encryptedSalt.t.size != 0)
      return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_StartAuthSession_encryptedSalt;
   salt.t.size = 0;
} switch(HandleGetType(in->bind))
{ case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
   { OBJECT *object = HandleToObject(in->bind);
      // If the bind handle references a transient object, make sure that we
      // can get to the authorization value. Also, make sure that the object
      // has a proper Name (nameAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL). If it doesn't, then
      // it might be possible to bind to an object where the authValue is
      // known. This does not create a real issue in that, if you know the
      // authorization value, you can actually bind to the object. However,
      // there is a potential
      if(object->attributes.publicOnly == SET)
         return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_StartAuthSession_bind;
   break;
   case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
   { NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->bind, NULL);
      if(IsNvPinPassIndex(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes)
         || IsNvPinFailIndex(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes))
         return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_StartAuthSession_bind;
   break;
   } default:
   break;
} if(in->symmetric.algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL
   && in->symmetric.algorithm != TPM_ALG_XOR
   && in->symmetric.mode.sym != TPM_ALG_CFB)
   return TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_StartAuthSession_symmetric;

// Create internal session structure.  TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP, TPM_RC_NO_HANDLES
// or TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY errors may be returned at this point.
// The detailed actions for creating the session context are not shown here
// as the details are implementation dependent
result = SessionCreate(in->sessionType, in->authHash, &in->nonceCaller,
   &in->symmetric, in->bind, &salt, &out->sessionHandle,
&out->nonceTPM);
return result;
}
#endif // CC_StartAuthSession
11.2 TPM2_PolicyRestart

11.2.1 General Description

This command allows a policy authorization session to be returned to its initial state. This command is used after the TPM returns TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED. That response code indicates that a policy will fail because the PCR have changed after TPM2_PolicyPCR() was executed. Restarting the session allows the authorizations to be replayed because the session restarts with the same nonceTPM. If the PCR are valid for the policy, the policy may then succeed.

This command does not reset the policy ID or the policy start time.
11.2.2 Command and Response

Table 17 — TPM2_PolicyRestart Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyRestart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>sessionHandle</td>
<td>the handle for the policy session</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 — TPM2_PolicyRestart Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyRestart_fp.h"
#if CC_PolicyRestart  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyRestart(
    PolicyRestart_In *in   // IN: input parameter list
) {
    // Initialize policy session data
    SessionResetPolicyData(SessionGet(in->sessionHandle));
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PolicyRestart
```
12 Object Commands

12.1 TPM2_Create

12.1.1 General Description

This command is used to create an object that can be loaded into a TPM using TPM2_Load(). If the command completes successfully, the TPM will create the new object and return the object's creation data (creationData), its public area (outPublic), and its encrypted sensitive area (outPrivate). Preservation of the returned data is the responsibility of the caller. The object will need to be loaded (TPM2_Load()) before it may be used. The only difference between the inPublic TPMT_PUBLIC template and the outPublic TPMT_PUBLIC object is in the unique field.

NOTE 1 This command may require temporary use of a transient resource, even though the object does not remain loaded after the command. See Part 1 Transient Resources.

TPM2B_PUBLIC template (inPublic) contains all of the fields necessary to define the properties of the new object. The setting for these fields is defined in "Public Area Template" in Part 1 of this specification and in "TPMA_OBJECT" in Part 2 of this specification. The size of the unique field shall not be checked for consistency with the other object parameters.

NOTE 2 For interoperability, it is recommended that the unique field not be set to a value that is larger than allowed by object parameters, so that the unmarshaling will not fail. A size of zero is recommended. After unmarshaling, the TPM does not use the input unique field. It is, however, used in TPM2_CreatePrimary() and TPM2_CreateLoaded.

EXAMPLE 1 It is recommended that a TPM_ALG_RSA object with a keyBits of 2048 in the object's parameters have a unique field that is no larger than 256 bytes.

EXAMPLE 2 It is recommended that a TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH or a TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER object have a unique field that is no larger than the digest produced by the object's nameAlg.

The parentHandle parameter shall reference a loaded decryption key that has both the public and sensitive area loaded.

When defining the object, the caller provides a template structure for the object in a TPM2B_PUBLIC structure (inPublic), an initial value for the object’s authValue (inSensitive.userAuth), and, if the object is a symmetric object, an optional initial data value (inSensitive.data). The TPM shall validate the consistency of the attributes of inPublic according to the Creation rules in "TPMA_OBJECT" in TPM 2.0 Part 2.

The inSensitive parameter may be encrypted using parameter encryption.

The methods in clause 12.1 are used by both TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary(). When a value is indicated as being TPM-generated, the value is filled in by bits from the RNG if the command is TPM2_Create() and with values from KDFa() if the command is TPM2_CreatePrimary(). The parameters of each creation value are specified in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

The sensitiveDataOrigin attribute of inPublic shall be SET if inSensitive.data is an Empty Buffer and CLEAR if inSensitive.data is not an Empty Buffer or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If the Object is a not a keyedHash object, and the sign and encrypt attributes are CLEAR, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

The TPM will create new data for the sensitive area and compute a TPMT_PUBLIC.unique from the sensitive area based on the object type:

a) For a symmetric key:

1) If inSensitive.sensitive.data is the Empty Buffer, a TPM-generated key value is placed in the new object’s TPMT_SENSITIVE.sensitive.sym. The size of the key will be determined by inPublic.publicArea.parameters.
2) If `inSensitive.sensitive.data` is not the Empty Buffer, the TPM will validate that the size of `inSensitive.data` is no larger than the key size indicated in the `inPublic` template (TPM_RC_SIZE) and copy the `inSensitive.data` to TPMT_SENSITIVE.sensitive.sym of the new object.

3) A TPM-generated obfuscation value is placed in TPMT_SENSITIVE.sensitive.seedValue. The size of the obfuscation value is the size of the digest produced by the `nameAlg` in `inPublic`. This value prevents the public unique value from leaking information about the sensitive area.

4) The TPMT_PUBLIC.unique.sym value for the new object is then generated, as shown in equation (1) below, by hashing the key and obfuscation values in the TPMT_SENSITIVE with the `nameAlg` of the object.

\[ unique := H_{nameAlg}(\text{seedValue.buffer} \| \text{sensitive.any.buffer}) \] (1)

b) If the Object is an asymmetric key:

1) If `inSensitive.sensitive.data` is not the Empty Buffer, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

2) A TPM-generated private key value is created with the size determined by the parameters of `inPublic` parameters.

3) If the key is a Storage Key, a TPM-generated TPMT_SENSITIVE.seedValue value is created; otherwise, TPMT_SENSITIVE.seedValue.size is set to zero.

NOTE 3 An Object that is not a storage key has no child Objects to encrypt, so it does not need a symmetric key.

4) The public unique value is computed from the private key according to the methods of the key type.

5) If the key is an ECC key and the scheme required by the `curveID` is not the same as `scheme` in the public area of the template, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SCHEME.

6) If the key is an ECC key and the KDF required by the `curveID` is not the same as `kdf` in the public area of the template, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KDF.

NOTE 4 There is currently no command in which the caller may specify the KDF to be used with an ECC decryption key. Since there is no use for this capability, the reference implementation requires that the `kdf` in the template be set to TPM_ALG_NULL or TPM_RC_KDF is returned.

c) If the Object is a keyedHash object:

1) If `inSensitive.sensitive.data` is an Empty Buffer, and both `sign` and `decrypt` are CLEAR in the attributes of `inPublic`, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. This would be a data object with no data.

NOTE 5 Revisions 134 and earlier reference code did not check the error case of sensitiveDataOrigin SET and an Empty Buffer. Thus, some TPM implementations did not include this error check.

2) If `sign` and `decrypt` are both CLEAR, or if `sign` and `decrypt` are both SET and the `scheme` in the public area of the template is not TPM_ALG_NULL, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SCHEME.

NOTE 6 Revisions 138 and earlier did not enforce this error case.

3) If `inSensitive.sensitive.data` is not an Empty Buffer, the TPM will copy the `inSensitive.sensitive.data` to TPMT_SENSITIVE.sensitive.bits of the new object.

NOTE 7 The size of inSensitive.sensitive.data is limited to be no larger than MAX_SYM_DATA.

4) If `inSensitive.sensitive.data` is an Empty Buffer, a TPM-generated key value that is the size of the digest produced by the `nameAlg` in `inPublic` is placed in TPMT_SENSITIVE.sensitive.bits.
5) A TPM-generated obfuscation value that is the size of the digest produced by the `nameAlg` of `inPublic` is placed in TPMT_SENSITIVE.seedValue.

6) The TPMT_PUBLIC.unique.keyedHash value for the new object is then generated, as shown in equation (1) above, by hashing the key and obfuscation values in the TPMT_SENSITIVE with the `nameAlg` of the object.

For TPM2_Load(), the TPM will apply normal symmetric protections to the created TPMT_SENSITIVE to create `outPublic`.

**NOTE** 8 The encryption key is derived from the symmetric seed in the sensitive area of the parent.

In addition to `outPublic` and `outPrivate`, the TPM will build a TPMS_CREATION_DATA structure for the object. TPMS_CREATION_DATA.outsideInfo is set to `outsideInfo`. This structure is returned in `creationData`. Additionally, the digest of this structure is returned in `creationHash`, and, finally, a TPMT_TK_CREATION is created so that the association between the creation data and the object may be validated by TPM2_CertifyCreation().

If the object being created is a Storage Key and `fixedParent` is SET in the attributes of `inPublic`, then the symmetric algorithms and parameters of `inPublic` are required to match those of the parent. The algorithms that must match are `inPublic.nameAlg`, and the values in `inPublic.parameters` that select the symmetric scheme. If `inPublic.nameAlg` does not match, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HASH. If the symmetric scheme of the key does not match, the parent, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC. The TPM shall not use different response code to differentiate between mismatches of the components of `inPublic.parameters`. However, after this verification, when using the scheme to encrypt child objects, the TPM ignores the symmetric mode and uses TPM_ALG_CFB.

**NOTE** 9 The symmetric scheme is a TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT. In a symmetric block cipher, it is at `inPublic.parameters.symDetail.sym` and in an asymmetric object is at `inPublic.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric`.

**NOTE** 10 Prior to revision 01.34, the parent asymmetric algorithms were also checked for `fixedParent` storage keys.
# Part 3: Commands

## 12.1.2 Command and Response

### Table 19 — TPM2_Create Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Create</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@parentHandle</td>
<td>handle of parent for new object; Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE</td>
<td>inSensitive</td>
<td>the sensitive data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>inPublic</td>
<td>the public template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>outsideInfo</td>
<td>data that will be included in the creation data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to provide permanent, verifiable linkage between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>this object and some object owner data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>creationPCR</td>
<td>PCR that will be used in creation data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 20 — TPM2_Create Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>outPrivate</td>
<td>the private portion of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>outPublic</td>
<td>the public portion of the created object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_CREATION_DATA</td>
<td>creationData</td>
<td>contains a TPMS_CREATION_DATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>creationHash</td>
<td>digest of creationData using nameAlg of outPublic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_CREATION</td>
<td>creationTicket</td>
<td>ticket used by TPM2_CertifyCreation() to validate that the creation data was produced by the TPM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.1.3 Detailed Actions

1 #include "Tpm.h"
2 #include "Object_spt_fp.h"
3 #include "Create_fp.h"
4
5 #if CC_Create // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>sensitiveDataOrigin is CLEAR when sensitive.data is an Empty Buffer, or is SET when sensitive.data is not empty; fixedTPM, fixedParent, or encryptedDuplication attributes are inconsistent between themselves or with those of the parent object; inconsistent restricted, decrypt and sign attributes; attempt to inject sensitive data for an asymmetric key;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different name algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>invalid key size values in an asymmetric key public area or a provided symmetric key has a value that is not allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE</td>
<td>key size in public area for symmetric key differs from the size in the sensitive creation area; may also be returned if the TPM does not allow the key size to be used for a Storage Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>a free slot is not available as scratch memory for object creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RANGE</td>
<td>the exponent value of an RSA key is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, or restricted and key's scheme ID; or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>size of public authPolicy or sensitive authValue does not match digest size of the name algorithm sensitive data size for the keyed hash object is larger than is allowed for the scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>unknown object type; parentHandle does not reference a restricted decryption key in the storage hierarchy with both public and sensitive portion loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>exponent is not prime or could not find a prime using the provided parameters for an RSA key; unsupported name algorithm for an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>there is no free slot for the object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 TPM_RC
7 TPM2_Create(
8     Create_In    *in,       // IN: input parameter list
9     Create_Out  *out       // OUT: output parameter list
10 )
11 {
12     TPM_RC       result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
13     OBJECT       *parentObject;
14     OBJECT       *newObject;
15     TPM2_PUBLIC  *publicArea;
17 // Input Validation
18 parentObject = HandleToObject(in->parentHandle);
19 pAssert(parentObject != NULL);
20
21 // Does parent have the proper attributes?
22 if (!ObjectIsParent(parentObject))
23 return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Create_parentHandle;
24
25 // Get a slot for the creation
26 newObject = FindEmptyObjectSlot(NULL);
27 if (newObject == NULL)
28 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
29 // If the TPM2B_PUBLIC was passed as a structure, marshal it into is canonical
30 // form for processing
31
32 // to save typing.
33 publicArea = &newObject->publicArea;
34
35 // Copy the input structure to the allocated structure
36 *publicArea = in->inPublic.publicArea;
37
38 // Check attributes in input public area. CreateChecks() checks the things that
39 // are unique to creation and then validates the attributes and values that are
40 // common to create and load.
41 result = CreateChecks(parentObject, publicArea,
42 in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.t.size);
43 if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
44 return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_Create_inPublic);
45 // Clean up the authValue if necessary
46 if (!AdjustAuthSize(&in->inSensitive.sensitive.userAuth, publicArea->nameAlg))
47 return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Create_inSensitive;
48
49 // Command Output
50 // Create the object using the default TPM random-number generator
51 result = CryptCreateObject(newObject, &in->inSensitive.sensitive, NULL);
52 if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
53 return result;
54 // Fill in creation data
55 FillInCreationData(in->parentHandle, publicArea->nameAlg,
56 in->creationPCR, in->outsideInfo,
57 &out->creationData, &out->creationHash);
58
59 // Compute creation ticket
60 TicketComputeCreation(EntityGetHierarchy(in->parentHandle), &newObject->name,
61 &out->creationHash, &out->creationTicket);
62
63 // Prepare output private data from sensitive
64 SensitiveToPrivate(&newObject->sensitive, &newObject->name, parentObject,
65 publicArea->nameAlg,
66 &out->outPrivate);
67
68 // Finish by copying the remaining return values
69 out->outPublic.publicArea = newObject->publicArea;
70
71 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
72 }
73 #endif // CC_Create
12.2 TPM2_Load

12.2.1 General Description

This command is used to load objects into the TPM. This command is used when both a TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_PRIVATE are to be loaded. If only a TPM2B_PUBLIC is to be loaded, the TPM2_LoadExternal command is used.

NOTE 1 Loading an object is not the same as restoring a saved object context.

The object’s TPMA_OBJECT attributes will be checked according to the rules defined in “TPMA_OBJECT” in TPM 2.0 Part 2 of this specification. If the Object is not a keyedHash object, and the sign and encrypt attributes are CLEAR, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

Objects loaded using this command will have a Name. The Name is the concatenation of nameAlg and the digest of the public area using the nameAlg.

NOTE 2 nameAlg is a parameter in the public area of the inPublic structure.

If inPrivate.size is zero, the load will fail.

After inPrivate.buffer is decrypted using the symmetric key of the parent, the integrity value shall be checked before the sensitive area is used, or unmarshaled.

NOTE 3 Checking the integrity before the data is used prevents attacks on the sensitive area by fuzzing the data and looking at the differences in the response codes.

The command returns a handle for the loaded object and the Name that the TPM computed for inPublic.public (that is, the digest of the TPMT_PUBLIC structure in inPublic).

NOTE 4 The TPM-computed Name is provided as a convenience to the caller for those cases where the caller does not implement the hash algorithms specified in the nameAlg of the object.

NOTE 5 The returned handle is associated with the object until the object is flushed (TPM2_FlushContext) or until the next TPM2_Startup.

For all objects, the size of the key in the sensitive area shall be consistent with the key size indicated in the public area or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE.

Before use, a loaded object shall be checked to validate that the public and sensitive portions are properly linked, cryptographically. Use of an object includes use in any policy command. If the parts of the object are not properly linked, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_BINDING. If a weak symmetric key is in the sensitive portion, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY.

EXAMPLE 1 For a symmetric object, the unique value in the public area is the digest of the sensitive key and the obfuscation value.

EXAMPLE 2 For a two-prime RSA key, the remainder when dividing the public modulus by the private key is zero and it is to form a private exponent from the two prime factors of the public modulus.

EXAMPLE 3 For an ECC key, the public point shall be f(x) where x is the private key.
### 12.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 21 — TPM2_Load Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@parentHandle</td>
<td>TPM handle of parent key; shall not be a reserved handle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>inPrivate</td>
<td>the private portion of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>inPublic</td>
<td>the public portion of the object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 22 — TPM2_Load Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>handle of type TPM_HT_TRANSIENT for the loaded object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_HANDLE</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>Name of the loaded object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Load_fp.h"

#if CC_Load // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td><code>inPublic</code> attributes are not allowed with selected parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td><code>inPrivate</code> and <code>inPublic</code> are not cryptographically bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>Incorrect hash selection for signing key or the <code>nameAlg</code> for <code>inPublic</code> is not valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INTEGRITY</td>
<td>HMAC on <code>inPrivate</code> was not valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>KDF selection not allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>The size of the object's <code>unique</code> field is not consistent with the indicated size in the object's parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>No available object slot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>The signing scheme is not valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SENSITIVE</td>
<td>The <code>inPrivate</code> did not unmarshal correctly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>inPrivate</code> missing, or <code>authPolicy</code> size for <code>inPublic</code> or is not valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>Symmetric algorithm not provided when required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td><code>parentHandle</code> is not a storage key, or the object to load is a storage key but its parameters do not match the parameters of the parent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>Decryption failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC_Load(
    Load_In *in,        // IN: input parameter list
    Load_Out *out);     // OUT: output parameter list
```

```c
// Input Validation
// Don't get invested in loading if there is no place to put it.
newObject = FindEmptyObjectSlot(&out->objectHandle);
if (newObject == NULL)
    return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
```

```c
if (in->inPrivate.t.size == 0)
    return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_Load_inPrivate;
```

```c
parentObject = HandleToObject(in->parentHandle);
pAssert(parentObject != NULL);
// Is the object that is being used as the parent actually a parent.
if (!ObjectIsParent(parentObject))
    return TPM_RC_TYPE + RC_Load_parentHandle;
```
// Compute the name of object. If there isn't one, it is because the nameAlg is not valid.
PublicMarshalAndComputeName(&in->inPublic.publicArea, &out->name);
if(out->name.t.size == 0)
    return TPM_RCS_HASH + RC_Load_inPublic;

// Retrieve sensitive data.
result = PrivateToSensitive(&in->inPrivate.b, &out->name.b, parentObject,
    in->inPublic.publicArea.nameAlg,
    &sensitive);
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_Load_inPrivate);

// Internal Data Update
// Load and validate object
result = ObjectLoad(newObject, parentObject,
    &in->inPublic.publicArea, &sensitive,
    RC_Load_inPublic, RC_Load_inPrivate,
    &out->name);
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
    // Set the common OBJECT attributes for a loaded object.
    ObjectSetLoadedAttributes(newObject, in->parentHandle);
}
return result;

#endif // CC_Load
12.3 TPM2_LoadExternal

12.3.1 General Description

This command is used to load an object that is not a Protected Object into the TPM. The command allows loading of a public area or both a public and sensitive area.

NOTE 1  Typical use for loading a public area is to allow the TPM to validate an asymmetric signature. Typical use for loading both a public and sensitive area is to allow the TPM to be used as a crypto accelerator.

Load of a public external object area allows the object to be associated with a hierarchy so that the correct algorithms may be used when creating tickets. The hierarchy parameter provides this association. If the public and sensitive portions of the object are loaded, hierarchy is required to be TPM_RH_NULL.

NOTE 2  If both the public and private portions of an object are loaded, the object is not allowed to appear to be part of a hierarchy.

The object's TPMA_OBJECT attributes will be checked according to the rules defined in “TPMA_OBJECT” in TPM 2.0 Part 2. In particular, fixedTPM, fixedParent, and restricted shall be CLEAR if inPrivate is not the Empty Buffer.

NOTE 3  The duplication status of a public key needs to be able to be the same as the full key which may be resident on a different TPM. If both the public and private parts of the key are loaded, then it is not possible for the key to be either fixedTPM or fixedParent, since, its private area would not be available in the clear to load.

Objects loaded using this command will have a Name. The Name is the nameAlg of the object concatenated with the digest of the public area using the nameAlg. The Qualified Name for the object will be the same as its Name. The TPM will validate that the authPolicy is either the size of the digest produced by nameAlg or the Empty Buffer.

NOTE 4  If nameAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, then the Name is the Empty Buffer. When the authorization value for an object with no Name is computed, no Name value is included in the HMAC. To ensure that these unnamed entities are not substituted, it is recommended that they have an authValue that is statistically unique.

NOTE 5  The digest size for TPM_ALG_NULL is zero.

If the nameAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, the TPM shall not verify the cryptographic binding between the public and sensitive areas, but the TPM will validate that the size of the key in the sensitive area is consistent with the size indicated in the public area. If it is not, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE.

NOTE 6  For an ECC object, the TPM will verify that the public key is on the curve of the key before the public area is used.

If nameAlg is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the same consistency checks between inPublic and inPrivate are made as for TPM2_Load().

NOTE 7  Consistency checks are necessary because an object with a Name needs to have the public and sensitive portions cryptographically bound so that an attacker cannot mix public and sensitive areas.

The command returns a handle for the loaded object and the Name that the TPM computed for inPublic.public (that is, the TPMT_PUBLIC structure in inPublic).

NOTE 8  The TPM-computed Name is provided as a convenience to the caller for those cases where the caller does not implement the hash algorithm specified in the nameAlg of the object.
The \textit{hierarchy} parameter associates the external object with a hierarchy. External objects are flushed when their associated hierarchy is disabled. If \textit{hierarchy} is TPM\_RH\_NULL, the object is part of no hierarchy, and there is no implicit flush.

If \textit{hierarchy} is TPM\_RH\_NULL or \textit{nameAlg} is TPM\_ALG\_NULL, a ticket produced using the object shall be a NULL Ticket.

\textbf{EXAMPLE} If a key is loaded with hierarchy set to TPM\_RH\_NULL, then TPM\_2\_VerifySignature() will produce a NULL Ticket of the required type.

External objects are Temporary Objects. The saved external object contexts shall be invalidated at the next TPM Reset.

If a weak symmetric key is in the sensitive area, the TPM shall return TPM\_RC\_KEY.

For an RSA key, the private exponent is computed using the two prime factors of the public modulus. One of the primes is $P$, and the second prime ($Q$) is found by dividing the public modulus by $P$. A TPM may return an error (TPM\_RC\_BINDING) if the bit size of $P$ and $Q$ are not the same.
### 12.3.2 Command and Response

#### Table 23 — TPM2_LoadExternal Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, encrypt, or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_LoadExternal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_SENSITIVE</td>
<td>inPrivate</td>
<td>the sensitive portion of the object (optional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC+</td>
<td>inPublic</td>
<td>the public portion of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY+</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>hierarchy with which the object area is associated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 24 — TPM2_LoadExternal Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_HANDLE</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of type TPM_HT_TRANSIENT for the loaded object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>name of the loaded object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "LoadExternal_fp.h"

#define CC_LoadExternal  // Conditional expansion of this file

#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td><code>fixedParent</code>, <code>fixedTPM</code>, and <code>restricted</code> must be CLEAR if sensitive portion of an object is loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td><code>inPublic</code> and <code>inPrivate</code> structures are not cryptographically bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>Incorrect hash selection for signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td><code>hierarchy</code> is turned off, or only NULL hierarchy is allowed when loading public and private parts of an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>Incorrect KDF selection for decrypting <code>keyedHash</code> object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>Size of the object's <code>unique</code> field is not consistent with the indicated size in the object's parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>If there is no free slot for an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>For a public-only ECC key, the ECC point is not on the curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>The signing scheme is not valid for the key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>authPolicy</code> is not zero and is not the size of a digest produced by the object's <code>nameAlg</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>Symmetric algorithm not provided when required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td><code>inPublic</code> and <code>inPrivate</code> are not the same type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
void TPM2_LoadExternal(
    LoadExternal_In *in,     // IN: input parameter list
    LoadExternal_Out *out    // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC result;
    OBJECT *object;
    TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive = NULL;

    // Input Validation
    // Don't get invested in loading if there is no place to put it.
    object = FindEmptyObjectSlot(&out->objectHandle);
    if(object == NULL)
        return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;

    // If the hierarchy to be associated with this object is turned off, the object
    // cannot be loaded.
    if(!HierarchyIsEnabled(in->hierarchy))
        return TPM_RC_HIERARCHY + RC_LoadExternal_hierarchy;

    // For loading an object with both public and sensitive
    if(in->inPrivate.size != 0)
        { // An external object with a sensitive area can only be loaded in the
        // NULL hierarchy
```
if (in->hierarchy != TPM_RH_NULL)
    return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_LoadExternal_hierarchy;
// An external object with a sensitive area must have fixedTPM == CLEAR
// fixedParent == CLEAR so that it does not appear to be a key created by
// this TPM.
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(in->inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT,
               fixedTPM)
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(in->inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT,
               fixedParent)
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(in->inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT,
               restricted))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_LoadExternal_inPublic;

// Have sensitive point to something other than NULL so that object
// initialization will load the sensitive part too
sensitive = &in->inPrivate.sensitiveArea;
}
// Need the name to initialize the object structure
PublicMarshalAndComputeName(&in->inPublic.publicArea, &out->name);

// Load and validate key
result = ObjectLoad(object, NULL,
                    &in->inPublic.publicArea, sensitive,
                    RC_LoadExternal_inPublic, RC_LoadExternal_inPrivate,
                    &out->name);
if (result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
    object->attributes.external = SET;
    // Set the common OBJECT attributes for a loaded object.
    ObjectSetLoadedAttributes(object, in->hierarchy);
}
return result;
#endif // CC_LoadExternal
12.4 TPM2_ReadPublic

12.4.1 General Description

This command allows access to the public area of a loaded object. Use of the objectHandle does not require authorization.

NOTE  Since the caller is not likely to know the public area of the object associated with objectHandle, it would not be possible to include the Name associated with objectHandle in the cpHash computation.

If objectHandle references a sequence object, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SEQUENCE.
### 12.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 25 — TPM2_ReadPublic Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ReadPublic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>TPM handle of an object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 26 — TPM2_ReadPublic Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>outPublic</td>
<td>structure containing the public area of an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>name of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>qualifiedName</td>
<td>the Qualified Name of the object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 12.4.3 Detailed Actions

1. 
   ```
   #include "Tpm.h"
   #include "ReadPublic_fp.h"
   ```

2. `#if CC_ReadPublic` // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SEQUENCE</td>
<td>can not read the public area of a sequence object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. `TPM_RC

   TPM2_ReadPublic(
   ReadPublic_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
   ReadPublic_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
   )

   {`OBJECT

   *object = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);

   if(ObjectIsSequence(object))

   return TPM_RC_SEQUENCE;

   // Command Output

   out->outPublic.publicArea = object->publicArea;

   out->name = object->name;

   out->qualifiedName = object->qualifiedName;

   return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

   }` // CC_ReadPublic
12.5 TPM2_ActivateCredential

12.5.1 General Description

This command enables the association of a credential with an object in a way that ensures that the TPM has validated the parameters of the credentialed object.

If both the public and private portions of activateHandle and keyHandle are not loaded, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE.

If keyHandle is not a Storage Key, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE.

Authorization for activateHandle requires the ADMIN role.

The key associated with keyHandle is used to recover a seed from secret, which is the encrypted seed. The Name of the object associated with activateHandle and the recovered seed are used in a KDF to recover the symmetric key. The recovered seed (but not the Name) is used in a KDF to recover the HMAC key.

The HMAC is used to validate that the credentialBlob is associated with activateHandle and that the data in credentialBlob has not been modified. The linkage to the object associated with activateHandle is achieved by including the Name in the HMAC calculation.

If the integrity checks succeed, credentialBlob is decrypted and returned as certInfo.

NOTE The output certInfo parameter is an application defined value. It is typically a symmetric key or seed that is used to decrypt a certificate. See the TPM2_MakeCredential credential input parameter.
### 12.5.2 Command and Response

**Table 27 — TPM2_ActivateCredential Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ActivateCredential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TPMI_DH_OBJECT              | @activateHandle   | handle of the object associated with certificate in credentialBlob  
                             | Auth Index: 1                                    |
|                             |                   | Auth Role: ADMIN                                  |
| TPMI_DH_OBJECT              | @keyHandle        | loaded key used to decrypt the TPMS_SENSITIVE in credentialBlob  
                             | Auth Index: 2                                    |
|                             |                   | Auth Role: USER                                  |
| TPM2B_ID_OBJECT             | credentialBlob    | the credential                                   |
| TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET      | secret            | keyHandle algorithm-dependent encrypted seed that protects credentialBlob |

**Table 28 — TPM2_ActivateCredential Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>certInfo</td>
<td>the decrypted certificate information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the data should be no larger than the size of the digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of the nameAlg associated with keyHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ActivateCredential_fp.h"

#if CC_ActivateCredential // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference a decryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>secret is invalid (when keyHandle is an ECC key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT</td>
<td>secret is invalid (when keyHandle is an ECC key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INTEGRITY</td>
<td>credentialBlob fails integrity test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>secret is invalid (when keyHandle is an ECC key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>secret size is invalid or the credentialBlob does not unmarshal correctly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an asymmetric key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>secret is invalid (when keyHandle is an RSA key)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_ActivateCredential(
    ActivateCredential_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    ActivateCredential_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                   result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    OBJECT                  *object;     // decrypt key
    OBJECT                  *activateObject; // key associated with credential
    TPM2B_DATA               data;       // credential data

    // Input Validation

    // Get decrypt key pointer
    object = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

    // Get certificated object pointer
    activateObject = HandleToObject(in->activateHandle);

    // input decrypt key must be an asymmetric, restricted decryption key
    if(!CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(object->publicArea.type)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes,
            TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_ActivateCredential_keyHandle;

    // Command output

    // Decrypt input credential data via asymmetric decryption. A
    // TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_KEY or unmarshal errors may be returned at this
    // point
    result = CryptSecretDecrypt(object, NULL, IDENTITY_STRING, &in->secret, &data);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        if(result == TPM_RC_KEY)
            return TPM_RC_FAILURE;
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_ActivateCredential_secret);
    }
```
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44     } // Retrieve secret data. A TPM_RC_INTEGRITY error or unmarshal
45     // errors may be returned at this point
46     result = CredentialToSecret(&in->credentialBlob.b,
47     &activateObject->name.b,
48     &data.b,
49     object,
50     &out->certInfo);
51     if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
52         return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_ActivateCredential_credentialBlob);
53     return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
54 #endif // CC_ActivateCredential
55
56 #endif // CC_ActivateCredential
12.6  TPM2_MakeCredential

12.6.1  General Description

This command allows the TPM to perform the actions required of a Certificate Authority (CA) in creating a TPM2B_ID_OBJECT containing an activation credential.

NOTE        The input credential parameter is an application defined value. It is typically a symmetric key or seed that is used to encrypt a certificate. See the TPM2_ActivateCredential certInfo output parameter.

The TPM will produce a TPM2B_ID_OBJECT according to the methods in “Credential Protection” in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

The loaded public area referenced by handle is required to be the public area of a Storage key, otherwise, the credential cannot be properly sealed.

This command does not use any TPM secrets nor does it require authorization. It is a convenience function, using the TPM to perform cryptographic calculations that could be done externally.
## 12.6.2 Command and Response

### Table 29 — TPM2_MakeCredential Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, encrypt, or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_MakeCredential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>handle</td>
<td>loaded public area, used to encrypt the sensitive area containing the credential key. Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>credential</td>
<td>the credential information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>objectName</td>
<td>Name of the object to which the credential applies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 30 — TPM2_MakeCredential Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ID_OBJECT</td>
<td>credentialBlob</td>
<td>the credential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>secret</td>
<td>handle algorithm-dependent data that wraps the key that encrypts credentialBlob</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "MakeCredential_fp.h"

#if CC_MakeCredential // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>handle referenced an ECC key that has a unique field that is not a point on the curve of the key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>credential is larger than the digest size of Name algorithm of handle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>handle does not reference an asymmetric decryption key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM2_MakeCredential(
    MakeCredential_In   *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    MakeCredential_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC               result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    OBJECT              *object;
    TPM2B_DATA           data;

    // Input Validation
    object = HandleToObject(in-&gt;handle);
    if (CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(object-&gt;publicArea.type)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(object-&gt;publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(object-&gt;publicArea.objectAttributes,
                          TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_MakeCredential_handle;

    // The credential information may not be larger than the digest size used for
    // the Name of the key associated with handle.
    if (in-&gt;credential.t.size &gt; CryptHashGetDigestSize(object-&gt;publicArea.nameAlg))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_MakeCredential_credential;

    // Command Output
    out-&gt;secret.t.size = sizeof(out-&gt;secret.t.secret);
    result = CryptSecretEncrypt(object, IDENTITY_STRING, &amp;data, &amp;out-&gt;secret);
    if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Prepare output credential data from secret
    SecretToCredential(&amp;in-&gt;credential, &amp;in-&gt;ObjectName.b, &amp;data.b,
                       object, &amp;out-&gt;credentialBlob);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
```

# endif // CC_MakeCredential
12.7 TPM2_Unseal

12.7.1 General Description

This command returns the data in a loaded Sealed Data Object.

NOTE 1 A random, TPM-generated, Sealed Data Object can be created by the TPM with TPM2_Create() or TPM2_CreatePrimary() using the template for a Sealed Data Object.

NOTE 2 TPM 1.2 hard coded PCR authorization. TPM 2.0 PCR authorization requires a policy.

The returned value may be encrypted using authorization session encryption.

If either restricted, decrypt, or sign is SET in the attributes of itemHandle, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. If the type of itemHandle is not TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE.
### 12.7.2 Command and Response

#### Table 31 — TPM2_Unseal Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Unseal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@itemHandle</td>
<td>handle of a loaded data object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 32 — TPM2_Unseal Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA</td>
<td>outData</td>
<td>unsealed data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Size of <strong>outData</strong> is limited to be no more than 128 octets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Unseal_fp.h"
#if CC_Unseal // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>itemHandle has wrong attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>itemHandle is not a KEYEDHASH data object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Unseal(
    Unseal_In *in,
    Unseal_Out *out
)
{
    OBJECT *object;
    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to loaded object
    object = HandleToObject(in->itemHandle);
    // Input handle must be a data object
    if(object->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH)
        return TPM_RC_TYPE + RC_Unseal_itemHandle;
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt)
        || IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign)
        || IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Unseal_itemHandle;
    // Command Output
    // Copy data
    out->outData = object->sensitive.sensitive.bits;
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_Unseal
```
12.8  TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth

12.8.1  General Description

This command is used to change the authorization secret for a TPM-resident object.

If successful, a new private area for the TPM-resident object associated with objectHandle is returned, which includes the new authorization value.

This command does not change the authorization of the TPM-resident object on which it operates. Therefore, the old authValue (of the TPM-resident object) is used when generating the response HMAC key if required.

NOTE 1  The returned outPrivate will need to be loaded before the new authorization will apply.

NOTE 2  The TPM-resident object can be persistent and changing the authorization value of the persistent object could prevent other users from accessing the object. This is why this command does not change the TPM-resident object.

EXAMPLE  If a persistent key is being used as a Storage Root Key and the authorization of the key is a well-known value so that the key can be used generally, then changing the authorization value in the persistent key would deny access to other users.

This command may not be used to change the authorization value for an NV Index or a Primary Object.

NOTE 3  If an NV Index is to have a new authorization, it is done with TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth().

NOTE 4  If a Primary Object is to have a new authorization, it needs to be recreated (TPM2_CreatePrimary()).
### 12.8.2 Command and Response

**Table 33 — TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ObjectChangeAuth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of the object Auth Index: 1 Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>parentHandle</td>
<td>handle of the parent Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_AUTH</td>
<td>newAuth</td>
<td>new authorization value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 34 — TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>outPrivate</td>
<td>private area containing the new authorization value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ObjectChangeAuth_fp.h"

#if CC_ObjectChangeAuth  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>newAuth</code> is larger than the size of the digest of the Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>algorithm of <code>objectHandle</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>the key referenced by <code>parentHandle</code> is not the parent of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object referenced by <code>objectHandle</code>; or <code>objectHandle</code> is a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sequence object.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth(
ObjectChangeAuth_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
ObjectChangeAuth_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list)
{
    TPMT_SENSITIVE sensitive;

    OBJECT *object = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);
    TPM2B_NAME QNCompare;

    // Input Validation
    // Can not change authorization on sequence object
    if(ObjectIsSequence(object))
        return TPM_RC_TYPE + RC_ObjectChangeAuth_objectHandle;

    // Make sure that the authorization value is consistent with the nameAlg
    if(!AdjustAuthSize(&in->newAuth, object->publicArea.nameAlg))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_ObjectChangeAuth_newAuth;

    // Parent handle should be the parent of object handle. In this
    // implementation we verify this by checking the QN of object. Other
    // implementation may choose different method to verify this attribute.
    ComputeQualifiedName(in->parentHandle,
        object->publicArea.nameAlg,
        &object->name, &QNCompare);
    if(!MemoryEqual2B(&object->qualifiedName.b, &QNCompare.b))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_ObjectChangeAuth_parentHandle;

    // Command Output
    // Prepare the sensitive area with the new authorization value
    sensitive = object->sensitive;
    sensitive.authValue = in->newAuth;

    // Protect the sensitive area
   SensitiveToPrivate(&sensitive, &object->name, HandleToObject(in->parentHandle),
        object->publicArea.nameAlg,
        &out->outPrivate);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
```
12.9 TPM2_CreateLoaded

12.9.1 General Description

This command creates an object and loads it in the TPM. This command allows creation of any type of object (Primary, Ordinary, or Derived) depending on the type of parentHandle. If parentHandle references a Primary Seed, then a Primary Object is created; if parentHandle references a Storage Parent, then an Ordinary Object is created; and if parentHandle references a Derivation Parent, then a Derived Object is generated.

The input validation is the same as for TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary() with one exception: when parentHandle references a Derivation Parent, then sensitiveDataOrigin in inPublic is required to be CLEAR.

Note 1 In the general descriptions of TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary() the validations refer to a TPMT_PUBLIC structure that is in inPublic. For TPM2_CreateLoaded(), inPublic is a TPM2B_TEMPLATE that can contain a TPMT_PUBLIC that is used for object creation. For object derivation, the unique field can contain a label and context that are used in the derivation process. To allow both the TPMT_PUBLIC and the derivation variation, a TPM2B_TEMPLATE is used. When referring to the checks in TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary(), TPM2B_TEMPLATE should be assumed to contain a TPMT_PUBLIC.

If parentHandle references a Derivation Parent, then the TPM may return TPM_RC_TYPE if the key type to be generated is an RSA key.

If parentHandle references a Derivation Parent or a Primary Seed, then outPrivate will be an Empty Buffer.

NOTE 2 Returning outPrivate would imply that the returned primary or derived object can be loaded and it cannot. It can only be re-derived.

A primary key cannot be loaded is because loading a key is a way to attack the protections of a key (e.g. using DPA). A saved context for a primary object is protected. The TPM will go into failure mode if the integrity of a saved context is good but the fingerprint doesn't decrypt. It is not possible to have these protections on loaded objects because this would be a simple way for an attacker to put the TPM into failure mode. Saved contexts are assumed to be under control of the driver but loaded objects are not.

If all objects were derived from their parents, then load could not be used as an attack. However, that would preclude importation of objects and key hierarchies.

NOTE 3 Unlike TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary(), this command does not return creation data. If creation data is needed, then TPM2_Create() or TPM2_CreatePrimary() should be used.

NOTE 4 If parentHandle references a Derivation Parent, the bits of the Label and Context are used in the creation of the key. This differs from TPM2_CreatePrimary(), where the bits of the template are used. This means that different templates (specifically, different public attributes) will result in the same key.
### 12.9.2 Command and Response

**Table 35 — TPM2_CreateLoaded Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_CreateLoaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PARENT+</td>
<td>@parentHandle</td>
<td>Handle of a transient storage key, a persistent storage key, TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, TPM_RH_OWNER, TPML:**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM+(PP), or TPM_RH_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE</td>
<td>inSensitive</td>
<td>the sensitive data, see TPM 2.0 Part 1 Sensitive Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_TEMPLATE</td>
<td>inPublic</td>
<td>the public template</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 36 — TPM2_CreateLoaded Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_HANDLE</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of type TPM_HT_TRANSIENT for created object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>outPrivate</td>
<td>the sensitive area of the object (optional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>outPublic</td>
<td>the public portion of the created object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>the name of the created object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.9.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "CreateLoaded_fp.h"

#if CC_CreateLoaded // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>sensitiveDataOrigin is CLEAR when sensitive.data is an Empty Buffer; fixedTPM, fixedParent, or encryptedDuplication attributes are inconsistent between themselves or with those of the parent object; inconsistent restricted, decrypt and sign attributes; attempt to inject sensitive data for an asymmetric key; attempt to create a symmetric cipher key that is not a decryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>the value of a provided symmetric key is not allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>there is no free slot for the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID; or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>size of public authorization policy or sensitive authorization value does not match digest size of the name algorithm sensitive data size for the keyed hash object is larger than is allowed for the scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>cannot create the object of the indicated type (usually only occurs if trying to derive an RSA key).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```
newObject = FindEmptyObjectSlot(&out->objectHandle);
if(newObject == NULL)
    return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;

// Do this to save typing
publicArea = &newObject->publicArea;

// Unmarshal the template into the object space. TPM2_Create() and
// TPM2_CreatePrimary() have the publicArea unmarshaled by CommandDispatcher.
// This command is different because of an unfortunate property of the
// unique field of an ECC key. It is a structure rather than a single TPM2B. If
// if had been a TPM2B, then the label and context could be within a TPM2B and
// unmarshaled like other public areas. Since it is not, this command needs its
// on template that is a TPM2B that is unmarshaled as a BYTE array with a
// its own unmarshal function.
result = UnmarshalToPublic(publicArea, &in->inPublic, derivation,
    &labelContext);
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result + RC_CreateLoaded_inPublic;

// Validate that the authorization size is appropriate
if(!AdjustAuthSize(&in->inSensitive.sensitive.userAuth, publicArea->nameAlg))
    return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_CreateLoaded_inSensitive;

// Command output
if(derivation)
{
    TPMF_KEYEDHASH_SCHEMA    *scheme;
scheme = &parent->publicArea.parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme;

    // SP800-108 is the only KDF supported by this implementation and there is
    // no default hash algorithm.
pAssert(scheme->details.xor.hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL
        && scheme->details.xor.kdf == TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108);
    // Don't derive RSA keys
    if(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_RSA)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_CreateLoaded_inPublic;
    // sensitiveDataOrigin has to be CLEAR in a derived object. Since this
    // is specific to a derived object, it is checked here.
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT,
        sensitiveDataOrigin))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES;

    // Check the rest of the attributes
    result = PublicAttributesValidation(parent, publicArea);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_CreateLoaded_inPublic);
    // Process the template and sensitive areas to get the actual 'label' and
    // 'context' values to be used for this derivation.
    result = SetLabelAndContext(&labelContext, &in->inSensitive.sensitive.data);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Set up the KDF for object generation
    DRBG_InstantiateSeededKdf((KDF_STATE *)rand,
        scheme->details.xor.hashAlg,
        scheme->details.xor.kdf,
        &parent->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b,
        &labelContext.label.b,
        &labelContext.context.b,
        TPM_MAX_DERIVATION_BITS);
    // Clear the sensitive size so that the creation functions will not try
    // to use this value.
    in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.t.size = 0;
}
else
{
    // Check attributes in input public area. CreateChecks() checks the things
98     // that are unique to creation and then validates the attributes and values
99     // that are common to create and load.
100    result = CreateChecks(parent, publicArea,
101       in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.t.size);
102    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
103       return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_CreateLoaded_inPublic);
104    // Creating a primary object
105    if(parent == NULL)
106    {
107       TPM2B_NAME              name;
108       newObject->attributes.primary = SET;
109       if(in->parentHandle == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)
110          newObject->attributes.epsHierarchy = SET;
111       // If so, use the primary seed and the digest of the template
112       // to seed the DRBG
113       result = DRBG_InstantiateSeeded((DRBG_STATE *)rand,
114          &HierarchyGetPrimarySeed(in->parentHandle)->b,
115          PRIMARY_OBJECT_CREATION,
116          (TPM2B *)PublicMarshalAndComputeName(publicArea,
117          &name),
118          &in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.b);
119       if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
120          return result;
121     }
122    else
123    {
124       // This is an ordinary object so use the normal random number generator
125       rand = NULL;
126     }
127    // Internal data update
128    // Create the object
129    result = CryptCreateObject(newObject, &in->inSensitive.sensitive, rand);
130    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
131       return result;
132    // if this is not a Primary key and not a derived key, then return the sensitive
133    // area
134    if(parent != NULL && !derivation)
135       // Prepare output private data from sensitive
136       SensitiveToPrivate(&newObject->sensitive, &newObject->name,
137          parent, newObject->publicArea.nameAlg,
138          &out->outPrivate);
139    else
140       out->outPrivate.t.size = 0;
141    // Set the remaining return values
142    out->outPublic.publicArea = newObject->publicArea;
143    out->name = newObject->name;
144    // Set the remaining attributes for a loaded object
145    ObjectSetLoadedAttributes(newObject, in->parentHandle);
146    return result;
147  }
148  #endif // CC_CreateLoaded
13 Duplication Commands

13.1 TPM2_Duplicate

13.1.1 General Description

This command duplicates a loaded object so that it may be used in a different hierarchy. The new parent key for the duplicate may be on the same or different TPM or TPM_RH_NULL. Only the public area of newParentHandle is required to be loaded.

NOTE 1 Since the new parent may only be extant on a different TPM, it is likely that the new parent’s sensitive area could not be loaded in the TPM from which objectHandle is being duplicated.

If encryptedDuplication is SET in the object being duplicated, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC if symmetricAlg.algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL or TPM_RC_HIERARCHY if newParentHandle is TPM_RH_NULL.

The authorization for this command shall be with a policy session.

If fixedParent of objectHandle→attributes is SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. If objectHandle→nameAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE.

The policySession→commandCode parameter in the policy session is required to be TPM_CC_Duplicate to indicate that authorization for duplication has been provided. This indicates that the policy that is being used is a policy that is for duplication, and not a policy that would approve another use. That is, authority to use an object does not grant authority to duplicate the object.

The policy is likely to include cpHash in order to restrict where duplication can occur. If TPM2_PolicyPpHash() has been executed as part of the policy, the policySession→cpHash is compared to the cpHash of the command.

If TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect() has been executed as part of the policy, the policySession→nameHash is compared to

\[ H_{policyAlg}(objectHandle→Name || newParentHandle→Name) \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

If the compared hashes are not the same, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL.

NOTE 2 It is allowed that policySession→nameHash and policySession→cpHash share the same memory space.

NOTE 3 A duplication policy is not required to have either TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect() or TPM2_PolicyPpHash() as part of the policy. If neither is present, then the duplication policy may be satisfied with a policy that only contains TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(code = TPM_CC_Duplicate).

The TPM shall follow the process of encryption defined in the “Duplication” subclause of “Protected Storage Hierarchy” in TPM 2.0 Part 1.
### 13.1.2 Command and Response

#### Table 37 — TPM2_Duplicate Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Duplicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@objectHandle</td>
<td>loaded object to duplicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: DUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>newParentHandle</td>
<td>shall reference the public area of an asymmetric key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>encryptionKeyIn</td>
<td>optional symmetric encryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The size for this key is set to zero when the TPM is to generate the key. This parameter may be encrypted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT+</td>
<td>symmetricAlg</td>
<td>definition for the symmetric algorithm to be used for the inner wrapper may be TPM_ALG_NULL if no inner wrapper is applied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 38 — TPM2_Duplicate Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>If the caller provided an encryption key or if symmetricAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL, then this will be the Empty Buffer; otherwise, it shall contain the TPM-generated, symmetric encryption key for the inner wrapper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>encryptionKeyOut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If the caller provided an encryption key or if symmetricAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL, then this will be the Empty Buffer; otherwise, it shall contain the TPM-generated, symmetric encryption key for the inner wrapper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>duplicate</td>
<td>private area that may be encrypted by encryptionKeyIn; and may be doubly encrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>outSymSeed</td>
<td>seed protected by the asymmetric algorithms of new parent (NP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Duplicate_fp.h"
#if CC_Duplicate // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key to duplicate has fixedParent SET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>for an RSA key, the nameAlg digest size for the newParent is not compatible with the key size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>encryptedDuplication is SET and newParentHandle specifies Null Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>newParentHandle references invalid ECC key (public point not on the curve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>input encryption key size does not match the size specified in symmetric algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>encryptedDuplication is SET but no symmetric algorithm is provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>newParentHandle is neither a storage key nor TPM_RH_NULL; or the object has a NULL nameAlg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>for an RSA newParent, the sizes of the digest and the encryption key are too large to be OAEP encoded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_Duplicate(
    Duplicate_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    Duplicate_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC                  result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    TPM_Sensitive           sensitive;
    UINT16                  innerKeySize = 0; // encrypt key size for inner wrap
    OBJECT                  *object;
    OBJECT                  *newParent;
    TPM2B_DATA              data;
    // Input Validation
    // Get duplicate object pointer
    object = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);
    // Get new parent
    newParent = HandleToObject(in->newParentHandle);
    // duplicate key must have fixParent bit CLEAR.
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedParent))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Duplicate_objectHandle;
    // Do not duplicate object with NULL nameAlg
    if(object->publicArea.nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Duplicate_objectHandle;
    // new parent key must be a storage object or TPM_RH_NULL
```
if (in->newParentHandle != TPM_RH_NULL
    && !ObjectIsStorage(in->newParentHandle))
    return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Duplicate_newParentHandle;

// If the duplicated object has encryptedDuplication SET, then there must be
// an inner wrapper and the new parent may not be TPM RH NULL
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT,
                 encryptedDuplication))
{
    if (in->symmetricAlg.algorithm == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_SYMMETRIC + RC_Duplicate_symmetricAlg;
    if (in->newParentHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_Duplicate_newParentHandle;
}
if (in->symmetricAlg.algorithm == TPM_ALG_NULL)
{
    // if algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL, input key size must be 0
    if (in->encryptionKeyIn.t.size != 0)
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Duplicate_encryptionKeyIn;
} else
{
    // Get inner wrap key size
    innerKeySize = in->symmetricAlg.keyBits.sym;
    // If provided the input symmetric key must match the size of the algorithm
    if (in->encryptionKeyIn.t.size != 0
        && in->encryptionKeyIn.t.size != (innerKeySize + 7) / 8)
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Duplicate_encryptionKeyIn;
}

// Command Output
if (in->newParentHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
{
    // Make encrypt key and its associated secret structure. A TPM_RC_KEY
    // error may be returned at this point
    out->outSymSeed.t.size = sizeof(out->outSymSeed.t.secret);
    result = CryptSecretEncrypt(newParent, DUPLICATE_STRING, &data,
                                &out->outSymSeed);
    if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;
} else
{
    // Do not apply outer wrapper
    data.t.size = 0;
    out->outSymSeed.t.size = 0;
}

// Copy sensitive area
sensitive = object->sensitive;

// Prepare output private data from sensitive.
// Note: If there is no encryption key, one will be provided by
// SensitiveToDuplicate(). This is why the assignment of encryptionKeyIn to
// encryptionKeyOut will work properly and is not conditional.
SensitiveToDuplicate(&sensitive, &object->name.b, newParent,
                     object->publicArea.nameAlg, &data.b,
                     &in->symmetricAlg, &in->encryptionKeyIn,
                     &out->duplicate);

out->encryptionKeyOut = in->encryptionKeyIn;

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_Duplicate
13.2 TPM2_Rewrap

13.2.1 General Description

This command allows the TPM to serve in the role as a Duplication Authority. If proper authorization for use of the oldParent is provided, then an HMAC key and a symmetric key are recovered from inSymSeed and used to integrity check and decrypt inDuplicate. A new protection seed value is generated according to the methods appropriate for newParent and the blob is re-encrypted and a new integrity value is computed. The re-encrypted blob is returned in outDuplicate and the symmetric key returned in outSymKey.

In the rewrap process, L is “DUPLICATE” (see TPM 2.0 Part 1, Terms and Definitions).

If inSymSeed has a zero length, then oldParent is required to be TPM_RH_NULL and no decryption of inDuplicate takes place.

If newParent is TPM_RH_NULL, then no encryption is performed on outDuplicate. outSymSeed will have a zero length. See TPM 2.0 Part 2 encryptedDuplication.
13.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 39 — TPM2_Rewrap Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Rewrap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@oldParent</td>
<td>parent of object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: User</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>newParent</td>
<td>new parent of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>inDuplicate</td>
<td>an object encrypted using symmetric key derived from inSymSeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>the Name of the object being rewrapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>inSymSeed</td>
<td>the seed for the symmetric key and HMAC key needs oldParent private key to recover the seed and generate the symmetric key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 40 — TPM2_Rewrap Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>outDuplicate</td>
<td>an object encrypted using symmetric key derived from outSymSeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>outSymSeed</td>
<td>seed for a symmetric key protected by newParent asymmetric key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Detailed Actions

1. `#include "Tpm.h"
2. `#include "Rewrap_fp.h"
3. `#if CC_Rewrap // Conditional expansion of this file
4. `#include "Object_spt_fp.h"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td><code>newParent</code> is not a decryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td><code>oldParent</code> is not consistent with <code>inSymSeed</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INTEGRITY</td>
<td>the integrity check of <code>inDuplicate</code> failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>for an ECC key, the public key is not on the curve of the curve ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE</td>
<td>the decrypted input symmetric key size does not match the symmetric algorithm key size of <code>oldParent</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td><code>oldParent</code> is not a storage key, or <code>newParent</code> is not a storage key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>for an <code>oldParent</code>; RSA key, the data to be decrypted is greater than the public exponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarshal errors</td>
<td>errors during unmarshaling the input encrypted buffer to a ECC public key, or unmarshal the private buffer to <code>sensitive</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_Rewrap(
    Rewrap_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    Rewrap_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    TPM2B_DATA data;      // symmetric key
    UINT16 hashSize = 0;
    TPM2B_PRIVATE privateBlob; // A temporary private blob
    // to transit between old
    // and new wrappers
    // Input Validation
    if((in->inSymSeed.t.size == 0 && in->oldParent != TPM_RH_NULL)
        || (in->inSymSeed.t.size != 0 && in->oldParent == TPM_RH_NULL))
        return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_Rewrap_oldParent;
    if(in->oldParent != TPM_RH_NULL)
        { 
            OBJECT *oldParent = HandleToObject(in->oldParent);
            if(!ObjectIsStorage(in->oldParent))
                return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Rewrap_oldParent;
            // Decrypt input secret data via asymmetric decryption. A
            // TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_KEY or unmarshal errors may be returned at this
            // point
            result = CryptSecretDecrypt(oldParent, NULL, DUPLICATE_STRING,
                                         &in->inSymSeed, &data);
            if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
                return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_Rewrap_inSymSeed;
            // Unwrap Outer
            result = UnwrapOuter(oldParent, &in->name.b,
                                  oldParent->publicArea.nameAlg, &data.b,
                                  FALSE,
                                  in->inDuplicate.t.size, in->inDuplicate.t.buffer);
        }
}
```
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_Rewrap_inDuplicate);

// Copy unwrapped data to temporary variable, remove the integrity field
hashSize = sizeof(UINT16) +
    CryptHashGetDigestSize(oldParent->publicArea.nameAlg);
privateBlob.t.size = in->inDuplicate.t.size - hashSize;
pAssert(privateBlob.t.size <= sizeof(privateBlob.t.buffer));
MemoryCopy(privateBlob.t.buffer, in->inDuplicate.t.buffer + hashSize,
    privateBlob.t.size);
}
else
{
    // No outer wrap from input blob. Direct copy.
    privateBlob = in->inDuplicate;
}
if(in->newParent != TPM_RH_NULL)
{
    OBJECT *newParent;
    newParent = HandleToObject(in->newParent);
    // New parent must be a storage object
    if(!ObjectIsStorage(in->newParent))
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Rewrap_newParent;
    // Make new encrypt key and its associated secret structure. A
    // TPM_RC_VALUE error may be returned at this point if RSA algorithm is
    // enabled in TPM
    out->outSymSeed.t.size = sizeof(out->outSymSeed.t.secret);
    result = CryptSecretEncrypt(newParent, DUPLICATE_STRING, &data,
        &out->outSymSeed);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;
    // Copy temporary variable to output, reserve the space for integrity
    hashSize = sizeof(UINT16) +
        CryptHashGetDigestSize(newParent->publicArea.nameAlg);
    // Make sure that everything fits into the output buffer
    // Note: this is mostly only an issue if there was no outer wrapper on
    // 'inDuplicate'. It could be as large as a TPM2B_PRIVATE buffer. If we add
    // a digest for an outer wrapper, it won't fit anymore.
    if((privateBlob.t.size + hashSize) > sizeof(out->outDuplicate.t.buffer))
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_Rewrap_inDuplicate;
    // Command output
    out->outDuplicate.t.size = privateBlob.t.size;
    pAssert(privateBlob.t.size <= sizeof(out->outDuplicate.t.buffer) - hashSize);
    MemoryCopy(out->outDuplicate.t.buffer + hashSize, privateBlob.t.buffer,
        privateBlob.t.size);
    // Produce outer wrapper for output
    out->outDuplicate.t.size = ProduceOuterWrap(newParent, &in->name.b,
        newParent->publicArea.nameAlg, &data.b, FALSE,
        out->outDuplicate.t.size, out->outDuplicate.t.buffer);
}
else // New parent is a null key so there is no seed
{
    out->outSymSeed.t.size = 0;
    // Copy privateBlob directly
    out->outDuplicate = privateBlob;
}
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
#endif // CC_Rewrap
13.3 TPM2_Import

13.3.1 General Description

This command allows an object to be encrypted using the symmetric encryption values of a Storage Key. After encryption, the object may be loaded and used in the new hierarchy. The imported object (duplicate) may be singly encrypted, multiply encrypted, or unencrypted.

If fixedTPM or fixedParent is SET in objectPublic, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If encryptedDuplication is SET in the object referenced by parentHandle and encryptedDuplication is CLEAR in objectPublic, the TPM may return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If encryptedDuplication is SET in objectPublic, then inSymSeed and encryptionKey shall not be Empty buffers (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES). Recovery of the sensitive data of the object occurs in the TPM in a multi-step process in the following order:

a) If inSymSeed has a non-zero size:
   1) The asymmetric parameters and private key of parentHandle are used to recover the seed used in the creation of the HMAC key and encryption keys used to protect the duplication blob.

   NOTE 1 When recovering the seed from inSymSeed, L is “DUPLICATE”.

   2) The integrity value in duplicate.buffer.integrityOuter is used to verify the integrity of the data blob, which is the remainder of duplicate.buffer (TPM_RC_INTEGRITY).

   NOTE 2 The data blob will contain a TPMT_SENSITIVE and can contain a TPM2B_DIGEST for the innerIntegrity.

   3) The symmetric key recovered in 1) is used to decrypt the data blob.

   NOTE 3 Checking the integrity before the data is used prevents attacks on the sensitive area by fuzzing the data and looking at the differences in the response codes.

b) If encryptionKey is not an Empty Buffer:
   1) Use encryptionKey to decrypt the inner blob.

   2) Use the TPM2B_DIGEST at the start of the inner blob to verify the integrity of the inner blob (TPM_RC_INTEGRITY).

c) Unmarshal the sensitive area

   NOTE 4 It is not necessary to validate that the sensitive area data is cryptographically bound to the public area other than that the Name of the public area is included in the HMAC. However, if the binding is not validated by this command, the binding must be checked each time the object is loaded. For an object that is imported under a parent with fixedTPM SET, binding need only be checked at import. If the parent has fixedTPM CLEAR, then the binding needs to be checked each time the object is loaded, or before the TPM performs an operation for which the binding affects the outcome of the operation (for example, TPM2_PolicySigned() or TPM2_Certify()).

   Similarly, if the new parent’s fixedTPM is set, the encryptedDuplication state need only be checked at import.

   If the new parent is not fixedTPM, then that object will be loadable on any TPM (including SW versions) on which the new parent exists. This means that, each time an object is loaded under a parent that is not fixedTPM, it is necessary to validate all of the properties of that object. If the parent is fixedTPM, then the new private blob is integrity protected by the TPM that “owns” the parent. So, it is sufficient to validate the object’s properties (attribute and public-private binding) on import and not again.

If a weak symmetric key is being imported, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY.
After integrity checks and decryption, the TPM will create a new symmetrically encrypted private area using the encryption key of the parent.

NOTE 5 The symmetric re-encryption is the normal integrity generation and symmetric encryption applied to a child object.

NOTE 6 Revision 01.16 of this specification required the ECC private key in duplicate to be padded.
### 13.3.2 Command and Response

#### Table 41 — TPM2_Import Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@parentHandle</td>
<td>the handle of the new parent for the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>encryptionKey</td>
<td>the optional symmetric encryption key used as the inner wrapper for <code>duplicate</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If <code>symmetricAlg</code> is TPM_ALG_NULL, then this parameter shall be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>objectPublic</td>
<td>the public area of the object to be imported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This is provided so that the integrity value for <code>duplicate</code> and the object attributes can be checked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTE Even if the integrity value of the object is not checked on input, the object Name is required to create the integrity value for the imported object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>duplicate</td>
<td>the symmetrically encrypted duplicate object that may contain an inner symmetric wrapper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET</td>
<td>inSymSeed</td>
<td>the seed for the symmetric key and HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><code>inSymSeed</code> is encrypted/encoded using the algorithms of <code>newParent</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT+</td>
<td>symmetricAlg</td>
<td>definition for the symmetric algorithm to use for the inner wrapper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If this algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL, no inner wrapper is present and <code>encryptionKey</code> shall be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 42 — TPM2_Import Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PRIVATE</td>
<td>outPrivate</td>
<td>the sensitive area encrypted with the symmetric key of <code>parentHandle</code>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Import_fp.h"

#if CC_Import  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>FixedTPM and fixedParent of objectPublic are not both CLEAR; or inSymSeed is nonempty and parentHandle does not reference a decryption key; or objectPublic and parentHandle have incompatible or inconsistent attributes; or encryptedDuplication is SET in objectPublic but the inner or outer wrapper is missing. Note that if the TPM provides parameter values, the parameter number will indicate symmetricKey (missing inner wrapper) or inSymSeed (missing outer wrapper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td>duplicate and objectPublic are not cryptographically bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>inSymSeed is nonempty and ECC point in inSymSeed is not on the curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>objectPublic does not have a valid nameAlg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT</td>
<td>inSymSeed is nonempty and failed to retrieve ECC point from the secret; or unmarshaling sensitive value from duplicate failed the result of inSymSeed decryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INTEGRITY</td>
<td>duplicate integrity is broken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>objectPublic representing decrypting keyed hash object specifies invalid KDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>inconsistent parameters of objectPublic; or inSymSeed is nonempty and parentHandle does not reference a key of supported type; or invalid key size in objectPublic representing an asymmetric key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>inSymSeed is nonempty and multiplication resulted in ECC point at infinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>no available object slot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID in objectPublic; or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>authPolicy size does not match digest size of the name algorithm in objectPublic; or symmetricAlg and encryptionKey have different sizes; or inSymSeed is nonempty and it size is not consistent with the type of parentHandle; or unmarshaling sensitive value from duplicate failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>objectPublic is either a storage key with no symmetric algorithm or a non-storage key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>unsupported type of objectPublic; or parentHandle is not a storage key; or only the public portion of parentHandle is loaded; or objectPublic and duplicate are of different types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>nonempty inSymSeed and its numeric value is greater than the modulus of the key referenced by parentHandle or inSymSeed is larger than the size of the digest produced by the name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
TPM_RC
TPM2_Import(
Import_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
Import_Out *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    OBJECT *parentObject;
    TPM2B_DATA data;   // symmetric key
    TPM2B_SENSITIVE sensitive;
    TPM2B_NAME name;
    TPM2A_OBJECT attributes;
    UINT16 innerKeySize = 0;    // encrypt key size for inner
                                // wrapper

    // Input Validation
    // to save typing
    attributes = in->objectPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes;
    // FixedTPM and fixedParent must be CLEAR
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedTPM)
       || IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedParent))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Import_objectPublic;

    // Get parent pointer
    parentObject = HandleToObject(in->parentHandle);
    if(!ObjectIsParent(parentObject))
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Import_parentHandle;

    if(in->symmetricAlg.algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL)
    {
        // Get inner wrap key size
        innerKeySize = in->symmetricAlg.keyBits.sym;
        // Input symmetric key must match the size of algorithm.
        if(in->encryptionKey.t.size != (innerKeySize + 7) / 8)
            return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Import_encryptionKey;
    }
    else
    {
        // If input symmetric algorithm is NULL, input symmetric key size must
        // be 0 as well
        if(in->encryptionKey.t.size != 0)
            return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Import_encryptionKey;
        // If encryptedDuplication is SET, then the object must have an inner
        // wrapper
        if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, encryptedDuplication))
            return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Import_encryptionKey;
    }
    // See if there is an outer wrapper
    if(in->inSymSeed.t.size != 0)
    {
        // in->inParentHandle is a parent, but in order to decrypt an outer wrapper,
        // it must be able to do key exchange and a symmetric key can’t do that.
        if(parentObject->publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER)
            return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_Import_parentHandle;
        // Decrypt input secret data via asymmetric decryption. TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES,
        // TPM_RC_ECC_POINT, TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT, TPM_RC_KEY, TPM_RC_NO_RESULT,
        // TPM_RC_SIZE, TPM_RC_VALUE may be returned at this point
        result = CryptSecretDecrypt(parentObject, NULL, DUPLICATE_STRING,
                                     &in->inSymSeed, &data);
        pAssert(result != TPM_RC_BINDING);
        if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
            return result;
    }

    // see if input parameter list is sufficient.
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Input validation
    if(INVALID(input, NULL, in))
        return TPM_RC_INVALID;
    if(INVALID(output, NULL, out))
        return TPM_RC_INVALID;
}
```
return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_Import_inSymSeed);
}

else {
    // If encryptedDuplication is set, then the object must have an outer
    // wrapper
    if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, encryptedDuplication))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Import_inSymSeed;
    data.t.size = 0;
}

// Compute name of object
PublicMarshalAndComputeName(&(in->objectPublic.publicArea), &name);
if (name.t.size == 0)
    return TPM_RCS_HASH + RC_Import_objectPublic;

// Retrieve sensitive from private.
// TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT, TPM_RC_INTEGRITY, TPM_RC_SIZE may be returned here.
result = DuplicateToSensitive(&in->duplicate.b, &name.b, parentObject, 
    in->objectPublic.publicArea.nameAlg,
    &data.b, &in->symmetricAlg, 
    &in->encryptionKey.b, &sensitive);
if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_Import_duplicate);

// If the parent of this object has fixedTPM SET, then validate this
// object as if it were being loaded so that validation can be skipped
// when it is actually loaded.
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedTPM))
    result = ObjectLoad(NULL, NULL, &in->objectPublic.publicArea, 
        &sensitive, RC_Import_objectPublic, RC_Import_duplicate, 
        NULL);

// Command output
if (result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        // Prepare output private data from sensitive
        SensitiveToPrivate(&sensitive, &name, parentObject, 
            in->objectPublic.publicArea.nameAlg, 
            &out->outPrivate);
    }
return result;
}
#endif // CC_Import
14 Asymmetric Primitives

14.1 Introduction

The commands in clause 1 provide low-level primitives for access to the asymmetric algorithms implemented in the TPM. Many of these commands are only allowed if the asymmetric key is an unrestricted key.

14.2 TPM2_RSA_Encrypt

14.2.1 General Description

This command performs RSA encryption using the indicated padding scheme according to IETF RFC 8017. If the scheme of keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL, then the caller may use inScheme to specify the padding scheme. If scheme of keyHandle is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then inScheme shall either be TPM_ALG_NULL or be the same as scheme (TPM_RC_SCHEME).

The key referenced by keyHandle is required to be an RSA key (TPM_RC_KEY).

The three types of allowed padding are:

1) TPM_ALG_OAEP – Data is OAEP padded as described in 7.1 of IETF RFC 8017 (PKCS#1).
   The only supported mask generation is MGF1.

2) TPM_ALG_RSAES – Data is padded as described in 7.2 of IETF RFC 8017 (PKCS#1).

3) TPM_ALG_NULL – Data is not padded by the TPM and the TPM will treat message as an unsigned integer and perform a modular exponentiation of message using the public exponent of the key referenced by keyHandle. This scheme is only used if both the scheme in the key referenced by keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL, and the inScheme parameter of the command is TPM_ALG_NULL. The input value cannot be larger than the public modulus of the key referenced by keyHandle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>keyHandle→ scheme</th>
<th>inScheme</th>
<th>padding scheme used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_RSAES</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>OAEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_RSAES</td>
<td>RSAES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>RSAES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_RSAES</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>RSAES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_RSAES</td>
<td>error (TPM_RC_SCHEME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>error (TPM_RC_SCHEME)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 43 — Padding Scheme Selection

After padding, the data is RSAEP encrypted according to 5.1.1 of IETF RFC 8017 (PKCS#1).

If inScheme is used, and the scheme requires a hash algorithm it may not be TPM_ALG_NULL.

NOTE 1 Because only the public portion of the key needs to be loaded for this command, the caller can manipulate the attributes of the key in any way desired. As a result, the TPM shall not check the consistency of the attributes. The only property checking is that the key is an RSA key and that the padding scheme is supported.
The *message* parameter is limited in size by the padding scheme according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Maximum Message Length ((mLen)) in Octets</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_OAEP</td>
<td>(mLen \leq k - 2hLen - 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_RSAES</td>
<td>(mLen \leq k - 11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>(mLen \leq k)</td>
<td>The numeric value of the message must be less than the numeric value of the public modulus ((n)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

1) \(k\) := the number of bytes in the public modulus

2) \(hLen\) := the number of octets in the digest produced by the hash algorithm used in the process

The *label* parameter is optional. If provided \((\text{label.size} \neq 0)\) then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE if the last octet in *label* is not zero. The terminating octet of zero is included in the *label* used in the padding scheme.

**NOTE 2**

If the scheme does not use a label, the TPM will still verify that label is properly formatted if label is present.

**NOTE 3**

Specifications before version 1.54 stated that *label* is truncated after the first zero octet. Applications should not include embedded zero bytes for compatibility.

The function returns padded and encrypted value *outData*.

The *message* parameter in the command may be encrypted using parameter encryption.

**NOTE 4**

Only the public area of *keyHandle* is required to be loaded. A public key can be loaded with any desired scheme. If the scheme is to be changed, a different public area needs to be loaded.
### 14.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 45 — TPM2_RSA_Encrypt Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, encrypt, or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_RSA_Encrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>keyHandle</td>
<td>reference to public portion of RSA key to use for encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA</td>
<td>message</td>
<td>message to be encrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTE 1 The data type was chosen because it limits the overall size of the input to no greater than the size of the largest RSA public key. This may be larger than allowed for keyHandle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the padding scheme to use if scheme associated with keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>label</td>
<td>optional label L to be associated with the message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Size of the buffer is zero if no label is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTE 2 See description of label above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 46 — TPM2_RSA_Encrypt Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA</td>
<td>outData</td>
<td>encrypted output</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "RSA_Encrypt_fp.h"

#ifndef CC_RSA_Encrypt // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>decrypt attribute is not SET in key referenced by keyHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an RSA key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>incorrect input scheme, or the chosen scheme is not a valid RSA decrypt scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>the numeric value of message is greater than the public modulus of the key referenced by keyHandle, or label is not a null-terminated string</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM RC

TPM2_RSA_Encrypt(
    RSA_Encrypt_In *in,     // IN: input parameter list
    RSA_Encrypt_Out *out,   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                  result;
    OBJECT                  *rsaKey;
    TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT       *scheme;
    // Input Validation
    rsaKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);
    // selected key must be an RSA key
    if(rsaKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_RSA)
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_RSA_Encrypt_keyHandle;
    // selected key must have the decryption attribute
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(rsaKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_RSA_Encrypt_keyHandle;
    // Is there a label?
    if(!IsLabelProperlyFormatted(&in->label.b))
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_RSA_Encrypt_label;
    // Command Output
    // Select a scheme for encryption
    scheme = CryptRsaSelectScheme(in->keyHandle, &in->inScheme);
    if(scheme == NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_RSA_Encrypt_inScheme;
    // Encryption. TPM_RC_VALUE, or TPM_RC_SCHEME errors may be returned by
    // CryptEncryptRSA.
    out->outData.t.size = sizeof(out->outData.t.buffer);
    result = CryptRsaEncrypt(out->outData, &in->message.b, rsaKey, scheme,
                              &in->label.b, NULL);
    return result;
}
#endif // CC_RSA_Encrypt
```

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14.3 TPM2_RSA_Decrypt

14.3.1 General Description

This command performs RSA decryption using the indicated padding scheme according to IETF RFC 8017 (PKCS#1).

The scheme selection for this command is the same as for TPM2_RSA_Encrypt() and is shown in Table 43.

The key referenced by keyHandle shall be an RSA key (TPM_RC_KEY) with restricted CLEAR and decrypt SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

This command uses the private key of keyHandle for this operation and authorization is required.

The TPM will perform a modular exponentiation of ciphertext using the private exponent associated with keyHandle (this is described in IETF RFC 8017 (PKCS#1), clause 5.1.2). It will then validate the padding according to the selected scheme. If the padding checks fail, TPM_RC_VALUE is returned. Otherwise, the data is returned with the padding removed. If no padding is used, the returned value is an unsigned integer value that is the result of the modular exponentiation of cipherText using the private exponent of keyHandle. The returned value may include leading octets zeros so that it is the same size as the public modulus. For the other padding schemes, the returned value will be smaller than the public modulus but will contain all the data remaining after padding is removed and this may include leading zeros if the original encrypted value contained leading zeros.

If a label is used in the padding process of the scheme during encryption, the label parameter is required to be present in the decryption process and label is required to be the same in both cases. If label is not the same, the decrypt operation is very likely to fail (TPM_RC_VALUE). If label is present (label.size != 0), it shall be a byte stream whose last byte is zero or the TPM will return TPM_RC_VALUE.

NOTE 1 The size of label includes the terminating null.

The message parameter in the response may be encrypted using parameter encryption.

If inScheme is used, and the scheme requires a hash algorithm it may not be TPM_ALG_NULL.

If the scheme does not require a label, the value in label is not used but the size of the label field is checked for consistency with the indicated data type (TPM2B_DATA). That is, the field may not be larger than allowed for a TPM2B_DATA.
### 14.3.2 Command and Response

**Table 47 — TPM2_RSA_Decrypt Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_RSA_Decrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>RSA key to use for decryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA</td>
<td>cipherText</td>
<td>cipher text to be decrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the padding scheme to use if scheme associated with keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>label</td>
<td>label whose association with the message is to be verified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 48 — TPM2_RSA_Decrypt Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA</td>
<td>message</td>
<td>decrypted output</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "RSA_Decrypt_fp.h"

#ifndef CC_RSA_Decrypt  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>decrypt is not SET or if restricted is SET in the key referenced by keyHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td>The public and private parts of the key are not properly bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an unrestricted decrypt key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>incorrect input scheme, or the chosen scheme is not a valid RSA decrypt scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>cipherText is not the size of the modulus of key referenced by keyHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>label is not a null terminated string or the value of cipherText is greater that the modulus of keyHandle or the encoding of the data is not valid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_RSA_Decrypt(
    RSA_Decrypt_In    *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    RSA_Decrypt_Out   *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                       result;
    OBJECT                      *rsaKey;
    TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT            *scheme;

    rsaKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

    // The selected key must be an RSA key
    if(rsaKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_RSA)
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_RSA_Decrypt_keyHandle;

    // The selected key must be an unrestricted decryption key
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(rsaKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(rsaKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_RSA_Decrypt_keyHandle;

    // NOTE: Proper operation of this command requires that the sensitive area
    // of the key is loaded. This is assured because authorization is required
    // to use the sensitive area of the key. In order to check the authorization,
    // the sensitive area has to be loaded, even if authorization is with policy.

    // If label is present, make sure that it is a NULL-terminated string
    if(!IsLabelProperlyFormatted(&in->label.b))
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_RSA_Decrypt_label;

    // Command Output
    // Select a scheme for decrypt.
    scheme = CryptRsaSelectScheme(in->keyHandle, &in->inScheme);
    if(scheme == NULL)
        return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_RSA_Decrypt_inScheme;

    // Decryption. TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_SIZE, and TPM_RC_KEY error may be
```

---

Part 3: Commands

**Trusted Platform Module Library**

**Family “2.0”**

**TCG PUBLIC REVIEW**

**Level 00 Revision 01.64**

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**December 24, 2020**
43  // returned by CryptRsaDecrypt.
44  // NOTE: CryptRsaDecrypt can also return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES or TPM_RC_BINDING
45  // when the key is not a decryption key but that was checked above.
46  out->message.t.size = sizeof(out->message.t.buffer);
47  result = CryptRsaDecrypt(&out->message.b, &in->cipherText.b, rsaKey,
48                             scheme, &in->label.b);
49  return result;
50 }
51 #endif // CC_RSA_Decrypt
14.4 TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen

14.4.1 General Description

This command uses the TPM to generate an ephemeral key pair \((d_e, Q_e)\) where \(Q_e := [d_e]G\). It uses the private ephemeral key and a loaded public key \((Q_S)\) to compute the shared secret value \((P := [hd_e]Q_S)\).

\(keyHandle\) shall refer to a loaded, ECC key (TPM_RC_KEY). The sensitive portion of this key need not be loaded.

The curve parameters of the loaded ECC key are used to generate the ephemeral key.

**NOTE** This function is the equivalent of encrypting data to another object’s public key. The seed value is used in a KDF to generate a symmetric key and that key is used to encrypt the data. Once the data is encrypted and the symmetric key discarded, only the object with the private portion of the \(keyHandle\) will be able to decrypt it.

The \(zPoint\) in the response may be encrypted using parameter encryption.
14.4.2 Command and Response

**Table 49 — TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ECDH_KeyGen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>keyHandle</td>
<td>Handle of a loaded ECC key public area. Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 50 — TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>zPoint</td>
<td>results of $P := h [d] Q_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>pubPoint</td>
<td>generated ephemeral public point ($Q_e$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ECDH_KeyGen_fp.h"

#if CC_ECDH_KeyGen  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an ECC key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen

// IN: input parameter list
ECDH_KeyGen_In  *in,

// OUT: output parameter list
ECDH_KeyGen_Out  *out,

{  
OBJECT                  *eccKey;
TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER      sensitive;
TPM_RC                   result;

// Input Validation

eccKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

  // Referenced key must be an ECC key
if(eccKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC) return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_ECDH_KeyGen_keyHandle;

// Command Output

  do
  {  
TPMT_PUBLIC         *keyPublic = &eccKey->publicArea;

  // Create ephemeral ECC key
  result = CryptEccNewKeyPair(&out->pubPoint.point, &sensitive, 
keyPublic->parameters.eccDetail.curveID);
  
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) 
  {  
    // Compute Z
    result = CryptEccPointMultiply(&out->zPoint.point, 
    keyPublic->parameters.eccDetail.curveID, 
    &keyPublic->unique.ecc, 
    &sensitive, 
    NULL, NULL);

    // The point in the key is not on the curve. Indicate that the key is bad.
    if(result == TPM_RC_ECC_POINT) return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_ECDH_KeyGen_keyHandle;

    // The other possible error from CryptEccPointMultiply is TPM_RC_NO_RESULT indicating that the multiplication resulted in the point at infinity, so get a new random key and start over
    // BTW, this never happens.
  }

  } while(result == TPM_RC_NO_RESULT);
  
return result;

} // CC_ECDH_KeyGen
```
14.5 TPM2_ECDH_ZGen

14.5.1 General Description

This command uses the TPM to recover the Z value from a public point \((Q_B)\) and a private key \((d_s)\). It will perform the multiplication of the provided \(\text{inPoint} (Q_B)\) with the private key \((d_s)\) and return the coordinates of the resultant point \(Z = (xZ, yZ) := [hd_s]Q_B; \text{ where } h\) is the cofactor of the curve).

\text{keyHandle} shall refer to a loaded, ECC key (TPM_RC_KEY) with the \textit{restricted} attribute CLEAR and the \textit{decrypt} attribute SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

NOTE While TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES is preferred, TPM_RC_KEY is acceptable.

The \textit{scheme} of the key referenced by \textit{keyHandle} is required to be either TPM_ALG_ECDH or TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_SCHEME).

\textit{inPoint} is required to be on the curve of the key referenced by \textit{keyHandle} (TPM_RC_ECC_POINT).

The parameters of the key referenced by \textit{keyHandle} are used to perform the point multiplication.
14.5.2 Command and Response

Table 51 — TPM2_ECDH_ZGen Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ECDH_ZGen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1, Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>inPoint</td>
<td>a public key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 52 — TPM2_ECDH_ZGen Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>outPoint</td>
<td>X and Y coordinates of the product of the multiplication Z = (xZ, yZ) := ([h^d] Q_b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ECDH_ZGen_fp.h"

#if CC_ECDH_ZGen // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by keyA is restricted or not a decrypt key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by keyA is not an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>multiplying inPoint resulted in a point at infinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme of the key referenced by keyA is not TPM_ALG_NULL, TPM_ALG_ECDH,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ECDH_ZGen(
  ECDH_ZGen_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
  ECDH_ZGen_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC result;
    OBJECT *eccKey;

    // Input Validation
    eccKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

    // Selected key must be a non-restricted, decrypt ECC key
    if(eccKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC)
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_ECDH_ZGen_keyHandle;

    // Selected key needs to be unrestricted with the 'decrypt' attribute
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(eccKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted)
        || !IS_ATTRIBUTE(eccKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_ECDH_ZGen_keyHandle;

    // Make sure the scheme allows this use
    if(eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.scheme.scheme != TPM_ALG_ECDH
        && eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.scheme.scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_ECDH_ZGen_keyHandle;

    // Command Output
    // Compute Z. TPM_RC_ECC_POINT or TPM_RC_NO_RESULT may be returned here.
    result = CryptEccPointMultiply(&out->outPoint.point,
        eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
        &in->inPoint.point,
        &eccKey->sensitive.sensitive.ecc,
        NULL, NULL);

    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_ECDH_ZGen_inPoint);

    return result;
}
#endif // CC_ECDH_ZGen
```
14.6 TPM2_ECC_Parameters

14.6.1 General Description

This command returns the parameters of an ECC curve identified by its TCG-assigned curveID. The value returned is the same as that from the TCG Algorithm Registry but may not be the same size.

EXAMPLE The value 01 can be returned as 00000001.
### 14.6.2 Command and Response

**Table 53 — TPM2_ECC_Parameters Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ECC_Parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ECC_CURVE</td>
<td>curveID</td>
<td>parameter set selector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 54 — TPM2_ECC_Parameters Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_ALGORITHM_DETAIL_ECC</td>
<td>parameters</td>
<td>ECC parameters for the selected curve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 14.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ECC_Parameters_fp.h"

#ifdef CC_ECC_Parameters  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>Unsupported ECC curve ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ECC_Parameters(
    ECC_Parameters_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    ECC_Parameters_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Command Output

    // Get ECC curve parameters
    if(CryptEccGetParameters(in->curveID, &out->parameters))
        return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    else
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_ECC_Parameters_curveID;
}
#endif  // CC_ECC_Parameters
```
14.7 TPM2_ZGen_2Phase

14.7.1 General Description

This command supports two-phase key exchange protocols. The command is used in combination with TPM2_EC_Ephemeral(). TPM2_EC_Ephemeral() generates an ephemeral key and returns the public point of that ephemeral key along with a numeric value that allows the TPM to regenerate the associated private key.

The input parameters for this command are a static public key \( (inQsU) \), an ephemeral key \( (inQeU) \) from party B, and the commitCounter returned by TPM2_EC_Ephemeral(). The TPM uses the counter value to regenerate the ephemeral private key \( (d_eV) \) and the associated public key \( (Q_eV) \). keyA provides the static ephemeral elements \( d_sV \) and \( Q_sV \). This provides the two pairs of ephemeral and static keys that are required for the schemes supported by this command.

The TPM will compute \( Z \) or \( Z_s \) and \( Z_e \) according to the selected scheme. If the scheme is not a two-phase key exchange scheme or if the scheme is not supported, the TPM will return TPM_RC_SCHEME.

It is an error if \( inQsB \) or \( inQeB \) are not on the curve of keyA (TPM_RC_ECC_POINT).

The two-phase key schemes that were assigned an algorithm ID as of the time of the publication of this specification are TPM_ALG_ECDH, TPM_ALG_ECMQV, and TPM_ALG_SM2.

If this command is supported, then support for TPM_ALG_ECDH is required. Support for TPM_ALG_ECMQV or TPM_ALG_SM2 is optional.

NOTE 1 If SM2 is supported and this command is supported, then the implementation is required to support the key exchange protocol of SM2, part 3.

For TPM_ALG_ECDH \( outZ1 \) will be \( Z_s \) and \( outZ2 \) will be \( Z_e \) as defined in 6.1.1.2 of SP800-56A.

NOTE 2 An unrestricted decryption key using ECDH can be used in either TPM2_EC_Ephemeral() or TPM2_ZGen_2Phase as the computation done with the private part of keyA is the same in both cases.

For TPM_ALG_ECMQV or TPM_ALG_SM2 \( outZ1 \) will be \( Z \) and \( outZ2 \) will be an Empty Point.

NOTE 3 An Empty Point has two Empty Buffers as coordinates meaning the minimum size value for \( outZ2 \) will be four.

If the input scheme is TPM_ALG_ECDH, then \( outZ1 \) will be \( Z_s \) and \( outZ2 \) will be \( Z_e \). For schemes like MQV (including SM2), \( outZ1 \) will contain the computed value and \( outZ2 \) will be an Empty Point.

NOTE 4 The \( Z \) values returned by the TPM are a full point and not just an x-coordinate.

If a computation of either \( Z \) produces the point at infinity, then the corresponding \( Z \) value will be an Empty Point.
### 14.7.2 Command and Response

#### Table 55 — TPM2\_ZGen\_2Phase Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ZGen_2Phase - handle of an unrestricted decryption key ECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyA</td>
<td>The private key referenced by this handle is used as ( d_{S,A} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>inQsB</td>
<td>other party’s static public key ( (Q_{s,B} = (X_{s,B}, Y_{s,B})) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>inQeB</td>
<td>other party’s ephemeral public key ( (Q_{e,B} = (X_{e,B}, Y_{e,B})) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ECC_KEY_EXCHANGE</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the key exchange scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>counter</td>
<td>value returned by TPM2_EC_Ephemeral()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 56 — TPM2\_ZGen\_2Phase Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>outZ1</td>
<td>X and Y coordinates of the computed value (scheme dependent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>outZ2</td>
<td>X and Y coordinates of the second computed value (scheme dependent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.7.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ZGen_2Phase_fp.h"

#if CC_ZGen_2Phase  // Conditional expansion of this file

This command uses the TPM to recover one or two Z values in a two phase key exchange protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by <code>keyA</code> is restricted or not a decrypt key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ECC_POINT</td>
<td><code>inQsB</code> or <code>inQeB</code> is not on the curve of the key reference by <code>keyA</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by <code>keyA</code> is not an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme of the key referenced by <code>keyA</code> is not <code>TPM_ALG_NULL</code>, <code>TPM_ALG_ECDH</code>, <code>TPM_ALG_ECMQV</code> or <code>TPM_ALG_SM2</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

TPM_RC
TPM2_ZGen_2Phase(
    ZGen_2Phase_In      *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    ZGen_2Phase_Out     *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                   result;
    OBJECT                  *eccKey;
    TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER      r;
    TPM_ALG_ID               scheme;

    // Input Validation
    eccKey = HandleToObject(in->keyA);

    // `keyA` must be an ECC key
    if(eccKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC)
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_ZGen_2Phase_keyA;

    // `keyA` must not be restricted and must be a decrypt key
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(eccKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted) ||
     IS_ATTRIBUTE(eccKey->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_ZGen_2Phase_keyA;

    // if the scheme of `keyA` is `TPM_ALG_NULL`, then use the input scheme; otherwise
    // the input scheme must be the same as the scheme of `keyA`
    scheme = eccKey->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.scheme.scheme;
    if(scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
    {
        if(scheme != in->inScheme)
            return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inScheme;
    }
    else
    {
        scheme = in->inScheme;
        if(scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
            return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inScheme;
    }

    // Input points must be on the curve of `keyA`
    if(!CryptEccIsPointOnCurve(eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID, &r))
        return TPM_RC_ECC_POINT + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inQsB;
    if(!CryptEccIsPointOnCurve(eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID, &r))
        return TPM_RC_ECC_POINT + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inQeB;
```
48    &in->inQeB.point))
49    return TPM_RCS_ECC_POINT + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inQeB;
50
51    if(!CryptGenerateR(&r, &in->counter,
52        eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
53        NULL))
54        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_ZGen_2Phase_counter;
55
56    // Command Output
57    
58    result =
59        CryptEcc2PhaseKeyExchange(&out->outZ1.point,
60        &out->outZ2.point,
61        eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
62        &eccKey->sensitive.sensitive.ecc,
63        &r,
64        &in->inQeB.point,
65        &in->inQeB.point);
66
67    if(result == TPM_RC_SCHEME)
68        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_ZGen_2Phase_inScheme;
69
70    if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
71        CryptEndCommit(in->counter);
72
73    return result;
74    }
75    #endif // CC_ZGen_2Phase
14.8 TPM2_ECC_Encrypt

14.8.1 General Description

This command performs ECC encryption as described in Part 1, Annex D.

The key referenced by keyHandle is required to be an ECC key (TPM_RC_KEY).

NOTE 1 Because only the public portion of the key needs to be loaded for this command, the caller can manipulate the attributes of the key in any way desired so the TPM does not verify the attributes of the key.

If the default key scheme is TPM_ALG_NULL, an appropriate inscheme is required, and if the default key scheme is not TPM_ALG_NULL, the key scheme and inscheme have to be the same, and the scheme must be a valid encryption scheme.

NOTE 2 The key scheme and input scheme are checked in the same way for both this command and for TPM2_ECC_Decrypt(). The consistency is to simplify the TPM.

As determined by the encryption scheme, the function returns a public ephemeral key (C1), encrypted data (C2), and an integrity value (C3).

The plainText parameter in the command may be encrypted using parameter encryption.
2.1.2 Command and Response

**Table 57 — TPM2_ECC_Encrypt Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, encrypt, or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ECC_Encrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>keyHandle</td>
<td>reference to public portion of ECC key to use for encryption Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>plainText</td>
<td>Plaintext to be encrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_KDF_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the KDF to use if scheme associated with keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 58 — TPM2_ECC_Encrypt Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>the public ephemeral key used for ECDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>the data block produced by the XOR process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>the integrity value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 14.8.2 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ECC_Encrypt_fp.h"

#if CC_ECC_Encrypt // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by keyHandle is restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RCS_SCHEME</td>
<td>bad scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ECC_Encrypt(
    ECC_Encrypt_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    ECC_Encrypt_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    OBJECT *pubKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

    // Parameter validation
    if (pubKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC)
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_ECC_Encrypt_keyHandle;

    // Have to have a scheme selected
    if (!CryptEccSelectScheme(pubKey, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_ECC_Encrypt_inScheme;

    // Command Output
    return CryptEccEncrypt(pubKey, &in->inScheme, &in->plaintText,
                           &out->C1, &out->C2, &out->C3);
}
#endif // CC_ECC_Encrypt
```
14.9  TPM2_ECC_Decrypt

14.9.1  General Description

This command performs ECC decryption.

The key referenced by keyHandle shall be an ECC key (TPM_RC_KEY) with restricted CLEAR and decrypt SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

This command uses the private key of keyHandle for this operation and authorization is required.

If the default key scheme is TPM_ALG_NULL, an appropriate inscheme is required, and if the default key scheme is not TPM_ALG_NULL, the key scheme and inscheme have to be the same, and the scheme must be a valid decryption scheme.

The function returns decrypted value plainText.

The ciphertext parameter in the command may be encrypted using parameter encryption.
### 2.2.1 Command and Response

**Table 59 — TPM2_ECC_Decrypt Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPMI_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ECC_Decrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>ECC key to use for decryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>the public ephemeral key used for ECDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>the data block produced by the XOR process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>the integrity value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_KDF_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the KDF to use if scheme associated with keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 60 — TPM2_ECC_Decrypt Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>plainText</td>
<td>decrypted output</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.9.2 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ECC_Decrypt_fp.h"
#include "CryptEccCrypt_fp.h"

#if CC_ECC_Decrypt // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by keyHandle is restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>internal error in big number processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>bad scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>C3 did not match hash of recovered data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_ECC_Decrypt:
ECC_Decrypt_In   *in,  // IN: input parameter list
ECC_Decrypt_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list

// Parameter validation
if (key->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC)
    return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_ECC_Decrypt_keyHandle;
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(key->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted)
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(key->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt))
    return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_ECC_Decrypt_keyHandle;
// Have to have a scheme selected
if(!CryptEccSelectScheme(key, &in->inScheme))
    return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_ECC_Decrypt_inScheme;
// Command Output
return CryptEccDecrypt(key, &in->inScheme, &out->plainText,
    &in->C1.point, &in->C2, &in->C3);
#endif // CC_ECC_Decrypt
```
15 Symmetric Primitives

15.1 Introduction

The commands in clause 1 provide low-level primitives for access to the symmetric algorithms implemented in the TPM that operate on blocks of data. These include symmetric encryption and decryption as well as hash and HMAC. All of the commands in this group are stateless. That is, they have no persistent state that is retained in the TPM when the command is complete.

For hashing, HMAC, and Events that require large blocks of data with retained state, the sequence commands are provided (see clause 1).

Some of the symmetric encryption/decryption modes use an IV. When an IV is used, it may be an initiation value or a chained value from a previous stage. The chaining for each mode is:
Table 61 — Symmetric Chaining Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Chaining process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_CTR</td>
<td>The TPM will increment the entire IV provided by the caller. The next count value will be returned to the caller as <em>ivOut</em>. This can be the input value to the next encrypt or decrypt operation. <em>ivIn</em> is required to be the size of a block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>ivIn</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. <strong>EXAMPLE 1</strong> AES requires that <em>ivIn</em> be 128 bits (16 octets). <em>ivOut</em> will be the size of a cipher block and not the size of the last encrypted block. <strong>NOTE</strong> <em>ivOut</em> will be the value of the counter after the last block is encrypted. <strong>EXAMPLE 2</strong> If <em>ivIn</em> were 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 16 and four data blocks were encrypted, <em>ivOut</em> will have a value of 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 16. All the bits of the IV are incremented as if it were an unsigned integer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_OFB</td>
<td>In Output Feedback (OFB), the output of the pseudo-random function (the block encryption algorithm) is XORed with a plaintext block to produce a ciphertext block. <em>ivOut</em> will be the value that was XORed with the last plaintext block. That value can be used as the <em>ivIn</em> for a next buffer. <em>ivIn</em> is required to be the size of a block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>ivIn</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. <em>ivOut</em> will be the size of a cipher block and not the size of the last encrypted block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_CBC</td>
<td>For Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), a block of ciphertext is XORed with the next plaintext block and that block is encrypted. The encrypted block is then input to the encryption of the next block. The last ciphertext block then is used as an IV for the next buffer. Even though the last ciphertext block is evident in the encrypted data, it is also returned in <em>ivOut</em>. <em>ivIn</em> is required to be the size of a block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>ivIn</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. <em>inData</em> is required to be an even multiple of the block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>inData</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_CFB</td>
<td>Similar to CBC in that the last ciphertext block is an input to the encryption of the next block. <em>ivOut</em> will be the value that was XORed with the last plaintext block. That value can be used as the <em>ivIn</em> for a next buffer. <em>ivIn</em> is required to be the size of a block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>ivIn</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. <em>ivOut</em> will be the size of a cipher block and not the size of the last encrypted block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ALG_ECB</td>
<td>Electronic Codebook (ECB) has no chaining. Each block of plaintext is encrypted using the key. ECB does not support chaining and <em>ivIn</em> shall be the Empty Buffer. <em>ivOut</em> will be the Empty Buffer. <em>inData</em> is required to be an even multiple of the block encrypted by the selected algorithm and key combination. If the size of <em>inData</em> is not correct, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.2 TPM2_EncryptDecrypt

15.2.1 General Description

NOTE 1 This command is deprecated, and TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2() is preferred. This should be reflected in platform-specific specifications.

This command performs symmetric encryption or decryption using the symmetric key referenced by keyHandle and the selected mode.

keyHandle shall reference a symmetric cipher object (TPM_RC_KEY) with the restricted attribute CLEAR (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

If the decrypt parameter of the command is TRUE, then the decrypt attribute of the key is required to be SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES). If the decrypt parameter of the command is FALSE, then the sign attribute of the key is required to be SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

NOTE 2 A key is permitted to have both decrypt and sign SET.

If the mode of the key is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then that is the only mode that can be used with the key and the caller is required to set mode either to TPM_ALG_NULL or to the same mode as the key (TPM_RC_MODE). If the mode of the key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then the caller may set mode to any valid symmetric encryption/decryption mode but may not select TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_MODE).

If the TPM allows this command to be canceled before completion, then the TPM may produce incremental results and return TPM_RC_SUCCESS rather than TPM_RC_CANCELED. In such case, outData may be less than inData.

NOTE 3 If all the data is encrypted/decrypted, the size of outData will be the same as inData.
### 15.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 62 — TPM2_EncryptDecrypt Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_EncryptDecrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>the symmetric key used for the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>decrypt</td>
<td>if YES, then the operation is decryption; if NO, the operation is encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_CIPHER_MODE+</td>
<td>mode</td>
<td>symmetric encryption/decryption mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_IV</td>
<td>ivIn</td>
<td>an initial value as required by the algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>inData</td>
<td>the data to be encrypted/decrypted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 63 — TPM2_EncryptDecrypt Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>outData</td>
<td>encrypted or decrypted output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_IV</td>
<td>ivOut</td>
<td>chaining value to use for IV in next round</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.2.3 Detailed Actions

```
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "EncryptDecrypt_fp.h"
#if CC_EncryptDecrypt2
#include "EncryptDecrypt_spt_fp.h"
#endif

#if CC_EncryptDecrypt // Conditional expansion of this file

Error Return | Meaning
-------------|--------------------------------------------------
TPM_RC_KEY   | is not a symmetric decryption key with both public and private portions loaded
TPM_RC_SIZE  | IvIn size is incompatible with the block cipher mode; or inData size is not an even multiple of the block size for CBC or ECB mode
TPM_RC_VALUE | keyHandle is restricted and the argument mode does not match the key's mode

TPM_RC
TPM2_EncryptDecrypt(
 EncryptDecrypt_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
 EncryptDecrypt_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
#if CC_EncryptDecrypt2
 return EncryptDecryptShared(in->keyHandle, in->decrypt, in->mode,
 &in->ivIn, &in->inData, out);
#else
 OBJECT *symKey;
 UINT16 keySize;
 UINT16 blockSize;
 BYTE *key;
 TPM_ALG_ID alg;
 TPM_ALG_ID mode;
 TPM_RC result;
 BOOL OK;
 TPMA_OBJECT attributes;

 // Input Validation
 symKey = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);
 mode = symKey->publicArea.parameters.symDetail.sym.mode.sym;
 attributes = symKey->publicArea.objectAttributes;

 // The input key should be a symmetric key
 if(symKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER)
 return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_EncryptDecrypt_keyHandle;
 // The key must be unrestricted and allow the selected operation
 OK = IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted)
 if(OK)
 OK = OK && IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, decrypt);
 else
 OK = OK && IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign);
 if(!OK)
 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_EncryptDecrypt_keyHandle;

 // If the key mode is not TPM_ALG_NULL...
 // or TPM_ALG_NULL
 if(mode != TPM_ALG_NULL)
 {
```
// then the input mode has to be TPM_ALG_NULL or the same as the key
if((in->mode != TPM_ALG_NULL) && (in->mode != mode))
    return TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_EncryptDecrypt_mode;
else
{
    // if the key mode is null, then the input can't be null
    if((in->mode == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_EncryptDecrypt_mode;
        mode = in->mode;
    }
    // The input iv for ECB mode should be an Empty Buffer. All the other modes
    // should have an iv size same as encryption block size
    keySize = symKey->publicArea.parameters.symDetail.sym.keyBits.sym;
    alg = symKey->publicArea.parameters.symDetail.sym.algorithm;
    blockSize = CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(alg, keySize);

    // reverify the algorithm. This is mainly to keep static analysis tools happy
    if(blockSize == 0)
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_EncryptDecrypt_keyHandle;
    if((mode == TPM_ALG_ECB) && (in->ivIn.t.size != 0))
        || (mode != TPM_ALG_ECB) && (in->ivIn.t.size != blockSize))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt_ivIn;
    // Note: When an algorithm is not supported by a TPM, the TPM_ALG_xxx for that
    // algorithm is not defined. However, it is assumed that the TPM_ALG_xxx for
    // the algorithm is always defined. Both have the same numeric value.
    // TPM_ALG_xxx is used here so that the code does not get cluttered with
    // ifdef's. Having this check does not mean that the algorithm is supported.
    // If it was not supported the unmarshaling code would have rejected it before
    // this function were called. This means that, depending on the implementation,
    // the check could be redundant but it doesn't hurt.
    if(((mode == TPM_ALG_CBC) && (in->inData.t.size % blockSize) != 0))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt_inData;
    // Copy IV
    // Note: This is copied here so that the calls to the encrypt/decrypt functions
    // will modify the output buffer, not the input buffer
    out->ivOut = in->ivIn;

    // Command Output
    key = symKey->sensitive.sensitive.sym.t.buffer;
    // For symmetric encryption, the cipher data size is the same as plain data
    // size.
    out->outData.t.size = in->inData.t.size;
    if(in->decrypt == YES)
    {
        // Decrypt data to output
        result = CryptSymmetricDecrypt(out->outData.t.buffer, alg, keySize, key,
            &(out->ivOut), mode, in->inData.t.size,
            in->inData.t.buffer);
    } else
    {
        // Encrypt data to output
        result = CryptSymmetricEncrypt(out->outData.t.buffer, alg, keySize, key,
            &(out->ivOut), mode, in->inData.t.size,
            in->inData.t.buffer);
    }
    return result;
}
115 } 
116 #endif // CC_EncryptDecrypt
15.3 TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2

15.3.1 General Description

This command is identical to TPM2_EncryptDecrypt(), except that the \textit{inData} parameter is the first parameter. This permits \textit{inData} to be parameter encrypted.

\textbf{NOTE} In platform specification updates, this command is preferred and TPM2_EncryptDecrypt() should be deprecated.
### 15.3.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_EncryptDecrypt2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>the symmetric key used for the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>inData</td>
<td>the data to be encrypted/decrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>decrypt</td>
<td>if YES, then the operation is decryption; if NO, the operation is encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_CIPHER_MODE+</td>
<td>mode</td>
<td>symmetric mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>this field shall match the default mode of the key or be TPM_ALG_NULL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_IV</td>
<td>ivIn</td>
<td>an initial value as required by the algorithm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>outData</td>
<td>encrypted or decrypted output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_IV</td>
<td>ivOut</td>
<td>chaining value to use for IV in next round</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "EncryptDecrypt2_fp.h"
#include "EncryptDecrypt_fp.h"
#include "EncryptDecrypt_spt_fp.h"

#if CC_EncryptDecrypt2 // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>is not a symmetric decryption key with both public and private portions loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>\textit{IvIn} size is incompatible with the block cipher mode; or \textit{inData} size is not an even multiple of the block size for CBC or ECB mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>\textit{keyHandle} is restricted and the argument \textit{mode} does not match the key's mode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

```

```c
TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2(
    EncryptDecrypt2_In   *in, // IN: input parameter list
    EncryptDecrypt2_Out  *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                result;
    // EncryptDecryptShared() performs the operations as shown in
    // TPM2_EncryptDecrypt
    result = EncryptDecryptShared(in->keyHandle, in->decrypt, in->mode,
        &in->ivIn, &in->inData,
        (EncryptDecrypt_Out *)out);
    // Handle response code swizzle.
    switch(result)
    {
        case TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_mode:
            result = TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_mode;
            break;
        case TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_ivIn:
            result = TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_ivIn;
            break;
        case TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_inData:
            result = TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_EncryptDecrypt2_inData;
            break;
        default:
            break;
    }
    return result;
}
#endif // CC_EncryptDecrypt2
```
15.4 TPM2_Hash

15.4.1 General Description

This command performs a hash operation on a data buffer and returns the results.

NOTE If the data buffer to be hashed is larger than will fit into the TPM's input buffer, then the sequence hash commands will need to be used.

If the results of the hash will be used in a signing operation that uses a restricted signing key, then the ticket returned by this command can indicate that the hash is safe to sign.

If the digest is not safe to sign, then the TPM will return a TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK with the hierarchy set to TPM_RH_NULL and digest set to the Empty Buffer.

If hierarchy is TPM_RH_NULL, then digest in the ticket will be the Empty Buffer.
### 15.4.2 Command and Response

**Table 66 — TPM2_Hash Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, decrypt, or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Hash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>data</td>
<td>data to be hashed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>algorithm for the hash being computed – shall not be TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY+</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>hierarchy to use for the ticket (TPM_RH_NULL allowed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 67 — TPM2_Hash Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>outHash</td>
<td>results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK</td>
<td>validation</td>
<td>ticket indicating that the sequence of octets used to compute outDigest did not start with TPM_GENERATED_VALUE will be a NULL ticket if the digest may not be signed with a restricted key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Hash_fp.h"

#if CC_Hash // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC TPM2_Hash(
    Hash_In  *in,    // IN: input parameter list
    Hash_Out *out    // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    HASH_STATE hashState;

    // Command Output
    // Output hash
    // Start hash stack
    out->outHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, in->hashAlg);
    // Adding hash data
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->data.b);
    // Complete hash
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &out->outHash.b);

    // Output ticket
    out->validation.tag = TPM_ST_HASHCHECK;
    out->validation.hierarchy = in->hierarchy;
    if(in->hierarchy == TPM_RH_NULL)
    {
        // Ticket is not required
        out->validation.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
        out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
    }
    else if(in->data.t.size >= sizeof(TPM_GENERATED_VALUE)
        && !TicketIsSafe(&in->data.b))
    {
        // Ticket is not safe
        out->validation.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
        out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
    }
    else
    {
        // Compute ticket
        TicketComputeHashCheck(in->hierarchy, in->hashAlg,
            &out->outHash, &out->validation);
    }
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_Hash
```
### 15.5 TPM2_HMAC

#### 15.5.1 General Description

This command performs an HMAC on the supplied data using the indicated hash algorithm.

NOTE 1 A TPM can implement either TPM2_HMAC() or TPM2_MAC() but not both, as they have the same command code and there is no way to distinguish them. A TPM that supports TPM2_MAC() will support any code that was written to use TPM2_HMAC(), but a TPM that supports TPM2_HMAC() will not support a MAC based on symmetric block ciphers.

The caller shall provide proper authorization for use of `handle`.

If the `sign` attribute is not SET in the key referenced by `handle` then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY. If the key type is not TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE. If the key referenced by `handle` has the `restricted` attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

NOTE 2 For symmetric signing with a restricted key, see TPM2_Sign(). TPM2_HMAC() has no ticket parameter, which is required with a restricted key.

If the default scheme of the key referenced by `handle` is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the `hashAlg` parameter is required to be either the same as the key's default or TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE). If the default scheme of the key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then `hashAlg` is required to be a valid hash and not TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE) (see hash selection matrix in Table 76).

NOTE 3 A key can only have both `sign` and `decrypt` SET if the key is unrestricted. When both `sign` and `decrypt` are set, there is no default scheme for the key and the hash algorithm must be specified.
### 15.5.2 Command and Response

#### Table 68 — TPM2_HMAC Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_HMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@handle</td>
<td>handle for the symmetric signing key providing the HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>buffer</td>
<td>HMAC data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>algorithm to use for HMAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 69 — TPM2_HMAC Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>outHMAC</td>
<td>the returned HMAC in a sized buffer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "HMAC_fp.h"

#if CC_HMAC  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is a restricted key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>handle does not reference a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not an HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>hashAlg is not compatible with the hash algorithm of the scheme of the object referenced by handle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_HMAC(
    HMAC_In         *in,   // IN: input parameter list
    HMAC_Out        *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    HMAC_STATE               hmacState;
    OBJECT                  *hmacObject;
    TPM1_ALG_HASH            hashAlg;
    TPMT_PUBLIC             *publicArea;

    // Input Validation

    // Get HMAC key object and public area pointers
    hmacObject = HandleToObject(in->handle);
    publicArea = &hmacObject->publicArea;
    // Make sure that the key is an HMAC key
    if(publicArea->type != TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_HMAC_handle;
    // and that it is unrestricted
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_HMAC_handle;
    // and that it is a signing key
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_HMAC_handle;
    // See if the key has a default
    if(publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme.scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        // it doesn't so use the input value
        hashAlg = in->hashAlg;
    else
    {
        // key has a default so use it
        hashAlg = publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme.details.hmac.hashAlg;
        // and verify that the input was either the TPM_ALG_NULL or the default
        if(in->hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL && in->hashAlg != hashAlg)
            hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
    }
    // if we ended up without a hash algorithm then return an error
    if(hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_HMAC_hashAlg;

    // Command Output
```

The code snippet above includes the necessary headers for `Tpm.h` and `HMAC_fp.h` and defines a function `TPM2_HMAC` that takes in an input parameter list `in` and an output parameter list `out`. It performs input validation to ensure that the HMAC key is an HMAC key, unrestricted, and a signing key. It also checks if the key has a default hash algorithm and uses it if present. If no default is found or if the input hash algorithm differs from the default, it returns an error. The function then proceeds with the command output.
51 // Start HMAC stack
52 out->outHMAC.t.size = CryptHmacStart2B(&hmacState, hashAlg, 
53   &hmacObject->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b);
54 // Adding HMAC data
55 CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hmacState.hashState, &in->buffer.b);
56 // Complete HMAC
57 CryptHmacEnd2B(&hmacState, &out->outHMAC.b);
58 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
59 }
60 #endif // CC_HMAC
15.6 TPM2_MAC

15.6.1 General Description

This command performs an HMAC or a block cipher MAC on the supplied data using the indicated algorithm.

NOTE 1 A TPM can implement either TPM2_HMAC() or TPM2_MAC() but not both as they have the same command code and there is no way to distinguish them. A TPM that supports TPM2_MAC() will support any code that was written to use TPM2_HMAC() but a TPM that supports TPM2_HMAC() will not support a MAC based on symmetric block ciphers.

The caller shall provide proper authorization for use of handle.

If the sign attribute is not SET in the key referenced by handle then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY.

If the key type is neither TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH nor TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE. If the key referenced by handle has the restricted attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

NOTE 2 For symmetric signing with a restricted key, see TPM2_Sign(). TPM2_MAC() has no ticket parameter, which is required with a restricted key.

If the default scheme or mode of the key referenced by handle is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the inScheme parameter is required to be either the same as the key’s default or TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE).

If the default scheme of an HMAC key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then inScheme is required to be a valid hash and not TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE) (see algorithm selection matrix in Table 79).

If the default mode of a symmetric cipher key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then inScheme is required to be a valid block cipher mode for authentication and not TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE)

NOTE 3 A key can only have both sign and decrypt SET if the key is unrestricted. When both sign and decrypt are set, there is no default scheme for the key and inScheme may not be TPM_ALG_NULL.

NOTE 4 TPM2_MAC() was added in revision 01.43.
## 15.6.2 Command and Response

### Table 70 — TPM2_MAC Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_MAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TPMI_DH_OBJECT            | @handle         | handle for the symmetric signing key providing the MAC key  
Auth Index: 1  
Auth Role: USER |
| TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER          | buffer          | MAC data                           |
| TPMI_ALG_MAC_SCHEME+      | inScheme        | algorithm to use for MAC           |

### Table 71 — TPM2_MAC Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>outMAC</td>
<td>the returned MAC in a sized buffer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "MAC_fp.h"

#if CC_MAC  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is a restricted key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>handle does not reference a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not an HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>hashAlg is not compatible with the hash algorithm of the scheme of the object referenced by handle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_MAC(
    MAC_In         *in,   // IN: input parameter list
    MAC_Out        *out,  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    OBJECT                  *keyObject;
    HMAC_STATE               state;
    TPMT_PUBLIC             *publicArea;
    TPM_RC                   result;

    // Input Validation
    // Get MAC key object and public area pointers
    keyObject = HandleToObject(in->handle);
    publicArea = &keyObject->publicArea;

    // If the key is not able to do a MAC, indicate that the handle selects an
    // object that can't do a MAC
    result = CryptSelectMac(publicArea, &in->inScheme);
    if(result == TPM_RCS_TYPE)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_MAC_handle;
    // If there is another error type, indicate that the scheme and key are not
    // compatible
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_MAC_inScheme);
    // Make sure that the key is not restricted
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_MAC_handle;
    // and that it is a signing key
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_MAC_handle;

    // Command Output
    out->outMAC.t.size = CryptMacStart(&state, &publicArea->parameters,
                                        in->inScheme,
                                        &keyObject->sensitive.sensitive.any.b);
    if(out->outMAC.t.size == 0)
        return TPM_RC_FAILURE;
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&state.hashState, &in->buffer.b);
    if(CryptHmacEnd2B(&state, &out->outMAC.b) != out->outMAC.t.size)
        return TPM_RC_FAILURE;
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_MAC
```
16 Random Number Generator

16.1 TPM2_GetRandom

16.1.1 General Description

This command returns the next bytesRequested octets from the random number generator (RNG).

NOTE 1 It is recommended that a TPM implement the RNG in a manner that would allow it to return RNG octets such that, as long as the value of bytesRequested is not greater than the maximum digest size, the frequency of bytesRequested being more than the number of octets available is an infrequent occurrence.

If bytesRequested is more than will fit into a TPM2B_DIGEST on the TPM, no error is returned but the TPM will only return as much data as will fit into a TPM2B_DIGEST buffer for the TPM.

NOTE 2 TPM2B_DIGEST is large enough to hold the largest digest that may be produced by the TPM. Because that digest size changes according to the implemented hashes, the maximum amount of data returned by this command is TPM implementation-dependent.
16.1.2 Command and Response

Table 72 — TPM2_GetRandom Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetRandom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>bytesRequested</td>
<td>number of octets to return</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 73 — TPM2_GetRandom Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>randomBytes</td>
<td>the random octets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "GetRandom_fp.h"

#if CC_GetRandom // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_GetRandom(
    GetRandom_In *in,         // IN: input parameter list
    GetRandom_Out *out        // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Command Output

    if(in->bytesRequested > sizeof(TPMU_HA))
        out->randomBytes.t.size = sizeof(TPMU_HA);
    else
        out->randomBytes.t.size = in->bytesRequested;

    CryptRandomGenerate(out->randomBytes.t.size, out->randomBytes.t.buffer);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_GetRandom
```
16.2  TPM2_StirRandom

16.2.1  General Description

This command is used to add "additional information" to the RNG state.

NOTE  The "additional information" is as defined in SP800-90A.

The inData parameter may not be larger than 128 octets.
### 16.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 74 — TPM2_StirRandom Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_StirRandom (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_Sensitive_Data</td>
<td>inData</td>
<td>additional information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 75 — TPM2_StirRandom Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "StirRandom_fp.h"

#if CC_StirRandom // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_StirRandom(
    StirRandom_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Internal Data Update
    CryptRandomStir(in->inData.t.size, in->inData.t.buffer);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_StirRandom
```
17 Hash/HMAC/Event Sequences

17.1 Introduction

All of the commands in this group are to support sequences for which an intermediate state must be maintained. For a description of sequences, see “Hash, MAC, and Event Sequences” in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

A TPM may implement either TPM2_HMAC_Start() or TPM2_MAC_Start() but not both as they have the same command code and there is no way to distinguish them. A TPM that supports TPM2_MAC_Start() will support any code that was written to use TPM2_HMAC_Start() but a TPM that supports TPM2_HMAC_Start() will not support a MAC based on symmetric block ciphers.

17.2 TPM2_HMAC_Start

17.2.1 General Description

This command starts an HMAC sequence. The TPM will create and initialize an HMAC sequence structure, assign a handle to the sequence, and set the authValue of the sequence object to the value in auth.

NOTE 1 The structure of a sequence object is vendor-dependent.

The caller shall provide proper authorization for use of handle.

If the sign attribute is not SET in the key referenced by handle then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY. If the key type is not TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE. If the key referenced by handle has the restricted attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

NOTE 2 For symmetric signing with a restricted key, see TPM2_Sign(). TPM2_HMAC_Start() has no ticket parameter, which is required with a restricted key.

If the default scheme of the key referenced by handle is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the hashAlg parameter is required to be either the same as the key's default or TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE). If the default scheme of the key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then hashAlg is required to be a valid hash and not TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE).

Table 76 — Hash Selection Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>handle→restricted (key's restricted attribute)</th>
<th>handle→scheme (hash algorithm from key's scheme)</th>
<th>hashAlg</th>
<th>hash used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR (unrestricted)</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL(1)</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>error(1) (TPM_RC_VALUE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>valid hash</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>valid hash</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL or same as handle→scheme</td>
<td>handle→scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>valid hash</td>
<td>valid hash</td>
<td>error (TPM_RC_VALUE) if hashAlg ≠ handle→scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SET (restricted)</td>
<td>don't care</td>
<td>don't care</td>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
1) A hash algorithm is required for the HMAC.
NOTE 1

A TPM can implement either TPM2_HMAC_Start() or TPM2_MAC_Start() but not both, as they have the same command code and there is no way to distinguish them. A TPM that supports TPM2_MAC_Start() will support any code that was written to use TPM2_HMAC_Start(), but a TPM that supports TPM2_HMAC_Start() will not support a MAC based on symmetric block ciphers.
### 17.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 77 — TPM2_HMAC_Start Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_HMAC_Start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@handle</td>
<td>handle of an HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B/Auth</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>authorization value for subsequent use of the sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>the hash algorithm to use for the HMAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 78 — TPM2_HMAC_Start Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>sequenceHandle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a handle to reference the sequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "HMAC_Start_fp.h"

#if CC_HMAC_Start  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not a signing key or is restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>no space to create an internal object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not an HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>hashAlg is not compatible with the hash algorithm of the scheme of the object referenced by handle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_HMAC_Start(
    HMAC_Start_In   *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    HMAC_Start_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    OBJECT                  *keyObject;
    TPMT_PUBLIC             *publicArea;
    TPM_ALG_ID               hashAlg;

    // Input Validation
    keyObject = HandleToObject(in->handle);
    publicArea = &keyObject->publicArea;

    // Make sure that the key is an HMAC key
    if(publicArea->type != TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_HMAC_Start_handle;

    // and that it is unrestricted
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_HMAC_Start_handle;

    // and that it is a signing key
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_HMAC_Start_handle;

    // See if the key has a default
    if(publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme.scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        // it doesn't so use the input value
        hashAlg = in->hashAlg;
    else
    {
        // key has a default so use it
        hashAlg = publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme.details.hmac.hashAlg;
        // and verify that the input was either the TPM_ALG_NULL or the default
        if(in->hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL && in->hashAlg != hashAlg)
            hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
    }

    // if we ended up without a hash algorithm then return an error
    if(hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_HMAC_Start_hashAlg;

    // Internal Data Update
```
51     // Create a HMAC sequence object. A TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY error may be
52     // returned at this point
53     return ObjectCreateHMACSequence(hashAlg,
54                                               keyObject,
55                                               &in->auth,
56                                               &out->sequenceHandle);
57 {
58     }  // CC_HMAC_Start
59     #endif // CC_HMAC_Start
17.3  TPM2_MAC_Start

17.3.1  General Description

This command starts a MAC sequence. The TPM will create and initialize a MAC sequence structure, assign a handle to the sequence, and set the `authValue` of the sequence object to the value in `auth`.

NOTE 1  The structure of a sequence object is vendor-dependent.

The caller shall provide proper authorization for use of `handle`.

If the `sign` attribute is not SET in the key referenced by `handle` then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY. If the key type is not TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH or TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE. If the key referenced by `handle` has the `restricted` attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

NOTE 2  For symmetric signing with a restricted key, see TPM2_Sign(). TPM2_MAC_Start() has no ticket parameter, which is required with a restricted key.

If the default scheme of the key referenced by `handle` is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the `inScheme` parameter is required to be either the same as the key's default or TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE). If the default scheme of the key is TPM_ALG_NULL, then `inScheme` is required to be a valid hash or symmetric MAC scheme and not TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_RC_VALUE).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><code>handle</code>→<code>restricted</code> (key's restricted attribute)</th>
<th><code>handle</code>→<code>scheme</code> (algorithm from key's scheme)</th>
<th><code>inScheme</code></th>
<th>algorithm used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR (unrestricted) TPM_ALG_NULL(1)</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td><code>inScheme</code></td>
<td>error(1) (TPM_RC_VALUE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>valid hash or symmetric MAC</td>
<td><code>inScheme</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>not TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL or same as <code>handle</code>→<code>scheme</code></td>
<td><code>inScheme</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>not TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>not TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
<td>error (TPM_RC_VALUE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SET (restricted)</td>
<td>don't care</td>
<td>don't care</td>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
1)  A hash algorithm is required for the HMAC.
2)  `hashAlg` shall be TPM_ALG_NULL for handle referencing a CMAC key.

NOTE 3  For a TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER key, the symmetric block cipher algorithm is part of the key definition.

NOTE 4  TPM2_MAC_Start() was added in revision 01.43.
### 17.3.2 Command and Response

#### Table 80 — TPM2_MAC_Start Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_MAC_Start handle of a MAC key Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@handle</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_MAC_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>the algorithm to use for the MAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 81 — TPM2_MAC_Start Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>sequenceHandle</td>
<td>a handle to reference the sequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "MAC_Start_fp.h"

#if CC_MAC_Start  // Conditional expansion of this file
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not a signing key or is restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>no space to create an internal object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by handle is not an HMAC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>hashAlg is not compatible with the hash algorithm of the scheme of the object referenced by handle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_MAC_Start(
MAC_Start_In  *in,  // IN: input parameter list
MAC_Start_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    OBJECT                  *keyObject;
    TPM2_PUBLIC             *publicArea;
    TPM_RC                   result;

    // Input Validation
    keyObject = HandleToObject(in->handle);
    publicArea = &keyObject->publicArea;

    if (CryptSelectMac(publicArea, &in->inScheme) == TPM_RCS_TYPE)
        return TPM_RCS_TYPE + RC_MAC_Start_handle;
        // If the key is not able to do a MAC, indicate that the handle selects an object that can't do a MAC
    if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_MAC_Start_inScheme);
        // Make sure that the key is not restricted
    if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_MAC_Start_handle;
        // and that it is a signing key
    if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(publicArea->objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_MAC_Start_handle;

    // Internal Data Update
    return ObjectCreateHMACSequence(in->inScheme,
        keyObject,
        &in->auth,
        &out->sequenceHandle);
}
#endif  // CC_MAC_Start
17.4 TPM2_HashSequenceStart

17.4.1 General Description

This command starts a hash or an Event Sequence. If hashAlg is an implemented hash, then a hash sequence is started. If hashAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, then an Event Sequence is started. If hashAlg is neither an implemented algorithm nor TPM_ALG_NULL, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HASH.

Depending on hashAlg, the TPM will create and initialize a Hash Sequence context or an Event Sequence context. Additionally, it will assign a handle to the context and set the authValue of the context to the value in auth. A sequence context for an Event (hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL) contains a hash context for each of the PCR banks implemented on the TPM.
### 17.4.2 Command and Response

Table 82 — TPM2_HashSequenceStart Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_HashSequenceStart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_AUTH</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>authorization value for subsequent use of the sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>the hash algorithm to use for the hash sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An Event Sequence starts if this is TPM_ALG_NULL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 83 — TPM2_HashSequenceStart Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>sequenceHandle</td>
<td>a handle to reference the sequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "HashSequenceStart_fp.h"

#if CC_HashSequenceStart  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>no space to create an internal object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_HashSequenceStart(
    HashSequenceStart_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    HashSequenceStart_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Internal Data Update

    if (in->hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        // Start a event sequence. A TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY error may be
        // returned at this point
        return ObjectCreateEventSequence(&in->auth, &out->sequenceHandle);

    // Start a hash sequence. A TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY error may be
    // returned at this point
    return ObjectCreateHashSequence(in->hashAlg, &in->auth, &out->sequenceHandle);
}
#endif // CC_HashSequenceStart
```
17.5 TPM2_SequenceUpdate

17.5.1 General Description

This command is used to add data to a hash or HMAC sequence. The amount of data in buffer may be any size up to the limits of the TPM.

NOTE 1 In all TPM, a buffer size of 1,024 octets is allowed.

Proper authorization for the sequence object associated with sequenceHandle is required. If an authorization or audit of this command requires computation of a cpHash and an rpHash, the Name associated with sequenceHandle will be the Empty Buffer.

If the command does not return TPM_RC_SUCCESS, the state of the sequence is unmodified.

If the sequence is intended to produce a digest that will be signed by a restricted signing key, then the first block of data shall contain sizeof(TPM_GENERATED) octets and the first octets shall not be TPM_GENERATED_VALUE.

NOTE 2 This requirement allows the TPM to validate that the first block is safe to sign without having to accumulate octets over multiple calls.
## 17.5.2 Command and Response

**Table 84 — TPM2_SequenceUpdate Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SequenceUpdate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@sequenceHandle</td>
<td>handle for the sequence object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>buffer</td>
<td>data to be added to hash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 85 — TPM2_SequenceUpdate Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "SequenceUpdate_fp.h"

#if CC_SequenceUpdate  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MODE</td>
<td>sequenceHandle does not reference a hash or HMAC sequence object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_SequenceUpdate(
    SequenceUpdate_In   *in       // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    OBJECT                  *object;
    HASH_OBJECT             *hashObject;

    // Input Validation

    // Get sequence object pointer
    object = HandleToObject(in->sequenceHandle);
    hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)object;

    // Check that referenced object is a sequence object.
    if(!ObjectIsSequence(object))
        return TPM_RC_MODE + RC_SequenceUpdate_sequenceHandle;

    // Internal Data Update

    if(object->attributes.eventSeq == SET)
    {
        // Update event sequence object
        UINT32 i;
        for(i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
        {
            // Update sequence object
            CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashObject->state.hashState[i], &in->buffer.b);
        }
    } else
    {
        // Update hash/HMAC sequence object
        if(hashObject->attributes.hashSeq == SET)
        {
            // Is this the first block of the sequence
            if(hashObject->attributes.firstBlock == CLEAR)
            {
                // If so, indicate that first block was received
                hashObject->attributes.firstBlock = SET;

                // Check the first block to see if the first block can contain
                // the TPM_GENERATED_VALUE. If it does, it is not safe for
                // a ticket.
                if(TicketIsSafe(&in->buffer.b))
                    hashObject->attributes.ticketSafe = SET;
            }
            // Update sequence object hash/HMAC stack
            CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashObject->state.hashState[0], &in->buffer.b);
        } else if(object->attributes.hmacSeq == SET)
    }
```
56     {
57         // Update sequence object HMAC stack
58         CryptDigestUpdate2B(hashObject->state.hmacState.hashState,
59             &in->buffer.b);
60     }
61 }
62     return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
63 }
64 #endif // CC_SequenceUpdate
17.6  TPM2_SequenceComplete

17.6.1  General Description

This command adds the last part of data, if any, to a hash/HMAC sequence and returns the result.

NOTE 1  This command is not used to complete an Event Sequence. TPM2_EventSequenceComplete() is used for that purpose.

For a hash sequence, if the results of the hash will be used in a signing operation that uses a restricted signing key, then the ticket returned by this command can indicate that the hash is safe to sign.

If the digest is not safe to sign, then validation will be a TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK with the hierarchy set to TPM_RH_NULL and digest set to the Empty Buffer.

If hierarchy is TPM_RH_NULL, then digest in the ticket will be the Empty Buffer.

NOTE 2  Regardless of the contents of the first octets of the hashed message, if the first buffer sent to the TPM had fewer than sizeof(TPM_GENERATED) octets, then the TPM will operate as if digest is not safe to sign.

NOTE 3  The ticket is only required for a signing operation that uses a restricted signing key. It is always returned but can be ignored if not needed.

If sequenceHandle references an Event Sequence, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_MODE.

Proper authorization for the sequence object associated with sequenceHandle is required. If an authorization or audit of this command requires computation of a cpHash and an rpHash, the Name associated with sequenceHandle will be the Empty Buffer.

If this command completes successfully, the sequenceHandle object will be flushed.
### Command and Response

**Table 86 — TPM2_SequenceComplete Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SequenceComplete (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@sequenceHandle</td>
<td>authorization for the sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>buffer</td>
<td>data to be added to the hash/HMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY+</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>hierarchy of the ticket for a hash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 87 — TPM2_SequenceComplete Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>result</td>
<td>the returned HMAC or digest in a sized buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK</td>
<td>validation</td>
<td>ticket indicating that the sequence of octets used to compute outDigest did not start with TPM_GENERATED_VALUE This is a NULL Ticket when the sequence is HMAC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "SequenceComplete_fp.h"

#if CC_SequenceComplete  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MODE</td>
<td>sequenceHandle does not reference a hash or HMAC sequence object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_SequenceComplete(
    SequenceComplete_In   *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    SequenceComplete_Out  *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    HASH_OBJECT       *hashObject;
    // Input validation
    // Get hash object pointer
    hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)HandleToObject(in->sequenceHandle);
    // input handle must be a hash or HMAC sequence object.
    if(hashObject->attributes.hashSeq == CLEAR
        && hashObject->attributes.hmacSeq == CLEAR)
        return TPM_RCS_MODE + RC_SequenceComplete_sequenceHandle;
    // Command Output
    if(hashObject->attributes.hashSeq == SET)  // sequence object for hash
    {
        // Get the hash algorithm before the algorithm is lost in CryptHashEnd
        TPM_ALG_ID       hashAlg = hashObject->state.hashState[0].hashAlg;
        // Update last piece of the data
        CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashObject->state.hashState[0], &in->buffer.b);
        // Complete hash
        out->result.t.size = CryptHashEnd(&hashObject->state.hashState[0],
                                          sizeof(out->result.t.buffer),
                                          out->result.t.buffer);
        // Check if the first block of the sequence has been received
        if(hashObject->attributes.firstBlock == CLEAR)
        {
            // If not, then this is the first block so see if it is 'safe'
            // to sign.
            if(TicketIsSafe(&in->buffer.b))
                hashObject->attributes.ticketSafe = SET;
        }
        // Output ticket
        out->validation.tag = TPM_ST_HASHCHECK;
        out->validation.hierarchy = in->hierarchy;
        if(in->hierarchy == TPM_RH_NULL)
        {
            // Ticket is not required
            out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
        }
        else if(hashObject->attributes.ticketSafe == CLEAR)
        {
            // Ticket is not safe to generate
            out->validation.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
            out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
        }
    }
}
```

```c
56   else
57   {
58       // Compute ticket
59       TicketComputeHashCheck(out->validation.hierarchy, hashAlg,
60           &out->result, &out->validation);
61   }
62
63   else
64   {
65       // Update last piece of data
66       CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashObject->state.hmacState.hashState, &in->buffer.b);
67       #if !SMAC_IMPLEMENTED
68           // Complete HMAC
69           out->result.t.size = CryptHmacEnd(&(hashObject->state.hmacState),
70               sizeof(out->result.t.buffer),
71               out->result.t.buffer);
72       #else
73           // Complete the MAC
74           out->result.t.size = CryptMacEnd(&(hashObject->state.hmacState),
75               sizeof(out->result.t.buffer),
76               out->result.t.buffer);
77       #endif
78       // No ticket is generated for HMAC sequence
79       out->validation.tag = TPM_ST_HASHCHECK;
80       out->validation.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
81       out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
82   }
83   // Internal Data Update
84   // mark sequence object as evict so it will be flushed on the way out
85   hashObject->attributes.evict = SET;
86   return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
87 } // CC_SequenceComplete
```
17.7 TPM2_EventSequenceComplete

17.7.1 General Description

This command adds the last part of data, if any, to an Event Sequence and returns the result in a digest list. If `pcrHandle` references a PCR and not TPM_RH_NULL, then the returned digest list is processed in the same manner as the digest list input parameter to TPM2_PCR_Extend(). That is, if a bank contains a PCR associated with `pcrHandle`, it is extended with the associated digest value from the list.

If `sequenceHandle` references a hash or HMAC sequence, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_MODE.

Proper authorization for the sequence object associated with `sequenceHandle` is required. If an authorization or audit of this command requires computation of a `cpHash` and an `rpHash`, the Name associated with `sequenceHandle` will be the Empty Buffer.

If this command completes successfully, the `sequenceHandle` object will be flushed.

NOTE: Unlike TPM2_PCR_Event(), a digest is always returned for each implemented hash algorithm. There is no option to only return digests for which `pcrHandle` is allocated.
17.7.2 Command and Response

### Table 88 — TPM2_EventSequenceComplete Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_EventSequenceComplete (NV F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR+</td>
<td>@pcrHandle</td>
<td>PCR to be extended with the Event data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@sequenceHandle</td>
<td>authorization for the sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>buffer</td>
<td>data to be added to the Event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 89 — TPM2_EventSequenceComplete Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_DIGEST_VALUES</td>
<td>results</td>
<td>list of digests computed for the PCR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "EventSequenceComplete_fp.h"
#if CC_EventSequenceComplete  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCALITY</td>
<td>PCR extension is not allowed at the current locality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_MODE</td>
<td>input handle is not a valid event sequence object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_EventSequenceComplete(
    EventSequenceComplete_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    EventSequenceComplete_Out *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    HASH_OBJECT *hashObject;
    UINT32 i;
    TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg;
    // Input validation
    // get the event sequence object pointer
    hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)HandleToObject(in->sequenceHandle);
    // input handle must reference an event sequence object
    if(hashObject->attributes.eventSeq != SET)
        return TPM_RC_MODE + RC_EventSequenceComplete_sequenceHandle;
    // see if a PCR extend is requested in call
    if(in->pcrHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
        {  // see if extend of the PCR is allowed at the locality of the command,
            if(!PCRIsExtendAllowed(in->pcrHandle))
                return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
            // if an extend is going to take place, then check to see if there has
            // been an orderly shutdown. If so, and the selected PCR is one of the
            // state saved PCR, then the orderly state has to change. The orderly state
            // does not change for PCR that are not preserved.
            // NOTE: This doesn't just check for Shutdown(STATE) because the orderly
            // state will have to change if this is a state-saved PCR regardless
            // of the current state. This is because a subsequent Shutdown(STATE) will
            // check to see if there was an orderly shutdown and not do anything if
            // there was. So, this must indicate that a future Shutdown(STATE) has
            // something to do.
            if(PCRIsStateSaved(in->pcrHandle))
                RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;
        }
    // Command Output
    out->results.count = 0;
    for(i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
        {
            hashAlg = CryptHashGetAlgByIndex(i);
            // Update last piece of data
            CryptDigestUpdate2B(hashObject->state.hashState[i], &in->buffer.b);
            // Complete hash
            out->results.digests[out->results.count].hashAlg = hashAlg;
            CryptHashEnd(hashObject->state.hashState[i],
                CryptHashGetDigestSize(hashAlg),
                ((BYTE *)&out->results.digests[out->results.count].digest);
```

```
if (in->pcrHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
    PCRExtend(in->pcrHandle, hashAlg,
              CryptHashGetDigestSize(hashAlg),
              (BYTE *)&out->results.digests[out->results.count].digest);
out->results.count++;

// Internal Data Update
// mark sequence object as evict so it will be flushed on the way out
hashObject->attributes.evict = SET;

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

#endif // CC_EventSequenceComplete
18 Attestation Commands

18.1 Introduction

The attestation commands cause the TPM to sign an internally generated data structure. The contents of the data structure vary according to the command.

If the sign attribute is not SET in the key referenced by signHandle then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY.

All signing commands include a parameter (typically inScheme) for the caller to specify a scheme to be used for the signing operation. This scheme will be applied only if the scheme of the key is TPM_ALG_NULL or the key handle is TPM_RH_NULL. If the scheme for signHandle is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then inScheme.scheme shall be TPM_ALG_NULL or the same as scheme in the public area of the key. If the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL or the key handle is TPM_RH_NULL, then inScheme will be used for the signing operation and may not be TPM_ALG_NULL. The TPM shall return TPM_RC_SCHEME to indicate that the scheme is not appropriate.

For a signing key that is not restricted, the caller may specify the scheme to be used as long as the scheme is compatible with the family of the key (for example, TPM_ALG_RSAPSS cannot be selected for an ECC key). If the caller sets scheme to TPM_ALG_NULL, then the default scheme of the key is used. For a restricted signing key, the key's scheme cannot be TPM_ALG_NULL and cannot be overridden.

If the handle for the signing key (signHandle) is TPM_RH_NULL, then all of the actions of the command are performed and the attestation block is “signed” with the NULL Signature.

NOTE 1  This mechanism is provided so that additional commands are not required to access the data that might be in an attestation structure.

NOTE 2  When signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, scheme is still required to be a valid signing scheme (may be TPM_ALG_NULL), but the scheme will have no effect on the format of the signature. It will always be the NULL Signature.

NOTE 3  For TPM2_Quote, a TPM may optionally return TPM_RC_SCHEME if signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL.

NOTE 4  Attestation commands typically use a restricted signing key. A key that is not restricted can sign any digest and would permit a forged attestation. It is common to use a fixedTPM key.

TPM2_NV_Certify() is an attestation command that is documented in 1. The remaining attestation commands are collected in the remainder of clause1.

Each of the attestation structures contains a TPMS_CLOCK_INFO structure and a firmware version number. These values may be considered privacy-sensitive, because they would aid in the correlation of attestations by different keys. To provide improved privacy, the resetCount, restartCount, and firmwareVersion numbers are obfuscated when the signing key is not in the Endorsement or Platform hierarchies.

The obfuscation value is computed by:

\[ \text{obfuscation} \equiv \text{KDFa}(\text{signHandle} \rightarrow \text{nameAlg}, \text{shProof}, \text{“OBFUSCATE”}, \text{signHandle} \rightarrow \text{QN}, 0, 128) \] (3)

Of the returned 128 bits, 64 bits are added to the versionNumber field of the attestation structure; 32 bits are added to the clockInfo.resetCount and 32 bits are added to the clockInfo.restartCount. The order in which the bits are added is implementation-dependent.

NOTE 5  The obfuscation value for each signing key will be unique to that key in a specific location. That is, each version of a duplicated signing key will have a different obfuscation value.

When the signing key is TPM_RH_NULL, the data structure is produced but not signed; and the values in the signed data structure are obfuscated. When computing the obfuscation value for TPM_RH_NULL, the hash used for context integrity is used.
NOTE 5

The QN for TPM_RH_NULL is TPM_RH_NULL.

If the signing scheme of signHandle is an anonymous scheme, then the attestation blocks will not contain the Qualified Name of the signHandle.

Each of the attestation structures allows the caller to provide some qualifying data (qualifyingData). For most signing schemes, this value will be placed in the TPMS_ATTEST.extraData parameter that is then hashed and signed. However, for some schemes such as ECDAA, the qualifyingData is used in a different manner (for details, see “ECDAA” in TPM 2.0 Part 1).
18.2 TPM2_Certify

18.2.1 General Description

The purpose of this command is to prove that an object with a specific Name is loaded in the TPM. By certifying that the object is loaded, the TPM warrants that a public area with a given Name is self-consistent and associated with a valid sensitive area. If a relying party has a public area that has the same Name as a Name certified with this command, then the values in that public area are correct.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

Authorization for objectHandle requires ADMIN role authorization. If performed with a policy session, the session shall have a policySession→commandCode set to TPM_CC_Certify. This indicates that the policy that is being used is a policy that is for certification, and not a policy that would approve another use. That is, authority to use an object does not grant authority to certify the object.

The object may be any object that is loaded with TPM2_Load() or TPM2_CreatePrimary(). An object that only has its public area loaded cannot be certified.

NOTE 2 The restriction occurs because the Name is used to identify the object being certified. If the TPM has not validated that the public area is associated with a matched sensitive area, then the public area may not represent a valid object and cannot be certified.

The certification includes the Name and Qualified Name of the certified object as well as the Name and the Qualified Name of the certifying object.

NOTE 3 If signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPMS_ATTEST structure is returned and signature is a NULL Signature.
### 18.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 90 — TPM2_Certify Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Certify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of the object to be certified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the key used to sign the attestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>user provided qualifying data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 91 — TPM2_Certify Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>certifyInfo</td>
<td>the structure that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the asymmetric signature over certifyInfo using the key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>referenced by signHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "Certify_fp.h"

#if CC_Certify  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inScheme is not compatible with signHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>digest generated for inScheme is greater or has larger size than the modulus of signHandle, or the buffer for the result in signature is too small (for an RSA key); invalid commit status (for an ECC key with a split scheme)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Certify(
    Certify_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    Certify_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM2S_ATTEST certifyInfo;
    OBJECT *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
    OBJECT *certifiedObject = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);
    // Input validation
    if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_Certify_signHandle;
    if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_Certify_inScheme;

    // Command Output
    // Filling in attest information
    // Common fields
    FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData,
                     &certifyInfo);
    // Certify specific fields
    certifyInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY;
    // NOTE: the certified object is not allowed to be TPM_ALG_NULL so
    // 'certifiedObject' will never be NULL
    certifyInfo.attested.certify.name = certifiedObject->name;

    // When using an anonymous signing scheme, need to set the qualified Name to the
    // empty buffer to avoid correlation between keys
    if(CryptIsSchemeAnonymous(in->inScheme.scheme))
        certifyInfo.attested.certify.qualifiedName.t.size = 0;
    else
        certifyInfo.attested.certify.qualifiedName = certifiedObject->qualifiedName;

    // Sign attestation structure.  A NULL signature will be returned if
    // signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL,  A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE, TPM_RC_NV_RATE,
    // TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_SCHEME or TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES error may be returned
    // by SignAttestInfo()
    return SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &certifyInfo,
                          &in->qualifyingData, &out->certifyInfo, &out->signature);
}
#endif  // CC_Certify
```
18.3 TPM2_CertifyCreation

18.3.1 General Description

This command is used to prove the association between an object and its creation data. The TPM will validate that the ticket was produced by the TPM and that the ticket validates the association between a loaded public area and the provided hash of the creation data (creationHash).

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

The TPM will create a test ticket using the Name associated with objectHandle and creationHash as:

\[ \text{HMAC(proof, (TPM\_ST\_CREATION || objectHandle→Name || creationHash))} \] (4)

This ticket is then compared to creation ticket. If the tickets are not the same, the TPM shall return TPM\_RC\_TICKET.

If the ticket is valid, then the TPM will create a TPMS\_ATTEST structure and place creationHash of the command in the creationHash field of the structure. The Name associated with objectHandle will be included in the attestation data that is then signed using the key associated with signHandle.

NOTE 2 If signHandle is TPM\_RH\_NULL, the TPMS\_ATTEST structure is returned and signature is a NULL Signature.

objectHandle may be any object that is loaded with TPM2_Load() or TPM2_CreatePrimary().
### 18.3.2 Command and Response

#### Table 92 — TPM2_CertifyCreation Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_CertifyCreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the key that will sign the attestation block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>the object associated with the creation data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>user-provided qualifying data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>creationHash</td>
<td>hash of the creation data produced by TPM2_Create() or TPM2_CreatePrimary()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_CREATION</td>
<td>creationTicket</td>
<td>ticket produced by TPM2_Create() or TPM2_CreatePrimary()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 93 — TPM2_CertifyCreation Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>certifyInfo</td>
<td>the structure that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature over certifyInfo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "CertifyCreation_fp.h"

#if CC_CertifyCreation   // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inScheme is not compatible with signHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TICKET</td>
<td>creationTicket does not match objectHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>digest generated for inScheme is greater or has larger size than the modulus of signHandle, or the buffer for the result in signature is too small (for an RSA key); invalid commit status (for an ECC key with a split scheme).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_CertifyCreation(
  CertifyCreation_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
  CertifyCreation_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
  TPMT_TK_CREATION ticket;
  TPMS_ATTEST certifyInfo;
  OBJECT *certified = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);
  OBJECT *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);

  // Input Validation
  if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
    return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_CertifyCreation_signHandle;
  if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
    return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_CertifyCreation_inScheme;

  // CertifyCreation specific input validation
  // Re-compute ticket
  TicketComputeCreation(in->creationTicket.hierarchy, &certified->name,
                        &in->creationHash, &ticket);

  // Compare ticket
  if(!MemoryEqual2B(&ticket.digest.b, &in->creationTicket.digest.b))
    return TPM_RCS_TICKET + RC_CertifyCreation_creationTicket;

  // Command Output
  // Common fields
  FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData,
                   &certifyInfo);

  // CertifyCreation specific fields
  // Attestation type
  certifyInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_CREATION;
  certifyInfo.attested.creation.objectName = certified->name;

  // Copy the creationHash
  certifyInfo.attested.creation.creationHash = in->creationHash;

  // Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
  // signObject is TPM_RH_NULL. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE, TPM_RC_NV_RATE,
  // TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_SCHEME or TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES error may be returned at
  // this point
  return SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &certifyInfo,
                        &in->qualifyingData, &out->certifyInfo,
```
\&out-\gt;signature);
}
#endif // CC_CertifyCreation
18.4 TPM2_Quote

18.4.1 General Description

This command is used to quote PCR values.

The TPM will hash the list of PCR selected by PCRselect using the hash algorithm in the selected signing scheme. If the selected signing scheme or the scheme hash algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SCHEME.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

The digest is computed as the hash of the concatenation of all of the digest values of the selected PCR. The concatenation of PCR is described in TPM 2.0 Part 1, Selecting Multiple PCR.

NOTE 2 If signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPMS_ATTEST structure is returned and signature is a NULL Signature.

NOTE 3 A TPM may optionally return TPM_RC_SCHEME if signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL.

NOTE 4 Unlike TPM 1.2, TPM2_Quote does not return the PCR values. See Part 1, “Attesting to PCR” for a discussion of this issue.
### 18.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 94 — TPM2_Quote Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Quote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of key that will perform signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>data supplied by the caller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>PCRselect</td>
<td>PCR set to quote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 95 — TPM2_Quote Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>quoted</td>
<td>the quoted information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature over quoted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "Quote_fp.h"

#if CC_Quote // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>signHandle does not reference a signing key;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme is not compatible with sign key type, or input scheme is not compatible with default scheme, or the chosen scheme is not a valid sign scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Quote(
    Quote_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    Quote_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg;
    TPMS_ATTEST quoted;
    OBJECT *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
    // Input Validation
    if (!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_Quote_signHandle;
    if (!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_Quote_inScheme;
    // Command Output
    // Filling in attest information
    // Common fields
    // FillInAttestInfo may return TPM_RC_SCHEME or TPM_RC_KEY
    FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, in->inScheme, in->qualifyingData, &quoted);
    // Quote specific fields
    // Attestation type
    quoted.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE;
    // Get hash algorithm in sign scheme. This hash algorithm is used to
    // compute PCR digest. If there is no algorithm, then the PCR cannot
    // be digested and this command returns TPM_RC_SCHEME
    hashAlg = in->inScheme.details.any.hashAlg;
    if (hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_Quote_inScheme;
    // Compute PCR digest
    PCRComputeCurrentDigest(hashAlg, &in->PCRselect,
        &quoted.attested.quote.pcrDigest);
    // Copy PCR select. "PCRselect" is modified in PCRComputeCurrentDigest
    // function
    quoted.attested.quote.pcrSelect = in->PCRselect;
    // Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
    // signObject is NULL.
    return SignAttestInfo(signObject, in->inScheme, &quoted, in->qualifyingData,
        &out->quoted, &out->signature);
}
```
#endif // CCQuote
18.5 TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest

18.5.1 General Description

This command returns a digital signature of the audit session digest.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

If sessionHandle is not an audit session, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TYPE.

NOTE 2 A session does not become an audit session until the successful completion of the command in which the session is first used as an audit session.

This command requires authorization from the privacy administrator of the TPM (expressed with Endorsement Authorization) as well as authorization to use the key associated with signHandle.

If this command is audited, then the audit digest that is signed will not include the digest of this command because the audit digest is only updated when the command completes successfully.

This command does not cause the audit session to be closed and does not reset the digest value.

NOTE 3 If sessionHandle is used as an audit session for this command, the command is audited in the same manner as any other command.

NOTE 4 If signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPMS_ATTEST structure is returned and signature is a NULL Signature.
### 18.5.2 Command and Response

#### Table 96 — TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetSessionAuditDigest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_ENDORSEMENT</td>
<td>@privacyAdminHandle</td>
<td>handle of the privacy administrator (TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_HMAC</td>
<td>sessionHandle</td>
<td>handle of the audit session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>user-provided qualifying data – may be zero-length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 97 — TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>auditInfo</td>
<td>the audit information that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature over auditInfo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.5.3 Detailed Actions

#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "GetSessionAuditDigest_fp.h"

#if CC_GetSessionAuditDigest  // Conditional expansion of this file

Error Return  Meaning
TPM_RC_KEY  key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key
TPM_RC_SCHEME  inScheme is incompatible with signHandle type; or both scheme and key's default scheme are empty; or scheme is empty while key's default scheme requires explicit input scheme (split signing); or non-empty default key scheme differs from scheme
TPM_RC_TYPE  sessionHandle does not reference an audit session
TPM_RC_VALUE  digest generated for the given scheme is greater than the modulus of signHandle (for an RSA key); invalid commit status or failed to generate r value (for an ECC key)

TPM_RC

TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest(
GetSessionAuditDigest_In    *in,   // IN: input parameter list
GetSessionAuditDigest_Out   *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
   SESSION *session = SessionGet(in->sessionHandle);
   TPMS_ATTEST auditInfo;
   OBJECT *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
   // Input Validation
   if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
      return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_GetSessionAuditDigest_signHandle;
   if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
      return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_GetSessionAuditDigest_inScheme;
   // session must be an audit session
   if(session->attributes.isAudit == CLEAR)
      return TPM_RC_TYPE + RC_GetSessionAuditDigest_sessionHandle;
   // Command Output
   // Fill in attest information common fields
   FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData,
   &auditInfo);
   // SessionAuditDigest specific fields
   auditInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_SESSION_AUDIT;
   auditInfo.attested.sessionAudit.sessionDigest = session->u2.auditDigest;
   // Exclusive audit session
   auditInfo.attested.sessionAudit.exclusiveSession
      = (g_exclusiveAuditSession == in->sessionHandle);
   // Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
   // signObject is NULL.
   return SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &auditInfo,
   &in->qualifyingData, &out->auditInfo,
   &out->signature);
} #endif  // CC_GetSessionAuditDigest
18.6 TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest

18.6.1 General Description

This command returns the current value of the command audit digest, a digest of the commands being audited, and the audit hash algorithm. These values are placed in an attestation structure and signed with the key referenced by `signHandle`.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

When this command completes successfully, and `signHandle` is not TPM_RH_NULL, the audit digest is cleared. If `signHandle` is TPM_RH_NULL, `signature` is the Empty Buffer and the audit digest is not cleared.

NOTE 2 The way that the TPM tracks that the digest is clear is vendor-dependent. The reference implementation resets the size of the digest to zero.

If this command is being audited, then the signed digest produced by the command will not include the command. At the end of this command, the audit digest will be extended with `cpHash` and the `rpHash` of the command, which would change the command audit digest signed by the next invocation of this command.

This command requires authorization from the privacy administrator of the TPM (expressed with Endorsement Authorization) as well as authorization to use the key associated with `signHandle`.
18.6.2 Command and Response

Table 98 — TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_ENDORSEMENT</td>
<td>@privacyHandle</td>
<td>handle of the privacy administrator (TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>the handle of the signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>other data to associate with this audit digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 99 — TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>auditInfo</td>
<td>the auditInfo that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature over auditInfo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "GetCommandAuditDigest_fp.h"

#if CC_GetCommandAuditDigest // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPM_RC Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>Key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inScheme is incompatible with signHandle type; or both scheme and key's default scheme are empty; or scheme is empty while key's default scheme requires explicit input scheme (split signing); or non-empty default key scheme differs from scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>Digest generated for the given scheme is greater than the modulus of signHandle (for an RSA key); invalid commit status or failed to generate r value (for an ECC key)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest(
    GetCommandAuditDigest_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    GetCommandAuditDigest_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                  result;
    TPMS_ATTEST             auditInfo;
    OBJECT                 *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
    // Input validation
    if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_GetCommandAuditDigest_signHandle;
    if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_GetCommandAuditDigest_inScheme;

    // Command Output
    // Fill in attest information common fields
    FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData, &auditInfo);

    // CommandAuditDigest specific fields
    auditInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_COMMAND_AUDIT;
    auditInfo.attested.commandAudit.digestAlg = gp.auditHashAlg;
    auditInfo.attested.commandAudit.auditCounter = gp.auditCounter;

    // Copy command audit log
    auditInfo.attested.commandAudit.auditDigest = gr.commandAuditDigest;
    CommandAuditGetDigest(&auditInfo.attested.commandAudit.commandDigest);

    // Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
    // signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE, TPM_RC_NV_RATE,
    // TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_SCHEME or TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES error may be returned at
    // this point
    result = SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &auditInfo,
        &in->qualifyingData, &out->auditInfo,
        &out->signature);

    // Internal Data Update
    if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && in->signHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
        // Reset log
        gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size = 0;
    return result;
```
48    }
49  #endif // CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
18.7 TPM2_GetTime

18.7.1 General Description

This command returns the current values of *Time* and *Clock*.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

The values of *Clock*, *resetCount* and *restartCount* appear in two places in *timeInfo*: once in TPMS_ATTEST.clockInfo and again in TPMS_ATTEST.attested.time.clockInfo. The firmware version number also appears in two places (TPMS_ATTEST.firmwareVersion and TPMS_ATTEST.attested.time.firmwareVersion). If *signHandle* is in the endorsement or platform hierarchies, both copies of the data will be the same. However, if *signHandle* is in the storage hierarchy or is TPM_RH_NULL, the values in TPMS_ATTEST.clockInfo and TPMS_ATTEST.firmwareVersion are obfuscated but the values in TPMS_ATTEST.attested.time are not.

NOTE 2 The purpose of this duplication is to allow an entity who is trusted by the privacy Administrator to correlate the obfuscated values with the clear-text values. This command requires Endorsement Authorization.

NOTE 3 If *signHandle* is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPMS_ATTEST structure is returned and *signature* is a NULL Signature.
### 18.7.2 Command and Response

#### Table 100 — TPM2_GetTime Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetTime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_ENDORSEMENT</td>
<td>@privacyAdminHandle</td>
<td>handle of the privacy administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>the keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>data to tick stamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 101 — TPM2_GetTime Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>timeInfo</td>
<td>standard TPM-generated attestation block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature over timeInfo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.7.3 Detailed Actions

```
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "GetTime_fp.h"

#if CC_GetTime  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inScheme is incompatible with signHandle type; or both scheme and key's default scheme are empty; or scheme is empty while key's default scheme requires explicit input scheme (split signing); or non-empty default key scheme differs from scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>digest generated for the given scheme is greater than the modulus of signHandle (for an RSA key); invalid commit status or failed to generate r value (for an ECC key)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_GetTime(
    GetTime_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    GetTime_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_ATTEST timeInfo;
    OBJECT *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);

    // Input Validation
    if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_GetTime_signHandle;
    if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_GetTime_inScheme;

    // Command Output
    // Fill in attest common fields
    FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData, &timeInfo);

    // GetClock specific fields
    timeInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_TIME;
    timeInfo.attested.time.time = g_time;
    TimeFillInfo(&timeInfo.attested.time.time.clockInfo);

    // Firmware version in plain text
    timeInfo.attested.time.firmwareVersion
        = (((UINT64)gp.firmwareV1) << 32) + gp.firmwareV2;

    // Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
    // signObject is NULL.
    return SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &timeInfo, &in->qualifyingData,
                          &timeInfo, &signature);
}
#endif  // CC_GetTime
```

18.8 TPM2_CertifyX509

18.8.1 General Description

The purpose of this command is to generate an X.509 certificate that proves an object with a specific public key and attributes is loaded in the TPM. In contrast to TPM2_Certify, which uses a TCG-defined
data structure to convey attestation information, TPM2_CertifyX509 encodes the attestation information in a DER-encoded X.509 certificate that is compliant with RFC5280. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.

As described in RFC, an X.509 certificate contains a collection of data that is hashed and signed. The full signature is the combination of the to be signed (TBS) data, a description of the signature algorithm, and the signature over the TBS data. The elements of the TBS data structure are DER-encoded values. They are:

1) Version [0] – integer value of 2 indicating version 3
2) Certificate Serial Number – integer value
3) Signature Algorithm Identifier – values (usually a collection of OIDs) identifying the algorithm used for the signature
4) Issuer Name – X.501 type Name to identify the entity that has authorized the use of signHandle to create the certificate.
5) Validity – two time values indicating the period during which the certificate is valid
6) Subject Name – X.501 type Name that identifies the entity that authorized the use of objectHandle
7) Subject Public Key Info – the public key associated with objectHandle.
8) Extensions [3] – a set of values that “provide methods for associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for managing relationships between CAs.”

NOTE 1: The numbers in square brackets (e.g., [0]) indicate application-specific tag values that are used to identify the type of the field.

NOTE 2: RFC 5280 describes two fields (issuerUniqueID and subjectUniqueID) but goes on to say: “CAs conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with unique identifiers.” The TPM does not allow them to be present.

The caller provides a partial certificate (partialCertificate) parameter that contains four or five of the elements enumerated above in a DER encoded SEQUENCE. They are:

1) Signature Algorithm Identifier (optional)
2) Issuer (mandatory)
3) Validity (mandatory)
4) Subject Name (mandatory)
5) Extensions (mandatory)

The fields are required to be in the order in which they are listed above.

NOTE 3: The TPM determines if the Signature Algorithm Identifier element is present by counting the elements.

The optional Signature Algorithm Identifier may be provided by the caller. If it is not present, the TPM will generate the value based on the selected signing scheme. If the caller provides this value, then the TPM will use it in the completed TBS. The TPM will not validate that the provided values are compatible with the signing scheme. If the caller does not provide this field and the TPM does not have OID values for the signing scheme, then the TPM will return an error (TPM_RC_SCHEME).

NOTE 4: The TPM may implement signing schemes for which OIDs are not defined at the time the TPM was manufactured. Those schemes may still be used if the caller can provide the Signature Algorithm Identifier.
The Extensions element is required to contain a Key Usage extension. The TPM will extract the Key Usage values and verify that the attributes of objectHandle are consistent with the selected values (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES)(See Part 2, TPMA_X509_KEY_USAGE).

The Extensions element may contain a TPMA_OBJECT extension. If present, the TPM will extract the value and verify that the extension value exactly matches the TPMA_OBJECT of objectKey (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES). The element uses the TCG OID tcg-tpmaObject, 2.23.133.10.1.1. It is a SEQUENCE containing that OID and an OCTET STRING encapsulating a 4-byte BIT STRING holding the big endian TPMA_OBJECT.

signHandle is required to have the sign attribute SET (TPM_RC_KEY).

NOTE 5: See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

Authorization for objectHandle requires ADMIN role authorization. If performed with a policy session, the session shall have a policySession→commandCode set to TPM_CC_CertifyX509. This indicates that the policy that is being used is a policy that is for certification, and not a policy that would approve another use. That is, authority to use an object does not grant authority to certify the object.

If objectHandle does not have a sensitive area loaded, the TPM will return an error (TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE).

NOTE 6: The command requires that authorization be provided for use of objectHandle. An object that only has its publicArea loaded does not have an authorization value and the authPolicy has no meaning as the sensitive area is not present.

The TPM will create the Version, the Certificate Serial Number, the Subject Public Key Info, and, if not provided by the caller, the Signature Algorithm Identifier. These TPM-created values will be combined with the provided values to make a full TBSCertificate structure (See RFC 5280, clause 4.1). The TPM will then sign the certificate using the selected signing scheme.

The TPM-created values will be returned in addedToCertificate. If the TPM creates the Signature Algorithm Identifier, it will be in addedToCertificate before the Subject Public Key Info. The TPM returns tbsDigest as a debugging aid.

NOTE 7: These returned fields allow the caller to unambiguously create a full RFC5280-defined TBSCertificate.

NOTE 8: This command was added in revision 01.53.
### 18.8.2 Command and Response

**Table 102 — TPM2_CertifyX509 Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_CertifyX509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of the object to be certified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the key used to sign the attestation structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>reserved</td>
<td>shall be an Empty Buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>partialCertificate</td>
<td>a DER encoded partial certificate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 103 — TPM2_CertifyX509 Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>addedToCertificate</td>
<td>a DER encoded SEQUENCE containing the DER encoded fields added to partialCertificate to make it a complete RFC5280 TBSCertificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>tbsDigest</td>
<td>the digest that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>The signature over tbsDigest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.8.3  Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "CertifyX509_fp.h"
#include "X509.h"
#include "TpmASN1_fp.h"
#include "X509_spt_fp.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#if CERTIFYX509_DEBUG
#include "Platform_fp.h"
#endif

#if CC_CertifyX509 // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>the attributes of objectHandle are not compatible with the KeyUsage() or TPMA_OBJECT values in the extensions fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td>the public and private portions of the key are not properly bound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>the hash algorithm in the scheme is not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>signHandle does not reference a signing key;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme is not compatible with sign key type, or input scheme is not compatible with default scheme, or the chosen scheme is not a valid sign scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>most likely a problem with the format of partialCertificate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_CertifyX509(
    CertifyX509_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    CertifyX509_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC
    result;
    OBJECT *signKey = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
    OBJECT *object = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);
    HASH_STATE hash;
    INT16 length;   // length for a tagged element
    ASN1UnmarshalContext ctx;
    ASN1MarshalContext ctxOut;
    // certTBS holds an array of pointers and lengths. Each entry references the corresponding value in a TBSCertificate structure. For example, the 1th
    // element references the version number
    stringRef certTBS[REF_COUNT] = {{0}};
    #define ALLOWED_SEQUENCES (SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_REF - SIGNATURE_REF)
    stringRef partial[ALLOWED_SEQUENCES] = {{0}};
    INT16 countOfSequences = 0;
    INT16 i;
    //
    #if CERTIFYX509_DEBUG
    DebugFileInit();
    DebugDumpBuffer(in->partialCertificate.t.size, in->partialCertificate.t.buffer, "partialCertificate");
    #endif
    // Input Validation
    if(in->reserved.b.size != 0)
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_CertifyX509_reserved;
    // signing key must be able to sign
    if(!IsSigningObject(signKey))
```
return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_CertifyX509_signHandle;

// Pick a scheme for sign. If the input sign scheme is not compatible with
// the default scheme, return an error.
if (CryptSelectSignScheme(signKey, &in->inScheme))
    return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_CertifyX509_inScheme;

// Make sure that the public Key encoding is known
if (!X509AddPublicKey(NULL, object))
    return TPM_RCS_ASYMMETRIC + RC_CertifyX509_objectHandle;

// Unbundle 'partialCertificate'.
// Initialize the unmarshaling context
if (ASN1UnmarshalContextInitialize(&ctx, in->partialCertificate.t.size,
in->partialCertificate.t.buffer))
    return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;

// Make sure that this is a constructed SEQUENCE
length = ASN1NextTag(&ctx);
// Must be a constructed SEQUENCE that uses all of the input parameter
if (ctx.tag != (ASN1_CONSTRUCTED_SEQUENCE))
    || (ctx.offset + length != in->partialCertificate.t.size)
return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;

// This scans through the contents of the outermost SEQUENCE. This would be the
// 'issuer', 'validity', 'subject', 'issuerUniqueID' (optional),
// 'subjectUniqueID' (optional), and 'extensions'.
while (ctx.offset < ctx.size)
{
    INT16 startOfElement = ctx.offset;
    // Read the next tag and length field.
    length = ASN1NextTag(&ctx);
    if (length < 0)
        break;
    if (ctx.tag == X509_EXTENSIONS)
    {
        if (certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].len != 0)
            return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;
        certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].buf = &ctx.buffer[startOfElement];
        ctx.offset += length;
        certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].len = (INT16)ctx.offset - startOfElement;
        if (++countOfSequences > ALLOWED_SEQUENCES)
            break;
    }
    else
    {
        if (certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].len != 0)
            return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;
        certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].buf = &ctx.buffer[startOfElement];
        ctx.offset += length;
        certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].len =
            (INT16)ctx.offset - startOfElement;
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;
    }
    // Make sure that we used all of the data and found at least the required
    // number of elements.
    if (ctx.offset != ctx.size) || (countOfSequences < 3)
        || (countOfSequences > 4)
        || (certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF].buf == 0)
    return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate;

    // Now that we know how many sequences there were, we can put them where they
    // belong
    for (i = 0; i < countOfSequences; i++)
        certTBS[SUBJECT_KEY_REF - i] = partial[countOfSequences - 1 - i];

    // If only three SEQUENCES, then the TPM needs to produce the signature algorithm.
    // See if it can
    if ((countOfSequences == 3) &&
        (X509AddSigningAlgorithm(NULL, signKey, &in->inScheme) == 0))
```c
return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_CertifyX509_signHandle;

// Process the extensions
result = X509ProcessExtensions(object, &certTBS[EXTENSIONS_REF]);
if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result + ((result == TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES)
        ? RC_CertifyX509_objectHandle
        : RC_CertifyX509_partialCertificate);

// Command Output
// Create the addedToCertificate values
// Build the addedToCertificate from the bottom up.
// Initialize the context structure
ASN1InitializeMarshalContext(&ctxOut, sizeof(out->addedToCertificate.t.buffer),
    out->addedToCertificate.t.buffer);
// Place a marker for the overall context
ASN1StartMarshalContext(&ctxOut); // SEQUENCE for addedToCertificate

// Add the subject public key descriptor
certTBS[SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_REF].len = X509AddPublicKey(&ctxOut, object);
certTBS[SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_REF].buf = ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset;
// If the caller didn't provide the algorithm identifier, create it
if (certTBS[SIGNATURE_REF].len == 0)
{
    certTBS[SIGNATURE_REF].len = X509AddSigningAlgorithm(&ctxOut, signKey, 
        in->inScheme);
    certTBS[SIGNATURE_REF].buf = ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset;
}
// Create the serial number value. Use the out->tbsDigest as scratch.
{
    TPM2B *digest = &out->tbsDigest.b;
    //
    digest->size = (INT16)CryptHashStart(&hash, signKey->publicArea.nameAlg);
    pAssert(digest->size != 0);
    // The serial number size is the smaller of the digest and the vendor-defined
    // value.
    digest->size = MIN(digest->size, SIZE_OF_X509_SERIAL_NUMBER);
    // Add all the parts of the certificate other than the serial number
    // and version number
    for (i = SIGNATURE_REF; i < REF_COUNT; i++)
        CryptDigestUpdate(&hash, certTBS[i].len, certTBS[i].buf);
    // throw in the Name of the signing key...
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hash, &signKey->name.b);
    // ...and the Name of the signed key.
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hash, &object->name.b);
    // Done
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hash, digest);
}
// Add the serial number
certTBS[SERIAL_NUMBER_REF].len =
    ASN1PushInteger(&ctxOut, out->tbsDigest.t.size, out->tbsDigest.t.buffer);
certTBS[SERIAL_NUMBER_REF].buf = ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset;

// Add the static version number
ASN1StartMarshalContext(&ctxOut);
ASN1PushUINT(&ctxOut, 2);
certTBS[VERSION_REF].len =
    ASN1EndEncapsulation(&ctxOut, ASN1_APPLICATION_SPECIFIC);
certTBS[VERSION_REF].buf = ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset;

// Create a fake tag and length for the TBS in the space used for
// 'addedToCertificate'
```

```
{  
    for(length = 0, i = 0; i < REF_COUNT; i++)  
        length += certTBS[i].len;  
    // Put a fake tag and length into the buffer for use in the tbsDigest  
    certTBS[ENCODED_SIZE_REF].len =  
        ASN1PushTagAndLength(&ctxOut, ASN1_CONSTRUCTED_SEQUENCE, length);  
    certTBS[ENCODED_SIZE_REF].buf = ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset;  
    // Restore the buffer pointer to add back the number of octets used for the  
    // tag and length  
    ctxOut.offset += certTBS[ENCODED_SIZE_REF].len;  
}

    // sanity check  
    if(ctxOut.offset < 0)  
        return TPM_RC_FAILURE;  
    // Create the tbsDigest to sign  
    out->tbsDigest.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hash, in->inScheme.details.any.hashAlg);  
    for(i = 0; i < REF_COUNT; i++)  
        CryptDigestUpdate(&hash, certTBS[i].len, certTBS[i].buf);  
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hash, &out->tbsDigest.b);

#if CERTIFYX509_DEBUG  
    {  
        BYTE fullTBS[4096];  
        BYTE *fill = fullTBS;  
        int j;  
        for (j = 0; j < REF_COUNT; j++)  
            {  
                MemoryCopy(fill, certTBS[j].buf, certTBS[j].len);  
                fill += certTBS[j].len;  
            }  
        DebugDumpBuffer((int)(fill - &fullTBS[0]), fullTBS, "\nfull TBS");  
    }  
#endif

    // Finish up the processing of addToCertificate  
    // Create the actual tag and length for the addToCertificate structure  
    out->addToCertificate.t.size =  
        ASN1EndEncapsulation(&ctxOut, ASN1_CONSTRUCTED_SEQUENCE);  
    // Now move all the addToContext to the start of the buffer  
    MemoryCopy(out->addToCertificate.t.buffer, ctxOut.buffer + ctxOut.offset,  
        out->addToCertificate.t.size);  
#if CERTIFYX509_DEBUG  
    DebugDumpBuffer(out->addToCertificate.t.size, out->addToCertificate.t.buffer,  
        "\naddedToCertificate");  
#endif

    // only thing missing is the signature  
    result = CryptSign(signKey, &in->inScheme, &out->tbsDigest, &out->signature);  
    return result;  
}  
#endif // CC_CertifyX509
19  Ephemeral EC Keys

19.1  Introduction

The TPM generates keys that have different lifetimes. TPM keys in a hierarchy can be persistent for as long as the seed of the hierarchy is unchanged and these keys may be used multiple times. Other TPM-generated keys are only useful for a single operation. Some of these single-use keys are used in the command in which they are created. Examples of this use are TPM2_Duplicate() where an ephemeral key is created for a single pass key exchange with another TPM. However, there are other cases, such as anonymous attestation, where the protocol requires two passes where the public part of the ephemeral key is used outside of the TPM before the final command "consumes" the ephemeral key.

For these uses, TPM2_Commit() or TPM2_EC_Ephemeral() may be used to have the TPM create an ephemeral EC key and return the public part of the key for external use. Then in a subsequent command, the caller provides a reference to the ephemeral key so that the TPM can retrieve or recreate the associated private key.

When an ephemeral EC key is created, it is assigned a number and that number is returned to the caller as the identifier for the key. This number is not a handle. A handle is assigned to a key that may be context saved but these ephemeral EC keys may not be saved and do not have a full key context. When a subsequent command uses the ephemeral key, the caller provides the number of the ephemeral key. The TPM uses that number to either look up or recompute the associated private key. After the key is used, the TPM records the fact that the key has been used so that it cannot be used again.

As mentioned, the TPM can keep each assigned private ephemeral key in memory until it is used. However, this could consume a large amount of memory. To limit the memory size, the TPM is allowed to restrict the number of pending private keys – keys that have been allocated but not used.

NOTE  The minimum number of ephemeral keys is determined by a platform specific specification

To further reduce the memory requirements for ephemeral private keys, the TPM is allowed to use pseudo-random values for the ephemeral keys. Instead of keeping the full value of the key in memory, the TPM can use a counter as input to a KDF. Incrementing the counter will cause the TPM to generate a new pseudo-random value.

Using the counter to generate pseudo-random private ephemeral keys greatly simplifies tracking of key usage. When a counter value is used to create a key, a bit in an array may be set to indicate that the key use is pending. When the ephemeral key is consumed, the bit is cleared. This prevents the key from being used more than once.

Since the TPM is allowed to restrict the number of pending ephemeral keys, the array size can be limited. For example, a 128 bit array would allow 128 keys to be "pending".

The management of the array is described in greater detail in the Split Operations clause in Annex C of TPM 2.0 Part 1.
19.2 TPM2_Commit

19.2.1 General Description

TPM2_Commit() performs the first part of an ECC anonymous signing operation. The TPM will perform the point multiplications on the provided points and return intermediate signing values. The signHandle parameter shall refer to an ECC key and the signing scheme must be anonymous (TPM_RC_SCHEME).

NOTE 1 Currently, TPM_ALG_ECDAA is the only defined anonymous scheme.

NOTE 2 This command cannot be used with a sign+decrypt key because that type of key is required to have a scheme of TPM_ALG_NULL.

For this command, p1, s2 and y2 are optional parameters. If s2 is an Empty Buffer, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE if y2 is not an Empty Buffer.

The algorithm is specified in the TPM 2.0 Part 1 Annex for ECC, TPM2_Commit().
19.2.2 Command and Response

Table 104 — TPM2_commit Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Cmmit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the key that will be used in the signing operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>a point (M) on the curve used by signHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B宋SENSITIVE_DATA</td>
<td>s2</td>
<td>octet array used to derive x-coordinate of a base point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER</td>
<td>y2</td>
<td>y coordinate of the point associated with s2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 105 — TPM2_commit Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>ECC point K := [dL](x2, y2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>ECC point L := [r](x2, y2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>ECC point E := [r]P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>counter</td>
<td>least-significant 16 bits of commitCount</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Commit_fp.h"

#if CC_Commit  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>keyHandle references a restricted key that is not a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>either P1 or the point derived from s2 is not on the curve of keyHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>invalid name algorithm in keyHandle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference an ECC key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme of keyHandle is not an anonymous scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>K, L or E was a point at infinity; or failed to generate r value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>s2 is empty but y2 is not or s2 provided but y2 is not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

void TPM2_Commit(  
    Commit_In       *in,  // IN: input parameter list  
    Commit_Out      *out  // OUT: output parameter list  
)
{
    OBJECT                  *eccKey;
    TPMS_ECC_POINT           P2;
    TPMS_ECC_POINT          *pP2 = NULL;
    TPMS_ECC_POINT          *pP1 = NULL;
    TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER      r;
    TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER      p;
    TPM_RC                   result;
    TPMS_ECC_PARMS          *parms;

    // Input Validation
    eccKey = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);
    parms = &eccKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail;

    // Input key must be an ECC key
    if((eccKey->publicArea.type != TPM_ALG_ECC)  
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_Commit_signHandle;

    // This command may only be used with a sign-only key using an anonymous  
    // scheme.
    // NOTE: a sign + decrypt key has no scheme so it will not be an anonymous one  
    // and an unrestricted sign key might no have a signing scheme but it can't  
    // be use in Commit()
    if(!CryptIsSchemeAnonymous(parms->scheme.scheme))
        return TPM_RC_SCHEME + RC_Commit_signHandle;

    // Make sure that both parts of P2 are present if either is present
    if((in->s2.t.size == 0) != (in->y2.t.size == 0))  
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_Commit_y2;

    // Get prime modulus for the curve. This is needed later but getting this now  
    // allows confirmation that the curve exists.
    if(!CryptEccGetParameter(&p, 'p', parms->curveID))
        return TPM_RC_KEY + RC_Commit_signHandle;

    // Get the random value that will be used in the point multiplications
```
// Note: this does not commit the count.
if(!CryptGenerateR(&r, NULL, parms->curveID, &eccKey->name))
    return TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;

// Set up P2 if s2 and Y2 are provided
if(in->s2.t.size != 0)
{
    TPM2B_DIGEST x2;
    pP2 = &P2;

    // copy y2 for P2
    P2.y = in->y2;

    // Compute x2 HnameAlg(s2) mod p
    // do the hash operation on s2 with the size of curve 'p'
    x2.t.size = CryptHashBlock(eccKey->publicArea.nameAlg,
        in->s2.t.size,
        in->s2.t.buffer,
        sizeof(x2.t.buffer),
        x2.t.buffer);

    // If there were error returns in the hash routine, indicate a problem
    // with the hash algorithm selection
    if(x2.t.size == 0)
        return TPM_RCC_HASH + RC_Commit_signHandle;
    // The size of the remainder will be same as the size of p. DivideB() will
    // pad the results (leading zeros) if necessary to make the size the same
    P2.x.t.size = p.t.size;
    // set p2.x = hash(s2) mod p
    if(DivideB(&x2.b, &p.b, NULL, &P2.x.b) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;

    // If there is a P1, make sure that it is on the curve
    // NOTE: an "empty" point has two UINT16 values which are the size values
    // for each of the coordinates.
    if(in->P1.size > 4)
    {
        pP1 = &in->P1.point;
        if(!CryptEccIsPointOnCurve(parms->curveID, pP1))
            return TPM_RCC_ECC_POINT + RC_Commit_s2;
    }

    // Pass the parameters to CryptCommit.
    // The work is not done in-line because it does several point multiplies
    // with the same curve. It saves work by not having to reload the curve
    // parameters multiple times.
    result = CryptEccCommitCompute(&out->K.point,
        &out->L.point,
        &out->E.point,
        parms->curveID,
        pP1,
        pP2,
        &eccKey->sensitive.sensitive.ecc,
        &r);

    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // The commit computation was successful so complete the commit by setting
    // the bit
    out->counter = CryptCommit();
```c
113  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
115 }
116 #endif // CC_Commit
```
19.3 TPM2_EC_Ephemeral

19.3.1 General Description

TPM2_EC_Ephemeral() creates an ephemeral key for use in a two-phase key exchange protocol. The TPM will use the commit mechanism to assign an ephemeral key $r$ and compute a public point $Q = [r]G$ where $G$ is the generator point associated with $\text{curvelID}$. 

\[ Q = [r]G \]
19.3.2 Command and Response

Table 106 — TPM2_EC_Ephemeral Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_EC_Ephemeral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ECC_CURVE</td>
<td>curveID</td>
<td>The curve for the computed ephemeral point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 107 — TPM2_EC_Ephemeral Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ECC_POINT</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>ephemeral public key $Q := [r]G$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>counter</td>
<td>least-significant 16 bits of commitCount</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "EC_Ephemeral_fp.h"

#if CC_EC_Ephemeral  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NO_RESULT</td>
<td>the TPM is not able to generate an r value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_EC_Ephemeral(
EC_Ephemeral_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
EC_Ephemeral_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)

TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER r;
TPM_RC result;

//

if(!CryptGenerateR(&r, NULL, in->curveID, NULL))
    return TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;

// do a point multiply
result = CryptEccPointMultiply(out->Q.point, in->curveID, NULL, &r,
NULL, NULL);

// commit the count value if either the r value results in the point at
// infinity or if the value is good. The commit on the r value for infinity
// is so that the r value will be skipped.
if((result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) || (result == TPM_RC_NO_RESULT))
    out->counter = CryptCommit();

while(result == TPM_RC_NO_RESULT);  
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

#endif  // CC_EC_Ephemeral
```
20 Signing and Signature Verification

20.1 TPM2_VerifySignature

20.1.1 General Description

This command uses loaded keys to validate a signature on a message with the message digest passed to the TPM.

If the signature check succeeds, then the TPM will produce a TPMT_TK_VERIFIED. Otherwise, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIGNATURE.

If the key is in the NULL hierarchy, then digest in the ticket will be the Empty Buffer.

NOTE 1 A valid ticket can be used in subsequent commands to provide proof to the TPM that the TPM has validated the signature over the message using the key referenced by keyHandle. For example, see

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyDuplicationSelect_fp.h"
#if CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE</td>
<td><code>commandCode</code> of <code>policySession</code> is not empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td><code>cpHash</code> of <code>policySession</code> is not empty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

TPM_RC

```c
TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect(
    PolicyDuplicationSelect_In  *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION   *session;
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    TPM_CC    commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    // `cpHash` in session context must be empty
    if(session->u1.cpHash.t.size != 0)
        return TPM_RC_CPHASH;
    // `commandCode` in session context must be empty
    if(session->commandCode != 0)
        return TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Update name hash
    session->u1.cpHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
    // add objectName
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);
    // add new parent name
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->newParentName.b);
    // complete hash
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u1.cpHash.b);
```
// update policy hash
// Old policyDigest size should be the same as the new policyDigest size since
// they are using the same hash algorithm
session->u2.policyDigest.t.size
    = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add old policy
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// add command code
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

// add objectName
if (in->includeObject == YES)
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);

// add new parent name
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->newParentName.b);

// add includeObject
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPMI_YES_NO), in->includeObject);

// complete digest
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// set commandCode in session context
session->commandCode = TPM_CC_Duplicate;

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect

TPM2_PolicyAuthorize.

If keyHandle references an asymmetric key, only the public portion of the key needs to be loaded. If keyHandle references a symmetric key, both the public and private portions need to be loaded.

NOTE 2 The sensitive area of the symmetric object is required to allow verification of the symmetric signature (the HMAC).
### 20.1.2 Command and Response

**Table 108 — TPM2_VerifySignature Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_VerifySignature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>keyHandle</td>
<td>handle of public key that will be used in the validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>digest</td>
<td>digest of the signed message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>signature to be tested</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 109 — TPM2_VerifySignature Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_VERIFIED</td>
<td>validation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20.1.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "VerifySignature_fp.h"

#error CC_VerifySignature  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>keyHandle does not reference a signing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature is not genuine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>CryptValidateSignature()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>the input handle is references an HMAC key but the private portion is not loaded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_VerifySignature(
    VerifySignature_In      *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    VerifySignature_Out     *out  // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC                   result;
    OBJECT                  *signObject = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);
    TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY       hierarchy;

    // Input Validation
    // The object to validate the signature must be a signing key.
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(signObject->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, sign))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_VerifySignature_keyHandle;

    // Validate Signature. TPM_RC_SCHEME, TPM_RC_HANDLE or TPM_RC_SIGNATURE
    // error may be returned by CryptValidateSignature()
    result = CryptValidateSignature(in->keyHandle, &in->digest, &in->signature);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_VerifySignature_signature);

    // Command Output
    hierarchy = GetHierarchy(in->keyHandle);
    if(hierarchy == TPM_RH_NULL
        || signObject->publicArea.nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
        {  // produce empty ticket if hierarchy is TPM_RH_NULL or nameAlg is
            // TPM_ALG_NULL.
            out->validation.tag = TPM_ST_VERIFIED;
            out->validation.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
            out->validation.digest.t.size = 0;
        }
    else
        {  // Compute ticket
            TicketComputeVerified(hierarchy, &in->digest, &signObject->name,
                                  &out->validation);
        }
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
```
20.2  TPM2_Sign

20.2.1  General Description

This command causes the TPM to sign an externally provided hash with the specified symmetric or asymmetric signing key.

NOTE 1  If keyHandle references an unrestricted signing key, a digest can be signed using either this command or an HMAC command.

If keyHandle references a restricted signing key, then validation shall be provided, indicating that the TPM performed the hash of the data and validation shall indicate that hashed data did not start with TPM_GENERATED_VALUE.

NOTE 2  If the hashed data did start with TPM_GENERATED_VALUE, then the validation will be a NULL ticket.

The x509sign attribute of keyHandle may not be SET (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES).

If the scheme of keyHandle is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then inScheme shall either be the same scheme as keyHandle or TPM_ALG_NULL. If the sign attribute is not SET in the key referenced by handle then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_KEY.

If the scheme of keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL, the TPM will sign using inScheme; otherwise, it will sign using the scheme of keyHandle.

NOTE 3  When the signing scheme uses a hash algorithm, the algorithm is defined in the qualifying data of the scheme. This is the same algorithm that is required to be used in producing digest. The size of digest must match that of the hash algorithm in the scheme.

If inScheme is not a valid signing scheme for the type of keyHandle (or TPM_ALG_NULL), then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SCHEME.

If the scheme of keyHandle is an anonymous scheme, then inScheme shall have the same scheme algorithm as keyHandle and inScheme will contain a counter value that will be used in the signing process.

EXAMPLE  For ECDAA, inScheme.details.ecdaa.count will contain the count value.

If validation is provided, then the hash algorithm used in computing the digest is required to be the hash algorithm specified in the scheme of keyHandle (TPM_RC_TICKET).

If the validation parameter is not the Empty Buffer, then it will be checked even if the key referenced by keyHandle is not a restricted signing key.

NOTE 4  If keyHandle is both a sign and decrypt key, keyHandle will have a scheme of TPM_ALG_NULL. If validation is provided, then it must be a NULL validation ticket or the ticket validation will fail.
20.2.2 Command and Response

Table 110 — TPM2_Sign Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@keyHandle</td>
<td>Handle of key that will perform signing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>digest</td>
<td>digest to be signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for keyHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK</td>
<td>validation</td>
<td>proof that digest was created by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If keyHandle is not a restricted signing key, this may be a NULL Ticket with tag = TPM_ST_CHECKHASH.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 111 — TPM2_Sign Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

1. `#include "Tpm.h"
2. `#include "Sign_fp.h"
3. `#if CC_Sign // Conditional expansion of this file
4. `#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"

#### Error Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_BINDING</td>
<td>The public and private portions of the key are not properly bound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td><code>signHandle</code> does not reference a signing key;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the scheme is not compatible with sign key type, or input scheme is not compatible with default scheme, or the chosen scheme is not a valid sign scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TICKET</td>
<td><code>validation</code> is not a valid ticket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>the value to sign is larger than allowed for the type of <code>keyHandle</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_Sign(
    Sign_In  *in,      // IN: input parameter list
    Sign_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
){
    TPM_RC     result;
    TPM_TK_HASHCHECK ticket;
    OBJECT     *signObject = HandleToObject(in->keyHandle);

    // Input Validation
    if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_Sign_keyHandle;
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(signObject->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, x509sign))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_Sign_keyHandle;
    if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_Sign_inScheme;
    if(in->validation.digest.t.size != 0 || IS_ATTRIBUTE(signObject->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, restricted))
    {
        // Compute and compare ticket
        TicketComputeHashCheck(in->validation.hierarchy,
            in->inScheme.details.any.hashAlg,
            &in->digest, &ticket);

        if(!MemoryEqual2B(in->validation.digest.b, &ticket.digest.b))
            return TPM_RCS_TICKET + RC_Sign_validation;
    } else
    {
        // If we don’t have a ticket, at least verify that the provided 'digest'
        // is the size of the scheme hashAlg digest.
        // NOTE: this does not guarantee that the 'digest' is actually produced using
```
47     // the indicated hash algorithm, but at least it might be.
48     {
49         if (in->digest.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->inScheme.details.any.hashAlg))
50             return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_Sign_digest;
51     }
52     // Command Output
53     // Sign the hash. A TPM_RC_VALUE or TPM_RC_SCHEME
54     // error may be returned at this point
55     result = CryptSign(signObject, &in->inScheme, &in->digest, &out->signature);
56     return result;
57 }
58 #endif // CC_Sign
21 Command Audit

21.1 Introduction

If a command has been selected for command audit, the command audit status will be updated when that command completes successfully. The digest is updated as:

\[
\text{commandAuditDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{auditAlg}}(\text{commandAuditDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{cpHash} || \text{rpHash}) \tag{5}
\]

where

- \( H_{\text{auditAlg}} \): hash function using the algorithm of the audit sequence
- \( \text{commandAuditDigest} \): accumulated digest
- \( \text{cpHash} \): the command parameter hash
- \( \text{rpHash} \): the response parameter hash

\( \text{auditAlg} \), the hash algorithm, is set using \text{TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus}().

\text{TPM2_Shutdown}() cannot be audited but \text{TPM2_Startup}() can be audited. If the \( \text{cpHash} \) of the \text{TPM2_Startup}() is \text{TPM_SU_STATE}, that would indicate that a \text{TPM2_Shutdown}() had been successfully executed.

\text{TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus}() is always audited, except when it is used to change \( \text{auditAlg} \).

If the TPM is in Failure mode, command audit is not functional.
21.2 TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus

21.2.1 General Description

This command may be used by the Privacy Administrator or platform to change the audit status of a command or to set the hash algorithm used for the audit digest, but not both at the same time.

If the auditAlg parameter is a supported hash algorithm and not the same as the current algorithm, then the TPM will check both setList and clearList are empty (zero length). If so, then the algorithm is changed, and the audit digest is cleared. If auditAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL or the same as the current algorithm, then the algorithm and audit digest are unchanged and the setList and clearList will be processed.

NOTE 1 Because the audit digest is cleared, the audit counter will increment the next time that an audited command is executed.

Use of TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus() to change the list of audited commands is an audited event. If TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus is in clearList, the fact that it is in clearList is ignored.

NOTE 2 Use of this command to change the audit hash algorithm is not audited and the digest is reset when the command completes. The change in the audit hash algorithm is the evidence that this command was used to change the algorithm.

The commands in setList indicate the commands to be added to the list of audited commands and the commands in clearList indicate the commands that will no longer be audited. It is not an error if a command in setList is already audited or is not implemented. It is not an error if a command in clearList is not currently being audited or is not implemented.

If a command code is in both setList and clearList, then it will not be audited (that is, setList shall be processed first).
## 21.2.2 Command and Response

### Table 112 — TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_RH_PROVISION</td>
<td>@auth</td>
<td>TPML_RH_PROVISION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>auditAlg</td>
<td>hash algorithm for the audit digest; if TPM_ALG_NULL, then the hash is not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
<td>setList</td>
<td>list of commands that will be added to those that will be audited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
<td>clearList</td>
<td>list of commands that will no longer be audited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 113 — TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "SetCommandCodeAuditStatus_fp.h"

#if CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus(
    SetCommandCodeAuditStatus_In    *in      // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update

    // Update hash algorithm
    if(in->auditAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL && in->auditAlg != gp.auditHashAlg)
    {
        // Can't change the algorithm and command list at the same time
        if(in->setList.count != 0 || in->clearList.count != 0)
            return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus_auditAlg;

        // Change the hash algorithm for audit
        gp.auditHashAlg = in->auditAlg;

        // Set the digest size to a unique value that indicates that the digest
        // algorithm has been changed. The size will be cleared to zero in the
        // command audit processing on exit.
        gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size = 1;

        // Save the change of command audit data (this sets g_updateNV so that NV
        // will be updated on exit.)
        NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(auditCommands);
    }
    else
    {
        UINT32          i;
        BOOL            changed = FALSE;

        // Process set list
        for(i = 0; i < in->setList.count; i++)
            // If change is made in CommandAuditSet, set changed flag
            if(CommandAuditSet(in->setList.commandCodes[i]))
                changed = TRUE;

        // Process clear list
        for(i = 0; i < in->clearList.count; i++)
            // If change is made in CommandAuditClear, set changed flag
            if(CommandAuditClear(in->clearList.commandCodes[i]))
                changed = TRUE;

        // if change was made to command list, update NV
        if(changed)
            // this sets g_updateNV so that NV will be updated on exit.
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(auditCommands);

        return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    }
}
```
#endif // CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus
22 Integrity Collection (PCR)

22.1 Introduction

In TPM 1.2, an Event was hashed using SHA-1 and then the 20-octet digest was extended to a PCR using TPM_Extend(). This specification allows the use of multiple PCR at a given Index, each using a different hash algorithm. Rather than require that the external software generate multiple hashes of the Event with each being extended to a different PCR, the Event data may be sent to the TPM for hashing. This ensures that the resulting digests will properly reflect the algorithms chosen for the PCR even if the calling software is unable to implement the hash algorithm.

NOTE 1 There is continued support for software hashing of events with TPM2_PCR_Extend().

To support recording of an Event that is larger than the TPM input buffer, the caller may use the command sequence described in clause 1.

Change to a PCR requires authorization. The authorization may be with either an authorization value or an authorization policy. The platform-specific specifications determine which PCR may be controlled by policy. All other PCR are controlled by authorization.

If a PCR may be associated with a policy, then the algorithm ID of that policy determines whether the policy is to be applied. If the algorithm ID is not TPM_ALG_NULL, then the policy digest associated with the PCR must match the policySession→policyDigest in a policy session. If the algorithm ID is TPM_ALG_NULL, then no policy is present and the authorization requires an EmptyAuth.

If a platform-specific specification indicates that PCR are grouped, then all the PCR in the group use the same authorization policy or authorization value.

pcrUpdateCounter counter will be incremented on the successful completion of any command that modifies (Extends or resets) a PCR unless the platform-specific specification explicitly excludes the PCR from being counted.

NOTE 2 If a command causes PCR in multiple banks to change, the PCR Update Counter must be incremented once for each bank. The commands that extend PCR are: TPM2_PCR_Extend, TPM2_PCR_Event, and TPM2_EventSequenceComplete.

If a command resets PCR in multiple banks, the PCR Update Counter must be incremented only once. The commands that reset PCR are: TPM2_PCR_Reset, and TPM2_Startup.

A platform-specific specification may designate a set of PCR that are under control of the TCB. These PCR may not be modified without the proper authorization. Updates of these PCR shall not cause the PCR Update Counter to increment.

EXAMPLE Updates of the TCB PCR will not cause the PCR update counter to increment because these PCR are changed at the whim of the TCB and may not represent the trust state of the platform.
22.2 TPM2_PCR_Extend

22.2.1 General Description

This command is used to cause an update to the indicated PCR. The `digests` parameter contains one or more tagged digest values identified by an algorithm ID. For each digest, the PCR associated with `pcrHandle` is Extended into the bank identified by the tag (`hashAlg`).

**EXAMPLE**

A SHA1 digest would be Extended into the SHA1 bank and a SHA256 digest would be Extended into the SHA256 bank.

For each list entry, the TPM will check to see if `pcrNum` is implemented for that algorithm. If so, the TPM shall perform the following operation:

\[
PCR.\text{digest}_{\text{new}}[\text{pcrNum}][\text{alg}] \leftarrow H_{\text{alg}}(PCR.\text{digest}_{\text{old}}[\text{pcrNum}][\text{alg}] \ || \ data[\text{alg}].\text{buffer})
\]

where

- \(H_{\text{alg}}()\) hash function using the hash algorithm associated with the PCR instance
- \(PCR.\text{digest}\) the digest value in a PCR
- \(pcrNum\) the PCR numeric selector (`pcrHandle`)
- \(alg\) the PCR algorithm selector for the digest
- \(data[\text{alg}].\text{buffer}\) the bank-specific data to be extended

If no digest value is specified for a bank, then the PCR in that bank is not modified.

**NOTE 1**

This allows consistent operation of the `digests` list for all of the Event recording commands.

If a digest is present and the PCR in that bank is not implemented, the digest value is not used.

**NOTE 2**

If the caller includes digests for algorithms that are not implemented, then the TPM will fail the call because the unmarshalling of `digests` will fail. Each of the entries in the list is a `TPMT_HA`, which is a hash algorithm followed by a digest. If the algorithm is not implemented, unmarshalling of the `hashAlg` will fail and the TPM will return `TPM_RC_HASH`.

If the TPM unmarshals the `hashAlg` of a list entry and the unmarshaled value is not a hash algorithm implemented on the TPM, the TPM shall return `TPM_RC_HASH`.

The `pcrHandle` parameter is allowed to reference `TPM_RH_NULL`. If so, the input parameters are processed but no action is taken by the TPM. This permits the caller to probe for implemented hash algorithms as an alternative to `TPM2_GetCapability`.

**NOTE 3**

This command allows a list of digests so that PCR in all banks may be updated in a single command. While the semantics of this command allow multiple extends to a single PCR bank, this is not the preferred use and the limit on the number of entries in the list make this use somewhat impractical.
## 22.2.2 Command and Response

### Table 114 — TPM2_PCR_Extend Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_Extend (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR+</td>
<td>@pcrHandle</td>
<td>handle of the PCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_DIGEST_VALUES</td>
<td>digests</td>
<td>list of tagged digest values to be extended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 115 — TPM2_PCR_Extend Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_Extend_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_Extend  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCALITY</td>
<td>current command locality is not allowed to extend the PCR referenced by pcrHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PCR_Extend(
    PCR_Extend_In   *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    )
{
    UINT32 i;

    // Input Validation

    // NOTE: This function assumes that the unmarshaling function for 'digests' will 
    // have validated that all of the indicated hash algorithms are valid. If the 
    // hash algorithms are correct, the unmarshaling code will unmarshal a digest 
    // of the size indicated by the hash algorithm. If the overall size is not 
    // consistent, the unmarshaling code will run out of input data or have input 
    // data left over. In either case, it will cause an unmarshaling error and this 
    // function will not be called.

    // For NULL handle, do nothing and return success
    if(in->pcrHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
        return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

    // Check if the extend operation is allowed by the current command locality
    if(!PCRIsExtendAllowed(in->pcrHandle))
        return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;

    // If PCR is state saved and we need to update orderlyState, check NV 
    // availability
    if(PCRIsStateSaved(in->pcrHandle))
        RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;

    // Internal Data Update

    // Iterate input digest list to extend
    for(i = 0; i < in->digests.count; i++)
    {
        PCRExtend(in->pcrHandle, in->digests.digests[i].hashAlg, 
            CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->digests.digests[i].hashAlg), 
            (BYTE *)&in->digests.digests[i].digest);
    }
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PCR_Extend
```
22.3 TPM2_PCR_Event

22.3.1 General Description

This command is used to cause an update to the indicated PCR.

The data in eventData is hashed using the hash algorithm associated with each bank in which the indicated PCR has been allocated. After the data is hashed, the digests list is returned. If the pcrHandle references an implemented PCR and not TPM_RH_NULL, the digests list is processed as in TPM2_PCR_Extend()

A TPM shall support an Event.size of zero through 1,024 inclusive (Event.size is an octet count). An Event.size of zero indicates that there is no data but the indicated operations will still occur.

EXAMPLE 1 If the command implements PCR[2] in a SHA1 bank and a SHA256 bank, then an extend to PCR[2] will cause eventData to be hashed twice, once with SHA1 and once with SHA256. The SHA1 hash of eventData will be Extended to PCR[2] in the SHA1 bank and the SHA256 hash of eventData will be Extended to PCR[2] of the SHA256 bank.

On successful command completion, digests will contain the list of tagged digests of eventData that was computed in preparation for extending the data into the PCR. At the option of the TPM, the list may contain a digest for each bank, or it may only contain a digest for each bank in which pcrHandle is extant. If pcrHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPM may return either an empty list or a digest for each bank.

EXAMPLE 2 Assume a TPM that implements a SHA1 bank and a SHA256 bank and that PCR[22] is only implemented in the SHA1 bank. If pcrHandle references PCR[22], then digests may contain either a SHA1 and a SHA256 digest or just a SHA1 digest.


22.3.2 Command and Response

Table 116 — TPM2_PCR_Event Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_Event (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR+</td>
<td>@pcrHandle</td>
<td>Handle of the PCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_EVENT</td>
<td>eventData</td>
<td>Event data in sized buffer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 117 — TPM2_PCR_Event Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_DIGEST_VALUES</td>
<td>digests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_Event_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_Event  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCALITY</td>
<td>current command locality is not allowed to extend the PCR referenced by pcrHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PCR_Event(
    PCR_Event_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    PCR_Event_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    UINT32 i;
    UINT16 size;

    // Input Validation
    if(in->pcrHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
    {
        // If the PCR is not allow to extend, return error
        if(!PCRIsExtendAllowed(in->pcrHandle))
            return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;

        // If PCR is state saved and we need to update orderlyState, check NV availability
        if(PCRIsStateSaved(in->pcrHandle))
            RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;
    }

    // Internal Data Update
    out->digests.count = HASH_COUNT;

    // Iterate supported PCR bank algorithms to extend
    for(i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
    {
        TPM_ALG_ID hash = CryptHashGetAlgByIndex(i);
        out->digests.digests[i].hashAlg = hash;
        size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, hash);
        CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->eventData.b);
        CryptHashEnd(&hashState, size,
                     (BYTE *)&out->digests.digests[i].digest);
        if(in->pcrHandle != TPM_RH_NULL)
            PCRExtend(in->pcrHandle, hash, size,
                      (BYTE *)&out->digests.digests[i].digest);
    }

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PCR_Event
```
22.4 TPM2_PCR_Read

22.4.1 General Description

This command returns the values of all PCR specified in `pcrSelectionIn`.

The TPM will process the list of TPMS_PCR_SELECTION in `pcrSelectionIn` in order. Within each TPMS_PCR_SELECTION, the TPM will process the bits in the `pcrSelect` array in ascending PCR order (see TPM 2.0 Part 1, Selecting Multiple PCR). If a bit is SET, and the indicated PCR is present, then the TPM will add the digest of the PCR to the list of values to be returned in `pcrValues`.

The TPM will continue processing bits until all have been processed or until `pcrValues` would be too large to fit into the output buffer if additional values were added.

The returned `pcrSelectionOut` will have a bit SET in its `pcrSelect` structures for each value present in `pcrValues`.

The current value of the PCR Update Counter is returned in `pcrUpdateCounter`.

The returned list may be empty if none of the selected PCR are implemented.

NOTE If no PCR are returned from a bank, the selector for the bank will be present in `pcrSelectionOut`.

No authorization is required to read a PCR and any implemented PCR may be read from any locality.
### 22.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 118 — TPM2_PCR_Read Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>pcrSelectionIn</td>
<td>The selection of PCR to read</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 119 — TPM2_PCR_Read Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_Rc</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>pcrUpdateCounter</td>
<td>the current value of the PCR update counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>pcrSelectionOut</td>
<td>the PCR in the returned list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_DIGEST</td>
<td>pcrValues</td>
<td>the contents of the PCR indicated in pcrSelectOut-&gt;pcrSelection[] as tagged digests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22.4.3  Detailed Actions

#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_Read_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_Read  // Conditional expansion of this file
TPM_RC
TPM2_PCR_Read(
    PCR_Read_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    PCR_Read_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Command Output
    // Call PCR read function. input pcrSelectionIn parameter could be changed
    // to reflect the actual PCR being returned
    PCRRead(&in->pcrSelectionIn, &out->pcrValues, &out->pcrUpdateCounter);
    out->pcrSelectionOut = in->pcrSelectionIn;
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PCR_Read
22.5 TPM2_PCR_Allocate

22.5.1 General Description

This command is used to set the desired PCR allocation of PCR and algorithms. This command requires Platform Authorization.

The TPM will evaluate the request and, if sufficient memory is available for the requested allocation, the TPM will store the allocation request for use during the next _TPM_Init operation. The PCR allocation in place when this command is executed will be retained until the next _TPM_Init. If this command is received multiple times before a _TPM_Init, each one overwrites the previous stored allocation.

This command will only change the allocations of banks that are listed in pcrAllocation.

EXAMPLE 1 If a TPM supports SHA1 and SHA256, then it maintains an allocation for two banks (one of which could be empty). If pcrAllocation only has a selector for the SHA1 bank, then only the allocation of the SHA1 bank will be changed and the SHA256 bank will remain unchanged. To change the allocation of a TPM from 24 SHA1 PCR and no SHA256 PCR to 24 SHA256 PCR and no SHA1 PCR, the pcrAllocation would have to have two selections: one for the empty SHA1 bank and one for the SHA256 bank with 24 PCR.

If a bank is listed more than once, then the last selection in the pcrAllocation list is the one that the TPM will attempt to allocate.

NOTE 1 This does not mean to imply that pcrAllocation.count can exceed HASH_COUNT, the number of digests implemented in the TPM.

EXAMPLE 2 If HASH_COUNT is 2, pcrAllocation can specify SHA-256 twice, and the second one is used. However, if SHA_256 is specified three times, the unmarshaling may fail and the TPM may return an error.

This command shall not allocate more PCR in any bank than there are PCR attribute definitions. The PCR attribute definitions indicate how a PCR is to be managed – if it is resettable, the locality for update, etc. In the response to this command, the TPM returns the maximum number of PCR allowed for any bank.

When PCR are allocated, if DRTM_PCR is defined, the resulting allocation must have at least one bank with the D-RTM PCR allocated. If HCRTM_PCR is defined, the resulting allocation must have at least one bank with the HCRTM_PCR allocated. If not, the TPM returns TPM_RC_PCR.

The TPM may return TPM_RC_SUCCESS even though the request fails. This is to allow the TPM to return information about the size needed for the requested allocation and the size available. If the sizeNeeded parameter in the return is less than or equal to the sizeAvailable parameter, then the allocationSuccess parameter will be YES. Alternatively, if the request fails, The TPM may return TPM_RC_NO_RESULT.

NOTE 2 An example for this type of failure is a TPM that can only support one bank at a time and cannot support arbitrary distribution of PCR among banks.

After this command, TPM2_Shutdown() is only allowed to have a startupType equal to TPM_SU_CLEAR until after the next _TPM_Init.

NOTE 3 Even if this command does not cause the PCR allocation to change, the TPM cannot have its state saved. This is done in order to simplify the implementation. There is no need to optimize this command as it is not expected to be used more than once in the lifetime of the TPM (it can be used any number of times but there is no justification for optimization).
### 22.5.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_Allocate {NV}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>pcrAllocation</td>
<td>the requested allocation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>allocationSuccess</td>
<td>YES if the allocation succeeded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>maxPCR</td>
<td>maximum number of PCR that may be in a bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>sizeNeeded</td>
<td>number of octets required to satisfy the request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>sizeAvailable</td>
<td>Number of octets available. Computed before the allocation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_Allocate_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_Allocate  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_PCR</td>
<td>the allocation did not have required PCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE</td>
<td>NV is not accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_RATE</td>
<td>NV is in a rate-limiting mode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

#define PCR_Allocate_In  *in,  // IN: input parameter list
#define PCR_Allocate_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list

TPM2_PCR_Allocate(

TPM_RC  result;

// The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
// A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
// this point.
// Note: These codes are not listed in the return values above because it is
// an implementation choice to check in this routine rather than in a common
// function that is called before these actions are called. These return values
// are described in the Response Code section of Part 3.
RETURN_IF_NV IS NOT_AVAILABLE;

// Command Output

// Call PCR Allocation function.
result = PCRAlocate(&in->pcrAllocation, &out->maxPCR,
                     &out->sizeNeeded, &out->sizeAvailable);
if (result == TPM_RC_PCR)
    return result;

// if re-configuration succeeds, set the flag to indicate PCR configuration is
// going to be changed in next boot
if (out->allocationSuccess == YES)
    g_pcrReConfig = TRUE;
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

#endif // CC_PCR_Allocate
```
22.6 TPM2_PCR_SetAuthPolicy

22.6.1 General Description

This command is used to associate a policy with a PCR or group of PCR. The policy determines the conditions under which a PCR may be extended or reset.

A policy may only be associated with a PCR that has been defined by a platform-specific specification as allowing a policy. If the TPM implementation does not allow a policy for pcrNum, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

A platform-specific specification may group PCR so that they share a common policy. In such case, a pcrNum that selects any of the PCR in the group will change the policy for all PCR in the group.

The policy setting is persistent and may only be changed by TPM2_PCR_SetAuthPolicy() or by TPM2_ChangePPS().

Before this command is first executed on a TPM or after TPM2_ChangePPS(), the access control on the PCR will be set to the default value defined in the platform-specific specification.

NOTE 1 It is expected that the typical default will be with the policy hash set to TPM_ALG_NULL and an Empty Buffer for the authPolicy value. This will allow an EmptyAuth to be used as the authorization value.

If the size of the data buffer in authPolicy is not the size of a digest produced by hashAlg, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

NOTE 2 If hashAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, then the size is required to be zero.

This command requires platformAuth/platformPolicy.

NOTE 3 If the PCR is in multiple policy sets, the policy will be changed in only one set. The set that is changed will be implementation dependent.
### Table 122 — TPM2_PCR_SetAuthPolicy Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>authPolicy</td>
<td>the desired authPolicy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>the hash algorithm of the policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR</td>
<td>pcrNum</td>
<td>the PCR for which the policy is to be set</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 123 — TPM2_PCR_SetAuthPolicy Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_SetAuthPolicy_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>size of authPolicy is not the size of a digest produced by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policyDigest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>PCR referenced by pcrNum is not a member of a PCR policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PCR_SetAuthPolicy(
    PCR_SetAuthPolicy_In    *in    // IN: input parameter list
) {
    UINT32 groupIndex;

    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Input Validation:
    if (in->authPolicy.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->hashAlg))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy_authPolicy;

    // If PCR does not belong to a policy group, return TPM_RC_VALUE
    if (!PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(in->pcrNum, &groupIndex))
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy_pcrNum;

    // Internal Data Update
    gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[groupIndex] = in->hashAlg;
    gp.pcrPolicies.policy[groupIndex] = in->authPolicy;

    // Save new policy to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(pcrPolicies);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy
```
22.7 TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue

22.7.1 General Description

This command changes the *authValue* of a PCR or group of PCR.

An *authValue* may only be associated with a PCR that has been defined by a platform-specific specification as allowing an authorization value. If the TPM implementation does not allow an authorization for *pcrNum*, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE. A platform-specific specification may group PCR so that they share a common authorization value. In such case, a *pcrNum* that selects any of the PCR in the group will change the *authValue* value for all PCR in the group.

The authorization setting is set to EmptyAuth on each STARTUP(CLEAR) or by TPM2_Clear(). The authorization setting is preserved by SHUTDOWN(STATE).
### 22.7.2 Command and Response

#### Table 124 — TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthValue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR</td>
<td>@pcrHandle</td>
<td>handle for a PCR that may have an authorization value set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>the desired authorization value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 125 — TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_SetAuthValue_fp.h"

#ifdef CC_PCR_SetAuthValue  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>PCR referenced by pcrHandle is not a member of a PCR authorization group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

TPM_RC
TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue(
  PCR_SetAuthValue_In  *in     // IN: input parameter list
) {
  UINT32       groupIndex;
  // Input Validation:
  // If PCR does not belong to an auth group, return TPM_RC_VALUE
  if(!PCRBelongsToAuthGroup(in->pcrHandle, &groupIndex))
    return TPM_RC_VALUE;
  // The command may cause the orderlyState to be cleared due to the update of
  // state clear data. If this is the case, Check if NV is available.
  // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
  // this point
  RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;
  // Internal Data Update
  // Set PCR authValue
  MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&in->auth);
  gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[groupIndex] = in->auth;
  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
} #endif // CC_PCR_SetAuthValue
```
22.8 TPM2_PCR_Reset

22.8.1 General Description

If the attribute of a PCR allows the PCR to be reset and proper authorization is provided, then this command may be used to set the PCR in all banks to zero. The attributes of the PCR may restrict the locality that can perform the reset operation.

NOTE 1 The definition of TPMI_DH_PCR in TPM 2.0 Part 2 indicates that if pcrHandle is out of the allowed range for PCR, then the appropriate return value is TPM_RC_VALUE.

If pcrHandle references a PCR that cannot be reset, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_LOCALITY.

NOTE 2 TPM_RC_LOCALITY is returned because the reset attributes are defined on a per-locality basis.
## 22.8.2 Command and Response

### Table 126 — TPM2_PCR_Reset Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PCR_Reset (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PCR</td>
<td>@pcrHandle</td>
<td>the PCR to reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 127 — TPM2_PCR_Reset Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22.8.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PCR_Reset_fp.h"

#if CC_PCR_Reset    // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_LOCALITY</td>
<td>current command locality is not allowed to reset the PCR referenced by pcrHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM2_PCR_Reset(
    PCR_Reset_In *in   // IN: input parameter list
) {
    // Input Validation
    // Check if the reset operation is allowed by the current command locality
    if (!PCRIsResetAllowed(in->pcrHandle))
        return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
    // If PCR is state saved and we need to update orderlyState, check NV availability
    if (PCRIsStateSaved(in->pcrHandle))
        RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;
    // Internal Data Update
    // Reset selected PCR in all banks to 0
    PCRSetValue(in->pcrHandle, 0);
    // Indicate that the PCR changed so that pcrCounter will be incremented if necessary.
    PCRChanged(in->pcrHandle);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
} #endif  // CC_PCR_Reset
```
22.9 _TPM_Hash_Start

22.9.1 Description

This indication from the TPM interface indicates the start of an H-CRTM measurement sequence. On receipt of this indication, the TPM will initialize an H-CRTM Event Sequence context.

If no object memory is available for creation of the sequence context, the TPM will flush the context of an object so that creation of the sequence context will always succeed.

A platform-specific specification may allow this indication before TPM2_Startup().

NOTE If this indication occurs after TPM2_Startup(), it is the responsibility of software to ensure that an object context slot is available or to deal with the consequences of having the TPM select an arbitrary object to be flushed. If this indication occurs before TPM2_Startup() then all context slots are available.
22.9.2 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"

This function is called to process a _TPM_Hash_Start indication.

LIB_EXPORT void _TPM_Hash_Start(
    void
)
{
    TPM_RC result;
    TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle;

    // If a DRTM sequence object exists, free it up
    if(g_DRTMHandle != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
    {
        FlushObject(g_DRTMHandle);
        g_DRTMHandle = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
    }

    // Create an event sequence object and store the handle in global
    // g_DRTMHandle. A TPM_RC OBJECT_MEMORY error may be returned at this point
    // The NULL value for the first parameter will cause the sequence structure to
    // be allocated without being set as present. This keeps the sequence from
    // being left behind if the sequence is terminated early.
    result = ObjectCreateEventSequence(NULL, &g_DRTMHandle);

    // If a free slot was not available, then free up a slot.
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        // An implementation does not need to have a fixed relationship between
        // slot numbers and handle numbers. To handle the general case, scan for
        // a handle that is assigned and free it for the DRTM sequence.
        // In the reference implementation, the relationship between handles and
        // slots is fixed. So, if the call to ObjectCreateEvenSequence()
        // failed indicating that all slots are occupied, then the first handle we
        // are going to check (TRANSIENT_FIRST) will be occupied. It will be freed
        // so that it can be assigned for use as the DRTM sequence object.
        for(handle = TRANSIENT_FIRST; handle < TRANSIENT_LAST; handle++)
        {
            // try to flush the first object
            if(IsObjectPresent(handle))
                break;
        }

        // If the first call to find a slot fails but none of the slots is occupied
        // then there's a big problem
        pAssert(handle < TRANSIENT_LAST);

        // Free the slot
        FlushObject(handle);

        // Try to create an event sequence object again. This time, we must
        // succeed.
        result = ObjectCreateEventSequence(NULL, &g_DRTMHandle);
        if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
            FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
    }

    return;
}
```
22.10 _TPM_Hash_Data

22.10.1 Description

This indication from the TPM interface indicates arrival of one or more octets of data that are to be included in the H-CRTM Event Sequence sequence context created by the _TPM_Hash_Start indication. The context holds data for each hash algorithm for each PCR bank implemented on the TPM.

If no H-CRTM Event Sequence context exists, this indication is discarded and no other action is performed.
22.10.2 Detailed Actions

```
#include "Tpm.h"

This function is called to process a _TPM.Hash_Data indication.

LIB_EXPORT void
_TPM.Hash_Data(
  uint32_t         dataSize,      // IN: size of data to be extend
  unsigned char *data        // IN: data buffer
)
{
  UINT32           i;
  HASH_OBJECT     *hashObject;
  TPMI_DH_PCR      pcrHandle = TPMIsStarted()
                   ? PCR_FIRST + DRTM_PCR : PCR_FIRST + HCRTM_PCR;

  // If there is no DRTM sequence object, then _TPM.Hash_Start
  // was not called so this function returns without doing
  // anything.
  if (g_DRTMHandle == TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
    return;

  hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)HandleToObject(g_DRTMHandle);
  pAssert(hashObject->attributes.eventSeq);

  // For each of the implemented hash algorithms, update the digest with the
  // data provided.
  for(i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
  {
    // make sure that the PCR is implemented for this algorithm
    if(PcrIsAllocated(pcrHandle,
                     hashObject->state.hashState[i].hashAlg))
      // Update sequence object
    CryptDigestUpdate(&hashObject->state.hashState[i], dataSize, data);
  }
return;
}
```
22.11 _TPM_Hash_End

22.11.1 Description

This indication from the TPM interface indicates the end of the H-CRTM measurement. This indication is discarded and no other action performed if the TPM does not contain an H-CRTM Event Sequence context.

NOTE 1 An H-CRTM Event Sequence context is created by _TPM_Hash_Start().

If the H-CRTM Event Sequence occurs after TPM2_Startup(), the TPM will set all of the PCR designated in the platform-specific specifications as resettable by this event to the value indicated in the platform specific specification and increment restartCount. The TPM will then Extend the Event Sequence digest/digests into the designated D-RTM PCR (PCR[17]).

\[
\text{PCR}[17][\text{hashAlg}] := \text{H}_{\text{hashAlg}}(\text{initial\_value}) | | \text{H}_{\text{hashAlg}}(\text{hash\_data}) \tag{7}
\]

where

- \text{hashAlg} hash algorithm associated with a bank of PCR
- \text{initial\_value} initialization value specified in the platform-specific specification (should be 0...0)
- \text{hash\_data} all the octets of data received in _TPM_Hash_Data indications

A _TPM_Hash_End indication that occurs after TPM2_Startup() will increment \text{pcrUpdateCounter} unless a platform-specific specification excludes modifications of PCR[DRTM] from causing an increment.

A platform-specific specification may allow an H-CRTM Event Sequence before TPM2_Startup(). If so, _TPM_Hash_End will complete the digest, initialize PCR[0] with a digest-size value of 4, and then extend the H-CRTM Event Sequence data into PCR[0].

\[
\text{PCR}[0][\text{hashAlg}] := \text{H}_{\text{hashAlg}}(0...04 | | \text{H}_{\text{hashAlg}}(\text{hash\_data}) \tag{8}
\]

NOTE 2 The entire sequence of _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data, and _TPM_Hash_End are required to complete before TPM2_Startup() or the sequence will have no effect on the TPM.

NOTE 3 PCR[0] does not need to be updated according to (8) until the end of TPM2_Startup().
22.11.2 Detailed Actions

#include "Tpm.h"

This function is called to process a _TPM_Hash_End indication.

LIB_EXPORT void _TPM_Hash_End(
    void
)
{
    UINT32 i;
    TPM2B_DIGEST digest;
    HASH_OBJECT *hashObject;
    TPMI_DH_PCR pcrHandle;

    // If the DRTM handle is not being used, then either _TPM_Hash_Start has not
    // been called, _TPM_Hash_End was previously called, or some other command
    // was executed and the sequence was aborted.
    if (g_DRTMHandle == TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
        return;

    // Get DRTM sequence object
    hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)HandleToObject(g_DRTMHandle);

    // Is this _TPM_Hash_End after Startup or before
    if (TPMIsStarted())
    {
        // After
        // Reset the DRTM PCR
        PCRResetDynamics();

        // Extend the DRTM PCR.
        pcrHandle = PCR_FIRST + DRTM_PCR;

        // DRTM sequence increments restartCount
        gr.restartCount++;
    }
    else
    {
        pcrHandle = PCR_FIRST + HCRTM_PCR;
        g_DrtmPreStartup = TRUE;
    }

    // Complete hash and extend PCR, or if this is an HCRTM, complete
    // the hash, reset the H-CRTM register (PCR[0]) to 0...04, and then
    // extend the H-CRTM data
    for (i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
    {
        TPMI_ALG_HASH hash = CryptHashGetAlgByIndex(i);
        // make sure that the PCR is implemented for this algorithm
        if (PcrIsAllocated(pcrHandle, hashObject->state.hashState[i].hashAlg))
        {
            // Complete hash
            digest.t.size = CryptHashGetDigestSize(hash);
            CryptHashEnd2B(&hashObject->state.hashState[i], &digest.b);

            PcrDrtm(pcrHandle, hash, &digest);
        }
    }

    // Flush sequence object.
    FlushObject(g_DRTMHandle);
g_DRTMHandle = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
return;
23 Enhanced Authorization (EA) Commands

23.1 Introduction

The commands in clause 1 are used for policy evaluation. When successful, each command will update the \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{policyDigest} \) in a policy session context in order to establish that the authorizations required to use an object have been provided. Many of the commands will also modify other parts of a policy context so that the caller may constrain the scope of the authorization that is provided.

NOTE 1 Many of the terms used in clause 1 are described in detail in TPM 2.0 Part 1 and are not redefined in clause 1.

The \( \text{policySession} \) parameter of the command is the handle of the policy session context to be modified by the command. If the \( \text{policySession} \) parameter indicates a trial policy session, then the \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{policyDigest} \) will be updated and the indicated validations are not performed. However, any authorizations required to perform the policy command will be checked and dictionary attack logic invoked as necessary.

NOTE 2 If software is used to create policies, no authorization values are used. For example, \( \text{TPM\_PolicySecret} \) requires an authorization in a trial policy session, but not in a policy calculation outside the TPM.

NOTE 3 A policy session is set to a trial policy by \( \text{TPM\_2\_StartAuthSession(sessionType = TPM\_SE\_TRIAL)} \).

NOTE 4 Unless there is an unmarshaling error in the parameters of the command, these commands will return \( \text{TPM\_RC\_SUCCESS} \) when \( \text{policySession} \) references a trial session.

NOTE 5 Policy context other than the \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{policyDigest} \) may be updated for a trial policy but it is not required.
23.2 Signed Authorization Actions

23.2.1 Introduction

The TPM2_PolicySigned, TPM_PolicySecret, and TPM2_PolicyTicket commands use many of the same functions. Clause 23.2 consolidates those functions to simplify the document and to ensure uniformity of the operations.

23.2.2 Policy Parameter Checks

These parameter checks will be performed when indicated in the description of each of the commands:

a) nonceTPM – If this parameter is not the Empty Buffer, and it does not match policySession→nonceTPM, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

b) expiration – If this parameter is not zero, then:

1) if nonceTPM is not an Empty Buffer, then the absolute value of expiration is converted to milliseconds and added to policySession→startTime to create the timeout value and proceed to c).

2) If nonceTPM is an Empty Buffer, then the absolute value of expiration is converted to milliseconds and used as the timeout value and proceed to c).

However, timeout can only be changed to a smaller value. See timeout in 23.2.4.

c) timeout – If timeout is less than the current value of Time, or the current timeEpoch is not the same as policySession→timeEpoch, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_EXPIRED

d) cpHashA – If this parameter is not an Empty Buffer

NOTE 2 cpHashA is the hash of the command to be executed using this policy session in the authorization. The algorithm used to compute this hash is required to be the algorithm of the policy session.

1) the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH if policySession→cpHash is set and the contents of policySession→cpHash are not the same as cpHashA; or

NOTE 3 cpHash is the expected cpHash value held in the policy session context.

2) the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE if cpHashA is not the same size as policySession→policyDigest.

NOTE 4 policySession→policyDigest is the size of the digest produced by the hash algorithm used to compute policyDigest.
23.2.3 Policy Digest Update Function (PolicyUpdate())

This is the update process for policySession→policyDigest used by TPM2_PolicySigned(), TPM2_PolicySecret(), TPM2_PolicyTicket(), and TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(). The function prototype for the update function is:

\[
\text{PolicyUpdate}(\text{commandCode, arg2, arg3})
\]

where

- \( \text{arg2} \) a TPM2B_NAME
- \( \text{arg3} \) a TPM2B

These parameters are used to update policySession→policyDigest by

\[
\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{commandCode} || \text{arg2.name})
\]

followed by

\[
\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new+1}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} || \text{arg3.buffer})
\]

where

\( H_{\text{policyAlg}}() \) the hash algorithm chosen when the policy session was started

NOTE 1  If arg3 is a TPM2B_NAME, then arg3.buffer will actually be an arg3.name.

NOTE 2  The arg2.size and arg3.size fields are not included in the hashes.

NOTE 3  PolicyUpdate() uses two hash operations because arg2 and arg3 are variable-sized and the concatenation of arg2 and arg3 in a single hash could produce the same digest even though arg2 and arg3 are different. For example, arg2 = 1 2 3 and arg3 = 4 5 6 would produce the same digest as arg2 = 1 2 and arg3 = 3 4 5 6. Processing of the arguments separately in different Extend operation ensures that the digest produced by PolicyUpdate() will be different if arg2 and arg3 are different.
23.2.4 Policy Context Updates

When a policy command modifies some part of the policy session context other than the policySession→policyDigest, the following rules apply.

- **cpHash** – this parameter may only be changed if it contains its initialization value (an Empty Buffer). If cpHash is not the Empty Buffer when a policy command attempts to update it, the TPM will return an error (TPM_RC_CPHASH) if the current and update values are not the same.

- **timeOut** – this parameter may only be changed to a smaller value. If a command attempts to update this value with a larger value (longer into the future), the TPM will discard the update value. This is not an error condition.

- **commandCode** – once set by a policy command, this value may not be changed except by TPM2_PolicyRestart(). If a policy command tries to change this to a different value, an error is returned (TPM_RC_POLICY_CC).

- **pcrUpdateCounter** – this parameter is updated by TPM2_PolicyPCR(). This value may only be set once during a policy. Each time TPM2_PolicyPCR() executes, it checks to see if policySession→pcrUpdateCounter has its default state, indicating that this is the first TPM2_PolicyPCR(). If it has its default value, then policySession→pcrUpdateCounter is set to the current value of pcrUpdateCounter. If policySession→pcrUpdateCounter does not have its default value and its value is not the same as pcrUpdateCounter, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED.

  NOTE 1 If this parameter and pcrUpdateCounter are not the same, it indicates that PCR have changed since checked by the previous TPM2_PolicyPCR(). Since they have changed, the previous PCR validation is no longer valid.

- **commandLocality** – this parameter is the logical AND of all enabled localities. All localities are enabled for a policy when the policy session is created. TPM2_PolicyLocalities() selectively disables localities. Once use of a policy for a locality has been disabled, it cannot be enabled except by TPM2_PolicyRestart().

- **isPPRequired** – once SET, this parameter may only be CLEARed by TPM2_PolicyRestart().

- **isAuthValueNeeded** – once SET, this parameter may only be CLEARed by TPM2_PolicyPassword() or TPM2_PolicyRestart().

- **isPasswordNeeded** – once SET, this parameter may only be CLEARed by TPM2_PolicyAuthValue() or TPM2_PolicyRestart().

  NOTE 2 Both TPM2_PolicyAuthValue() and TPM2_PolicyPassword() change policySession→policyDigest in the same way. The different commands simply indicate to the TPM the format used for the authValue (HMAC or clear text). Both commands could be in the same policy. The final instance of these commands determines the format.
23.2.5 Policy Ticket Creation

For TPM2_PolicySigned() or TPM2_PolicySecret(), if the caller specified a negative value for expiration, then the TPM will return a ticket that includes a value indicating when the authorization expires. Otherwise, the TPM will return a NULL Ticket.

NOTE 1 If the authHandle in TPM2_PolicySecret() references a PIN Pass Index, then the command may succeed but a NULL Ticket will be returned.

The required computation for the digest in the authorization ticket is:

\[
\text{HMAC}_{\text{contextAlg}}(\text{proof}, (\text{TPM}_\text{ST}_\text{AUTH}_\text{xxx} | | \text{cpHash} | | \text{policyRef} | | \text{authName} | | \text{timeout} | | [\text{timeEpoch}] | | [\text{resetCount}]))
\]

where

- \text{HMAC}_{\text{contextAlg}}() \quad \text{an HMAC using the context integrity hash}
- \text{proof} \quad \text{a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy of the object associated with authName}
- \text{TPM}_\text{ST}_\text{AUTH}_\text{xxx} \quad \text{either TPM}_\text{ST}_\text{AUTH}_\text{SIGNED} \text{ or TPM}_\text{ST}_\text{AUTH}_\text{SECRET}; used to ensure that the ticket is properly used
- \text{cpHash} \quad \text{optional hash of the authorized command}
- \text{policyRef} \quad \text{optional reference to a policy value}
- \text{authName} \quad \text{Name of the object that signed the authorization}
- \text{timeout} \quad \text{implementation-specific value indicating when the authorization expires}
- \text{timeEpoch} \quad \text{implementation-specific representation of the timeEpoch at the time the ticket was created}

NOTE 2 Not included if \text{timeout} is zero.

- \text{resetCount} \quad \text{implementation-specific representation of the TPM's \text{totalResetCount}}

NOTE 3 Not included if \text{timeout} is zero or if nonceTPM was include in the authorization.
23.3 TPM2_PolicySigned

23.3.1 General Description

This command includes a signed authorization in a policy. The command ties the policy to a signing key by including the Name of the signing key in the policyDigest.

If policySession is a trial session, the TPM will not check the signature and will update policySession→policyDigest as described in 23.2.3 as if a properly signed authorization was received, but no ticket will be produced.

If policySession is not a trial session, the TPM will validate auth and only perform the update if it is a valid signature over the fields of the command.

The authorizing entity will sign a digest of the authorization qualifiers: nonceTPM, expiration, cpHashA, and policyRef. The digest is computed as:

\[ aHash := H_{authAlg}(nonceTPM || expiration || cpHashA || policyRef) \] (13)

where

- \( H_{authAlg}() \): the hash associated with the auth parameter of this command.
- \( nonceTPM \): the nonceTPM parameter from the TPM2_StartAuthSession() response. If the authorization is not limited to this session, the size of this value is zero.
- \( expiration \): time limit on authorization set by authorizing object. This 32-bit value is set to zero if the expiration time is not being set.
- \( cpHashA \): digest of the command parameters for the command being approved using the hash algorithm of the policy session. Set to an Empty Digest if the authorization is not limited to a specific command.

**NOTE 1** Each signature and key combination indicates the scheme and each scheme has an associated hash.

**NOTE 3** This is not the cpHash of this TPM2_PolicySigned() command.

**policyRef**: an opaque value determined by the authorizing entity. Set to the Empty Buffer if no value is present.

**NOTE 4** The nonceTPM, cpHashA, and policyRef qualifiers used to compute aHash use the TPM2B buffer but do not prepend the size.

**EXAMPLE** The computation for an aHash if there are no restrictions is:

\[ aHash := H_{authAlg}(00 00 00 00_{16}) \]

which is the hash of an expiration time of zero.

The aHash is signed by the key associated with a key whose handle is authObject. The signature and signing parameters are combined to create the auth parameter.

The TPM will perform the parameter checks listed in 23.2.2.

If the parameter checks succeed, the TPM will construct a test digest (tHash) over the provided parameters using the same formulation as shown in equation (13) above.

If tHash does not match the digest of the signed aHash, then the authorization fails and the TPM shall return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL and make no change to policySession→policyDigest.
When all validations have succeeded, $policySession\rightarrow policyDigest$ is updated by $\text{PolicyUpdate}()$ (see 23.2.3).

$$\text{PolicyUpdate}(\text{TPM\_CC\_PolicySigned}, authObject\rightarrow Name, policyRef)$$ \hspace{1cm} (14)

$authObject\rightarrow Name$ is a TPM2B\_NAME. $policySession$ is updated as described in 23.2.4. The TPM will optionally produce a ticket as described in 23.2.5. Authorization to use $authObject$ is not required.
23.3.2 Command and Response

### Table 128 — TPM2_PolicySigned Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit, encrypt, or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicySigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>authObject</td>
<td>handle for a key that will validate the signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>nonceTPM</td>
<td>the policy nonce for the session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This can be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>cpHashA</td>
<td>digest of the command parameters to which this authorization is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This is not the cpHash for this command but the cpHash for the command to which this policy session will be applied. If it is not limited, the parameter will be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>policyRef</td>
<td>a reference to a policy relating to the authorization – may be the Empty Buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Size is limited to be no larger than the nonce size supported on the TPM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT32</td>
<td>expiration</td>
<td>time when authorization will expire, measured in seconds from the time that nonceTPM was generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If expiration is non-negative, a NULL Ticket is returned. See 23.2.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>signed authorization (not optional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 129 — TPM2_PolicySigned Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>timeout</td>
<td>implementation-specific time value, used to indicate to the TPM when the ticket expires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If policyTicket is a NULL Ticket, then this shall be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_AUTH</td>
<td>policyTicket</td>
<td>produced if the command succeeds and expiration in the command was non-zero; this ticket will use the TPMT_ST_AUTH_SIGNED structure tag. See 23.2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#include "PolicySigned_fp.h"
#if CC_PolicySigned // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>cpHash was previously set to a different value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_EXPIRED</td>
<td>expiration indicates a time in the past or expiration is non-zero but no nonceTPM is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NONCE</td>
<td>nonceTPM is not the nonce associated with the policySession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>the signing scheme of auth is not supported by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>the signature is not genuine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>input cpHash has wrong size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PolicySigned(
    PolicySigned_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    PolicySigned_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    SESSION *session;
    TPM2B_NAME entityName;
    TPM2B_DIGEST authHash;
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    UINT64 authTimeout = 0;
    // Input Validation
    // Set up local pointers
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);  // the session structure
    if (session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR) {
        authTimeout = ComputeAuthTimeout(session, in->expiration, &in->nonceTPM);
        result = PolicyParameterChecks(session, authTimeout,
                                        &in->cpHashA, &in->nonceTPM,
                                        RC_PolicySigned_nonceTPM,
                                        RC_PolicySigned_cpHashA,
                                        RC_PolicySigned_expiration);
        if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
            return result;
        // Re-compute the digest being signed
        // Start hash
        authHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState,
                                            CryptGetSignHashAlg(&in->auth));
        if there is no digest size, then we don't have a verification function
        // for this algorithm (e.g. TPM_ALG_ECDAA) so indicate that it is a
        // bad scheme.
        if (authHash.t.size == 0)
            return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_PolicySigned_auth;
        // nonceTPM
        CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->nonceTPM.b);
    }
```

```
47  // expiration
48  CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(UINT32), in->expiration);
49
50  // cpHashA
51  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->cpHashA.b);
52
53  // policyRef
54  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->policyRef.b);
55
56  // Complete digest
57  CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &authHash.b);
58
59  // Validate Signature.  A TPM_RC_SCHEME, TPM_RC_HANDLE or TPM_RC_SIGNATURE
60  // error may be returned at this point
61  result = CryptValidateSignature(in->authObject, &authHash, &in->auth);
62  if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
63    return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_PolicySigned_auth);
64  }
65
66  // Internal Data Update
67  // Update policy with input policyRef and name of authorization key
68  // These values are updated even if the session is a trial session
69  PolicyContextUpdate(TPM_CC_PolicySigned,
70    EntityGetName(in->authObject, &entityName),
71    &in->policyRef,
72    &in->cpHashA, authTimeout, session);
73
74  // Command Output
75  // Create ticket and timeout buffer if in->expiration < 0 and this is not
76  // a trial session.
77  // NOTE: PolicyParameterChecks() makes sure that nonceTPM is present
78  // when expiration is non-zero.
79  if(in->expiration < 0 && session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR)
80  {
81    BOOL expiresOnReset = (in->nonceTPM.t.size == 0);
82    // Compute policy ticket
83    authTimeout &= ~EXPIRATION_BIT;
84    TicketComputeAuth(TPM_ST_AUTH_SIGNED, EntityGetHierarchy(in->authObject),
85      authTimeout, expiresOnReset, &in->cpHashA, &in->policyRef,
86      &entityName, &out->policyTicket);
87  // Generate timeout buffer.  The format of output timeout buffer is
88  // TPM-specific.
89  // Note: In this implementation, the timeout buffer value is computed after
90  // the ticket is produced so, when the ticket is checked, the expiration
91  // flag needs to be extracted before the ticket is checked.
92  // In the Windows compatible version, the least-significant bit of the
93  // timeout value is used as a flag to indicate if the authorization expires
94  // on reset.  The flag is the MSb.
95  out->timeout.t.size = sizeof(authTimeout);
96  if(expiresOnReset)
97    authTimeout |= EXPIRATION_BIT;
98  UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(authTimeout, out->timeout.t.buffer);
99  }
100  else
101  {
102    // Generate a null ticket.
103    // timeout buffer is null
104    out->timeout.t.size = 0;
105
106    // authorization ticket is null
107    out->policyTicket.tag = TPM_ST_AUTH_SIGNED;
108    out->policyTicket.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
109    out->policyTicket.digest.t.size = 0;
110  }
111  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}  
#endif  // CC_PolicySigned
23.4 TPM2_PolicySecret

23.4.1 General Description

This command includes a secret-based authorization to a policy. The caller proves knowledge of the secret value using an authorization session using the authValue associated with authHandle. A password session, an HMAC session, or a policy session containing TPM2_PolicyAuthValue() or TPM2_PolicyPassword() will satisfy this requirement.

If a policy session is used and use of the authValue of authHandle is not required, the TPM will return TPM_RC_MODE. That is, the session for authHandle must have either isAuthValueNeeded or isPasswordNeeded SET.

The secret is the authValue of the entity whose handle is authHandle, which may be any TPM entity with a handle and an associated authValue. This includes the reserved handles (for example, Platform, Storage, and Endorsement), NV Indexes, and loaded objects. authEntity is the entity referenced by authHandle. If authEntity references an Ordinary object, it must have userWithAuth SET.

NOTE 1 The userWithAuth requirement permits the implementation to use common authorization code.

If authEntity references a non-PIN Index, TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD is required to be SET in the Index. If authEntity references an NV PIN index, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is required to be SET and pinCount must be less than pinLimit.

NOTE 2 The authorization value for a hierarchy cannot be used in this command if the hierarchy is disabled.

If the authorization check fails, then the normal dictionary attack logic is invoked. If authEntity references a NV PIN Pass index, a successful authorization check increments pinCount. If authEntity references a NV PIN Fail index, a failing authorization check increments pinCount. The authorization is checked even for a trial policy session.

If the authorization provided by the authorization session is valid, the command parameters are checked as described in 23.2.2.

When all validations have succeeded, policySession→policyDigest is updated by PolicyUpdate() (see 23.2.3).

\[
\text{PolicyUpdate}(\text{TPM_CC_PolicySecret, authEntity→Name, policyRef}) \tag{15}
\]

authEntity→Name is a TPM2B_NAME. policySession is updated as described in 23.2.4. The TPM will optionally produce a ticket as described in 23.2.5.

If the session is a trial session, policySession→policyDigest is updated if the authorization is valid.

NOTE 2 If an HMAC is used to convey the authorization, a separate session is needed for the authorization. Because the HMAC in that authorization will include a nonce that prevents replay of the authorization, the value of the nonceTPM parameter in this command is limited. It is retained mostly to provide processing consistency with TPM2_PolicySigned().
### 23.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 130 — TPM2_PolicySecret Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicySecret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_ENTITY</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle for an entity providing the authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>nonceTPM</td>
<td>the policy nonce for the session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This can be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>cpHashA</td>
<td>digest of the command parameters to which this authorization is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This is not the cpHash for this command but the cpHash for the command which</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>this policy session will be applied. If it is not limited, the parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>will be the Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>policyRef</td>
<td>a reference to a policy relating to the authorization – may be the Empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Size is limited to be no larger than the nonce size supported on the TPM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT32</td>
<td>expiration</td>
<td>time when authorization will expire, measured in seconds from the time that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nonceTPM was generated. If expiration is non-negative, a NULL Ticket is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>returned. See 23.2.5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 131 — TPM2_PolicySecret Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>timeout</td>
<td>implementation-specific time value used to indicate to the TPM when the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ticket expires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_AUTH</td>
<td>policyTicket</td>
<td>produced if the command succeeds and expiration in the command was non-zero (</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See 23.2.5). This ticket will use the TPMT_ST_AUTH_SECRET structure tag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicySecret_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicySecret  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#include "NV_spt_fp.h"
#endif
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td><code>cpHash</code> for policy was previously set to a value that is not the same as <code>cpHashA</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_EXPIRED</td>
<td><code>expiration</code> indicates a time in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NONCE</td>
<td><code>nonceTPM</code> does not match the nonce associated with <code>policySession</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>cpHashA</code> is not the size of a digest for the hash associated with <code>policySession</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC PolicySecret(
    PolicySecret_In     *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    PolicySecret_Out    *out ) // OUT: output parameter list
{
    TPM_RC result;
    SESSION *session;
    TPM2B_NAME entityName;
    UINT64 authTimeout = 0;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // Only do input validation if this is not a trial policy session
    if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR)
    {
        authTimeout = ComputeAuthTimeout(session, in->expiration, &in->nonceTPM);
        result = PolicyParameterChecks(session, authTimeout,
                                        &in->cpHashA, &in->nonceTPM,
                                        RC_PolicySecret_nonceTPM,
                                        RC_PolicySecret_cpHashA,
                                        RC_PolicySecret_expiration);

        if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
            return result;
    }

    // Internal Data Update
    // Update policy context with input policyRef and name of authorizing key
    // This value is computed even for trial sessions. Possibly update the cpHash
    PolicyContextUpdate(TPM_CC_PolicySecret,
                        EntityGetName(in->authHandle, &entityName), &in->policyRef,
                        &in->cpHashA, authTimeout, session);

    // Command Output
    // Create ticket and timeout buffer if in->expiration < 0 and this is not
    // a trial session.
    // NOTE: PolicyParameterChecks() makes sure that nonceTPM is present
    // when expiration is non-zero.
    if(in->expiration < 0)
    {
        if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR
            && !NvIsPinPassIndex(in->authHandle))
{  
  BOOL expiresOnReset = (in->nonceTPM.t.size == 0);
  // Compute policy ticket
  authTimeout &= ~EXPIRATION_BIT;
  TicketComputeAuth(TPM_ST_AUTH_SECRET, EntityGetHierarchy(in->authHandle),
                      authTimeout, expiresOnReset, &in->cpHashA, &in->policyRef,
                      &entityName, &out->policyTicket);
  // Generate timeout buffer. The format of output timeout buffer is
  // TPM-specific.
  // Note: In this implementation, the timeout buffer value is computed after
  // the ticket is produced so, when the ticket is checked, the expiration
  // flag needs to be extracted before the ticket is checked.
  out->timeout.t.size = sizeof(authTimeout);
  // In the Windows compatible version, the least-significant bit of the
  // timeout value is used as a flag to indicate if the authorization expires
  // on reset. The flag is the MSb.
  if(expiresOnReset)
    authTimeout |= EXPIRATION_BIT;
  UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(authTimeout, out->timeout.t.buffer);
  } else
  {
    // timeout buffer is null
    out->timeout.t.size = 0;
    // authorization ticket is null
    out->policyTicket.tag = TPM_ST_AUTH_SECRET;
    out->policyTicket.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
    out->policyTicket.digest.t.size = 0;
  }
  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicySecret
23.5 TPM2_PolicyTicket

23.5.1 General Description

This command is similar to TPM2_PolicySigned() except that it takes a ticket instead of a signed authorization. The ticket represents a validated authorization that had an expiration time associated with it.

The parameters of this command are checked as described in 23.2.2.

If the checks succeed, the TPM uses the timeout, cpHashA, policyRef, and authName to construct a ticket to compare with the value in ticket. If these tickets match, then the TPM will create a TPM2B_NAME (objectName) using authName and update the context of policySession by PolicyUpdate() (see 23.2.3).

\[ \text{PolicyUpdate}(\text{commandCode}, \text{authName}, \text{policyRef}) \] (16)

If the structure tag of ticket is TPM_ST_AUTH_SECRET, then commandCode will be TPM_CC_PolicySecret. If the structure tag of ticket is TPM_ST_AUTH_SIGNED, then commandCode will be TPM_CC_PolicySigned.

\[ \text{policySession} \] is updated as described in 23.2.4.
# 23.5.2 Command and Response

## Table 132 — TPM2_PolicyTicket Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyTicket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>timeout</td>
<td>time when authorization will expire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>cpHashA</td>
<td>digest of the command parameters to which this authorization is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>policyRef</td>
<td>reference to a qualifier for the policy – may be the Empty Buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>authName</td>
<td>name of the object that provided the authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_AUTH</td>
<td>ticket</td>
<td>an authorization ticket returned by the TPM in response to a TPM2_PolicySigned() or TPM2_PolicySecret()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 133 — TPM2_PolicyTicket Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 23.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyTicket_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyTicket // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>policy's cpHash was previously set to a different value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_EXPIRED</td>
<td>timeout value in the ticket is in the past and the ticket has expired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>timeout or cpHash has invalid size for the ticket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TICKET</td>
<td>ticket is not valid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

```c
TPM2_PolicyTicket(
    PolicyTicket_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                 result;
    SESSION                *session;
    UINT64                 authTimeout;
    TPMT_TK_AUTH           ticketToCompare;
    TPM_CC                 commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicySecret;
    BOOL                   expiresOnReset;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // NOTE: A trial policy session is not allowed to use this command.
    // A ticket is used in place of a previously given authorization. Since
    // a trial policy doesn't actually authenticate, the validated
    // ticket is not necessary and, in place of using a ticket, one
    // should use the intended authorization for which the ticket
    // would be a substitute.
    if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy)
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_PolicyTicket_policySession;

    // Restore timeout data. The format of timeout buffer is TPM-specific.
    // In this implementation, the most significant bit of the timeout value is
    // used as the flag to indicate that the ticket expires on TPM Reset or
    // TPM Restart. The flag has to be removed before the parameters and ticket
    // are checked.
    if(in->timeout.t.size != sizeof(UINT64))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_PolicyTicket_timeout;
    authTimeout = BYTE_ARAAY_TO_UINT64(in->timeout.t.buffer);

    // extract the flag
    expiresOnReset = (authTimeout & EXPIRATION_BIT) != 0;
    authTimeout &= ~EXPIRATION_BIT;

    // Do the normal checks on the cpHashA and timeout values
    result = PolicyParameterChecks(session, authTimeout,
        &in->cpHashA,
        NULL, // no nonce
        0, // no bad nonce return
        RC_PolicyTicket_cpHashA,
```

---

**Error Return**

- **TPM_RC_CPHASH**: Policy's cpHash was previously set to a different value.
- **TPM_RC_EXPIRED**: Timeout value in the ticket is in the past and the ticket has expired.
- **TPM_RC_SIZE**: Timeout or cpHash has invalid size for the ticket.
- **TPM_RC_TICKET**: Ticket is not valid.

---

**Detailed Actions**

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyTicket_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyTicket // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

TPM2_PolicyTicket(
    PolicyTicket_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                 result;
    SESSION                *session;
    UINT64                 authTimeout;
    TPMT_TK_AUTH           ticketToCompare;
    TPM_CC                 commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicySecret;
    BOOL                   expiresOnReset;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // NOTE: A trial policy session is not allowed to use this command.
    // A ticket is used in place of a previously given authorization. Since
    // a trial policy doesn't actually authenticate, the validated
    // ticket is not necessary and, in place of using a ticket, one
    // should use the intended authorization for which the ticket
    // would be a substitute.
    if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy)
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_PolicyTicket_policySession;

    // Restore timeout data. The format of timeout buffer is TPM-specific.
    // In this implementation, the most significant bit of the timeout value is
    // used as the flag to indicate that the ticket expires on TPM Reset or
    // TPM Restart. The flag has to be removed before the parameters and ticket
    // are checked.
    if(in->timeout.t.size != sizeof(UINT64))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_PolicyTicket_timeout;
    authTimeout = BYTE_ARAAY_TO_UINT64(in->timeout.t.buffer);

    // extract the flag
    expiresOnReset = (authTimeout & EXPIRATION_BIT) != 0;
    authTimeout &= ~EXPIRATION_BIT;

    // Do the normal checks on the cpHashA and timeout values
    result = PolicyParameterChecks(session, authTimeout,
        &in->cpHashA,
        NULL, // no nonce
        0, // no bad nonce return
        RC_PolicyTicket_cpHashA,
```
RC_PolicyTicket_timeout);
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result;
// Validate Ticket
// Re-generate policy ticket by input parameters
TicketComputeAuth(in->ticket.tag, in->ticket.hierarchy,
    authTimeout, expiresOnReset, &in->cpHashA, &in->policyRef,
    &in->authName, &ticketToCompare);
// Compare generated digest with input ticket digest
if(!MemoryEqual2B(in->ticket.digest.b, &ticketToCompare.digest.b))
    return TPM_RC_TICKET + RC_PolicyTicket_ticket;

// Internal Data Update
// Is this ticket to take the place of a TPM2_PolicySigned() or
// a TPM2_PolicySecret()? if(in->ticket.tag == TPM_ST_AUTH_SIGNED)
commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicySigned;
else if(in->ticket.tag == TPM_ST_AUTH_SECRET)
    commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicySecret;
else
    // There could only be two possible tag values. Any other value should
    // be caught by the ticket validation process.
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);

// Update policy context
PolicyContextUpdate(commandCode, &in->authName, &in->policyRef,
    &in->cpHashA, authTimeout, session);
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
} #endif // CC_PolicyTicket
23.6  TPM2_PolicyOR

23.6.1  General Description

This command allows options in authorizations without requiring that the TPM evaluate all of the options. If a policy may be satisfied by different sets of conditions, the TPM need only evaluate one set that satisfies the policy. This command will indicate that one of the required sets of conditions has been satisfied.

PolicySession→policyDigest is compared against the list of provided values. If the current policySession→policyDigest does not match any value in the list, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE. Otherwise, the TPM will reset policySession→policyDigest to a Zero Digest. Then policySession→policyDigest is extended by the concatenation of TPM_CC_PolicyOR and the concatenation of all of the digests.

If policySession is a trial session, the TPM will assume that policySession→policyDigest matches one of the list entries and compute the new value of policyDigest.

The algorithm for computing the new value for policyDigest of policySession is:

a)  Concatenate all the digest values in pHashList:

\[ \text{digests} := pHashList.digests[1].buffer \ || \ldots \ || pHashList.digests[n].buffer \]

\hspace{1cm} (17)

NOTE 1  The TPM will not return an error if the size of an entry is not the same as the size of the digest of the policy. However, that entry cannot match policyDigest.

b)  Reset policyDigest to a Zero Digest.

c)  Extend the command code and the hashes computed in step a) above:

\[ \text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} \ || \ TPM\_\text{CC}\_\text{PolicyOR} \ || \ \text{digests}) \]

\hspace{1cm} (18)

NOTE 2  The computation in b) and c) above is equivalent to:

\[ \text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(0\ldots0 \ || \ TPM\_\text{CC}\_\text{PolicyOR} \ || \ \text{digests}) \]

A TPM shall support a list with at least eight tagged digest values.

NOTE 3  If policies are to be portable between TPMs, then they should not use more than eight values.
### 23.6.2 Command and Response

#### Table 134 — TPM2_PolicyOR Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG | tag     | TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherw.
| UINT32              | commandSize | otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS                        |
| TPM_CC              | commandCode | TPM_CC_PolicyOR                                      |
| TPMI_SH_POLICY      | policySession | handle for the policy session being extended          |
| TPML_DIGEST         | pHashList | the list of hashes to check for a match               |

#### Table 135 — TPM2_PolicyOR Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 23.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyOR_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyOR  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>no digest in pHashList matched the current value of policyDigest for policySession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyOR(
    PolicyOR_In     *in,     // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION     *session;
    UINT32       i;

    // Input Validation and Update
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    // Compare and Update Internal Session policy if match
    for(i = 0; i < in->pHashList.count; i++)
        {  
            if((session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == SET
                || (MemoryEqual2B(&session->u2.policyDigest.b,
                    &in->pHashList.digests[i].b)))
            {  
                // Found a match
                HASH_STATE         hashState;
                TPM_CC          commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyOR;
                // Start hash
                session->u2.policyDigest.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
                // Set policyDigest to 0 string and add it to hash
                MemorySet(session->u2.policyDigest.t.buffer, 0,
                    session->u2.policyDigest.t.size);
                CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
                // add command code
                CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);
                // Add each of the hashes in the list
                for(i = 0; i < in->pHashList.count; i++)
                    {  
                        // Extend policyDigest
                        CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->pHashList.digests[i].b);
                    }
                // Complete digest
                CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
                return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
            }
        }
    // None of the values in the list matched the current policyDigest
    return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyOR_pHashList;
```
56 }
57 #endif // CC_PolicyOR
23.7 TPM2_PolicyPCR

23.7.1 General Description

This command is used to cause conditional gating of a policy based on PCR. This command together with TPM2_PolicyOR() allows one group of authorizations to occur when PCR are in one state and a different set of authorizations when the PCR are in a different state.

The TPM will modify the pcrs parameter so that bits that correspond to unimplemented PCR are CLEAR. If policySession is not a trial policy session, the TPM will use the modified value of pcrs to select PCR values to hash according to TPM 2.0 Part 1, Selecting Multiple PCR. The hash algorithm of the policy session is used to compute a digest (digestTPM) of the selected PCR. If pcrDigest does not have a length of zero, then it is compared to digestTPM; and if the values do not match, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE and make no change to policySession→policyDigest. If the values match, or if the length of pcrDigest is zero, then policySession→policyDigest is extended by:

\[
policyDigest_{\text{new}} = H_{policyAlg}(policyDigest_{\text{old}} \| \text{TPM_CC_PolicyPCR} \| \text{pcrs} \| \text{digestTPM})
\]

where

- \text{pcrs} the pcrs parameter with bits corresponding to unimplemented PCR set to 0
- \text{digestTPM} the digest of the selected PCR using the hash algorithm of the policy session

NOTE 1 If the caller provides the expected PCR value, the intention is that the policy evaluation stop at that point if the PCR do not match. If the caller does not provide the expected PCR value, then the validity of the settings will not be determined until an attempt is made to use the policy for authorization. If the policy is constructed such that the PCR check comes before user authorization checks, this early termination would allow software to avoid unnecessary prompts for user input to satisfy a policy that would fail later due to incorrect PCR values.

After this command completes successfully, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED if the policy session is used for authorization and the PCR are not known to be correct.

The TPM uses a "generation" number (pcrUpdateCounter) that is incremented each time PCR are updated (unless the PCR being changed is specified not to cause a change to this counter). The value of this counter is stored in the policy session context (policySession→pcrUpdateCounter) when this command is executed. When the policy is used for authorization, the current value of the counter is compared to the value in the policy session context and the authorization will fail if the values are not the same. When this command is executed, policySession→pcrUpdateCounter is checked to see if it has been previously set (in the reference implementation, it has a value of zero if not previously set). If it has been set, it will be compared with the current value of pcrUpdateCounter to determine if any PCR changes have occurred. If the values are different, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED.

NOTE 2 Since the pcrUpdateCounter is updated if any PCR is extended (except those specified not to do so), this means that the command will fail even if a PCR not specified in the policy is updated. This is an optimization for the purposes of conserving internal TPM memory. This would be a rare occurrence, and, if this should occur, the policy could be reset using the TPM2_PolicyRestart command and rerun.

If policySession→pcrUpdateCounter has not been set, then it is set to the current value of pcrUpdateCounter.

If this command is used for a trial policySession, policySession→policyDigest will be updated using the values from the command rather than the values from a digest of the TPM PCR. If the caller does not provide PCR settings (pcrDigest has a length of zero), the TPM may (and it is preferred to) use the current TPM PCR settings (digestTPM) in the calculation for the new policyDigest. The TPM may return...
an error if the caller does not provide a PCR digest for a trial policy session but this is not the preferred behavior.

The TPM will not check any PCR and will compute:

\[
policyDigest_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyPCR} || \text{pcrs} || \text{pcrDigest})
\]  

In this computation, \text{pcrs} is the input parameter without modification.

\begin{itemize}
  \item [NOTE 3] The \text{pcrs} parameter is expected to match the configuration of the TPM for which the policy is being computed which may not be the same as the TPM on which the trial policy is being computed.
  
  \item [NOTE 4] Although no PCR are checked in a trial policy session, \text{pcrDigest} is expected to correspond to some useful PCR values. It is legal, but pointless, to have the TPM aid in calculating a \text{policyDigest} corresponding to PCR values that are not useful in practice.
\end{itemize}
23.7.2 Command and Response

### Table 136 — TPM2_PolicyPCR Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyPCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>pcrDigest</td>
<td>expected digest value of the selected PCR using the hash algorithm of the session; may be zero length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>pcrs</td>
<td>the PCR to include in the check digest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 137 — TPM2_PolicyPCR Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.7.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyPCR_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyPCR // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>if provided, pcrDigest does not match the current PCR settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED</td>
<td>a previous TPM2_PolicyPCR() set pcrCounter and it has changed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PolicyPCR(
    PolicyPCR_In *in          // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION     *session;
    TPM2B_DIGEST pcrDigest;
    BYTE        pcrs[sizeof(TPML_PCR_SELECTION)];
    UINT32      pcrSize;
    BYTE        *buffer;
    TPM_CC      commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyPCR;
    HASH_STATE  hashState;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    // Compute current PCR digest
    PCRComputeCurrentDigest(session->authHashAlg, &in->pcrs, &pcrDigest);
    // Do validation for non trial session
    if((session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR) &&
    // Make sure that this is not going to invalidate a previous PCR check
    !pkrCounter != 0 && session->pcrCounter != gr.pcrCounter)
        return TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED;
    // If the caller specified the PCR digest and it does not
    // match the current PCR settings, return an error..
    if(in->pcrDigest.t.size != 0)
    {
        if(!MemoryEqual2B(&in->pcrDigest.b, &pcrDigest.b))
            return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyPCR_pcrDigest;
    }
    else
    {
        // For trial session, just use the input PCR digest if one provided
        // Note: It can’t be too big because it is a TPM2B_DIGEST and the size
        // would have been checked during unmarshaling
        if(in->pcrDigest.t.size != 0)
            pcrDigest = in->pcrDigest;
    }
    // Internal Data Update
    // Update policy hash
    policyDigestnew = hash(   policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyPCR
                           || PCRS || pcrDigest)
    // Start hash
```

---

Details on how the code is structured and what it accomplishes in the context of the Trusted Platform Module Library, focusing on error handling and policy PCR operations.
CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add old digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// add commandCode
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

// add PCRs
buffer = pcrs;
pcrSize = TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Marshal(&in->pcrs, &buffer, NULL);
CryptDigestUpdate(&hashState, pcrSize, pcrs);

// add PCR digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &pcrDigest.b);

// complete the hash and get the results
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// update pcrCounter in session context for non trial session
if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR)
{
    session->pcrCounter = gr.pcrCounter;
}
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

#endif // CC_PolicyPCR
23.8 TPM2_PolicyLocality

23.8.1 General Description

This command indicates that the authorization will be limited to a specific locality.

\(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\) is a parameter kept in the session context. When the policy session is started, this parameter is initialized to a value that allows the policy to apply to any locality.

If \(\text{locality}\) has a value greater than 31, then an extended locality is indicated. For an extended locality, the TPM will validate that \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\) has not previously been set or that the current value of \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\) is the same as \(\text{locality}\) (TPM_RC_RANGE).

When \(\text{locality}\) is not an extended locality, the TPM will validate that the \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\) is not set to an extended locality value (TPM_RC_RANGE). If not the TPM will disable any locality not SET in the \(\text{locality}\) parameter. If the result of disabling localities results in no locality being enabled, the TPM will return TPM_RC_RANGE.

If no error occurred in the validation of \(\text{locality}\), \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{policyDigest}\) is extended with

\[
\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyLocality} || \text{locality})
\]  

(21)

Then \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\) is updated to indicate which localities are still allowed after execution of TPM2_PolicyLocality().

When the policy session is used to authorize a command, the authorization will fail if the locality used for the command is not one of the enabled localities in \(\text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{commandLocality}\).
### 23.8.2 Command and Response

#### Table 138 — TPM2_PolicyLocality Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyLocality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMA_LOCALITY</td>
<td>locality</td>
<td>the allowed localities for the policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 139 — TPM2_PolicyLocality Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.8.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyLocality_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyLocality // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RANGE</td>
<td>all the locality values selected by locality have been disabled by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>previous TPM2_PolicyLocality() calls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyLocality(
  PolicyLocality_In   *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION     *session;
    BYTE         marshalBuffer[sizeof(TPMA_LOCALITY)];
    BYTE         prevSetting[sizeof(TPMA_LOCALITY)];
    UINT32       marshalSize;
    BYTE        *buffer;
    TPM_CC       commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyLocality;
    HASH_STATE   hashState;

    // Input Validation
    
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    
    // Get new locality setting in canonical form
    marshalBuffer[0] = 0; // Code analysis says that this is not initialized
    buffer = marshalBuffer;
    marshalSize = TPMA_LOCALITY_Marshal(&in->locality, &buffer, NULL);

    // Its an error if the locality parameter is zero
    if(marshalBuffer[0] == 0)
        return TPM_RC_RANGE + RC_PolicyLocality_locality;

    // Get existing locality setting in canonical form
    prevSetting[0] = 0; // Code analysis says that this is not initialized
    buffer = prevSetting;
    TPMA_LOCALITY_Marshal(&session->commandLocality, &buffer, NULL);

    // If the locality has previously been set
    if(prevSetting[0] != 0)
        // then the current locality setting and the requested have to be the same
        // type (that is, either both normal or both extended
        && ((prevSetting[0] < 32) != (marshalBuffer[0] < 32))
        return TPM_RC_RANGE + RC_PolicyLocality_locality;

    // See if the input is a regular or extended locality
    if(marshalBuffer[0] < 32)
    {
        // if there was no previous setting, start with all normal localities
        // enabled
        if(prevSetting[0] == 0)
            prevSetting[0] = 0x1F;

        // AND the new setting with the previous setting and store it in prevSetting
        prevSetting[0] &= marshalBuffer[0];

        // The result setting can not be 0
```
if(prevSetting[0] == 0) {
    return TPM_RCS_RANGE + RC_PolicyLocality locality;
} else {
    // for extended locality
    // if the locality has already been set, then it must match the
    if(prevSetting[0] != 0 && prevSetting[0] != marshalBuffer[0]) {
        return TPM_RCS_RANGE + RC_PolicyLocality locality;
    }
    // Setting is OK
    prevSetting[0] = marshalBuffer[0];
}
// Internal Data Update

// Update policy hash
// policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyLocality || locality)
// Start hash
CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add old digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// add commandCode
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

// add input locality
CryptDigestUpdate(&hashState, marshalSize, marshalBuffer);

// complete the digest
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// update session locality by unmarshal function. The function must succeed
// because both input and existing locality setting have been validated.
buffer = prevSetting;
TPMA_LOCALITY.Unmarshal(&session->commandLocality, &buffer,
                        (INT32 *)&marshalSize);
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
#else // CC_PolicyLocality

// If the command is CC_PolicyLocality_revert, set the entered locality to the
// default locality. No validation is done on the entered locality as the
// default locality is well defined.
if(commandCode == TPM_CC_PolicyLocality_revert) {
    prevSetting[0] = 0;
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyLocality
23.9 TPM2_PolicyNV

23.9.1 General Description

This command is used to cause conditional gating of a policy based on the contents of an NV Index. It is an immediate assertion. The NV index is validated during the TPM2_PolicyNV() command, not when the session is used for authorization.

The authorization to read the NV Index must succeed even if policySession is a trial policy session.

If policySession is a trial policy session, the TPM will update policySession→policyDigest as shown in equations (22) and (23) below and return TPM_RC_SUCCESS. It will not perform any further validation. The remainder of this general description would apply only if policySession is not a trial policy session.

An authorization session providing authorization to read the NV Index shall be provided.

If TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is not SET in the NV Index, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED. If TPMA_NV_READLOCKED of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

For an NV Index with the TPM_NT_COUNTER or TPM_NT_BITS attribute SET, the TPM may ignore the offset parameter and use an offset of 0. Therefore, it is recommended that the caller set the offset parameter to 0 for interoperability.

If offset and the size field of data add to a value that is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index referenced by nvIndex, the TPM shall return an error (TPM_RC_NV_RANGE). The implementation may return an error (TPM_RC_VALUE) if it performs an additional check and determines that offset is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index.

operandA begins at offset into the NV index contents and has a size equal to the size of operandB. The TPM will perform the indicated arithmetic check using operandA and operandB. If the check fails, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_POLICY and not change policySession→policyDigest. If the check succeeds, the TPM will hash the arguments:

\[ \text{args} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{operandB.buffer} || \text{offset} || \text{operation}) \]  

(22)

where

- \( H_{\text{policyAlg}}() \) is the hash function using the algorithm of the policy session
- \( \text{operandB} \) is the value used for the comparison
- \( \text{offset} \) is the offset from the start of the NV Index data to start the comparison
- \( \text{operation} \) is the operation parameter indicating the comparison being performed

The value of args and the Name of the NV Index are extended to policySession→policyDigest by

\[ \text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyNV} || \text{args} || \text{nvIndex}→\text{Name}) \]  

(23)

where

- \( H_{\text{policyAlg}}() \) is the hash function using the algorithm of the policy session
- \( \text{args} \) is the value computed in equation (22)
- \( \text{nvIndex}→\text{Name} \) is the Name of the NV Index

The signed arithmetic operations are performed using twos-compliment.

Magnitude comparisons assume that the octet at offset zero in the referenced NV location and in operandB contain the most significant octet of the data.
### 23.9.2 Command and Response

#### Table 140 — TPM2_PolicyNV Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index of the area to read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_OPERAND</td>
<td>operandB</td>
<td>the second operand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>offset</td>
<td>the octet offset in the NV Index for the start of operand A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_EO</td>
<td>operation</td>
<td>the comparison to make</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 141 — TPM2_PolicyNV Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 23.9.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyNV_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyNV // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE</td>
<td>NV index authorization type is not correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>NV index read locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED</td>
<td>the NV index has not been initialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_POLICY</td>
<td>the comparison to the NV contents failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>the size of <code>nvIndex</code> data starting at <code>offset</code> is less than the size of <code>operandB</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td><code>offset</code> is too large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyNV(
    PolicyNV_In *in          // IN: input parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC result;
    SESSION *session;
    NV_REF locator;
    NV_INDEX *nvIndex;
    BYTE nvBuffer[sizeof(in->operandB.t.buffer)];
    TPM2B_NAME nvName;
    TPM_CC commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyNV;
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    TPM2B_DIGEST argHash;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // If this is a trial policy, skip all validations and the operation
    if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR) {
        // No need to access the actual NV index information for a trial policy.
        nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    }

    // Common read access checks. NvReadAccessChecks() may return
    // TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION, TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED, or TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED
    result = NvReadAccessChecks(in->authHandle,
                                in->nvIndex,
                                nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
        return result;
    }

    // Make sure that offset is within range
    if(in->offset > nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize) {
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyNV_offset;
    }

    // Valid NV data size should not be smaller than input operandB size
    if((nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize - in->offset) < in->operandB.t.size) {
        // "..."
    }
```
return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_PolicyNV_operandB;

// Get NV data. The size of NV data equals the input operand B size
NvGetIndexData(nvIndex, locator, in->offset, in->operandB.t.size, nvBuffer);

// Check to see if the condition is valid
if (!PolicySptCheckCondition(in->operation, nvBuffer, in->operandB.t.buffer, in->operandB.t.size))
    return TPM_RC_POLICY;
}

// Internal Data Update

// Start argument hash
argHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
// add operandB
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->operandB.b);
// add offset
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(UINT16), in->offset);
// add operation
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_EO), in->operation);
// complete argument digest
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &argHash.b);

// Update policyDigest
// Start digest
CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
// add old digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
// add commandCode
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);
// add argument digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &argHash.b);
// Adding nvName
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &EntityGetName(in->nvIndex, &nvName)->b);
// complete the digest
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
#endif // CC_PolicyNV
23.10 TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer

23.10.1 General Description

This command is used to cause conditional gating of a policy based on the contents of the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure.

If policySession is a trial policy session, the TPM will update policySession→policyDigest as shown in equations (24) and (25) below and return TPM_RC_SUCCESS. It will not perform any validation. The remainder of this general description would apply only if policySession is not a trial policy session.

The TPM will perform the indicated arithmetic check on the indicated portion of the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure. If the check fails, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_POLICY and not change policySession→policyDigest. If the check succeeds, the TPM will hash the arguments:

\[
args := H_{policyAlg}(operandB.buffer || offset || operation)
\]  

where

- \(H_{policyAlg}()\) hash function using the algorithm of the policy session
- operandB.buffer the value used for the comparison
- offset offset from the start of the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure at which the comparison starts
- operation the operation parameter indicating the comparison being performed

**NOTE** There is no security related reason for the double hash.

The value of args is extended to policySession→policyDigest by

\[
policyDigest_{new} := H_{policyAlg}(policyDigest_{old} || TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer || args)
\]  

where

- \(H_{policyAlg}()\) hash function using the algorithm of the policy session
- args value computed in equation (24)

The signed arithmetic operations are performed using two's-compliment. The indicated portion of the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure begins at offset and has a length of operandB.size. If the number of octets to be compared overflows the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure, the TPM returns TPM_RC_RANGE. If offset is greater than the size of the marshaled TPMS_TIME_INFO structure, the TPM returns TPM_RC_VALUE. The structure is marshaled into its canonical form with no padding. The TPM does not check for alignment of the offset with a TPMS_TIME_INFO structure member.

Magnitude comparisons assume that the octet at offset zero in the referenced location and in operandB contain the most significant octet of the data.
### 23.10.2 Command and Response

**Table 142 — TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_OPERAND</td>
<td>operandB</td>
<td>the second operand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>offset</td>
<td>the octet offset in the TPMS_TIME_INFO structure for the start of operand A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_EO</td>
<td>operation</td>
<td>the comparison to make</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 143 — TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.10.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyCounterTimer_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyCounterTimer  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_POLICY</td>
<td>the comparison of the selected portion of the TPMS_TIME_INFO with operandB failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RANGE</td>
<td>offset + size exceed size of TPMS_TIME_INFO structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer(
    PolicyCounterTimer_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION *session;
    TIME_INFO infoData;  // data buffer of TPMS_TIME_INFO
    BYTE *pInfoData = (BYTE *)&infoData;
    UINT16 infoDataSize;
    TPM_CC commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer;
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    TPM2B_DIGEST argHash;

    // Input Validation
    // Get a marshaled time structure
    infoDataSize = TimeGetMarshaled(infoData);
    // Make sure that the referenced stays within the bounds of the structure.
    // NOTE: the offset checks are made even for a trial policy because the policy
    // will not make any sense if the references are out of bounds of the timer
    // structure.
    if (in->offset > infoDataSize)
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyCounterTimer_offset;
    if ((UINT32)in->offset + (UINT32)in->operandB.t.size > infoDataSize)
        return TPM_RC_RANGE;
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    // If this is a trial policy, skip the check to see if the condition is met.
    if (session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR)
    {
        // If the command is going to use any part of the counter or timer, need
        // to verify that time is advancing.
        // The time and clock values are the first two 64-bit values in the clock
        if (in->offset < sizeof(UINT64) + sizeof(UINT64))
        {
            // Using Clock or Time so see if clock is running. Clock doesn't
            // run while NV is unavailable.
            // TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned here.
            return TPM_RC_NV_RATE;
        }
        // offset to the starting position
        pInfoData = (BYTE *)infoData;
        // Check to see if the condition is valid
        if (!PolicySptCheckCondition(in->operation, pInfoData + in->offset,
                                      in->operandB.t.buffer, in->operandB.t.size))
            return TPM_RC_POLICY;
    }
}
```
// Internal Data Update
// Start argument list hash
argHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add operandB
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->operandB.b);

// add offset
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(UINT16), in->offset);

// add operation
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_EO), in->operation);

// complete argument hash
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &argHash.b);

// update policyDigest
// start hash
CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add old digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// add commandCode
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

// add argument digest
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &argHash.b);

// complete the digest
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyCounterTimer
23.11 TPM2_PolicyCommandCode

23.11.1 General Description

This command indicates that the authorization will be limited to a specific command code.

If \(\text{policySession}\rightarrow\text{commandCode}\) has its default value, then it will be set to \(\text{code}\). If \(\text{policySession}\rightarrow\text{commandCode}\) does not have its default value, then the TPM will return \(\text{TPM_RC_VALUE}\) if the two values are not the same.

If \(\text{code}\) is not implemented, the TPM will return \(\text{TPM_RC_POLICY_CC}\).

If the TPM does not return an error, it will update \(\text{policySession}\rightarrow\text{policyDigest}\) by

\[
\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} := \text{H}_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode} || \text{code})
\]  

(26)

**NOTE 1**  
If a previous \(\text{TPM2_PolicyCommandCode()}\) had been executed, then it is probable that the policy expression is improperly formed but the TPM does not return an error if \(\text{code}\) is the same.

**NOTE 2**  
A \(\text{TPM2_PolicyOR()}\) would be used to allow an authorization to be used for multiple commands.

When the policy session is used to authorize a command, the TPM will fail the command if the \(\text{commandCode}\) of that command does not match \(\text{policySession}\rightarrow\text{commandCode}\).

This command, or \(\text{TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect()}\), is required to enable the policy to be used for \text{ADMIN} role authorization.

**EXAMPLE**  
Before \(\text{TPM2_Certify()}\) can be executed, \(\text{TPM2_PolicyCommandCode()}\) with code set to \(\text{TPM_CC_Certify}\) is required.
23.11.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 144 — TPM2_PolicyCommandCode Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 145 — TPM2_PolicyCommandCode Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.11.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyCommandCode_fp.h"

#ifndef CC_PolicyCommandCode  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>commandCode of policySession previously set to a different value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM_OK
PolicyCommandCode_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
{
  SESSION  *session;
  TPM_CC   commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode;
  HASH_STATE hashState;

  // Input validation
  if((session->commandCode != 0 && session->commandCode != in->code)
    return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyCommandCode_code;
  if(CommandCodeToCommandIndex(in->code) == UNIMPLEMENTED_COMMAND_INDEX)
    return TPM_RC_POLICY_CC + RC_PolicyCommandCode_code;

  // Internal Data Update
  // Update policy hash
  // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode || code)
  // Start hash
  CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
  // add old digest
  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
  // add commandCode
  CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);
  // add input commandCode
  CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), in->code);
  // complete the hash and get the results
  CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
  // update commandCode value in session context
  session->commandCode = in->code;
  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PolicyCommandCode
```
23.12 TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence

23.12.1 General Description

This command indicates that physical presence will need to be asserted at the time the authorization is performed.

If this command is successful, \texttt{policySession→isPPRequired} will be SET to indicate that this check is required when the policy is used for authorization. Additionally, \texttt{policySession→policyDigest} is extended with

\[
policyDigest_{\text{new}} \leftarrow H_{\text{policyAlg}}(policyDigest_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence})
\]  

(27)
23.12.2 Command and Response

Table 146 — TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 147 — TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.12.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyPhysicalPresence_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence(  
    PolicyPhysicalPresence_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION *session;
    TPM_CC commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence;
    HASH_STATE hashState;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // complete the digest
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // update session attribute
    session->attributes.isPPRequired = SET;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence
```
23.13 TPM2_PolicyCpHash

23.13.1 General Description

This command is used to allow a policy to be bound to a specific command and command parameters. TPM2_PolicySigned(), TPM2_PolicySecret(), and TPM2_PolicyTicket() are designed to allow an authorizing entity to execute an arbitrary command as the cpHashA parameter of those commands is not included in policySession→policyDigest. TPM2_PolicyCommandCode() allows the policy to be bound to a specific Command Code so that only certain entities may authorize specific command codes. This command allows the policy to be restricted such that an entity may only authorize a command with a specific set of parameters.

If policySession→cpHash is already set and not the same as cpHashA, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH. That is, only one of a TPM2_StartAuthSession() bound session, TPM2_PolicyCpHash(), TPM2_PolicyNameHash, or TPM2_PolicyTemplate can be used for a policy session. If cpHashA does not have the size of the policySession→policyDigest, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

NOTE 1 If a previous TPM2_PolicyCpHash() had been executed, then it is probable that the policy expression is improperly formed but the TPM does not return an error if cpHash is the same.

If the cpHashA checks succeed, policySession→cpHash is set to cpHashA and policySession→policyDigest is updated with

\[ policyDigest_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(policyDigest_{\text{old}} |\| \text{TPM}_{\text{CC}}_{\text{PolicyCpHash}} |\| \text{cpHashA}) \] (28)
### 23.13.2 Command and Response

#### Table 148 — TPM2_PolicyCpHash Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>cpHashA</td>
<td>the cpHash added to the policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 149 — TPM2_PolicyCpHash Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.13.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyCpHash_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyCpHash // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>cpHash of policySession has previously been set to a different value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>cpHashA is not the size of a digest produced by the hash algorithm associated with policySession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PolicyCpHash(
PolicyCpHash_In *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION *session;
    TPM_CC commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash;
    HASH_STATE hashState;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // A valid cpHash must have the same size as session hash digest
    // NOTE: the size of the digest can't be zero because TPM_ALG_NULL
    // can't be used for the authHashAlg.
    if(in->cpHashA.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(session->authHashAlg))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_PolicyCpHash_cpHashA;
    // error if the cpHash in session context is not empty and is not the same
    // as the input or is not a cpHash
    if((session->u1.cpHash.t.size != 0)
        && (!session->attributes.isCpHashDefined
            || !MemoryEqual2B(&in->cpHashA.b, &session->u1.cpHash.b)))
        return TPM_RC_CPHASH;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash || cpHashA)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // add cpHashA
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->cpHashA.b);

    // complete the digest and get the results
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // update cpHash in session context
    session->u1.cpHash = in->cpHashA;
    session->attributes.isCpHashDefined = SET;

```

```
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
  }
#endif /* CC_PolicyCpHash */
23.14 **TPM2_PolicyNameHash**

### 23.14.1 General Description

This command allows a policy to be bound to a specific set of TPM entities without being bound to the parameters of the command. This is most useful for commands such as TPM2_Duplicate() and for TPM2_PCR_Event() when the referenced PCR requires a policy.

The `nameHash` parameter should contain the digest of the Names associated with the handles to be used in the authorized command.

**EXAMPLE** For the TPM2_Duplicate() command, two handles are provided. One is the handle of the object being duplicated and the other is the handle of the new parent. For that command, `nameHash` would contain:

\[ nameHash \equiv H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{objectHandle} \rightarrow \text{Name} \mid\mid \text{newParentHandle} \rightarrow \text{Name}) \]

If `policySession->cpHash` is already set, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH. That is, only one of a TPM2_StartAuthSession() bound session, TPM2_PolicyCpHash(), TPM2_PolicyNameHash, or TPM2_PolicyTemplate can be used for a policy session. If the size of `nameHash` is not the size of `policySession->policyDigest`, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. Otherwise, `policySession->cpHash` is set to `nameHash`.

If this command completes successfully, the `cpHash` of the authorized command will not be used for validation. Only the digest of the Names associated with the handles in the command will be used.

**NOTE 1** This allows the space normally used to hold `policySession->cpHash` to be used for `policySession->nameHash` instead.

The `policySession->policyDigest` will be updated with

\[ policyDigest_{\text{new}} \equiv H_{\text{policyAlg}}(policyDigest_{\text{old}} \mid\mid \text{TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash} \mid\mid nameHash) \] (29)

**NOTE 2** This command can only be used with TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() or TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV. The owner of the object being duplicated provides approval for their object to be migrated to a specific new parent.

Without this approval, the Name of the Object would need to be known at the time that Object's policy is created. However, since the Name of the Object includes its policy, the Name is not known. The Name can be known by the authorizing entity.
### 23.14.2 Command and Response

#### Table 150 — TPM2_PolicyNameHash Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>nameHash</td>
<td>the digest to be added to the policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 151 — TPM2_PolicyNameHash Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.14.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyNameHash_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyNameHash // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>nameHash has been previously set to a different value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>nameHash is not the size of the digest produced by the hash algorithm associated with policySession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC_PolicyNameHash( 
  PolicyNameHash_In   *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
  SESSION             *session;
  TPM_CC               commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash;
  HASH_STATE           hashState;

  // Input Validation
  // Get pointer to the session structure
  session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
  // A valid nameHash must have the same size as session hash digest
  // Since the authHashAlg for a session cannot be TPM_ALG_NULL, the digest size
  // is always non-zero.
  if(in->nameHash.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(session->authHashAlg))
    return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_PolicyNameHash_nameHash;
  // u1 in the policy session context cannot otherwise be occupied
  if(session->u1.cpHash.b.size != 0
     || session->attributes.isBound
     || session->attributes.isCpHashDefined
     || session->attributes.isTemplateSet)
    return TPM_RC_CPHASH;

  // Internal Data Update
  // Update policy hash
  // policyDigestNew = hash(policyDigestOld || TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash || nameHash)
  // Start hash
  CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
  // add old digest
  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
  // add commandCode
  CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);
  // add nameHash
  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->nameHash.b);
  // complete the digest
  CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
  // update nameHash in session context
  session->u1.cpHash = in->nameHash;
```
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyNameHash
23.15 TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect

23.15.1 General Description

This command allows qualification of duplication to allow duplication to a selected new parent.

If this command not used in conjunction with a PolicyAuthorize Command, then only the new parent is selected and includeObject should be CLEAR.

EXAMPLE

When an object is created when the list of allowed duplication targets is known, the policy would be created with includeObject CLEAR.

NOTE 1

Only the new parent may be selected because, without TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(), the Name of the Object to be duplicated would need to be known at the time that Object's policy is created. However, since the Name of the Object includes its policy, the Name is not known. The Name can be known by the authorizing entity (a PolicyAuthorize Command) in which case includeObject may be SET.

If used in conjunction with TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(), then the authorizer of the new policy has the option of selecting just the new parent or of selecting both the new parent and the duplication Object.

NOTE 2

If the authorizing entity for an TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() only specifies the new parent, then that authorization may be applied to the duplication of any number of other Objects. If the authorizing entity specifies both a new parent and the duplicated Object, then the authorization only applies to that pairing of Object and new parent.

If either policySession→cpHash or policySession→nameHash has been previously set, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH. Otherwise, policySession→nameHash will be set to:

\[
nameHash = H_{policyAlg}(\text{objectName.name || newParentName.name})
\] (30)

NOTE 3

It is allowed that policySession→nameHash and policySession→cpHash share the same memory space.

NOTE 4

The Name in these equations uses Name.name, indicating that the UINT16 size is not included in the hash.

The policySession→policyDigest will be updated according to the setting of includeObject. If equal to YES, policySession→policyDigest is updated by:

\[
policyDigest_{new} = H_{policyAlg}(\text{policyDigest}_{old} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect} || \text{objectName.name || newParentName.name || includeObject})
\] (31)

If includeObject is NO, policySession→policyDigest is updated by:

\[
policyDigest_{new} = H_{policyAlg}(\text{policyDigest}_{old} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect} || \text{newParentName.name || includeObject})
\] (32)

NOTE 5

policySession→nameHash receives the digest of both Names so that the check performed in TPM2_Duplicate() may be the same regardless of which Names are included in policySession→policyDigest. This means that, when TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect() is executed, it is only valid for a specific pair of duplication object and new parent.

If the command succeeds, policySession→commandCode is set to TPM_CC_Duplicate.

NOTE 6

The normal use of this command is before a TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(). An authorized entity would approve a policyDigest that allowed duplication to a specific new parent. The authorizing entity may want to limit the authorization so that the approval allows only a specific object to be duplicated to the new parent. In that case, the authorizing entity would approve the policyDigest of equation (31).
### 23.15.2 Command and Response

#### Table 152 — TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>objectName</td>
<td>the Name of the object to be duplicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>newParentName</td>
<td>the Name of the new parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>includeObject</td>
<td>if YES, the objectName will be included in the value in policySession→policyDigest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 153 — TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyDuplicationSelect_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE</td>
<td>commandCode of policySession is not empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>cpHash of policySession is not empty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM RC

TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect(
    PolicyDuplicationSelect_In *in       // IN: input parameter list
) {
    SESSION *session;
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    TPM_CC commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // cpHash in session context must be empty
    if (session->u1.cpHash.t.size != 0)
        return TPM_RC_CPHASH;

    // commandCode in session context must be empty
    if (session->commandCode != 0)
        return TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE;

    // Internal Data Update
    // update name hash
    session->u1.cpHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add objectName
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);

    // add new parent name
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->newParentName.b);

    // complete hash
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u1.cpHash.b);

    // update policy hash
    // Old policyDigest size should be the same as the new policyDigest size since
    // they are using the same hash algorithm
    session->u2.policyDigest.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old policy
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add command code
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // add objectName
    if (in->includeObject == YES)
        CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);
125  // add new parent name
126  CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->newParentName.b);
127
128  // add includeObject
129  CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPMI_YES_NO), in->includeObject);
130
131  // complete digest
132  CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
133
134  // set commandCode in session context
135  session->commandCode = TPM_CC_Duplicate;
136
137  return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
138 }
139 #endif // CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect
140
23.16 TPM2_PolicyAuthorize

23.16.1 General Description

This command allows policies to change. If a policy were static, then it would be difficult to add users to a policy. This command lets a policy authority sign a new policy so that it may be used in an existing policy.

The authorizing entity signs a structure that contains

\[ aHash := H_{aHashAlg}(approvedPolicy || policyRef) \]  

(33)

The \( aHashAlg \) is required to be the \( nameAlg \) of the key used to sign the \( aHash \). The \( aHash \) value is then signed (symmetric or asymmetric) by \( keySign \). That signature is then checked by the TPM in 20.1 TPM2_VerifySignature() which produces a ticket by

\[ \text{HMAC}(proof, (TPM_ST_VERIFIED || aHash || keySign \rightarrow name)) \]  

(34)

NOTE 1 The reason for the validation is because of the expectation that the policy will be used multiple times and it is more efficient to check a ticket than to load an object each time to check a signature.

The ticket is then used in TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() to validate the parameters.

The \( keySign \) parameter is required to be a valid object name using \( nameAlg \) other than TPM_ALG_NULL. If the first two octets of \( keySign \) are not a valid hash algorithm, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HASH. If the remainder of the Name is not the size of the indicated digest, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

The TPM validates that the \( approvedPolicy \) matches the current value of \( policySession \rightarrow policyDigest \) and if not, shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

The TPM then validates that the parameters to TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() match the values used to generate the ticket. If so, the TPM will reset \( policySession \rightarrow policyDigest \) to a Zero Digest. Then it will update \( policySession \rightarrow policyDigest \) with PolicyUpdate() (see 23.2.3).

\[ \text{PolicyUpdate}(TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize, keySign, policyRef) \]  

(35)

If the ticket is not valid, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_POLICY.

If \( policySession \) is a trial session, \( policySession \rightarrow policyDigest \) is extended as if the ticket is valid without actual verification.

NOTE 2 The unmarshaling process requires that a proper TPMT_TK_VERIFIED be provided for checkTicket but it may be a NULL Ticket. A NULL ticket is useful in a trial policy, where the caller uses the TPM to perform policy calculations but does not have a valid authorization ticket.
### 23.16.2 Command and Response

#### Table 154 — TPM2_PolicyAuthorize Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended \nAuth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>approvedPolicy</td>
<td>digest of the policy being approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NONCE</td>
<td>policyRef</td>
<td>a policy qualifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>keySign</td>
<td>Name of a key that can sign a policy addition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_VERIFIED</td>
<td>checkTicket</td>
<td>ticket validating that approvedPolicy and policyRef were signed by keySign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 155 — TPM2_PolicyAuthorize Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.16.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyAuthorize_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyAuthorize  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>hash algorithm in keyName is not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>keyName is not the correct size for its hash algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>the current policyDigest of policySession does not match approvedPolicy; or checkTicket doesn't match the provided values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(
PolicyAuthorize_In  *in     // IN: input parameter list
)
{
  SESSION                 *session;
  TPM2B_DIGEST             authHash;
  HASH_STATE               hashState;
  TPMT_TK_VERIFIED         ticket;
  TPM_ALG_ID               hashAlg;
  UINT16                    digestSize;

  // Input Validation

  // Get pointer to the session structure
  session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

  // Extract from the Name of the key, the algorithm used to compute it's Name
  hashAlg = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(in->keySign.t.name);

  // 'keySign' parameter needs to use a supported hash algorithm, otherwise
  // can't tell how large the digest should be
  if(!CryptHashIsValidAlg(hashAlg, FALSE))
    return TPM_RCS_HASH + RC_PolicyAuthorize_keySign;

  digestSize = CryptHashGetDigestSize(hashAlg);
  if(digestSize != (in->keySign.t.size - 2))
    return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_PolicyAuthorize_keySign;

  //If this is a trial policy, skip all validations
  if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == CLEAR)
    {
      // Check that "approvedPolicy" matches the current value of the
      // policyDigest in policy session
      if(!MemoryEqual2B(&session->u2.policyDigest.b,
                         &in->approvedPolicy.b))
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_PolicyAuthorize_approvedPolicy;

      // Validate ticket TPMT_TK_VERIFIED
      // Compute aHash. The authorizing object sign a digest
      // aHash := hash(approvedPolicy || policyRef).
      // Start hash
      authHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, hashAlg);
```

```
// add approvedPolicy
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->approvedPolicy.b);
// add policyRef
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->policyRef.b);
// complete hash
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &authHash.b);
// re-compute TPM_TK_VERIFIED
TicketComputeVerified(in->checkTicket.hierarchy, &authHash,
                    &in->keySign, &ticket);
    // Compare ticket digest. If not match, return error
    if (!MemoryEqual2B(&in->checkTicket.digest.b, &ticket.digest.b))
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_PolicyAuthorize_checkTicket;
}
// Internal Data Update

// Set policyDigest to zero digest
PolicyDigestClear(session);
    // Update policyDigest
    PolicyContextUpdate(TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize, &in->keySign, &in->policyRef,
                        NULL, 0, session);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyAuthorize
23.17 TPM2_PolicyAuthValue

23.17.1 General Description

This command allows a policy to be bound to the authorization value of the authorized entity.

When this command completes successfully, $policySession\rightarrow isAuthValueNeeded$ is SET to indicate that the authValue will be included in $hmacKey$ when the authorization HMAC is computed for the command being authorized using this session. Additionally, $policySession\rightarrow isPasswordNeeded$ will be CLEAR.

NOTE If a policy does not use this command, then the $hmacKey$ for the authorized command would only use $sessionKey$. If $sessionKey$ is not present, then the $hmacKey$ is an Empty Buffer and no HMAC would be computed.

If successful, $policySession\rightarrow policyDigest$ will be updated with

$$policyDigest_{new} := H_{policyAlg}(policyDigest_{old} || TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue)$$ (36)
23.17.2 Command and Response

### Table 156 — TPM2_PolicyAuthValue Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 157 — TPM2_PolicyAuthValue Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.17.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyAuthValue_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyAuthValue  // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyAuthValue(
    PolicyAuthValue_In  *in,       // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION             *session;
    TPM_CC               commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue;
    HASH_STATE           hashState;

    // Internal Data Update

    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // complete the hash and get the results
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // update isAuthValueNeeded bit in the session context
    session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded = SET;
    session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded = CLEAR;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyAuthValue
```
23.18 TPM2_PolicyPassword

23.18.1 General Description

This command allows a policy to be bound to the authorization value of the authorized object.

When this command completes successfully, \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{isPasswordNeeded} \) is SET to indicate that \( \text{authValue} \) of the authorized object will be checked when the session is used for authorization. The caller will provide the \( \text{authValue} \) in clear text in the \( \text{hmac} \) parameter of the authorization. The comparison of \( \text{hmac} \) to \( \text{authValue} \) is performed as if the authorization is a password.

NOTE 1 The parameter field in the policy session where the authorization value is provided is called \( \text{hmac} \). If TPM2_PolicyPassword() is part of the sequence, then the field will contain a password and not an HMAC.

If successful, \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{policyDigest} \) will be updated with

\[
\text{policyDigest}_{\text{new}} = H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue}) \tag{37}
\]

NOTE 2 This is the same extend value as used with TPM2_PolicyAuthValue so that the evaluation may be done using either an HMAC or a password with no change to the \( \text{authPolicy} \) of the object. The reason that two commands are present is to indicate to the TPM if the \( \text{hmac} \) field in the authorization will contain an HMAC or a password value.

When this command is successful, \( \text{policySession} \rightarrow \text{isAuthValueNeeded} \) will be CLEAR.
## 23.18.2 Command and Response

### Table 158 — TPM2_PolicyPassword Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyPassword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 159 — TPM2_PolicyPassword Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.18.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyPassword_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyPassword  // Conditional expansion of this file
  #include "Policy_spt_fp.h"

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyPassword(
    PolicyPassword_In   *in       // IN: input parameter list
    )
{
    SESSION             *session;
    TPM_CC               commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue;
    HASH_STATE           hashState;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // complete the digest
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // Update isPasswordNeeded bit
    session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded = SET;
    session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded = CLEAR;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PolicyPassword
```
23.19 TPMB_PolicyGetDigest

23.19.1 General Description

This command returns the current policyDigest of the session. This command allows the TPM to be used to perform the actions required to pre-compute the authPolicy for an object.
### 23.19.2 Command and Response

#### Table 160 — TPM2_PolicyGetDigest Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyGetDigest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Auth Index: None

#### Table 161 — TPM2_PolicyGetDigest Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>policyDigest</td>
<td>the current value of the policySession→policyDigest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyGetDigest_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyGetDigest  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyGetDigest(  
    PolicyGetDigest_In  *in,  // IN: input parameter list  
    PolicyGetDigest_Out *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    SESSION  *session;

    // Command Output
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    out->policyDigest = session->u2.policyDigest;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyGetDigest
23.20 TPM2_PolicyNvWritten

23.20.1 General Description

This command allows a policy to be bound to the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attributes. This is a deferred assertion. Values are stored in the policy session context and checked when the policy is used for authorization.

If policySession→checkNVWritten is CLEAR, it is SET and policySession→nvWrittenState is set to writtenSet. If policySession→checkNVWritten is SET, the TPM will return TPM_RC_VALUE if policySession→nvWrittenState and writtenSet are not the same.

If the TPM does not return an error, it will update policySession→policyDigest by

\[
policyDigest_{\text{new}} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(policyDigest_{\text{old}} | | \text{TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten} | | \text{writtenSet})
\]  

(38)

When the policy session is used to authorize a command, the TPM will fail the command if policySession→checkNVWritten is SET and nvIndex→attributes→TPMA_NV_WRITTEN does not match policySession→nvWrittenState.

NOTE 1 A typical use case is a simple policy for the first write during manufacturing provisioning that would require TPMA_NV_WRITTEN CLEAR and a more complex policy for later use that would require TPMA_NV_WRITTEN SET.

NOTE 2 When an Index is written, it has a different authorization name than an Index that has not been written. It is possible to use this change in the NV Index to create a write-once Index.
### 23.20.2 Command and Response

#### Table 162 — TPM2_PolicyNvWritten Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>writtenSet</td>
<td>YES if NV Index is required to have been written</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO if NV Index is required not to have been written</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 163 — TPM2_PolicyNvWritten Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.20.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyNvWritten_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyNvWritten  // Conditional expansion of this file

Make an NV Index policy dependent on the state of the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attribute of the index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>a conflicting request for the attribute has already been processed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```TPM_RC =
```TPM2_PolicyNvWritten(
    PolicyNvWritten_In  *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    SESSION     *session;
    TPM_CC       commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten;
    HASH_STATE   hashState;

    // Input Validation
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);
    // If already set is this a duplicate (the same setting)? If it
    // is a conflicting setting, it is an error
    if((session->attributes.checkNvWritten == SET) &&
       ((session->attributes.nvWrittenState == SET) != (in->writtenSet == YES)))
    {
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_PolicyNvWritten_writtenSet;
    }

    // Internal Data Update
    // Set session attributes so that the NV Index needs to be checked
    session->attributes.checkNvWritten = SET;
    session->attributes.nvWrittenState = (in->writtenSet == YES);
    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten
    //                       || writtenSet)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);
    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);
    // add the byte of writtenState
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPMI_YES_NO), in->writtenSet);
    // complete the digest
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyNvWritten
23.21 TPM2_PolicyTemplate

23.21.1 General Description

This command allows a policy to be bound to a specific creation template. This is most useful for an object creation command such as TPM2_Create(), TPM2_CreatePrimary(), or TPM2_CreateLoaded().

The `templateHash` parameter should contain the digest of the template that will be required for the `inPublic` parameter of an Object creation command.

If `policySession->isTemplateSet` is `SET` and `policySession->cpHash` is not equal to `templateHash`, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE. Only one of a TPM2_StartAuthSession() bound session, TPM2_PolicyCpHash(), TPM2_PolicyNameHash, or TPM2_PolicyTemplate can be used for a policy session.

NOTE 1 Revision 01.38 of this specification permitted the TPM to return TPM_RC_CPHASH.

Otherwise, if `policySession->cpHash` is already set, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH.

NOTE 2 Revision 01.38 of this specification permitted the TPM to return TPM_RC_VALUE.

If the size of `templateHash` is not the size of `policySession->policyDigest`, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE. Otherwise, `policySession->cpHash` is set to `templateHash`.

NOTE 3 The digest calculation includes the TPM2B buffer but not the TPM2B size.

If this command completes successfully, the `cpHash` of the authorized command will not be used for validation. Only the digest of the `inPublic` parameter will be used.

NOTE 4 This allows the space normally used to hold `policySession->cpHash` to be used for `policySession->templateHash` instead.

The `policySession->policyDigest` will be updated with

\[
policyDigest_{new} := H_{policyAlg}(policyDigest_{old} || TPM_CC_PolicyTemplate || templateHash)
\] (39)
### 23.21.2 Command and Response

#### Table 164 — TPM2_PolicyTemplate Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyTemplate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>templateHash</td>
<td>the digest to be added to the policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 165 — TPM2_PolicyTemplate Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.21.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PolicyTemplate_fp.h"

#if CC_PolicyTemplate  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>cpHash of policySession has previously been set to a different value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>templateHash is not the size of a digest produced by the hash algorithm associated with policySession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyTemplate(
    PolicyTemplate_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
) {
    SESSION  *session;
    TPM_CC    commandCode = TPM_CC_PolicyTemplate;
    HASH_STATE hashState;

    // Input Validation
    
    // Get pointer to the session structure
    session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

    // If the template is set, make sure that it is the same as the input value
    if(session->attributes.isTemplateSet) {
        if(!MemoryEqual2B(&in->templateHash.b, &session->u1.cpHash.b))
            return TPM_RC_CPHASH + RC_PolicyTemplate_templateHash;
    }
    // error if cpHash contains something that is not a template
    else if(session->u1.templateHash.t.size != 0)
        return TPM_RC_CPHASH;

    // A valid templateHash must have the same size as session hash digest
    if(in->templateHash.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(session->authHashAlg))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_PolicyTemplate_templateHash;

    // Internal Data Update
    
    // Update policy hash
    // policyDigestnew = hash(policyDigestold || TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash
    // || cpHashA.buffer)
    // Start hash
    CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

    // add old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // add commandCode
    CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

    // add cpHashA
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->templateHash.b);

    // complete the digest and get the results
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

    // update cpHash in session context
```

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December 24, 2020
session->u1.templateHash = in->templateHash;
session->attributes.isTemplateSet = SET;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_PolicyTemplateHash
23.22 TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV

23.22.1 General Description

This command provides a capability that is the equivalent of a revocable policy. With TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(), the authorization ticket never expires, so the authorization may not be withdrawn. With this command, the approved policy is kept in an NV Index location so that the policy may be changed as needed to render the old policy unusable.

NOTE 1 This command is useful for Objects but of limited value for other policies that are persistently stored in TPM NV, such as the OwnerPolicy.

An authorization session providing authorization to read the NV Index shall be provided. The authorization to read the NV Index must succeed even if policySession is a trial policy session.

If policySession is a trial policy session, the TPM will update policySession→policyDigest as shown in equation (40) below and return TPM_RC_SUCCESS. It will not perform any further validation. The remainder of this general description would apply only if policySession is not a trial policy session.

NOTE 2 If read access is controlled by policy, the policy should include a branch that authorizes a TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV().

If TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is not SET in the Index referenced by nvIndex, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED. If TPMA_NV_READLOCKED of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

The dataSize of the NV Index referenced by nvIndex is required to be at least large enough to hold a properly formatted TPMT_HA (TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT).

NOTE 3 A TPMT_HA contains a TPM_ALG_ID followed a digest that is consistent in size with the hash algorithm indicated by the TPM_ALG_ID.

It is an error (TPM_RC_HASH) if the first two octets of the Index are not a TPM_ALG_ID for a hash algorithm implemented on the TPM or if the indicated hash algorithm does not match policySession→authHash.

NOTE 4 The TPM_ALG_ID is stored in the first two octets in big endian format.

The TPM will compare policySession→policyDigest to the contents of the NV Index, starting at the first octet after the TPM_ALG_ID (the third octet) and return TPM_RC_VALUE if they are not the same.

NOTE 5 If the Index does not contain enough bytes for the compare, then TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT is generated as indicated above.

NOTE 6 The dataSize of the Index may be larger than is required for this command. This permits the Index to include metadata.

If the comparison is successful, the TPM will reset policySession→policyDigest to a Zero Digest. Then it will update policySession→policyDigest with

\[
policyDigest_{\text{new}} = H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\policyDigest_{\text{old}} || \text{TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorizeNV} || \text{nvIndex→Name})
\] (40)
### 23.22.2 Command and Response

**Table 166 — TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorizeNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index of the area to read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 167 — TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23.22.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"

#if CC_PolicyAuthorizeNV // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "PolicyAuthorizeNV_fp.h"
#include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>hash algorithm in <code>keyName</code> is not supported or is not the same as the hash algorithm of the policy session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>keyName</code> is not the correct size for its hash algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>the current <code>policyDigest</code> of <code>policySession</code> does not match <code>approvedPolicy</code>; or <code>checkTicket</code> doesn't match the provided values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV(
    PolicyAuthorizeNV_In *in
);
```

```c
SESSION *session;
TPM RC result;
NV REF locator;
NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
TPM2B_NAME name;
TPMT_HA policyInNv;
BYTE nvTemp[sizeof(TPMT_HA)];
BYTE *buffer = nvTemp;
INT32 size;

// Input Validation
// Get pointer to the session structure
session = SessionGet(in->policySession);

// Skip checks if this is a trial policy
if(!session->attributes.isTrialPolicy)
{
    // Check the authorizations for reading
    // Common read access checks. NvReadAccessChecks() returns
    // TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION, TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED, or TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED
    // error may be returned at this point
    result = NvReadAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex,
        nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Read the contents of the index into a temp buffer
    size = MIN(nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize, sizeof(TPMT_HA));
    NvGetIndexData(nvIndex, locator, 0, (UINT16)size, nvTemp);

    // Unmarshal the contents of the buffer into the internal format of a
    // TPMT_HA so that the hash and digest elements can be accessed from the
    // structure rather than the byte array that is in the Index (written by
    // user of the Index).
    result = TPMT_HA_Unmarshal(&policyInNv, &buffer, &size, FALSE);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Verify that the hash is the same
```
if(policyInNv.hashAlg != session->authHashAlg)
    return TPM_RC_HASH;

    // See if the contents of the digest in the Index matches the value
    // in the policy
    if(!MemoryEqual(&policyInNv.digest, &session->u2.policyDigest.t.buffer,
                    session->u2.policyDigest.t.size))
        return TPM_RC_VALUE;
    }

    // Internal Data Update
    // Set policyDigest to zero digest
    PolicyDigestClear(session);

    // Update policyDigest
    PolicyContextUpdate(TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorizeNV, EntityGetName(in->nvIndex, &name),
                        NULL, NULL, 0, session);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}  
#endif  // CC_PolicyAuthorize
24 Hierarchy Commands

24.1 TPM2_CreatePrimary

24.1.1 General Description

This command is used to create a Primary Object under one of the Primary Seeds or a Temporary Object under TPM_RH_NULL. The command uses a TPM2B_PUBLIC as a template for the object to be created. The size of the unique field shall not be checked for consistency with the other object parameters. The command will create and load a Primary Object. The sensitive area is not returned.

NOTE 1 Since the sensitive data is not returned, the key cannot be reloaded. It can either be made persistent or it can be recreated.

NOTE 2 For interoperability, the unique field should not be set to a value that is larger than allowed by object parameters, so that the unmarshaling will not fail.

NOTE 3 An Empty Buffer is a legal unique field value.

EXAMPLE 1 A TPM_ALG_RSA object with a keyBits of 2048 in the object’s parameters should have a unique field that is no larger than 256 bytes.

EXAMPLE 2 It is recommended that a TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH or a TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER object have a unique field this is no larger than the digest produced by the object’s nameAlg.

Any type of object and attributes combination that is allowed by TPM2_Create() may be created by this command. The constraints on templates and parameters are the same as TPM2_Create() except that a Primary Storage Key and a Temporary Storage Key are not constrained to use the algorithms of their parents.

For setting of the attributes of the created object, fixedParent, fixedTPM, decrypt, and restricted are implied to be SET in the parent (a Permanent Handle). The remaining attributes are implied to be CLEAR.

The TPM will derive the object from the Primary Seed indicated in primaryHandle using an approved KDF. All of the bits of the template are used in the creation of the Primary Key. Methods for creating a Primary Object from a Primary Seed are described in TPM 2.0 Part 1 and implemented in TPM 2.0 Part 4.

If this command is called multiple times with the same inPublic parameter, inSensitive.data, and Primary Seed, the TPM shall produce the same Primary Object.

NOTE 4 If the Primary Seed is changed, the Primary Objects generated with the new seed shall be statistically unique even if the parameters of the call are the same.

This command requires authorization. Authorization for a Primary Object attached to the Platform Primary Seed (PPS) shall be provided by platformAuth or platformPolicy. Authorization for a Primary Object attached to the Storage Primary Seed (SPS) shall be provided by ownerAuth or ownerPolicy. Authorization for a Primary Key attached to the Endorsement Primary Seed (EPS) shall be provided by endorsementAuth or endorsementPolicy.
## 24.1.2 Command and Response

### Table 168 — TPM2_CreatePrimary Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_CreatePrimary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY+</td>
<td>@primaryHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, TPM_RH_OWNER, TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP}, or TPM_RH_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_SENSITIVE&gt;Create</td>
<td>inSensitive</td>
<td>the sensitive data, see TPM 2.0 Part 1 Sensitive Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>inPublic</td>
<td>the public template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>outsideInfo</td>
<td>data that will be included in the creation data for this object to provide permanent, verifiable linkage between this object and some object owner data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
<td>creationPCR</td>
<td>PCR that will be used in creation data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 169 — TPM2_CreatePrimary Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_HANDLE</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>handle of type TPM_HT_TRANSIENT for created Primary Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_PUBLIC</td>
<td>outPublic</td>
<td>the public portion of the created object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_CREATION_DATA</td>
<td>creationData</td>
<td>contains a TPMS_CREATION_DATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>creationHash</td>
<td>digest of creationData using nameAlg of outPublic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_TK_CREATION</td>
<td>creationTicket</td>
<td>ticket used by TPM2_CertifyCreation() to validate that the creation data was produced by the TPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>the name of the created object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "CreatePrimary_fp.h"

#if CC_CreatePrimary  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>sensitiveDataOrigin is CLEAR when sensitive.data is an Empty Buffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fixedTPM, fixedParent, or encryptedDuplication attributes are inconsistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between themselves or with those of the parent object; inconsistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restricted, decrypt and sign attributes attempt to inject sensitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>data for an asymmetric key;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KDF</td>
<td>incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>a provided symmetric key value is not allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>there is no free slot for the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SCHEME</td>
<td>inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>keyed hash object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>size of public authorization policy or sensitive authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>does not match digest size of the name algorithm; or sensitive data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>size for the keyed hash object is larger than is allowed for the scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>unknown object type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```

```c
TPM_RC

TPM2_CreatePrimary(
    CreatePrimary_In    *in,     // IN: input parameter list
    CreatePrimary_Out   *out     // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC               result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    TPMT_PUBLIC         *publicArea;
    DRBG_STATE           rand;
    OBJECT              *newObject;
    TPM2B_NAME           name;

    // Input Validation
    // Will need a place to put the result
    newObject = FindEmptyObjectSlot(&out->objectHandle);
    if(newObject == NULL)
        return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
    // Get the address of the public area in the new object
    // (this is just to save typing)
    publicArea = &newObject->publicArea;
    *publicArea = in->inPublic.publicArea;

    // Check attributes in input public area. CreateChecks() checks the things that
    // are unique to creation and then validates the attributes and values that are
    // common to create and load.
    result = CreateChecks(NULL, publicArea,
                          in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.t.size);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;
}
```

---

Part 3: Commands

Trusted Platform Module Library

Family "2.0"

Level 00 Revision 01.64

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December 24, 2020
return RcSafeAddToResult(result, RC_CreatePrimary_inPublic);

// Validate the sensitive area values
if (!AdjustAuthSize(&in->inSensitive.sensitive.userAuth,
                    publicArea->nameAlg))
    return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_CreatePrimary_inSensitive;

// Command output
// Compute the name using out->name as a scratch area (this is not the value
// that ultimately will be returned, then instantiate the state that will be
// used as a random number generator during the object creation.
// The caller does not know the seed values so the actual name does not have
// to be over the input, it can be over the unmarshaled structure.
result = DRBG_InstantiateSeeded(&rand,
    &HierarchyGetPrimarySeed(in->primaryHandle)->b,
    PRIMARY_OBJECT_CREATION,
    (TPM2B *)&PublicMarshalAndComputeName(publicArea, &name),
    &in->inSensitive.sensitive.data.b);

if (result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
    newObject->attributes.primary = SET;
    if (in->primaryHandle == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)
        newObject->attributes.epsHierarchy = SET;

    // Create the primary object.
    result = CryptCreateObject(newObject, &in->inSensitive.sensitive,
                                RAND_STATE *)&rand);
}
else if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result;

// Set the publicArea and name from the computed values
out->outPublic.publicArea = newObject->publicArea;
out->name = newObject->name;

// Fill in creation data
FillInCreationData(in->primaryHandle, publicArea->nameAlg,
                    &in->creationPCR, &in->outsideInfo, &out->creationData,
                    &out->creationHash);

// Compute creation ticket
TicketComputeCreation(EntityGetHierarchy(in->primaryHandle), &out->name,
                       &out->creationHash, &out->creationTicket);

// Set the remaining attributes for a loaded object
ObjectSetLoadedAttributes(newObject, in->primaryHandle);
return result;
}
#endif // CC_CreatePrimary
24.2 TPM2_HierarchyControl

24.2.1 General Description

This command enables and disables use of a hierarchy and its associated NV storage. The command allows \textit{phEnable}, \textit{phEnableNV}, \textit{shEnable}, and \textit{ehEnable} to be changed when the proper authorization is provided.

This command may be used to CLEAR \textit{phEnable} and \textit{phEnableNV} if \textit{platformAuth/platformPolicy} is provided. \textit{phEnable} may not be SET using this command.

This command may be used to CLEAR \textit{shEnable} if either \textit{platformAuth/platformPolicy} or \textit{ownerAuth/ownerPolicy} is provided. \textit{shEnable} may be SET if \textit{platformAuth/platformPolicy} is provided.

This command may be used to CLEAR \textit{ehEnable} if either \textit{platformAuth/platformPolicy} or \textit{endorsementAuth/endorsementPolicy} is provided. \textit{ehEnable} may be SET if \textit{platformAuth/platformPolicy} is provided.

When this command is used to CLEAR \textit{phEnable}, \textit{shEnable}, or \textit{ehEnable}, the TPM will disable use of any persistent entity associated with the disabled hierarchy and will flush any transient objects associated with the disabled hierarchy.

When this command is used to CLEAR \textit{shEnable}, the TPM will disable access to any NV index that has \textit{TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE CLEAR} (indicating that the NV Index was defined using Owner Authorization). As long as \textit{shEnable} is CLEAR, the TPM will return an error in response to any command that attempts to operate upon an NV index that has \textit{TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE CLEAR}.

When this command is used to CLEAR \textit{phEnableNV}, the TPM will disable access to any NV index that has \textit{TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE SET} (indicating that the NV Index was defined using Platform Authorization). As long as \textit{phEnableNV} is CLEAR, the TPM will return an error in response to any command that attempts to operate upon an NV index that has \textit{TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE SET}.
### Command and Response

**Table 170 — TPM2_HierarchyControl Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_HierarchyControl (NV E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_ENABLES</td>
<td>enable</td>
<td>the enable being modified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, TPM_RH_OWNER, TPM_RH_PLATFORM, or TPM_RH_PLATFORM_NV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>YES if the enable should be SET, NO if the enable should be CLEAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 171 — TPM2_HierarchyControl Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "HierarchyControl_fp.h"

#if CC_HierarchyControl  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE</td>
<td>authHandle is not applicable to hierarchy in its current state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_HierarchyControl(
    HierarchyControl_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    BOOL select = (in->state == YES);
    BOOL *selected = NULL;

    // Input Validation
    switch(in->enable)
    {
        // Platform hierarchy has to be disabled by PlatformAuth
        // If the platform hierarchy has already been disabled, only a reboot
        // can enable it again
        case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
            break;

        case TPM_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
            if(in->authHandle != TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
            return TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE;
            break;

        // ShEnable may be disabled if PlatformAuth/PlatformPolicy or
        // OwnerAuth/OwnerPolicy is provided. If ShEnable is disabled, then it
        // may only be enabled if PlatformAuth/PlatformPolicy is provided.
        case TPM_RH_OWNER:
            if(in->authHandle != TPM_RH_PLATFORM
                && in->authHandle != TPM_RH_OWNER)
            return TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE;
            if(gc.shEnable == FALSE && in->state == YES
                && in->authHandle != TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
            return TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE;
            break;

        // EhEnable may be disabled if either PlatformAuth/PlatformPolicy or
        // EndorsementAuth/EndorsementPolicy is provided. If EhEnable is disabled, then it
        // may only be enabled if PlatformAuth/PlatformPolicy is
        // provided.
        case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
            if(in->authHandle != TPM_RH_PLATFORM
                && gc.ehEnable == FALSE
                && in->state == YES
                && in->authHandle != TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
            return TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE;
            break;
        default:
            FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
            break;
    }

    // Internal Data Update
    // Enable or disable the selected hierarchy
    // Note: the authorization processing for this command may keep these
```
// command actions from being executed. For example, if phEnable is CLEAR, then platformAuth cannot be used for authorization. This means that would not be possible to use platformAuth to change the state of phEnable from CLEAR to SET. If it is decided that platformPolicy can still be used when phEnable is CLEAR, then this code could SET phEnable when proper platform policy is provided.

```
switch(in->enable)
{
    case TPM_RH_OWNER:
        selected = &gc.shEnable;
        break;
    case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
        selected = &gc.ehEnable;
        break;
    case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
        selected = &g_phEnable;
        break;
    case TPM_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
        selected = &gc.phEnableNV;
        break;
    default:
        FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
        break;
}
```

if(selected != NULL && *selected != select)
{
    // Before changing the internal state, make sure that NV is available.
    // Only need to update NV if changing the orderly state
    RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;

    // state is changing and NV is available so modify
    *selected = select;
    // If a hierarchy was just disabled, flush it
    if(select == CLEAR && in->enable != TPM_RH_PLATFORM_NV)
        // Flush hierarchy
        ObjectFlushHierarchy(in->enable);

    // orderly state should be cleared because of the update to state clear data
    // This gets processed in ExecuteCommand() on the way out.
    g_clearOrderly = TRUE;
}
```

```bash
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
```
24.3 TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy

24.3.1 General Description

This command allows setting of the authorization policy for the lockout (lockoutPolicy), the platform hierarchy (platformPolicy), the storage hierarchy (ownerPolicy), and the endorsement hierarchy (endorsementPolicy). On TPMs implementing Authenticated Countdown Timers (ACT), this command may also be used to set the authorization policy for an ACT.

The command requires an authorization session. The session shall use the authValue associated with authHandle or the current policy associated with authHandle.

The policy that is changed is the policy associated with authHandle.

If the enable associated with authHandle is not SET, then the associated authorization values (authValue or authPolicy) may not be used, and the TPM returns TPM_RC_HIERARCHY.

When hashAlg is not TPM_ALG_NULL, if the size of authPolicy is not consistent with the hash algorithm, the TPM returns TPM_RC_SIZE.
# 24.3.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SetPrimaryPolicy (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY_POLICY</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1&lt;br&gt;Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>authPolicy</td>
<td>an authorization policy digest; may be the Empty Buffer&lt;br&gt;If hashAlg is TPM_ALG_NULL, then this shall be an Empty Buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ALG_HASH+</td>
<td>hashAlg</td>
<td>the hash algorithm to use for the policy&lt;br&gt;If the authPolicy is an Empty Buffer, then this field shall be TPM_ALG_NULL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "SetPrimaryPolicy_fp.h"

#if CC_SetPrimaryPolicy  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>size of input authPolicy is not consistent with input hash algorithm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy(
    SetPrimaryPolicy_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Input Validation
    // Check the authPolicy consistent with hash algorithm. If the policy size is
    // zero, then the algorithm is required to be TPM_ALG_NULL
    if (in->authPolicy.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->hashAlg))
        return TPM_RC_SIZE + RC_SetPrimaryPolicy_authPolicy;

    // The command need NV update for OWNER and ENDORSEMENT hierarchy, and
    // might need orderlyState update for PLATFORM hierarchy.
    // Check if NV is available. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE
    // error may be returned at this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Set hierarchy policy
    switch (in->authHandle)
    {
        case TPM_RH_OWNER:
            gp.ownerAlg = in->hashAlg;
            gp.ownerPolicy = in->authPolicy;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(ownerAlg);
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(ownerPolicy);
            break;
        case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
            gp.endorsementAlg = in->hashAlg;
            gp.endorsementPolicy = in->authPolicy;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementAlg);
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementPolicy);
            break;
        case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
            gc.platformAlg = in->hashAlg;
            gc.platformPolicy = in->authPolicy;
            // need to update orderly state
            g_clearOrderly = TRUE;
            break;
        case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
            gp.lockoutAlg = in->hashAlg;
            gp.lockoutPolicy = in->authPolicy;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(lockoutAlg);
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(lockoutPolicy);
            break;

        #define SET_ACT_POLICY(N)
        case TPM_RH_ACT_##N:
            go.ACT_##N.hashAlg = in->hashAlg;
            break;

```
go.ACT_##N.authPolicy = in->authPolicy; \ 
g_clearOrderly = TRUE; \ 
break;

FOR_EACH_ACT SET_ACT_POLICY

default:
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
break;
}
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
#endif // CC_SetPrimaryPolicy
24.4 TPM2_ChangePPS

24.4.1 General Description

This replaces the current platform primary seed (PPS) with a value from the RNG and sets platformPolicy to the default initialization value (the Empty Buffer).

NOTE 1 A policy that is the Empty Buffer can match no policy.

NOTE 2 Platform Authorization is not changed.

All resident transient and persistent objects in the Platform hierarchy are flushed.

Saved contexts in the Platform hierarchy that were created under the old PPS will no longer be able to be loaded.

The policy hash algorithm for PCR is reset to TPM_ALG_NULL.

This command does not clear any NV Index values.

NOTE 3 Index values belonging to the Platform are preserved because the indexes may have configuration information that will be the same after the PPS changes. The Platform may remove the indexes that are no longer needed using TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace().

This command requires Platform Authorization.
### Command and Response

**Table 174 — TPM2\_ChangePPS Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ChangePPS (NV E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 175 — TPM2\_ChangePPS Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ChangePPS.fp.h"

#if CC_ChangePPS  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_ChangePPS(
    ChangePPS_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    UINT32 i;

    // Check if NV is available. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE
    // error may be returned at this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Input parameter is not referenced in command action
    NOT_REFERENCED(in);

    // Internal Data Update

    // Reset platform hierarchy seed from RNG
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.PPSeed.t.buffer), gp.PPSeed.t.buffer);

    // Create a new phProof value from RNG to prevent the saved platform
    // hierarchy contexts being loaded
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.phProof.t.buffer), gp.phProof.t.buffer);

    // Set platform authPolicy to null
    gc.platformAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
    gc.platformPolicy.t.size = 0;

    // Flush loaded object in platform hierarchy
    ObjectFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_PLATFORM);

    // Flush platform evict object and index in NV
    NvFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_PLATFORM);

    // Save hierarchy changes to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(PPSeed);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(phProof);

    // Re-initialize PCR policies
    #if defined NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP && NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP > 0
        for(i = 0; i < NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP; i++)
        {
            gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[i] = TPM_ALG_NULL;
            gp.pcrPolicies.policy[i].t.size = 0;
        }
    #endif

    // orderly state should be cleared because of the update to state cleared data
    g_clearOrderly = TRUE;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ChangePPS
24.5 TPM2_ChangeEPS

24.5.1 General Description

This replaces the current endorsement primary seed (EPS) with a value from the RNG and sets the
Endorsement hierarchy controls to their default initialization values: ehEnable is SET, endorsementAuth
and endorsementPolicy are both set to the Empty Buffer. It will flush any resident objects (transient or
persistent) in the Endorsement hierarchy and not allow objects in the hierarchy associated with the
previous EPS to be loaded.

NOTE In the reference implementation, ehProof is a non-volatile value from the RNG. It is allowed that the
ehProof be generated by a KDF using both the EPS and SPS as inputs. If generated with a KDF, the
ehProof can be generated on an as-needed basis or made a non-volatile value.

This command requires Platform Authorization.
### 24.5.2 Command and Response

**Table 176 — TPM2\_ChangeEPS Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ChangeEPS (NV E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 177 — TPM2\_ChangeEPS Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ChangeEPS_fp.h"

#if CC_ChangeEPS  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_ChangeEPS(
    ChangeEPS_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Input parameter is not reference in command action
    NOT_REFERENCED(in);

    // Internal Data Update
    // Reset endorsement hierarchy seed from RNG
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.EPSeed.t.buffer), gp.EPSeed.t.buffer);
    // Create new ehProof value from RNG
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.ehProof.t.buffer), gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
    // Enable endorsement hierarchy
    gc.ehEnable = TRUE;

    // set authValue buffer to zeros
    MemorySet(gp.endorsementAuth.t.buffer, 0, gp.endorsementAuth.t.size);
    // Set endorsement authValue to null
    gp.endorsementAuth.t.size = 0;

    // Set endorsement authPolicy to null
    gp.endorsementAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
    gp.endorsementPolicy.t.size = 0;

    // Flush loaded object in endorsement hierarchy
    ObjectFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT);
    // Flush evict object of endorsement hierarchy stored in NV
    NvFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT);

    // Save hierarchy changes to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(EPSeed);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(ehProof);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementAuth);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementAlg);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementPolicy);

    // orderly state should be cleared because of the update to state clear data
    g_clearOrderly = TRUE;

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ChangeEPS
```
24.6 TPM2_Clear

24.6.1 General Description

This command removes all TPM context associated with a specific Owner.

The clear operation will:

• flush resident objects (persistent and volatile) in the Storage and Endorsement hierarchies;
• delete any NV Index with TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE == CLEAR;
• change the storage primary seed (SPS) to a new value from the TPM’s random number generator (RNG),
• change shProof and ehProof,

NOTE 1 The proof values is permitted to be set from the RNG or derived from the associated new Primary Seed. If derived from the Primary Seeds, the derivation of ehProof shall use both the SPS and EPS. The computation shall use the SPS as an HMAC key and the derived value may then be a parameter in a second HMAC in which the EPS is the HMAC key. The reference design uses values from the RNG.

• SET shEnable and ehEnable;
• set ownerAuth, endorsementAuth, and lockoutAuth to the Empty Buffer;
• set ownerPolicy, endorsementPolicy, and lockoutPolicy to the Empty Buffer;
• set Clock to zero;
• set resetCount to zero;
• set restartCount to zero; and
• set Safe to YES.
• increment pcrUpdateCounter

NOTE 2 This permits an application to create a policy session that is invalidated on TPM2_Clear. The policy needs, ideally as the first term, TPM2_PolicyPCR(). The session is invalidated even if the PCR selection is empty.

This command requires Platform Authorization or Lockout Authorization. If TPM2_ClearControl() has disabled this command, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_DISABLED.

If this command is authorized using lockoutAuth, the HMAC in the response shall use the new lockoutAuth value (that is, the Empty Buffer) when computing the response HMAC.
24.6.2 Command and Response

Table 178 — TPM2_Clear Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPML_CC_Clear (NV E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RH_CLEAR</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>TPML_CC_Clear (TPM_RH_LOCKOUT or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 179 — TPM2_Clear Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Clear_fp.h"

#if CC_Clear  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_DISABLED</td>
<td>Clear command has been disabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_Clear(
    Clear_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
) {
    // Input parameter is not reference in command action
    NOT_REFERENCED(in);

    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV IS NOT AVAILABLE;

    // Input Validation
    if (gp.disableClear)
        return TPM_RC_DISABLED;

    // Internal Data Update
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.SPSeed.t.buffer), gp.SPSeed.t.buffer);
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.shProof.t.buffer), gp.shProof.t.buffer);
    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.ehProof.t.buffer), gp.ehProof.t.buffer);

    // Enable storage and endorsement hierarchy
    gc.shEnable = gc.ehEnable = TRUE;
    set the authValue buffers to zero
    MemorySet(&gp.ownerAuth, 0, sizeof(gp.ownerAuth));
    MemorySet(&gp.endorsementAuth, 0, sizeof(gp.endorsementAuth));
    MemorySet(&gp.lockoutAuth, 0, sizeof(gp.lockoutAuth));

    // Set storage, endorsement, and lockout authPolicy to null
    gp.ownerAlg = gp.endorsementAlg = gp.lockoutAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
    MemorySet(&gp.ownerPolicy, 0, sizeof(gp.ownerPolicy));
    MemorySet(&gp.endorsementPolicy, 0, sizeof(gp.endorsementPolicy));
    MemorySet(&gp.lockoutPolicy, 0, sizeof(gp.lockoutPolicy));

    // Flush loaded object in storage and endorsement hierarchy
    ObjectFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_OWNER);
    ObjectFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT);

    // Flush owner and endorsement object and owner index in NV
    NvFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_OWNER);
    NvFlushHierarchy(TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT);

    // Initialize dictionary attack parameters
    DAPreInstall_Init();
```
57     // Reset clock
58     go.clock = 0;
59     go.clockSafe = YES;
60     NvWrite(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, sizeof(ORDERLY_DATA), &go);
61
62     // Reset counters
63     gp.resetCount = gr.restartCount = gr.clearCount = 0;
64     gp.auditCounter = 0;
65
66     // Save persistent data changes to NV
67     // Note: since there are so many changes to the persistent data structure, the
68     // entire PERSISTENT_DATA structure is written as a unit
69     NvWrite(NV_PERSISTENT_DATA, sizeof(PERSISTENT_DATA), &gp);
70
71     // Reset the PCR authValues (this does not change the PCRs)
72     PCR_ClearAuth();
73
74     // Bump the PCR counter
75     PCRChanged(0);
76
77     // orderly state should be cleared because of the update to state clear data
78     g_clearOrderly = TRUE;
79
80     return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
81  }
82 #endif // CC_Clear
24.7 TPM2_ClearControl

24.7.1 General Description

TPM2_ClearControl() disables and enables the execution of TPM2_Clear().
The TPM will SET the TPM’s TPMA_PERMANENT.disableClear attribute if disable is YES and will CLEAR the attribute if disable is NO. When the attribute is SET, TPM2_Clear() may not be executed.

NOTE This is to simplify the logic of TPM2_Clear(). TPM2_ClearControl() can be called using Platform Authorization to CLEAR the disableClear attribute and then execute TPM2_Clear().

Lockout Authorization may be used to SET disableClear but not to CLEAR it.
Platform Authorization may be used to SET or CLEAR disableClear.
### 24.7.2 Command and Response

**Table 180 — TPM2_ClearControl Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ClearControl {NV}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_CLEAR</td>
<td>@auth</td>
<td>TPM_RH_LOCKOUT or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>disable</td>
<td>YES if the disableOwnerClear flag is to be SET, NO if the flag is to be CLEAR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 181 — TPM2_ClearControl Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24.7.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ClearControl_fp.h"

#if CC_ClearControl  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL</td>
<td>authorization is not properly given</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ClearControl(
    ClearControl_In *in       // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Input Validation
    if (in->auth == TPM_RH_LOCKOUT && in->disable == NO)
        return TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL;

    // Internal Data Update
    if (in->disable == YES)
        gp.disableClear = TRUE;
    else
        gp.disableClear = FALSE;

    // Record the change to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(disableClear);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ClearControl
```
24.8 TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth

24.8.1 General Description

This command allows the authorization secret for a hierarchy or lockout to be changed using the current authorization value as the command authorization.

If `authHandle` is TPM_RH_PLATFORM, then `platformAuth` is changed. If `authHandle` is TPM_RH_OWNER, then `ownerAuth` is changed. If `authHandle` is TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, then `endorsementAuth` is changed. If `authHandle` is TPM_RH_LOCKOUT, then `lockoutAuth` is changed. The HMAC in the response shall use the new authorization value when computing the response HMAC.

If `authHandle` is TPM_RH_PLATFORM, then Physical Presence may need to be asserted for this command to succeed (see 26.2, TPM2_PP_Commands).

The authorization value may be no larger than the digest produced by the hash algorithm used for context integrity.

EXAMPLE If SHA384 is used in the computation of the integrity values for saved contexts, then the largest authorization value is 48 octets.
24.8.2 Command and Response

Table 182 — TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_HierarchyChangeAuth (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_LOCKOUT, TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT, TPM_RH_OWNER or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+(PP) Auth Index: 1 Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_AUTH</td>
<td>newAuth</td>
<td>new authorization value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 183 — TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "HierarchyChangeAuth_fp.h"

#if CC_HierarchyChangeAuth // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Object_spt_fp.h"
#endif // CC_HierarchyChangeAuth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>newAuth size is greater than that of integrity hash digest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth(
    HierarchyChangeAuth_In *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Make sure that the authorization value is a reasonable size (not larger than
    // the size of the digest produced by the integrity hash. The integrity
    // hash is assumed to produce the longest digest of any hash implemented
    // on the TPM. This will also remove trailing zeros from the authValue.
    if (MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&in->newAuth) > CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE)
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_HierarchyChangeAuth_newAuth;

    // Set hierarchy authValue
    switch(in->authHandle)
    {
        case TPM_RH_OWNER:
            gp.ownerAuth = in->newAuth;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(ownerAuth);
            break;
        case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
            gp.endorsementAuth = in->newAuth;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(endorsementAuth);
            break;
        case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
            gc.platformAuth = in->newAuth;
            // orderly state should be cleared
            g_clearOrderly = TRUE;
            break;
        case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
            gp.lockoutAuth = in->newAuth;
            NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(lockoutAuth);
            break;
        default:
            FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
            break;
    }
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
```
25 Dictionary Attack Functions

25.1 Introduction

A TPM is required to have support for logic that will help prevent a dictionary attack on an authorization value. The protection is provided by a counter that increments when a password authorization or an HMAC authorization fails. When the counter reaches a predefined value, the TPM will not accept, for some time interval, further requests that require authorization and the TPM is in Lockout mode. While the TPM is in Lockout mode, the TPM will return TPM_RC_LOCKOUT if the command requires use of an object’s or Index’s authValue unless the authorization applies to an entry in the Platform hierarchy.

NOTE 1 Authorizations for objects and NV Index values in the Platform hierarchy are never locked out. However, a command that requires multiple authorizations will not be accepted when the TPM is in Lockout mode unless all of the authorizations reference objects and indexes in the Platform hierarchy.

If the TPM is continuously powered for the duration of newRecoveryTime and no authorization failures occur, the authorization failure counter will be decremented by one. This property is called “self-healing.” Self-healing shall not cause the count of failed attempts to decrement below zero.

The count of failed attempts, the lockout interval, and self-healing interval are settable using TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters(). The lockout parameters and the current value of the lockout counter can be read with TPM2_GetCapability().

Dictionary attack protection does not apply to an entity associated with a permanent handle (handle type == TPM_HT_PERMANENT) other than TPM_RH_LOCKOUT.

25.2 TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset

25.2.1 General Description

This command cancels the effect of a TPM lockout due to a number of successive authorization failures. If this command is properly authorized, the lockout counter is set to zero.

Only one lockoutAuth authorization failure is allowed for this command during a lockoutRecovery interval (set using TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters()).
25.2.2 Command and Response

Table 184 — TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RH_LOCKOUT</td>
<td>@lockHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 185 — TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "DictionaryAttackLockReset_fp.h"

#if CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset(
DictionaryAttackLockReset_In *in    // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Input parameter is not reference in command action
    NOT_REFERENCED (in);

    // The command needs NV update.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Set failed tries to 0
    gp.failedTries = 0;

    // Record the changes to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(failedTries);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset
```
25.3 TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters

25.3.1 General Description

This command changes the lockout parameters.
The command requires Lockout Authorization.

The timeout parameters \(\text{newRecoveryTime}\) and \(\text{lockoutRecovery}\) indicate values that are measured with respect to the \(\text{Time}\) and not \(\text{Clock}\).

NOTE Use of \(\text{Time}\) means that the TPM shall be continuously powered for the duration of a timeout.

If \(\text{newRecoveryTime}\) is zero, then DA protection is disabled. Authorizations are checked but authorization failures will not cause the TPM to enter lockout.

If \(\text{newMaxTries}\) is zero, the TPM will be in lockout and use of DA protected entities will be disabled.

If \(\text{lockoutRecovery}\) is zero, then the recovery interval is \_TPM\_Init followed by TPM2\_Startup().

Only one \(\text{lockoutAuth}\) authorization failure is allowed for this command during a \(\text{lockoutRecovery}\) interval.
### 25.3.2 Command and Response

**Table 186 — TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackParameters (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_LOCKOUT</td>
<td>@lockHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_LOCKOUT Auth Index: 1 Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>newMaxTries</td>
<td>count of authorization failures before the lockout is imposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>newRecoveryTime</td>
<td>time in seconds before the authorization failure count is automatically decremented. A value of zero indicates that DA protection is disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>lockoutRecovery</td>
<td>time in seconds after a lockoutAuth failure before use of lockoutAuth is allowed. A value of zero indicates that a reboot is required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 187 — TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "DictionaryAttackParameters_fp.h"

#if CC_DictionaryAttackParameters // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters(
    DictionaryAttackParameters_In *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Set dictionary attack parameters
    gp.maxTries = in->newMaxTries;
    gp.recoveryTime = in->newRecoveryTime;
    gp.lockoutRecovery = in->lockoutRecovery;

    #if 0 // Errata eliminates this code
    // This functionality has been disabled. The preferred implementation is now
    // to leave failedTries unchanged when the parameters are changed. This could
    // have the effect of putting the TPM into DA lockout if in->newMaxTries is
    // not greater than the current value of gp.failedTries.
    // Set failed tries to 0
    gp.failedTries = 0;
    #endif

    // Record the changes to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(failedTries);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(maxTries);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(recoveryTime);
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(lockoutRecovery);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_DictionaryAttackParameters
```
26 Miscellaneous Management Functions

26.1 Introduction

Clause 1 contains commands that do not logically group with any other commands.

26.2 TPM2_PP_Commands

26.2.1 General Description

This command is used to determine which commands require assertion of Physical Presence (PP) in addition to platformAuth/platformPolicy.

This command requires that auth is TPM_RH_PLATFORM and that Physical Presence be asserted.

After this command executes successfully, the commands listed in setList will be added to the list of commands that require that Physical Presence be asserted when the handle associated with the authorization is TPM_RH_PLATFORM. The commands in clearList will no longer require assertion of Physical Presence in order to authorize a command.

If a command is not in either list, its state is not changed. If a command is in both lists, then it will no longer require Physical Presence (for example, setList is processed first).

Only commands with handle types of TPMI_RH_PLATFORM, TPMI_RH_PROVISION, TPMI_RH_CLEAR, or TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY can be gated with Physical Presence. If any other command is in either list, it is discarded.

When a command requires that Physical Presence be provided, then Physical Presence shall be asserted for either an HMAC or a Policy authorization.

NOTE 1 Physical Presence may be made a requirement of any policy.

NOTE 2 If the TPM does not implement this command, the command list is vendor specific. A platform-specific specification may require that the command list be initialized in a specific way.

TPM2_PP_Commands() always requires assertion of Physical Presence.
26.2.2 Command and Response

Table 188 — TPM2_PP_Commands Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_PP_Commands {NV}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
<td>@auth</td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM+PP  Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER + Physical Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
<td>setList</td>
<td>list of commands to be added to those that will require Physical Presence be asserted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
<td>clearList</td>
<td>list of commands that will no longer require that Physical Presence be asserted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 189 — TPM2_PP_Commands Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
26.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "PP_Commands_fp.h"

#ifdef CC_PP_Commands  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_PP_Commands(
    PP_Commands_In  *in   // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    UINT32          i;

    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update

    // Process set list
    for(i = 0; i < in->setList.count; i++)
    {
        // If command is implemented, set it as PP required. If the input
        // command is not a PP command, it will be ignored at
        // PhysicalPresenceCommandSet().
        // Note: PhysicalPresenceCommandSet() checks if the command is implemented.
        PhysicalPresenceCommandSet(in->setList.commandCodes[i]);
    }

    // Process clear list
    for(i = 0; i < in->clearList.count; i++)
    {
        // If command is implemented, clear it as PP required. If the input
        // command is not a PP command, it will be ignored at
        // PhysicalPresenceCommandClear(). If the input command is
        // TPM2_PP_Commands, it will be ignored as well
        PhysicalPresenceCommandClear(in->clearList.commandCodes[i]);
    }

    // Save the change of PP list
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(ppList);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_PP_Commands
```
26.3 TPM2_SetAlgorithmSet

26.3.1 General Description

This command allows the platform to change the set of algorithms that are used by the TPM. The algorithmSet setting is a vendor-dependent value.

If the changing of the algorithm set results in a change of the algorithms of PCR banks, then the TPM will need to be reset (_TPM_Init and TPM2_Startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR)) before the new PCR settings take effect. After this command executes successfully, if startupType in the next TPM2_Startup() is not TPM_SU_CLEAR, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE and may enter Failure mode.

Other than PCR, when an algorithm is no longer supported, the behavior of this command is vendor-dependent.

EXAMPLE Entities can remain resident. Persistent objects, transient objects, or sessions can be flushed. NV Indexes may be undefined. Policies may be erased.

NOTE The reference implementation does not have support for this command. In particular, it does not support use of this command to selectively disable algorithms. Proper support would require modification of the unmarshaling code so that each time an algorithm is unmarshaled, it would be verified as being enabled.
26.3.2 Command and Response

Table 190 — TPM2_SetAlgorithmSet Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_SetAlgorithmSet (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>algorithmSet</td>
<td>a TPM vendor-dependent value indicating the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>algorithm set selection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 191 — TPM2_SetAlgorithmSet Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 26.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "SetAlgorithmSet_fp.h"

#if CC_SetAlgorithmSet  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_SetAlgorithmSet(
    SetAlgorithmSet_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
    // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
    // this point
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;

    // Internal Data Update
    gp.algorithmSet = in->algorithmSet;

    // Write the algorithm set changes to NV
    NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(algorithmSet);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_SetAlgorithmSet
```
27 Field Upgrade

27.1 Introduction

Clause 1 contains the commands for managing field upgrade of the firmware in the TPM. The field upgrade scheme may be used for replacement or augmentation of the firmware installed in the TPM.

EXAMPLE 1 If an algorithm is found to be flawed, a patch of that algorithm might be installed using the firmware upgrade process. The patch might be a replacement of a portion of the code or a complete replacement of the firmware.

EXAMPLE 2 If an additional set of ECC parameters is needed, the firmware process can be used to add the parameters to the TPM data set.

The field upgrade process uses two commands (TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart() and TPM2_FieldUpgradeData()). TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart() validates that a signature on the provided digest is from the TPM manufacturer and that proper authorization is provided using platformPolicy.

NOTE 1 The platformPolicy for field upgraded is defined by the PM and may include requirements that the upgrade be signed by the PM or the TPM owner and include any other constraints that are desired by the PM.

If the proper authorization is given, the TPM will retain the signed digest and enter the Field Upgrade mode (FUM). While in FUM, the TPM will accept TPM2_FieldUpgradeData() commands. It may accept other commands if it is able to complete them using the previously installed firmware. Otherwise, it will return TPM_RC_UPGRADE.

Each block of the field upgrade shall contain the digest of the next block of the field upgrade data. That digest shall be included in the digest of the previous block. The digest of the first block is signed by the TPM manufacturer. That signature and first block digest are the parameters for TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart(). The digest is saved in the TPM as the required digest for the next field upgrade data block and as the identifier of the field upgrade sequence.

For each field upgrade data block that is sent to the TPM by TPM2_FieldUpgradeData(), the TPM shall validate that the digest matches the required digest and if not, shall return TPM_RC_VALUE. The TPM shall extract the digest of the next expected block and return that value to the caller, along with the digest of the first data block of the update sequence.

The system may attempt to abandon the firmware upgrade by using a zero-length buffer in TPM2_FieldUpdateData(). If the TPM is able to resume operation using the firmware present when the upgrade started, then the TPM will indicate that it has abandon the update by setting the digest of the next block to the Empty Buffer. If the TPM cannot abandon the update, it will return the expected next digest.

The system may also attempt to abandon the update because of a power interruption. If the TPM is able to resume normal operations, then it will respond normally to TPM2_Startup(). If the TPM is not able to resume normal operations, then it will respond to any command but TPM2_FieldUpgradeData() with TPM_RC_UPGRADE.

After a _TPM_Init, system software may not be able to resume the field upgrade that was in process when the power interruption occurred. In such case, the TPM firmware may be reset to one of two other values:

- the original firmware that was installed at the factory ("initial firmware"); or
- the firmware that was in the TPM when the field upgrade process started ("previous firmware").

The TPM retains the digest of the first block for these firmware images and checks to see if the first block after _TPM_Init matches either of those digests. If so, the firmware update process restarts and the original firmware may be loaded.
NOTE 2  The TPM is required to accept the previous firmware as either a vendor-provided update or as recovered from the TPM using TPM2_FirmwareRead().

When the last block of the firmware upgrade is loaded into the TPM (indicated to the TPM by data in the data block in a TPM vendor-specific manner), the TPM will complete the upgrade process. If the TPM is able to resume normal operations without a reboot, it will set the hash algorithm of the next block to TPM_ALG_NULL and return TPM_RC_SUCCESS. If a reboot is required, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_REBOOT in response to the last TPM2_FieldUpgradeData() and all subsequent TPM commands until a _TPM_Init is received.

NOTE 3  Because no additional data is allowed when the response code is not TPM_RC_SUCCESS, the TPM returns TPM_RC_SUCCESS for all calls to TPM2_FieldUpgradeData() except the last. In this manner, the TPM is able to indicate the digest of the next block. If a _TPM_Init occurs while the TPM is in FUM, the next block may be the digest for the first block of the original firmware. If it is not, then the TPM will not accept the original firmware until the next _TPM_Init when the TPM is in FUM.

During the field upgrade process, either the one specified in clause 1 or a vendor proprietary field upgrade process, the TPM should preserve:

- Primary Seeds;
- Hierarchy authValue, authPolicy, and proof values;
- Lockout authValue and authorization failure count values;
- PCR authValue and authPolicy values;
- NV Index allocations and contents;
- Persistent object allocations and contents; and
- Clock.

NOTE 4  A platform manufacturer may provide a means to change preserved data to accommodate a case where a field upgrade fixes a flaw that might have compromised TPM secrets.
27.2 TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart

27.2.1 General Description

This command uses platformPolicy and a TPM Vendor Authorization Key to authorize a Field Upgrade Manifest.

If the signature checks succeed, the authorization is valid and the TPM will accept TPM2_FieldUpgradeData().

This signature is checked against the loaded key referenced by keyHandle. This key will have a Name that is the same as a value that is part of the TPM firmware data. If the signature is not valid, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIGNATURE.

NOTE A loaded key is used rather than a hard-coded key to reduce the amount of memory needed for this key data in case more than one vendor key is needed.
27.2.2 Command and Response

Table 192 — TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeStart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@authorization</td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP} Auth Index:1 Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>keyHandle</td>
<td>handle of a public area that contains the TPM Vendor Authorization Key that will be used to validate manifestSignature Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DIGEST</td>
<td>fuDigest</td>
<td>digest of the first block in the field upgrade sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>manifestSignature</td>
<td>signature over fuDigest using the key associated with keyHandle (not optional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 193 — TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "FieldUpgradeStart_fp.h"
#if CC_FieldUpgradeStart  // Conditional expansion of this file
TPM_RC
TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart(
    FieldUpgradeStart_In    *in    // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Not implemented
    UNUSED_PARAMETER(in);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
```
27.3 TPM2_FieldUpgradeData

27.3.1 General Description

This command will take the actual field upgrade image to be installed on the TPM. The exact format of \texttt{fuData} is vendor-specific. This command is only possible following a successful TPM2\_FieldUpgradeStart(). If the TPM has not received a properly authorized TPM2\_FieldUpgradeStart(), then the TPM shall return TPM\_RC\_FIELDUPGRADE.

The TPM will validate that the digest of \texttt{fuData} matches an expected value. If so, the TPM may buffer or immediately apply the update. If the digest of \texttt{fuData} does not match an expected value, the TPM shall return TPM\_RC\_VALUE.
27.3.2 Command and Response

Table 194 — TPM2_FieldUpgradeData Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or decrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>fuData</td>
<td>field upgrade image data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 195 — TPM2_FieldUpgradeData Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_HA+</td>
<td>nextDigest</td>
<td>tagged digest of the next block, TPM_ALG_NULL if field update is complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_HA</td>
<td>firstDigest</td>
<td>tagged digest of the first block of the sequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "FieldUpgradeData_fp.h"
#if CC_FieldUpgradeData  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_FieldUpgradeData(
    FieldUpgradeData_In     *in,    // IN: input parameter list
    FieldUpgradeData_Out    *out    // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Not implemented
    UNUSED_PARAMETER(in);
    UNUSED_PARAMETER(out);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
```
27.4  TPM2_FirmwareRead

27.4.1  General Description

This command is used to read a copy of the current firmware installed in the TPM.

The presumption is that the data will be returned in reverse order so that the last block in the sequence would be the first block given to the TPM in case of a failure recovery. If the TPM2_FirmwareRead sequence completes successfully, then the data provided from the TPM will be sufficient to allow the TPM to recover from an abandoned upgrade of this firmware.

To start the sequence of retrieving the data, the caller sets sequenceNumber to zero. When the TPM has returned all the firmware data, the TPM will return the Empty Buffer as fuData.

The contents of fuData are opaque to the caller.

NOTE 1  The caller should retain the ordering of the update blocks so that the blocks sent to the TPM have the same size and inverse order as the blocks returned by a sequence of calls to this command.

NOTE 2  Support for this command is optional even if the TPM implements TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart() and TPM2_FieldUpgradeData().
27.4.2 Command and Response

Table 196 — TPM2_FirmwareRead Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_FirmwareRead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>sequenceNumber</td>
<td>the number of previous calls to this command in this sequence set to 0 on the first call</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 197 — TPM2_FirmwareRead Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>fuData</td>
<td>field upgrade image data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "FirmwareRead_fp.h"

#if CC_FirmwareRead // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_FirmwareRead(
    FirmwareRead_In  *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    FirmwareRead_Out *out       // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Not implemented
    UNUSED_PARAMETER(in);
    UNUSED_PARAMETER(out);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_FirmwareRead
```
28  Context Management

28.1  Introduction

Three of the commands in clause 1 (TPM2_ContextSave(), TPM2_ContextLoad(), and TPM2_FlushContext()) implement the resource management described in the "Context Management" clause in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

The fourth command in clause 1 (TPM2_EvictControl()) is used to control the persistence of loadable objects in TPM memory. Background for this command may be found in the "Owner and Platform Evict Objects" clause in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

28.2  TPM2_ContextSave

28.2.1  General Description

This command saves a session context, object context, or sequence object context outside the TPM.

No authorization sessions of any type are allowed with this command and tag is required to be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS.

NOTE  This preclusion avoids complex issues of dealing with the same session in handle and in the session area. While it might be possible to provide specificity, it would add unnecessary complexity to the TPM and, because this capability would provide no application benefit, use of authorization sessions for audit or encryption is prohibited.

The TPM shall encrypt and integrity protect the TPM2B_CONTEXT_SENSITIVE context as described in the "Context Protections" clause in TPM 2.0 Part 1.

See the “Context Data” clause in TPM 2.0 Part 2 for a description of the context structure in the response.
28.2.2 Command and Response

Table 198 — TPM2_ContextSave Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ContextSave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_CONTEXT</td>
<td>saveHandle</td>
<td>handle of the resource to save</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 199 — TPM2_ContextSave Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_CONTEXT</td>
<td>context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ContextSave_fp.h"

#if CC_ContextSave // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Context_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP</td>
<td>a contextID could not be assigned for a session context save</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TOO_MANY_CONTEXTS</td>
<td>no more contexts can be saved as the counter has maxed out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ContextSave(
    ContextSave_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    ContextSave_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC          result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    UINT16          fingerprintSize; // The size of fingerprint in context blob.
    UINT64          contextID = 0; // session context ID
    TPM2B_SYM_KEY   symKey;
    TPM2B_IV        iv;
    TPM2B_DIGEST    integrity;
    UINT16          integritySize;
    BYTE            *buffer;

    // This command may cause the orderlyState to be cleared due to
    // the update of state reset data. If the state is orderly and
    // cannot be changed, exit early.
    RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;

    // Internal Data Update
    switch(HandleGetType(in->saveHandle))
    {
        // Initialize output handle. At the end of command action, the output
        // handle of an object will be replaced, while the output handle
        // for a session will be the same as input
        out->context.savedHandle = in->saveHandle;

        // Get the size of fingerprint in context blob. The sequence value in
        // TPMS_CONTEXT structure is used as the fingerprint
        fingerprintSize = sizeof(out->context.sequence);

        // Compute the integrity size at the beginning of context blob
        integritySize = sizeof(integrity.t.size)
        + CryptHashGetDigestSize(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG);

        // Perform object or session specific context save
        switch(HandleGetType(in->saveHandle))
        { switch(HandleGetType(in->saveHandle))
            // This implementation does not do things in quite the same way as described in
            // Part 2 of the specification. In Part 2, it indicates that the
            // TPMS CONTEXT_DATA contains two TPM2B values. That is not how this is
            // implemented. Rather, the size field of the TPM2B CONTEXT_DATA is used to
            // determine the amount of data in the encrypted data. That part is not
            // independently sized. This makes the actual size 2 bytes smaller than
            // calculated using Part 2. Since this is opaque to the caller, it is not
            // necessary to fix. The actual size is returned by TPM2_GetCapabilities().
```

Note: The above code snippet is incomplete and truncated for brevity. The full code is necessary to understand the implementation details. The code is written in C and includes conditional compilation directives for different parts of the implementation.
```c
55  
56  case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
57  {
58      OBJECT *object = HandleToObject(in->saveHandle);
59      ANY_OBJECT_BUFFER *outObject;
60      UINT16 objectSize = ObjectIsSequence(object)
61          ? sizeof(HASH_OBJECT) : sizeof(OBJECT);
62      
63      outObject = (ANY_OBJECT_BUFFER *) (out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer
64          + integritySize + fingerprintSize);
65      
66      // Set size of the context data. The contents of context blob is vendor
67      // defined. In this implementation, the size is size of integrity
68      // plus fingerprint plus the whole internal OBJECT structure
69      out->context.contextBlob.t.size = integritySize +
70          fingerprintSize + objectSize;
71      #if ALG_RSA
72          // For an RSA key, make sure that the key has had the private exponent
73          // computed before saving.
74          if (object->publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_RSA &&
75              !(object->attributes.publicOnly))
76              CryptRsaLoadPrivateExponent(&object->publicArea, &object->sensitive);
77      #endif
78      // Make sure things fit
79      pAssert(out->context.contextBlob.t.size
80          <= sizeof(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer));
81      // Copy the whole internal OBJECT structure to context blob
82      MemoryCopy(outObject, object, objectSize);
83      
84      // Increment object context ID
85      gr.objectContextID++;
86      // If object context ID overflows, TPM should be put in failure mode
87      if (gr.objectContextID == 0)
88          FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
89      
90      // Fill in other return values for an object.
91      out->context.sequence = gr.objectContextID;
92      // For regular object, savedHandle is 0x80000000. For sequence object,
93      // savedHandle is 0x80000001. For object with stClear, savedHandle
94      // is 0x80000002
95      if (ObjectIsSequence(object))
96          
97          out->context.savedHandle = 0x80000001;
98          SequenceDataExport((HASH_OBJECT *)object,
99              (HASH_OBJECT_BUFFER *)outObject);
100      }
101      else
102          out->context.savedHandle = (object->attributes.stClear == SET)
103              ? 0x80000002 : 0x80000000;
104      // Get object hierarchy
105      out->context.hierarchy = ObjectGetHierarchy(object);
106      break;
107  }
108  
109  case TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
110  case TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
111  {
112      SESSION *session = SessionGet(in->saveHandle);
113      
114      // Set size of the context data. The contents of context blob is vendor
115      // defined. In this implementation, the size of context blob is the
116      // size of a internal session structure plus the size of
117      // fingerprint plus the size of integrity
118      out->context.contextBlob.t.size = integritySize +
119          fingerprintSize + sizeof(*session);
120```
// Make sure things fit
pAssert(out->context.contextBlob.t.size < sizeof(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer));

// Copy the whole internal SESSION structure to context blob.
// Save space for fingerprint at the beginning of the buffer
// This is done before anything else so that the actual context
// can be reclaimed after this call
pAssert(sizeof(*session) <= sizeof(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer) - integritySize - fingerprintSize);
MemoryCopy(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer + integritySize + fingerprintSize, session, sizeof(*session));

// Fill in the other return parameters for a session
// Get a context ID and set the session tracking values appropriately
// TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP is a possible error.
// SessionContextSave() will flush the in-memory context
// so no additional errors may occur after this call.
result = SessionContextSave(out->context.savedHandle, &contextID);
if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result;

result = SessionContextSave(out->context.savedHandle, &contextID);
if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result;

// sequence number is the current session contextID
out->context.sequence = contextID;

// use TPM_RH_NULL as hierarchy for session context
out->context.hierarchy = TPM_RH_NULL;
break;

default:
    // SaveContext may only take an object handle or a session handle.
    // All the other handle type should be filtered out at unmarshal
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
    break;

    // Save fingerprint at the beginning of encrypted area of context blob.
    // Reserve the integrity space
pAssert(sizeof(out->context.sequence) <= sizeof(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer) - integritySize);
MemoryCopy(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer + integritySize, &out->context.sequence, sizeof(out->context.sequence));

    // Compute context encryption key
ComputeContextProtectionKey(&out->context, &symKey, &iv);

    // Encrypt context blob
CryptSymmetricEncrypt(out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer + integritySize, CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG, CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS, symKey.t.buffer, &iv, TPM_ALG_CFB, out->context.contextBlob.t.size - integritySize, out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer + integritySize);

    // Compute integrity hash for the object
    // In this implementation, the same routine is used for both sessions
    // and objects.
    ComputeContextIntegrity(&out->context, &integrity);

    // add integrity at the beginning of context blob
    buffer = out->context.contextBlob.t.buffer;
    TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&integrity, &buffer, NULL);

    // orderly state should be cleared because of the update of state reset and
temp state clear data
g_clearOrderly = TRUE;

    return result;
#endif // CC_ContextSave
28.3 TPM2_ContextLoad

28.3.1 General Description

This command is used to reload a context that has been saved by TPM2_ContextSave().

No authorization sessions of any type are allowed with this command and tag is required to be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS (see note in 28.2.1).

The TPM will return TPM_RC_HIERARCHY if the context is associated with a hierarchy that is disabled.

NOTE Contexts for authorization sessions and for sequence objects belong to the NULL hierarchy, which is never disabled.

See the “Context Data” clause in TPM 2.0 Part 2 for a description of the values in the context parameter.

If the integrity HMAC of the saved context is not valid, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_INTEGRITY.

The TPM shall perform a check on the decrypted context as described in the "Context Confidentiality Protection" clause of TPM 2.0 Part 1 and enter failure mode if the check fails.
### 28.3.2 Command and Response

**Table 200 — TPM2_ContextLoad Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPML_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ContextLoad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_CONTEXT</td>
<td>context</td>
<td>the context blob</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 201 — TPM2_ContextLoad Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_DH_CONTEXT</td>
<td>loadedHandle</td>
<td>the handle assigned to the resource after it has been successfully loaded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ContextLoad_fp.h"

#if CC_ContextLoad // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Context_spt_fp.h"
#endif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP</td>
<td>there is only one available slot and this is not the oldest saved session context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>context.savedHandle does not reference a saved session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>context.hierarchy is disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_INTEGRITY</td>
<td>context integrity check fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY</td>
<td>no free slot for an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY</td>
<td>no free session slots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>incorrect context blob size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ContextLoad(
    ContextLoad_In      *in, // IN: input parameter list
    ContextLoad_Out     *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC              result;
    TPM2B_DIGEST        integrityToCompare;
    TPM2B_DIGEST        integrity;
    BYTE                *buffer; // defined to save some typing
    INT32               size; // defined to save some typing
    TPM_HT              handleType;
    TPM2B_SYM_KEY       symKey;
    TPM2B_IV            iv;

    // Input Validation

    // See discussion about the context format in TPM2_ContextSave Detailed Actions

    // IF this is a session context, make sure that the sequence number is
    // consistent with the version in the slot

    // Check context blob size
    handleType = HandleGetType(in->context.savedHandle);

    // Get integrity from context blob
    buffer = in->context.contextBlob.t.buffer;
    size = (INT32)in->context.contextBlob.t.size;
    result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&integrity, &buffer, &size);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        return result;
    }

    // the size of the integrity value has to match the size of digest produced
    // by the integrity hash
    if(integrity.t.size != CryptHashGetDigestSize(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG))
    {
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_ContextLoad_context;
    }

    // Make sure that the context blob has enough space for the fingerprint. This
    // is elastic pants to go with the belt and suspenders we already have to make
```
// sure that the context is complete and untampered.
if((unsigned)size < sizeof(in->context.sequence))
    return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_ContextLoad_context;

// After unmarshaling the integrity value, 'buffer' is pointing at the first
// byte of the integrity protected and encrypted buffer and 'size' is the number
// of integrity protected and encrypted bytes.

// Compute context integrity
ComputeContextIntegrity(&in->context, &integrityToCompare);

// Compare integrity
if(!MemoryEqual2B(&integrity.b, &integrityToCompare.b))
    return TPM_RCS_INTEGRITY + RC_ContextLoad_context;

// Compute context encryption key
ComputeContextProtectionKey(&in->context, &symKey, &iv);

// Decrypt context data in place
CryptSymmetricDecrypt(buffer, CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG, CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS,
    symKey.t.buffer, &iv, TPM_ALG_CFB, size, buffer);

// See if the fingerprint value matches. If not, it is symptomatic of either
// a broken TPM or that the TPM is under attack so go into failure mode.
if(!MemoryEqual(buffer, &in->context.sequence, sizeof(in->context.sequence)))
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);

// step over fingerprint
buffer += sizeof(in->context.sequence);

// set the remaining size of the context
size -= sizeof(in->context.sequence);

// Perform object or session specific input check
switch(handleType) {
    case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
        {
            OBJECT *outObject;

            if(size > (INT32)sizeof(OBJECT))
                FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);

            // Discard any changes to the handle that the TRM might have made
            in->context.savedHandle = TRANSIENT_FIRST;

            // If hierarchy is disabled, no object context can be loaded in this
            // hierarchy
            if(!HierarchyIsEnabled(in->context.hierarchy))
                return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_ContextLoad_context;

            // Restore object. If there is no empty space, indicate as much
            outObject = ObjectContextLoad((ANY_OBJECT_BUFFER *)buffer,
                &out->loadedHandle);

            if(outObject == NULL)
                return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;

            break;
        }

    case TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
    case TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
        {
            if(size != sizeof(SESSION))
                FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);

            // This command may cause the orderlyState to be cleared due to
            // the update of state reset data. If this is the case, check if NV is
            // available first
        }

    default:
        break;
}

RETURN_IF_ORDERLY;

// Check if input handle points to a valid saved session and that the
// sequence number makes sense
if (!SequenceNumberForSavedContextIsValid(&in->context))
    return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_ContextLoad_context;

// Restore session. A TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY, TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP error
// may be returned at this point
result = SessionContextLoad((SESSION_BUF *)buffer, &in->context.savedHandle);
if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    return result;

out->loadedHandle = in->context.savedHandle;

// orderly state should be cleared because of the update of state
// reset and state clear data
break;

break;
}

default:
    // Context blob may only have an object handle or a session handle.
    // All the other handle type should be filtered out at unmarshal
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
    break;

return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_ContextLoad
28.4 TPM2_FlushContext

28.4.1 General Description

This command causes all context associated with a loaded object, sequence object, or session to be removed from TPM memory.

This command may not be used to remove a persistent object from the TPM. Use TPM2_EvictControl to remove a persistent object.

A session does not have to be loaded in TPM memory to have its context flushed. The saved session context associated with the indicated handle is invalidated. When flushing a session, the upper byte of the handle is ignored.

EXAMPLE A command to flush session handle 0x20000000 will flush session handle 0x03000000.

No sessions of any type are allowed with this command and tag is required to be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS (see note in 28.2.1).

If the handle is for a Transient Object and the handle is not associated with a loaded object, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE.

If the handle is for an authorization session and the handle does not reference a loaded or active session, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE.

NOTE flushHandle is a parameter and not a handle. If it were in the handle area, the TPM would validate that the context for the referenced entity is in the TPM. When a TPM2_FlushContext references a saved session context, it is not necessary for the context to be in the TPM. When the flushHandle is in the parameter area, the TPM does not validate that associated context is actually in the TPM.
### 28.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 202 — TPM2_FlushContext Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_FlushContext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_CONTEXT</td>
<td>flushHandle</td>
<td>the handle of the item to flush</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE** This is a use of a handle as a parameter.

#### Table 203 — TPM2_FlushContext Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 28.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "FlushContext_fp.h"

#if CC_FlushContext  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>flushHandle does not reference a loaded object or session</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_FlushContext(
    FlushContext_In *in       // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Internal Data Update

    // Call object or session specific routine to flush
    switch(HandleGetType(in->flushHandle))
    {
    case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
    if(!IsObjectPresent(in->flushHandle))
        return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_FlushContext_flushHandle;
    // Flush object
    FlushObject(in->flushHandle);
    break;

    case TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
    case TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
    if(!SessionIsLoaded(in->flushHandle)
    && !SessionIsSaved(in->flushHandle))
        return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_FlushContext_flushHandle;
    // If the session to be flushed is the exclusive audit session, then
    // indicate that there is no exclusive audit session any longer.
    if(in->flushHandle == g_exclusiveAuditSession)
    g_exclusiveAuditSession = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;

    // Flush session
    SessionFlush(in->flushHandle);
    break;
    default:
    // This command only takes object or session handle. Other handles
    // should be filtered out at handle unmarshal
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
    break;
    }

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_FlushContext
```
28.5 TPM2_EvictControl

28.5.1 General Description

This command allows certain Transient Objects to be made persistent or a persistent object to be evicted.

NOTE 1 A transient object is one that may be removed from TPM memory using either TPM2_FlushContext or TPM2_Startup(). A persistent object is not removed from TPM memory by TPM2_FlushContext() or TPM2_Startup().

If objectHandle is a Transient Object, then this call makes a persistent copy of the object and assigns persistentHandle to the persistent version of the object. If objectHandle is a persistent object, then the call evicts the persistent object. The call does not affect the transient object.

Before execution of TPM2_EvictControl code below, the TPM verifies that objectHandle references an object that is resident on the TPM and that persistentHandle is a valid handle for a persistent object.

NOTE 2 This requirement simplifies the unmarshaling code so that it only need check that persistentHandle is always a persistent object.

If objectHandle references a Transient Object:

a) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if
   1) it is in the hierarchy of TPM_RH_NULL,
   2) only the public portion of the object is loaded, or
      NOTE 3 This is for NV space efficiency. Loading an object whose private part is empty would unnecessarily consume NV resources.
   3) the stClear is SET in the object or in an ancestor key.

b) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_HIERARCHY if the object is not in the proper hierarchy as determined by auth.
   1) If auth is TPM_RH_PLATFORM, the proper hierarchy is the Platform hierarchy.
   2) If auth is TPM_RH_OWNER, the proper hierarchy is either the Storage or the Endorsement hierarchy.

c) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_RANGE if persistentHandle is not in the proper range as determined by auth.
   1) If auth is TPM_RH_OWNER, then persistentHandle shall be in the inclusive range of 81 00 00 00_{16} to 81 7F FF FF_{16}.
   2) If auth is TPM_RH_PLATFORM, then persistentHandle shall be in the inclusive range of 81 80 00 00_{16} to 81 FF FF FF_{16}.
      NOTE 4 This separation permits the platform (the platform OEM) a range of indexes that will not interfere with indexes used by the TPM owner (the OS or applications).

d) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED if a persistent object exists with the same handle as persistentHandle.

e) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE if insufficient space is available to make the object persistent.

f) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE if execution of this command will prevent the TPM from being able to hold two transient objects of any kind.

NOTE 5 This requirement anticipates that a TPM may be implemented such that all TPM memory is non-volatile and not subject to endurance issues. In such case, there is no movement of an object.
between memory of different types and it is necessary that the TPM ensure that it is always possible for the management software to move objects to/from TPM memory in order to ensure that the objects required for command execution can be context restored.

g) If the TPM returns TPM_RC_SUCCESS, the object referenced by objectHandle will not be flushed and both objectHandle and persistentHandle may be used to access the object.

If objectHandle references a persistent object:

a) The TPM shall return TPM_RC_RANGE if objectHandle is not in the proper range as determined by auth. If auth is TPM_RC_OWNER, objectHandle shall be in the inclusive range of 81 00 00 0016 to 81 7F FF FF16. If auth is TPM_RC_PLATFORM, objectHandle may be any valid persistent object handle.

b) If objectHandle is not the same value as persistentHandle, return TPM_RC_HANDLE.

c) If the TPM returns TPM_RC_SUCCESS, objectHandle will be removed from persistent memory and no longer be accessible.

NOTE 5 The persistent object is not converted to a transient object, as this would prevent the immediate revocation of an object by removing it from persistent memory.
## 28.5.2 Command and Response

### Table 204 — TPM2_EvictControl Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPMS_CC_EvictControl (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PROVISION</td>
<td>@auth</td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>objectHandle</td>
<td>the handle of a loaded object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_PERSISTENT</td>
<td>persistentHandle</td>
<td>if objectHandle is a transient object handle, then this is the persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>handle for the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>if objectHandle is a persistent object handle, then it shall be the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>value as persistentHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 205 — TPM2_EvictControl Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "EvictControl_fp.h"

#if CC_EvictControl // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>an object with temporary, stClear or publicOnly attribute SET cannot be made persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>auth cannot authorize the operation in the hierarchy of evictObject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>evictHandle of the persistent object to be evicted is not the same as the persistentHandle argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_HANDLE</td>
<td>persistentHandle is unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_SPACE</td>
<td>no space in NV to make evictHandle persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RANGE</td>
<td>persistentHandle is not in the range corresponding to the hierarchy of evictObject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM2_EvictControl(
    EvictControl_In *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC result;
    OBJECT *evictObject;

    // Input Validation
    evictObject = HandleToObject(in->objectHandle);

    // Temporary, stClear or public only objects can not be made persistent
    if(evictObject->attributes.temporary == SET
        || evictObject->attributes.stClear == SET
        || evictObject->attributes.publicOnly == SET)
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_EvictControl_objectHandle;

    // If objectHandle refers to a persistent object, it should be the same as input persistentHandle
    if(evictObject->attributes.evict == SET
        && evictObject->evictHandle != in->persistentHandle)
    return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_EvictControl_objectHandle;

    // Additional authorization validation
    if(in->auth == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
    {
        // To make persistent
        if(evictObject->attributes.evict == CLEAR)
        {
            // PlatformAuth can not set evict object in storage or endorsement hierarchy
            if(evictObject->attributes.ppsHierarchy == CLEAR)
            return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_EvictControl_objectHandle;
            // Platform cannot use a handle outside of platform persistent range.
            if(!NvIsPlatformPersistentHandle(in->persistentHandle))
            return TPM_RCS_RANGE + RC_EvictControl_persistentHandle;
        }
    }
}
```
// PlatformAuth can delete any persistent object
} else if (in->auth == TPM_RH_OWNER) {
    // OwnerAuth can not set or clear evict object in platform hierarchy
    if (evictObject->attributes.ppsHierarchy == SET)
        return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_EvictControl_objectHandle;
    // Owner cannot use a handle outside of owner persistent range.
    if (evictObject->attributes.evict == CLEAR
        && !NvIsOwnerPersistentHandle(in->persistentHandle))
        return TPM_RCS_RANGE + RC_EvictControl_persistentHandle;
} else {
    // Other authorization is not allowed in this command and should have been
    // filtered out in unmarshal process
    FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}

// Internal Data Update
// Change evict state
if (evictObject->attributes.evict == CLEAR) {
    // Make object persistent
    if (NvFindHandle(in->persistentHandle) != 0)
        return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED;
    // A TPM_RC_NV_DEFINE or TPM_RC_NV_SPACE error may be returned at this
    // point
    result = NvAddEvictObject(in->persistentHandle, evictObject);
} else {
    // Delete the persistent object in NV
    result = NvDeleteEvict(evictObject->evictHandle);
}
return result;
#endif // CC_EvictControl
29 Clocks and Timers

29.1 TPM2_ReadClock

29.1.1 General Description

This command reads the current TPMS_TIME_INFO structure that contains the current setting of Time, Clock, resetCount, and restartCount.
29.1.2 Command and Response

Table 206 — TPM2_ReadClock Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ReadClock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 207 — TPM2_ReadClock Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_TIME_INFO</td>
<td>currentTime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29.1.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ReadClock_fp.h"

#if CC_ReadClock  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_ReadClock( 
    ReadClock_Out  *out  // OUT: output parameter list 
)
{
    // Command Output
    out->currentTime.time = g_time;
    TimeFillInfo(&out->currentTime.clockInfo);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ReadClock
```
29.2 TPM2_ClockSet

29.2.1 General Description

This command is used to advance the value of the TPM’s Clock. The command will fail if newTime is less than the current value of Clock or if the new time is greater than FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 16. If both of these checks succeed, Clock is set to newTime. If either of these checks fails, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE and make no change to Clock.

NOTE This maximum setting would prevent Clock from rolling over to zero for approximately 8,000 years at the real time Clock update rate. If the Clock update rate was set so that TPM time was passing 33 percent faster than real time, it would still be more than 6,000 years before Clock would roll over to zero. Because Clock will not roll over in the lifetime of the TPM, there is no need for external software to deal with the possibility that Clock may wrap around.

If the value of Clock after the update makes the volatile and non-volatile versions of TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.clock differ by more than the reported update interval, then the TPM shall update the non-volatile version of TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.clock before returning.

This command requires Platform Authorization or Owner Authorization.
### 29.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 208 — TPM2_ClockSet Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ClockSet (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PROVISION @auth</td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT64</td>
<td>newTime</td>
<td>new Clock setting in milliseconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 209 — TPM2_ClockSet Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ClockSet_fp.h"

#if CC_ClockSet  // Conditional expansion of this file

Read the current TPMS_TIMER_INFO structure settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_RATE</td>
<td>NV is unavailable because of rate limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE</td>
<td>NV is inaccessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>invalid new clock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ClockSet(
    ClockSet_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Input Validation
    // new time can not be bigger than 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF or smaller than
    // current clock
    if(in->newTime > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
        || in->newTime < go.clock)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_ClockSet_newTime;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Can't modify the clock if NV is not available.
    RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;
    TimeClockUpdate(in->newTime);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ClockSet
```
29.3 TPM2_ClockRateAdjust

29.3.1 General Description

This command adjusts the rate of advance of Clock and Time to provide a better approximation to real time.

The rateAdjust value is relative to the current rate and not the nominal rate of advance.

EXAMPLE 1 If this command had been called three times with rateAdjust = TPM_CLOCK_COARSE_SLOWER and once with rateAdjust = TPM_CLOCK_COARSE_FASTER, the net effect will be as if the command had been called twice with rateAdjust = TPM_CLOCK_COARSE_SLOWER.

The range of adjustment shall be sufficient to allow Clock and Time to advance at real time but no more. If the requested adjustment would make the rate advance faster or slower than the nominal accuracy of the input frequency, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_VALUE.

EXAMPLE 2 If the frequency tolerance of the TPM's input clock is +/-10 percent, then the TPM will return TPM_RC_VALUE if the adjustment would make Clock run more than 10 percent faster or slower than nominal. That is, if the input oscillator were nominally 100 megahertz (MHz), then 1 millisecond (ms) would normally take 100,000 counts. The update Clock should be adjustable so that 1 ms is between 90,000 and 110,000 counts.

The interpretation of “fine” and “coarse” adjustments is implementation-specific.

The nominal rate of advance for Clock and Time shall be accurate to within 15 percent. That is, with no adjustment applied, Clock and Time shall be advanced at a rate within 15 percent of actual time.

NOTE If the adjustments are incorrect, it will be possible to make the difference between advance of Clock/Time and real time to be as much as 1.15 or ~1.33.

Changes to the current Clock update rate adjustment need not be persisted across TPM power cycles.
29.3.2 Command and Response

### Table 210 — TPM2 ClockRateAdjust Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ClockRateAdjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>@auth</td>
<td>TPM_RH_OWNER or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+{PP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Handle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CLOCK_ADJUST</td>
<td>rateAdjust</td>
<td>Adjustment to current Clock update rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 211 — TPM2 ClockRateAdjust Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ClockRateAdjust_fp.h"

#if CC_ClockRateAdjust  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
Tpm2_ClockRateAdjust(
    ClockRateAdjust_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Internal Data Update
    TimeSetAdjustRate(in->rateAdjust);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_ClockRateAdjust
```
30 Capability Commands

30.1 Introduction

The TPM has numerous values that indicate the state, capabilities, and properties of the TPM. These values are needed for proper management of the TPM. The TPM2_GetCapability() command is used to access these values.

TPM2_GetCapability() allows reporting of multiple values in a single call. The values are grouped according to type.

NOTE TPM2_TestParms() is used to determine if a TPM supports a particular combination of algorithm parameters.

30.2 TPM2_GetCapability

30.2.1 General Description

This command returns various information regarding the TPM and its current state.

The capability parameter determines the category of data returned. The property parameter selects the first value of the selected category to be returned. If there is no property that corresponds to the value of property, the next higher value is returned, if it exists.

EXAMPLE 1 The list of handles of transient objects currently loaded in the TPM may be read one at a time. On the first read, set the property to TRANSIENT_FIRST and propertyCount to one. If a transient object is present, the lowest numbered handle is returned and moreData will be YES if transient objects with higher handles are loaded. On the subsequent call, use returned handle value plus 1 in order to access the next higher handle.

The propertyCount parameter indicates the number of capabilities in the indicated group that are requested. The TPM will return no more than the number of requested values (propertyCount) or until the last property of the requested type has been returned.

NOTE 1 The type of the capability is derived from a combination of capability and property.

NOTE 2 If the property selects an unimplemented property, the next higher implemented property is returned.

When all of the properties of the requested type have been returned, the moreData parameter in the response will be set to NO. Otherwise, it will be set to YES.

NOTE 3 The moreData parameter will be YES if there are more properties even if the requested number of capabilities has been returned.

The TPM is not required to return more than one value at a time. It is not required to provide the same number of values in response to subsequent requests.

EXAMPLE 2 A TPM may return 4 properties in response to a TPM2_GetCapability( capability = TPM_CAP_TPMPROPERTY, property = TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER, propertyCount = 8 ) and for a latter request with the same parameters, the TPM may return as few as one and as many as 8 values.

When the TPM is in Failure mode, a TPM is required to allow use of this command for access of the following capabilities:
• TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER
• TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1
• TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2 (NOTE 4)
• TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3 (NOTE 4)
• TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4 (NOTE 4)
• TPM_PT_VENDOR_TPM_TYPE
• TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1
• TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2

NOTE 4 If the vendor string does not require one of these values, the property type does not need to exist.

A vendor may optionally allow the TPM to return other values.

If in Failure mode and a capability is requested that is not available in Failure mode, the TPM shall return no value.

EXAMPLE 3 Assume the TPM is in Failure mode and the TPM only supports reporting of the minimum required set of properties (the limited subset of TPML_TAGGED_TPM_PROPERTY values). If a TPM2_GetCapability is received requesting a capability that has a property type value greater than TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2, the TPM can return a zero length list with the moreData parameter set to NO or return the property TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2. If the property type is less than TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER, the TPM will return properties beginning with TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER.

In Failure mode, tag is required to be TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_FAILURE.

The capability categories and the types of the return values are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>capability</th>
<th>property</th>
<th>Return Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_ALGS</td>
<td>TPM_ALG_ID(1)</td>
<td>TPML_ALG_PROPERTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_HANDLES</td>
<td>TPM_HANDLE</td>
<td>TPML_HANDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_COMMANDS</td>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>TPML_CCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_PP_COMMANDS</td>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_AUDIT_COMMANDS</td>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>TPML_CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_PCRS</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>TPML_PCR_SELECTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES</td>
<td>TPM_PT</td>
<td>TPML_TAGGED_TPMPROPERTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_PCR_PROPERTIES</td>
<td>TPM_PT_PCR</td>
<td>TPML_TAGGED_PCR_PROPERTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_ECC_CURVES</td>
<td>TPM_ECC_CURVE(1)</td>
<td>TPML_ECC_CURVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_AUTH_POLICIES(3)</td>
<td>TPM_HANDLE(2)</td>
<td>TPML_TAGGED_POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_ACT(4)</td>
<td>TPM_HANDLE(2)</td>
<td>TPML_ACT_DATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP_VENDOR_PROPERTY</td>
<td>manufacturer specific</td>
<td>manufacturer-specific values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
(1) The TPM_ALG_ID or TPM_ECC_CURVE is cast to a UINT32
(2) The TPM will return TPM_RC_VALUE if the handle does not reference the range for permanent handles.
(3) TPM_CAP_AUTH_POLICIES was added in revision 01.32.
(4) TPM_CAP_ACT was added in revision 01.56.
- **TPM_CAP_ALGS** – Returns a list of TPMS_ALG_PROPERTIES. Each entry is an algorithm ID and a set of properties of the algorithm.

- **TPM_CAP_HANDLES** – Returns a list of all of the handles within the handle range of the property parameter. The range of the returned handles is determined by the handle type (the most-significant octet (MSO) of the property). Any of the defined handle types is allowed.

  **EXAMPLE 4**  
  If the MSO of property is TPM_HT_NV_INDEX, then the TPM will return a list of NV Index values.

  **EXAMPLE 5**  
  If the MSO of property is TPM_HT_PCR, then the TPM will return a list of PCR.

- For this capability, use of TPM_HT_LOADED_SESSION and TPM_HT_SAVED_SESSION is allowed. Requesting handles with a handle type of TPM_HT_LOADED_SESSION will return handles for loaded sessions. The returned handle values will have a handle type of either TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION or TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION. If saved sessions are requested, all returned values will have the TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION handle type because the TPM does not track the session type of saved sessions.

  **NOTE 5**  
  TPM_HT_LOADED_SESSION and TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION have the same value, as do TPM_HT_SAVED_SESSION and TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION. It is not possible to request that the TPM return a list of loaded HMAC sessions without including the policy sessions.

- **TPM_CAP_COMMANDS** – Returns a list of the command attributes for all of the commands implemented in the TPM, starting with the TPM_CC indicated by the property parameter. If vendor specific commands are implemented, the vendor-specific command attribute with the lowest commandIndex, is returned after the non-vendor-specific (base) command.

  **NOTE 6**  
  The type of the property parameter is a TPM_CC while the type of the returned list is TPML_CCA.

- **TPM_CAP_PP_COMMANDS** – Returns a list of all of the commands currently requiring Physical Presence for confirmation of platform authorization. The list will start with the TPM_CC indicated by property.

- **TPM_CAP_AUDIT_COMMANDS** – Returns a list of all of the commands currently set for command audit.

- **TPM_CAP_PCRS** – Returns the current allocation of PCR in a TPML_PCR_SELECTION. The property parameter shall be zero. The TPM will always respond to this command with the full PCR allocation and moreData will be NO.

  The TPML_PCR_SELECTION must include a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION for each PCR bank in which there is at least one allocated PCR. The TPML_PCR_SELECTION may return a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION for each implemented PCR bank. The TPML_PCR_SELECTION may return a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION for each implemented hash algorithm.

- **TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES** – Returns a list of tagged properties. The tag is a TPM_PT and the property is a 32-bit value. The properties are returned in groups. Each property group is on a 256-value boundary (that is, the boundary occurs when the TPM_PT is evenly divisible by 256). The TPM will only return values in the same group as the property parameter in the command.

- **TPM_CAP_PCR_PROPER-TRIES** – Returns a list of tagged PCR properties. The tag is a TPM_PT_PCR and the property is a TPMS_PCR_SELECT.

  The input command property is a TPM_PT_PCR (see TPM 2.0 Part 2 for PCR properties to be requested) that specifies the first property to be returned. If propertyCount is greater than 1, the list of properties begins with that property and proceeds in TPM_PT_PCR sequence.

  Each item in the list is a TPMS_PCR_SELECT structure that contains a bitmap of all PCR.

  **NOTE 7**  
  A PCR index in all banks (all hash algorithms) has the same properties, so the hash algorithm is not specified here.
• TPM_CAP_TPM_ECC_CURVES – Returns a list of ECC curve identifiers currently available for use in the TPM.

• TPM_CAP_AUTH_POLICIES - Returns a list of tagged policies reporting the authorization policies for the permanent handles.

• TPM_CAP_ACT – Returns a list of TPMS_ACT_DATA, each of which contains the handle for the ACT, the remaining time before it expires, and the ACT attributes.

The moreData parameter will have a value of YES if there are more values of the requested type that were not returned.

If no next capability exists, the TPM will return a zero-length list and moreData will have a value of NO.
### 30.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 212 — TPM2_GetCapability Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_GetCapability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CAP</td>
<td>capability</td>
<td>group selection; determines the format of the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>property</td>
<td>further definition of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>propertyCount</td>
<td>number of properties of the indicated type to return</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 213 — TPM2_GetCapability Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>moreData</td>
<td>flag to indicate if there are more values of this type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_CAPABILITY_DATA</td>
<td>capabilityData</td>
<td>the capability data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "GetCapability_fp.h"

#error CC_GetCapability  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HANDLE</td>
<td>value of <code>property</code> is in an unsupported handle range for the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_CAP_HANDLES capability value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>invalid <code>capability</code>; or <code>property</code> is not 0 for the TPM_CAP_PCRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capability value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_GetCapability(
    GetCapability_In    *in, // IN: input parameter list
    GetCapability_Out   *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    TPMU_CAPABILITIES   *data = &out->capabilityData.data;
    // Command Output
    // Set output `capability` type the same as input type
    out->capabilityData.capability = in->capability;
    switch(in->capability)
    {
        case TPM_CAP_ALGS:
        {
            out->moreData = AlgorithmCapGetImplemented((TPM_ALG_ID)in->property,
                in->propertyCount,
                &data->algorithms);
            break;
        } case TPM_CAP_HANDLES:
        {
            TPMU.HandleType   &data = HandleGetType((TPM_HANDLE)in->property);
            switch(data)
            {
                case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
                {
                    out->moreData = ObjectCapGetLoaded((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                        in->propertyCount,
                        &data->handles);
                    break;
                } case TPM_HT_PERSISTENT:
                {
                    out->moreData = NvCapGetPersistent((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                        in->propertyCount,
                        &data->handles);
                    break;
                } case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
                {
                    out->moreData = NvCapGetIndex((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                        in->propertyCount,
                        &data->handles);
                    break;
                } case TPM_HT_LOADED_SESSION:
                {
                    out->moreData = SessionCapGetLoaded((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                        in->propertyCount,
                        &data->handles);
                    break;
                } #ifdef TPM_HT_SAVED_SESSION
                case TPM_HT_SAVED_SESSION:
                {
                    out->moreData = SavedSessionCapGetLoaded((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                        in->propertyCount,
                        &data->handles);
                    break;
                } #endif
```

```c
```
#else
  case TPM_HT_ACTIVE_SESSION:
    // Get list of handles of
    out->moreData = SessionCapGetSaved((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                                         in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->handles);
    break;
  case TPM_HT_PCR:
    // Get list of handles of PCR
    out->moreData = PCRCapGetHandles((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                                      in->propertyCount,
                                      &data->handles);
    break;
  case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
    // Get list of permanent handles
    out->moreData = PermanentCapGetHandles((TPM_HANDLE)in->property,
                                              in->propertyCount,
                                              &data->handles);
    break;
  default:
    // Unsupported input handle type
    return TPM_RCS_HANDLE + RC_GetCapability_property;
    break;
  }
break;
  case TPM_CAP_COMMANDS:
    out->moreData = CommandCapGetCCList((TPM_CC)in->property,
                                         in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->command);
    break;
  case TPM_CAP_PP_COMMANDS:
    out->moreData = PhysicalPresenceCapGetCCList((TPM_CC)in->property,
                                                  in->propertyCount,
                                                  &data->ppCommands);
    break;
  case TPM_CAP_AUDIT_COMMANDS:
    out->moreData = CommandAuditCapGetCCList((TPM_CC)in->property,
                                               in->propertyCount,
                                               &data->auditCommands);
    break;
  case TPM_CAP_PCRS:
    // Input property must be 0
    if (in->property != 0)
      return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_GetCapability_property;
    out->moreData = PCRCapGetAllocation(in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->assignedPCR);
    break;
  case TPM_CAP_PCR_PROPERTIES:
    out->moreData = PCRCapGetProperties((TPM_PT_PCR)in->property,
                                         in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->pcrProperties);
    break;
  case TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES:
    out->moreData = TPMCapGetProperties((TPM_PT)in->property,
                                         in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->tpmProperties);
    break;
  #if ALG_ECC
  case TPM_CAP_ECC_CURVES:
    out->moreData = CryptCapGetECCCurve((TPM_ECC_CURVE)in->property,
                                         in->propertyCount,
                                         &data->eccCurves);
    break;
  #endif // ALG_ECC
  case TPM_CAP_AUTH_POLICIES:
if(醐GetHandleType((TMPT_HANDLE)in-p>roperty) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
    return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_GetCapability_property;
out-p>moreData = PermanentHandleGetPolicy((TMPT_HANDLE)in-p>roperty,
    in-p>ropertyCount,
    &data-p->authPolicies);
break;
case TPM_CAP_ACT:
    if(((TMPT_RH)in-p>roperty < TPM_RH_ACT_0)
        || ((TMPT_RH)in-p>roperty > TPM_RH_ACT_F))
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_GetCapability_property;
    out-p>moreData = ActGetCapabilityData((TMPT_HANDLE)in-p>roperty,
        in-p>ropertyCount,
        &data-p->actData);
break;
case TPM_CAP_VENDOR_PROPERTY:
    // vendor property is not implemented
    // Unsupported TPM_CAP value
    return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_GetCapability_capability;
    break;
} return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
#endif
30.3 TPM2_TestParms

30.3.1 General Description

This command is used to check to see if specific combinations of algorithm parameters are supported. The TPM will unmarshal the provided TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS. If the parameters unmarshal correctly, then the TPM will return TPM_RC_SUCCESS, indicating that the parameters are valid for the TPM. The TPM will return the appropriate unmarshaling error if a parameter is not valid.
30.3.2 Command and Response

Table 214 — TPM2_TestParms Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_TestParms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS</td>
<td>parameters</td>
<td>algorithm parameters to be validated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 215 — TPM2_TestParms Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "TestParms_fp.h"

#if CC_TestParms // Conditional expansion of this file
    TPM_RC
    TPM2_TestParms(
        TestParms_In  *in  // IN: input parameter list
    )
    {
        // Input parameter is not reference in command action
        NOT_REFERENCED(in);
        // The parameters are tested at unmarshal process. We do nothing in command
        // action
        return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    }
#endif // CC_TestParms
```
31 Non-volatile Storage

31.1 Introduction

The NV commands are used to create, update, read, and delete allocations of space in NV memory. Before an Index may be used, it must be defined (TPM2_NV_DefineSpace()).

An Index may be modified if the proper write authorization is provided or read if the proper read authorization is provided. Different controls are available for reading and writing.

An Index may have an Index-specific authValue and authPolicy. The authValue may be used to authorize reading if TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD is SET and writing if TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE is SET. The authPolicy may be used to authorize reading if TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD is SET and writing if TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE is SET.

For commands that have both authHandle and nvIndex parameters, authHandle can be an NV Index, Platform Authorization, or Owner Authorization. If authHandle is an NV Index, it must be the same as nvIndex (TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION).

TPMA_NV_PPREAD and TPMA_NV_PPWRITE indicate if reading or writing of the NV Index may be authorized by platformAuth or platformPolicy.

TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD and TPMA_NV.OwnerWRITE indicate if reading or writing of the NV Index may be authorized by ownerAuth or ownerPolicy.

If an operation on an NV index requires authorization, and the authHandle parameter is the handle of an NV Index, then the nvIndex parameter must have the same value or the TPM will return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION.

NOTE 1 This check ensures that the authorization that was provided is associated with the NV Index being authorized.

For creating an Index, Owner Authorization may not be used if shEnable is CLEAR and Platform Authorization may not be used if phEnableNV is CLEAR.

If an Index was defined using Platform Authorization, then that Index is not accessible when phEnableNV is CLEAR. If an Index was defined using Owner Authorization, then that Index is not accessible when shEnable is CLEAR.

For read access control, any combination of TPMA_NV_PPREAD, TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD, TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD, or TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD is allowed as long as at least one is SET.

For write access control, any combination of TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, TPMA_NV.AuthWRITE, or TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE is allowed as long as at least one is SET.

If an Index has been defined and not written, then any operation on the NV Index that requires read authorization will fail (TPM_RC_NV_INITIALIZED). This check may be made before or after other authorization checks but shall be performed before checking the NV Index authValue. An authorization failure due to the NV Index not having been written shall not be logged by the dictionary attack logic.

If TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR is SET, then the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN will be CLEAR on each TPM2_Startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR). TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR shall not be SET if the nvIndexType is TPM_NT_COUNTER.

The code in the "Detailed Actions" clause of each command is written to interface with an implementation-dependent library that allows access to NV memory. The actions assume no specific layout of the structure of the NV data.

Only one NV Index may be directly referenced in a command.

NOTE 2 This means that, if authHandle references an NV Index, then nvIndex will have the same value. However, this does not limit the number of changes that may occur as side effects. For example, any number of NV Indexes might be relocated as a result of deleting or adding a NV Index.
31.2 NV Counters

When an Index has the TPM_NT_COUNTER attribute, it behaves as a monotonic counter and may only be updated using TPM2_NV_Increment().

When an NV counter is created, the TPM shall initialize the 8-octet counter value with a number that is greater than any count value for any NV counter on the TPM since the time of TPM manufacture.

An NV counter may be defined with the TPMA_NV_ORDERLY attribute to indicate that the NV Index is expected to be modified at a high frequency and that the data is only required to persist when the TPM goes through an orderly shutdown process. The TPM may update the counter value in RAM and occasionally update the non-volatile version of the counter. An orderly shutdown is one occasion to update the non-volatile count. If the difference between the volatile and non-volatile version of the counter becomes as large as MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT, this shall be another occasion for updating the non-volatile count.

Before an NV counter can be used, the TPM shall validate that the count is not less than a previously reported value. If the TPMA_NV_ORDERLY attribute is not SET, or if the TPM experienced an orderly shutdown, then the count is assumed to be correct. If the TPMA_NV_ORDERLY attribute is SET, and the TPM shutdown was not orderly, then the TPM shall OR MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT to the contents of the non-volatile counter and set that as the current count.

NOTE 1 Because the TPM would have updated the NV Index if the difference between the count values was equal to MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT + 1, the highest value that could have been in the NV Index is MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT so it is safe to restore that value.

NOTE 2 The TPM is permitted to implement the RAM portion of the counter such that the effective value of the NV counter is the sum of both the volatile and non-volatile parts. If so, then the TPM may initialize the RAM version of the counter to MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT and no update of NV is necessary.

NOTE 3 When a new NV counter is created, the TPM can search all the counters to determine which has the highest value. In this search, the TPM would use the sum of the non-volatile and RAM portions of the counter. The RAM portion of the counter shall be properly initialized to reflect shutdown process (orderly or not) of the TPM.
31.3  TPM2_NV_DefineSpace

31.3.1  General Description

This command defines the attributes of an NV Index and causes the TPM to reserve space to hold the data associated with the NV Index. If a definition already exists at the NV Index, the TPM will return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED.

The TPM will return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if \texttt{nvIndexType} has a reserved value in \texttt{publicInfo}.

\textbf{NOTE 1}  It is not required that any of these three attributes be set.

The TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if TPMA_NV_WRITTEN, TPMA_NV_READLOCKED, or TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED is SET.

If \texttt{nvIndexType} is TPM_NT_COUNTER, TPM_NT_BITS, TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL, or TPM_NT_PIN_PASS, then \texttt{publicInfo->dataSize} shall be set to eight (8) or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

If \texttt{nvIndexType} is TPM_NT_EXTEND, then \texttt{publicInfo->dataSize} shall match the digest size of the \texttt{publicInfo.nameAlg} or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

\textbf{NOTE 2}  TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES could be returned by a TPM that is based on the reference code of older versions of the specification but the correct response for this error is TPM_RC_SIZE.

If the NV Index is an ordinary Index and \texttt{publicInfo->dataSize} is larger than supported by the TPM implementation then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_SIZE.

\textbf{NOTE 3}  The limit for the data size can vary according to the type of the index. For example, if the index has TPMA_NV_ORDERLY SET, then the maximum size of an ordinary NV Index may be less than the size of an ordinary NV Index that has TPMA_NV_ORDERLY CLEAR.

At least one of TPMA_NV_PPREAD, TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD, TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD, or TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD shall be SET or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

At least one of TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE, or TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE shall be SET or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR is SET, then \texttt{nvIndexType} shall not be TPM_NT_COUNTER or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If \texttt{platformAuth/platformPolicy} is used for authorization, then TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE shall be SET in \texttt{publicInfo}. If \texttt{ownerAuth/ownerPolicy} is used for authorization, TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE shall be CLEAR in \texttt{publicInfo}. If TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE is not set correctly for the authorization, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE is SET, then the authorization shall be with Platform Authorization or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If \texttt{nvIndexType} is TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL, then TPMA_NV_NO_DA shall be SET. Otherwise, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

\textbf{NOTE 4}  The intent of a PIN Fail index is that its DA protection is on a per-index basis, not based on the global DA protection. This avoids conflict over which type of dictionary attack protection is in use.

If \texttt{nvIndexType} is TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL or TPM_NT_PIN_PASS, then at least one of TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, or TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE shall be SET or the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE shall be CLEAR. Otherwise, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

\textbf{NOTE 5}  If TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE was SET for a PIN Pass index, a user knowing the authorization value could decrease pinCount or increase pinLimit, defeating the purpose of a PIN Pass index. The requirement is also enforced for a PIN Fail index for consistency.
If the implementation does not support TPM2_NV_Increment(), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if nvIndexType is TPM_NT_COUNTER.

If the implementation does not support TPM2_NV_SetBits(), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if nvIndexType is TPM_NT_BITS.

If the implementation does not support TPM2_NV_Extend(), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if nvIndexType is TPM_NT_EXTEND.

If the implementation does not support TPM2_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial(), the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES if TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE is SET.

After the successful completion of this command, the NV Index exists but TPMA_NV_WRITTEN will be CLEAR. Any access of the NV data will return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED.

In some implementations, an NV Index with the TPM_NT_COUNTER attribute may require special TPM resources that provide higher endurance than regular NV. For those implementations, if this command fails because of lack of resources, the TPM will return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE.

The value of auth is saved in the created structure. The size of auth is limited to be no larger than the size of the digest produced by the NV Index's nameAlg (TPM_RC_SIZE).
### 31.3.2 Command and Response

**Table 216 — TPM2_NV_DefineSpace Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_DefineSpace (NV)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TPM_RH_PROVISION      | @authHandle   | Auth Index: 1  
Auth Role: USER                                                          |
| TPM2B_AUTH            | auth          | the authorization value                                                    |
| TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC       | publicInfo    | the public parameters of the NV area                                        |

**Table 217 — TPM2_NV_DefineSpace Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detailed Actions

1. `#include "Tpm.h"
2. `#include "NV_DefineSpace_fp.h"
3. `#if CC_NV_DefineSpace // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>for authorizations using <code>TPM_RH_PLATFORM phEnable_NV</code> is clear preventing access to NV data in the platform hierarchy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>attributes of the index are not consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED</td>
<td>index already exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_SPACE</td>
<td>insufficient space for the index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>auth-&gt;size</code> or <code>publicInfo-&gt;authPolicy.size</code> is larger than the digest size of <code>publicInfo-&gt;nameAlg</code>; or <code>publicInfo-&gt;dataSize</code> is not consistent with <code>publicInfo-&gt;attributes</code> (this includes the case when the index is larger than a <code>MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE</code> but the <code>TPMA_NV_WRITEALL</code> attribute is <code>SET</code>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```
5  TPM_RC
6  TPM2_NV_DefineSpace(
7       NV_DefineSpace_In   *in // IN: input parameter list
8   )
9   {
10     TPMA_NV attributes = in->publicInfo.nvPublic.attributes;
11     UINT16 nameSize;
12     
13     nameSize = CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->publicInfo.nvPublic.nameAlg);
14   // Input Validation
15   // Checks not specific to type
16   // If the UndefineSpaceSpecial command is not implemented, then can't have
17   // an index that can only be deleted with policy
18   #if CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial == NO
19     if((ISATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICY_DELETE))
20        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
21     endif
22     // check that the authPolicy consistent with hash algorithm
23     if((in->publicInfo.nvPublic.authPolicy.t.size != 0
24        && in->publicInfo.nvPublic.authPolicy.t.size != nameSize)
25        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
26     // make sure that the authValue is not too large
27     if(MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&(in->auth)
28        > CryptHashGetDigestSize(in->publicInfo.nvPublic.nameAlg))
29        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_auth;
30     // If an index is being created by the owner and shEnable is
31     // clear, then we would not reach this point because ownerAuth
32     // can't be given when shEnable is CLEAR. However, if phEnable
33     // is SET but phEnableNV is CLEAR, we have to check here
34     if((in->authHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM && gc.phEnableNV == CLEAR)
35        return TPM_RCS_HIERARCHY + RC_NV_DefineSpace_authHandle;
36     // Attribute checks
```
// Eliminate the unsupported types
switch(GET_TPM_NT(attributes))
{
#if CC_NV_Increment == YES
  case TPM_NT_COUNTER:
#endif
#if CC_NV_SetBits == YES
  case TPM_NT_BITS:
#endif
#if CC_NV_Extend == YES
  case TPM_NT_EXTEND:
#endif
#if CC_PolicySecret == YES && defined TPM_NT_PIN_PASS
  case TPM_NT_PIN_PASS:
  case TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL:
#endif
  case TPM_NT_ORDINARY:
    break;
  default:
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
endif
}

// Check that the sizes are OK based on the type
switch(GET_TPM_NT(attributes))
{
  case TPM_NT_ORDINARY:
    // Can't exceed the allowed size for the implementation
    if((in->publicInfo.nvPublic.dataSize > MAX_NV_INDEX_SIZE)
      return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
    break;
  case TPM_NT_EXTEND:
    if((in->publicInfo.nvPublic.dataSize != nameSize)
      return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
    break;
  default:
    // Everything else needs a size of 8
    if((in->publicInfo.nvPublic.dataSize != 8)
      return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
    break;
}

// Handle other specifics
switch(GET_TPM_NT(attributes))
{
  case TPM_NT_COUNTER:
    // Counter can't have TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR SET (don't clear counters)
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, CLEAR_STCLEAR))
      return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
    break;
#ifdef TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL
  case TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL:
    // NV_NO_DA must be SET and AUTHWRITE must be CLEAR
    // NOTE: As with a PIN_PASS index, the authValue of the index is not
    // available until the index is written. If AUTHWRITE is the only way to
    // write then index, it could never be written. Rather than go through
    // all of the other possible ways to write the Index, it is simply
    // prohibited to write the index with the authValue. Other checks
    // below will insure that there seems to be a way to write the index
    // (i.e., with platform authorization, owner authorization,
    // or with policyAuth.)
    // It is not allowed to create a PIN Index that can't be modified.
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, NO_DA))
      return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
#endif
#ifdef TPM_NT_PIN_PASS
  case TPM_NT_PIN_PASS:
    // AUTHWRITE must be CLEAR (see note above to TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL)
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, AUTHWRITE)  
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, GLOBALLOCK)  
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEDEFINE))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
#endif  // this comes before break because PIN_FAIL falls through
break;
default:
    break;
}
// Locks may not be SET and written cannot be SET
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITTEN)  
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITELOCKED)  
    || IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, READLOCKED))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// There must be a way to read the index
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, OWNERREAD)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, PPREAD)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, AUTHREAD)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICYREAD))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// There must be a way to write the index
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, OWNERWRITE)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, PPWRITE)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, AUTHWRITE)  
    && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICYWRITE))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// An index with TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR can't have TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE SET
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, CLEAR_STCLEAR)  
    && IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEDEFINE))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// Make sure that the creator of the index can delete the index
if ((IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, PLATFORMCREATE)  
    && in->authHandle == TPM_RH_OWNER)  
    || ((IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, PLATFORMCREATE)  
        && in->authHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM))
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_authHandle;
// If TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE is SET, then the index must be defined by
// the platform
if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICY_DELETE)  
    && TPM_RH_PLATFORM != in->authHandle)
    return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// Make sure that the TPMA_NV_WRITEALL is not set if the index size is larger
// than the allowed NV buffer size.
if (in->publicInfo.nvPublic.dataSize > MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE  
    && IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEALL))
    return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_DefineSpace_publicInfo;
// And finally, see if the index is already defined.
if (NvIndexIsDefined(in->publicInfo.nvPublic.nvIndex))
    return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED;
// Internal Data Update
// define the space. A TPM_RC_NV_SPACE error may be returned at this point
return NvDefineIndex(&in->publicInfo.nvPublic, &in->auth);
31.4 TPM2_NV.UndefineSpace

31.4.1 General Description

This command removes an Index from the TPM.

If \textit{nvlIndex} is not defined, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE.

If \textit{nvlIndex} references an Index that has its TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION unless Platform Authorization is provided.

If \textit{nvlIndex} references an Index that has its TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE attribute SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

\textbf{NOTE}\hspace{1em}An Index with TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE CLEAR may be deleted with Platform Authorization as long as shEnable is SET. If shEnable is CLEAR, indexes created using Owner Authorization are not accessible even for deletion by the platform.
### Command and Response

#### Table 218 — TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV.UndefineSpace (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PROVISION</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>TPM_RH_OWNER or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+(PP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index to remove from NV space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 219 — TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 31.4.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV.UndefineSpace_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_UndefineSpace  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>TPM2_NV_POLICY_DELETE is SET in the Index referenced by nvIndex so this command may not be used to delete this Index (see TPM2_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial())</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>attempt to use ownerAuth to delete an index created by the platform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_NV.UndefineSpace(
    NV.UndefineSpace_In    *in  // IN: input parameter list
) {
    NV_REF           locator;
    NV_INDEX        *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    // Input Validation
    if (IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICY_DELETE))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV.UndefineSpace_nvIndex;
    // The owner may only delete an index that was defined with ownerAuth. The
    // platform may delete an index that was created with either authorization.
    if (in->authHandle == TPM_RH_OWNER
        && IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, PLATFORMCREATE))
        return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
    // Internal Data Update
    // Call implementation dependent internal routine to delete NV index
    return NvDeleteIndex(nvIndex, locator);
}
#endif  // CC_NV.UndefineSpace
```
31.5 TPM2_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial

31.5.1 General Description

This command allows removal of a platform-created NV Index that has TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE SET.

This command requires that the policy of the NV Index be satisfied before the NV Index may be deleted. Because administrative role is required, the policy must contain a command that sets the policy command code to TPM_CC_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial. This indicates that the policy that is being used is a policy that is for this command, and not a policy that would approve another use. That is, authority to use an entity does not grant authority to undefine the entity.

Since the index is deleted, the Empty Buffer is used as the authValue when generating the response HMAC.

If nvIndex is not defined, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_HANDLE.

If nvIndex references an Index that has its TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE or TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE attribute CLEAR, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

NOTE An Index with TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE CLEAR can be deleted with TPM2.UndefineSpace() as long as shEnable is SET. If shEnable is CLEAR, indexes created using Owner Authorization are not accessible even for deletion by the platform.
### 31.5.2 Command and Response

**Table 220 — TPM2_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>@nvIndex</td>
<td>Index to be deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PLATFORM</td>
<td>@platform</td>
<td>TPM_RH_PLATFORM + {PP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 221 — TPM2_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.5.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial_fp.h"
#include "SessionProcess_fp.h"

#if CC_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE is not SET in the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial(
  NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial_In *in   // IN: input parameter list
)
{
  TPM_RC result;
  NV_REF locator;
  NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
  // Input Validation
  if (!IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, POLICY_DELETE))
    return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial_nvIndex;
  // Internal Data Update
  result = NvDeleteIndex(nvIndex, locator);
  if (result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    SessionRemoveAssociationToHandle(in->nvIndex);
  return result;
}
#endif // CC_NV.UndefineSpaceSpecial
```
31.6 TPM2_NV_ReadPublic

31.6.1 General Description

This command is used to read the public area and Name of an NV Index. The public area of an Index is not privacy-sensitive and no authorization is required to read this data.
### 31.6.2 Command and Response

#### Table 222 — TPM2_NV_ReadPublic Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit or encrypt session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_ReadPublic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 223 — TPM2_NV_ReadPublic Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC</td>
<td>nvPublic</td>
<td>the public area of the NV Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>nvName</td>
<td>the Name of the nvIndex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.6.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_ReadPublic_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_ReadPublic    // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_ReadPublic(
    NV_ReadPublic_In *in,      // IN: input parameter list
    NV_ReadPublic_Out *out     // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, NULL);

    // Command Output
    out->nvPublic.nvPublic = nvIndex->publicArea;

    // Compute NV name
    NvGetIndexName(nvIndex, &out->nvName);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif    // CC_NV_ReadPublic
```
31.7  TPM2_NV_Write

31.7.1  General Description

This command writes a value to an area in NV memory that was previously defined by TPM2_NV_DefineSpace().

Proper authorizations are required for this command as determined by TPMA_NV_PPWRITE; TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE; TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE; and, if TPMA_NV_POLICY_WRITE is SET, the authPolicy of the NV Index.

If the TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED attribute of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

NOTE 1  If authorization sessions are present, they are checked before checks to see if writes to the NV Index are locked.

If nvIndexType is TPM_NT_COUNTER, TPM_NT_BITS or TPM_NT_EXTEND, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If offset and the size field of data add to a value that is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index referenced by nvIndex, the TPM shall return an error (TPM_RC_NV_RANGE). The implementation may return an error (TPM_RC_VALUE) if it performs an additional check and determines that offset is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index.

If the TPMA_NV_WRITEALL attribute of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE if the size of the data parameter of the command is not the same as the data field of the NV Index.

If all checks succeed, the TPM will merge the data.size octets of data.buffer value into the nvIndex→data starting at nvIndex→data[offset]. If the NV memory is implemented with a technology that has endurance limitations, the TPM shall check that the merged data is different from the current contents of the NV Index and only perform a write to NV memory if they differ.

After successful completion of this command, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN for the NV Index will be SET.

NOTE 2  Once SET, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN remains SET until the NV Index is undefined or the NV Index is cleared.
31.7.2 Command and Response

| Table 224 — TPM2_NV_Write Command |
| Type | Name | Description |
| TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG | tag | TPM_ST_SESSIONS |
| UINT32 | commandSize | |
| TPM_CC | commandCode | TPM_CC_NV_Write (NV) |
| TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH | @authHandle | handle indicating the source of the authorization value |
| | | Auth Index: 1 |
| | | Auth Role: USER |
| TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX | nvIndex | the NV Index of the area to write |
| | | Auth Index: None |
| TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER | data | the data to write |
| UINT16 | offset | the octet offset into the NV Area |

| Table 225 — TPM2_NV_Write Response |
| Type | Name | Description |
| TPM_ST | tag | see clause 6 |
| UINT32 | responseSize | |
| TPM_RC | responseCode | |
31.7.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_Write_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_Write  // Conditional expansion of this file

#include <Tpm.h>
#include <NV_Write_fp.h>

#define TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES
#define TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
#define TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
#define TPM_RC_NV_RANGE

enum TPM_RC {
    TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES,
    TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION,
    TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED,
    TPM_RC_NV_RANGE,
};

 TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_Write(
    NV_Write_In     *in   /* IN: input parameter list */
) {
    NV_INDEX        *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, NULL);
    TPMA_NV          attributes = nvIndex->publicArea.attributes;
    TPM_RC           result;

    // Input Validation
    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
    result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle,
        in->nvIndex,
        attributes);
    if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Bits index, extend index or counter index may not be updated by
    // TPM2_NV_Write
    if(IsNvCounterIndex(attributes)
        || IsNvBitsIndex(attributes)
        || IsNvExtendIndex(attributes))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;

    // Make sure that the offset is not too large
    if(in->offset > nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_NV_Write_offset;

    // Make sure that the selection is within the range of the Index
    if(in->data.t.size > (nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize - in->offset))
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;

    // If this index requires a full sized write, make sure that input range is
    // full sized.
    // Note: if the requested size is the same as the Index data size, then offset
    // will have to be zero. Otherwise, the range check above would have failed.
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEALL)
        && in->data.t.size < nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;

    // Input Validation
    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
    result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle,
        in->nvIndex,
        attributes);
    if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Bits index, extend index or counter index may not be updated by
    // TPM2_NV_Write
    if(IsNvCounterIndex(attributes)
        || IsNvBitsIndex(attributes)
        || IsNvExtendIndex(attributes))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;

    // Make sure that the offset is not too large
    if(in->offset > nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_NV_Write_offset;

    // Make sure that the selection is within the range of the Index
    if(in->data.t.size > (nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize - in->offset))
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;

    // If this index requires a full sized write, make sure that input range is
    // full sized.
    // Note: if the requested size is the same as the Index data size, then offset
    // will have to be zero. Otherwise, the range check above would have failed.
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEALL)
        && in->data.t.size < nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;
```

### Error Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>Index referenced by <code>nvIndex</code> has either TPMA_NV_BITS, TPMA_NV_COUNTER, or TPMA_NV_EVENT attribute SET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to write to the Index referenced by <code>nvIndex</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>Index referenced by <code>nvIndex</code> is write locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_RANGE</td>
<td>if TPMA_NV_WRITEALL is SET then the write is not the size of the Index referenced by <code>nvIndex</code>; otherwise, the write extends beyond the limits of the Index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Family “2.0”

TCG PUBLIC REVIEW

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47 // Internal Data Update
48 // Perform the write. This called routine will SET the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN
49 // attribute if it has not already been SET. If NV isn't available, an error
50 // will be returned.
51 return NvWriteIndexData(nvIndex, in->offset, in->data.t.size,
52                          in->data.t.buffer);
53 } // CC_NV_Write
31.8 TPM2_NV_Increment

31.8.1 General Description

This command is used to increment the value in an NV Index that has the TPM_NT_COUNTER attribute. The data value of the NV Index is incremented by one.

NOTE 1 The NV Index counter is an unsigned value.

If nvIndexType is not TPM_NT_COUNTER in the indicated NV Index, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED is SET, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

If TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is CLEAR, it will be SET.

If TPMA_NV_ORDERLY is SET, and the difference between the volatile and non-volatile versions of this field is greater than MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT, then the non-volatile version of the counter is updated.

NOTE 2 If a TPM implements TPMA_NV_ORDERLY and an Index is defined with TPMA_NV_ORDERLY and TPM_NT_COUNTER both SET, then in the Event of a non-orderly shutdown, the non-volatile value for the counter Index will be advanced by MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT at the next TPM2_Startup().

NOTE 3 An allowed implementation would keep a counter value in NV and a resettable counter in RAM. The reported value of the NV Index would be the sum of the two values. When the RAM count increments past the maximum allowed value (MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT), the non-volatile version of the count is updated with the sum of the values and the RAM count is reset to zero.
## 31.8.2 Command and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_Increment (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index to increment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.8.3 Detailed Actions

#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_Increment_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_Increment  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>NV index is not a counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>authorization failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>Index is write locked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_NV_Increment(
    NV_Increment_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC result;
    NV_REF locator;
    NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    UINT64 countValue;

    // Input Validation
    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
    result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle,
                                in->nvIndex,
                                nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Make sure that this is a counter
    if(!IsNvCounterIndex(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_Increment_nvIndex;

    // Internal Data Update
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITTEN))
        countValue = NvReadMaxCount();
    else
        // Read NV data in native format for TPM CPU.
        countValue = NvGetUINT64Data(nvIndex, locator);

    // Do the increment
    countValue++;

    // Write NV data back. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may
    // be returned at this point. If necessary, this function will set the
    // TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attribute
    result = NvWriteUINT64Data(nvIndex, countValue);
    if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        // If a counter just rolled over, then force the NV update.
        // Note, if this is an orderly counter, then the write-back needs to be
        // forced, for other counters, the write-back will happen anyway
        if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, ORDERLY)
        && (countValue & MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT) == 0 )
        {[

DRAFT
// Need to force an NV update of orderly data
SET_NV_UPDATE(UT_ORDERLY);
}
return result;
#endif // CC_NV_Increment
31.9 TPM2_NV_Extend

31.9.1 General Description

This command extends a value to an area in NV memory that was previously defined by TPM2_NV_DefineSpace.

If \( \text{nvIndexType} \) is not TPM_NT_EXTEND, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

Proper write authorizations are required for this command as determined by TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE, and the \text{authPolicy} of the NV Index.

After successful completion of this command, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN for the NV Index will be SET.

\textbf{NOTE 1} Once SET, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN remains SET until the NV Index is undefined, unless the TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR attribute is SET and a TPM Reset or TPM Restart occurs.

If the TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED attribute of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

\textbf{NOTE 2} If authorization sessions are present, they are checked before checks to see if writes to the NV Index are locked.

\textbf{NOTE 3} The \text{data.buffer} parameter does not have to be the defined size of the NV Index. It may be any size allowed by TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER.

The Index will be updated by:

\[ \text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{data}_{\text{new}} := \text{H}_{\text{nameAlg}}(\text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{data}_{\text{old}} || \text{data.buffer}) \]  

where

\( \text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{data}_{\text{new}} \) the value of the data field in the NV Index after the command returns

\( \text{H}_{\text{nameAlg}}() \) the hash algorithm indicated in \( \text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{nameAlg} \)

\( \text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{data}_{\text{old}} \) the value of the data field in the NV Index before the command is called

\( \text{data.buffer} \) the data buffer of the command parameter

\textbf{NOTE 3} If TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is CLEAR, then \( \text{nvlIndex} \rightarrow \text{data}_{\text{old}} \) is a Zero Digest.
### 31.9.2 Command and Response

#### Table 228 — TPM2_NV_Extend Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_Extend (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1 Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index to extend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER</td>
<td>data</td>
<td>the data to extend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 229 — TPM2_NV_Extend Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 31.9.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_Extend_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_Extend  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>the TPMA_NV_EXTEND attribute is not SET in the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to write to the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>the Index referenced by nvIndex is locked for writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

```c
TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_Extend(
    NV_Extend_In    *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC                  result;
    NV_REF                  locator;
    NV_INDEX                *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    TPM2B_DIGEST            oldDigest;
    TPM2B_DIGEST            newDigest;
    HASH_STATE              hashState;
    // Input Validation
    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM RC NV_LOCKED
    result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex, nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;
    // Make sure that this is an extend index
    if(!IsNvExtendIndex(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_Extend_nvIndex;
    // Internal Data Update
    // Perform the write.
    oldDigest.t.size = CryptHashGetDigestSize(nvIndex->publicArea.nameAlg);
    pAssert(oldDigest.t.size <= sizeof(oldDigest.t.buffer));
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITTEN))
        {
            NvGetIndexData(nvIndex, locator, 0, oldDigest.t.size, oldDigest.t.buffer);
        }
    else
    {
        MemorySet(oldDigest.t.buffer, 0, oldDigest.t.size);
    }
    // Start hash
    newDigest.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, nvIndex->publicArea.nameAlg);
    // Adding old digest
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &oldDigest.b);
```
50     // Adding new data
51     CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->data.b);
52
53     // Complete hash
54     CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &newDigest.b);
55
56     // Write extended hash back.
57     // Note, this routine will SET the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attribute if necessary
58     return NvWriteIndexData(nvIndex, 0, newDigest.t.size, newDigest.t.buffer);
59 } // CC_NV_Extend
60 #endif
31.10  TPM2_NV_SetBits

31.10.1  General Description

This command is used to SET bits in an NV Index that was created as a bit field. Any number of bits from 0 to 64 may be SET. The contents of bits are ORed with the current contents of the NV Index.

If TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is not SET, then, for the purposes of this command, the NV Index is considered to contain all zero bits and data is ORed with that value.

If TPM_NT_BITS is not SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

After successful completion of this command, TPMA_NV_WRITTEN for the NV Index will be SET.

NOTE TPMA_NV_WRITTEN will be SET even if no bits were SET.
### 31.10.2 Command and Response

#### Table 230 — TPM2_NV_SetBits Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_SetBits (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>NV Index of the area in which the bit is to be set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT64</td>
<td>bits</td>
<td>the data to OR with the current contents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 231 — TPM2_NV_SetBits Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 31.10.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_SetBits_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_SetBits  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>the TPMA_NV_BITS attribute is not SET in the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to write to the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>the Index referenced by nvIndex is locked for writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

static TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_SetBits(
    NV_SetBits_In   *in   // IN: input parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC           result;
    NV_REF           locator;
    NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    UINT64           oldValue;
    UINT64           newValue;

    // Input Validation
    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
    result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex, nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // Make sure that this is a bit field
    if(!IsNvBitsIndex(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes))
        return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_SetBits_nvIndex;

    // If index is not been written, initialize it
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes, TPMA_NV, WRITTEN))
        oldValue = 0;
    else
        // Read index data
        oldValue = NvGetUINT64Data(nvIndex, locator);

    // Figure out what the new value is going to be
    newValue = oldValue | in->bits;

    // Internal Data Update
    return NvWriteUINT64Data(nvIndex, newValue);
}
#endif  // CC_NV_SetBits
```
31.11 TPM2_NV_WriteLock

31.11.1 General Description

If the TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE or TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR attributes of an NV location are SET, then this command may be used to inhibit further writes of the NV Index.

Proper write authorization is required for this command as determined by TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE, and the authPolicy of the NV Index.

It is not an error if TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED for the NV Index is already SET.

If neither TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE nor TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES.

If the command is properly authorized and TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR or TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE is SET, then the TPM shall SET TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED for the NV Index. TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED will be clear on the next TPM2_Startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR) if either TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE is CLEAR or TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is CLEAR.
### 31.11.2 Command and Response

**Table 232 — TPM2_NV_WriteLock Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_WriteLock (NV) handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index of the area to lock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 233 — TPM2_NV_WriteLock Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.11.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_WriteLock_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_WriteLock // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>neither TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE nor TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR is SET in Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to write to the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_NV_WriteLock(
  NV_WriteLock_In *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
  TPM_RC          result;
  NV_REF          locator;
  NV_INDEX        *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
  TPMA_NV        nvAttributes = nvIndex->publicArea.attributes;

  // Input Validation:
  // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
  // or TPM RC_NV_UNLOCKED
  result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex, nvAttributes);
  if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
  {
    if (result == TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION)
    {
      return result;
    // If write access failed because the index is already locked, then it is
    // no error.
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
    }
    // if neither TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE nor TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR is set, the index
    // can not be write-locked
    if (!IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvAttributes, TPMA_NV, WRITEDEFINE)
     && !IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvAttributes, TPMA_NV, WRITE_STCLEAR))
    {
      return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_WriteLock_nvIndex;
    // Internal Data Update
    // Set the WRITELOCK attribute.
    // Note: if TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED were already SET, then the write access check
    // above would have failed and this code isn't executed.
    SET_ATTRIBUTE(nvAttributes, TPMA_NV, WRITELOCKED);
    
    // Write index info back
    return NvWriteIndexAttributes(nvIndex->publicArea.nvIndex, locator,
     nvAttributes);
  }
  #endif // CC_NV_WriteLock

```

```
```
31.12 TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock

31.12.1 General Description

The command will SET TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED for all indexes that have their TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK attribute SET.

If an Index has both TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK and TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE SET, then this command will permanently lock the NV Index for writing unless TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is CLEAR.

NOTE: If an Index is defined with TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK SET, then the global lock does not apply until the next time this command is executed.

This command requires either platformAuth/platformPolicy or ownerAuth/ownerPolicy.
31.12.2 Command and Response

### Table 234 — TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_PROVISION</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>Auth Index: 1&lt;br&gt;Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TPM_RH_OWNER or TPM_RH_PLATFORM+(PP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 235 — TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.12.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_GlobalWriteLock_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock(
    NV_GlobalWriteLock_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    // Input parameter (the authorization handle) is not reference in command action.
    NOT_REFERENCED(in);

    // Internal Data Update
    // Implementation dependent method of setting the global lock
    return NvSetGlobalLock();
}
#endif // CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock
```
31.13 TPM2_NV_Read

31.13.1 General Description

This command reads a value from an area in NV memory previously defined by TPM2_NV_DefineSpace().

Proper authorizations are required for this command as determined by TPMA_NV_PPREAD, TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD, TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD, and the authPolicy of the NV Index.

If TPMA_NV_READLOCKED of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED.

If offset and the size field of data add to a value that is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index referenced by nvIndex, the TPM shall return an error (TPM_RC_NV_RANGE). The implementation may return an error (TPM_RC_VALUE) if it performs an additional check and determines that offset is greater than the dataSize field of the NV Index.

For an NV Index with the TPM_NT_COUNTER or TPM_NT_BITS attribute SET, the TPM may ignore the offset parameter and use an offset of 0. Therefore, it is recommended that the caller set the offset parameter to 0 for interoperability.

NOTE 1 If authorization sessions are present, they are checked before the read-lock status of the NV Index is checked.

If the NV Index has been defined but the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attribute is CLEAR, then this command shall return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED even if size is zero.

The data parameter in the response may be encrypted using parameter encryption.
31.13.2 Command and Response

Table 236 — TPM2_NV_Read Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>the handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index to be read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>size</td>
<td>number of octets to read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>offset</td>
<td>octet offset into the NV area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td>This value shall be less than or equal to the size of the nvIndex data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 237 — TPM2_NV_Read Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER</td>
<td>data</td>
<td>the data read</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.13.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_Read_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_Read // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to read from the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED</td>
<td>the Index referenced by nvIndex is read locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_RANGE</td>
<td>read range defined by size and offset is outside the range of the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED</td>
<td>the Index referenced by nvIndex has not been initialized (written)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>the read size is larger than the MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC_NV_Read
TPM2_NV_Read(
    NV_Read_In *in,       // IN: input parameter list
    NV_Read_Out *out      // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    NV_REF locator;
    NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    TPM_RC result;

    // Input Validation
    // Common read access checks. NvReadAccessChecks() may return
    TPM_RC_V AUTHORIZATION, TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED, or TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED
    result = NvReadAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex,
        nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
    {
        return result;
    }

    // Make sure the data will fit the return buffer
    if(in->size > MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE)
    {
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_NV_Read_size;
    }

    // Verify that the offset is not too large
    if(in->offset > nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
    {
        return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_NV_Read_offset;
    }

    // Make sure that the selection is within the range of the Index
    if(in->size > (nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize - in->offset))
    {
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;
    }

    // Command Output
    // Set the return size
    out->data.t.size = in->size;
    if(out->data.t.size > MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE)
    {
        return TPM_RC_VALUE;
    }

    // Perform the read
    NvGetIndexData(nvIndex, locator, in->offset, in->size, out->data.t.buffer);

    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_NV_Read
```

Error Return | Meaning
-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------
TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION | the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to read from the Index referenced by nvIndex
TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED | the Index referenced by nvIndex is read locked
TPM_RC_NV_RANGE | read range defined by size and offset is outside the range of the Index referenced by nvIndex
TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED | the Index referenced by nvIndex has not been initialized (written)
TPM_RC_VALUE | the read size is larger than the MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE
31.14 TPM2_NV_ReadLock

31.14.1 General Description

If TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR is SET in an Index, then this command may be used to prevent further reads of the NV Index until the next TPM2_Startup (TPM_SU_CLEAR).

Proper authorizations are required for this command as determined by TPMA_NV_PPREAD, TPMA_NVOWNERREAD, TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD, and the authPolicy of the NV Index.

NOTE Only an entity that may read an Index is allowed to lock the NV Index for read.

If the command is properly authorized and TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR of the NV Index is SET, then the TPM shall SET TPMA_NV_READLOCKED for the NV Index. If TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR of the NV Index is CLEAR, then the TPM shall return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES. TPMA_NV_READLOCKED will be CLEAR by the next TPM2_Startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR).

It is not an error to use this command for an Index that is already locked for reading.

An Index that had not been written may be locked for reading.
### 31.14.2 Command and Response

**Table 238 — TPM2_NV_ReadLock Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_ReadLock (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>the handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: 1 Auth Role: USER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>the NV Index to be locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 239 — TPM2_NV_ReadLock Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.14.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV ReadLock_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_ReadLock // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR is not SET so Index referenced by nvIndex may not be write locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION</td>
<td>the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to read from the Index referenced by nvIndex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_ReadLock(
    NV_ReadLock_In  *in // IN: input parameter list
)
{
    TPM_RC           result;
    NV_REF           locator;
    // The referenced index has been checked multiple times before this is called
    // so it must be present and will be loaded into cache
    NV_INDEX         *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    TPMA_NV          nvAttributes = nvIndex->publicArea.attributes;

    // Input Validation
    // Common read access checks. NvReadAccessChecks() may return
    // TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION, TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED, or TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED
    result = NvReadAccessChecks(in->authHandle, 
        in->nvIndex, 
        nvAttributes);
    if(result == TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION)
        return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
    else if(result == TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED)
        return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;

    // If NvReadAccessChecks return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED, then continue.
    // It is not an error to read lock an uninitialized Index.
    // if TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR is not set, the index can not be read-locked
    if(!IS_ATTRIBUTE(nvAttributes, TPMA_NV, READ_STCLEAR))
        return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_NV_ReadLock_nvIndex;

    // Internal Data Update
    SET_ATTRIBUTE(nvAttributes, TPMA_NV, READLOCKED);
    // Write NV info back
    return NvWriteIndexAttributes(nvIndex->publicArea.nvIndex, 
        locator, 
        nvAttributes);
}
#endif // CC_NV_ReadLock
```
31.15 TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth

31.15.1 General Description

This command allows the authorization secret for an NV Index to be changed.

If successful, the authorization secret \((authValue)\) of the NV Index associated with \(nvIndex\) is changed.

This command requires that a policy session be used for authorization of \(nvIndex\) so that the ADMIN role may be asserted and that \(commandCode\) in the policy session context shall be TPM_CC_NV_ChangeAuth. That is, the policy must contain a specific authorization for changing the authorization value of the referenced entity.

NOTE The reason for this restriction is to ensure that the administrative actions on \(nvIndex\) require explicit approval while other commands may use policy that is not command-dependent.

The size of the \(newAuth\) value may be no larger than the size of the digest produced by the \(nameAlg\) of the NV Index.

Since the NV Index authorization is changed before the response HMAC is calculated, the newAuth value is used when generating the response HMAC key if required. See TPM 2.0 Part 4 ComputeResponseHMAC().
### 31.15.2 Command and Response

#### Table 240 — TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_ChangeAuth (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>@nvIndex</td>
<td>handle of the entity Auth Index: 1, Auth Role: ADMIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_AUTH</td>
<td>newAuth</td>
<td>new authorization value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 241 — TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.15.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "NV_ChangeAuth_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_ChangeAuth  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td><code>newAuth</code> size is larger than the digest size of the Name algorithm for the Index referenced by <code>nvIndex</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth (NV_ChangeAuth_In *in) // IN: input parameter list
{
    NV_REF              locator;
    NV_INDEX            *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);

    // Input Validation
    if (MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&in->newAuth) > CryptHashGetDigestSize(nvIndex->publicArea.nameAlg))
        return TPM_RCS_SIZE + RC_NV_ChangeAuth_newAuth;

    // Internal Data Update
    // Change authValue
    return NvWriteIndexAuth(locator, &in->newAuth);
}
#endif // CC_NV_ChangeAuth
```
31.16 TPM2_NV_Certify

31.16.1 General Description

The purpose of this command is to certify the contents of an NV Index or portion of an NV Index.

If the `sign` attribute is not SET in the key referenced by `signHandle` then the TPM shall return `TPM_RC_KEY`.

If the NV Index has been defined but the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN attribute is CLEAR, then this command shall return `TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED` even if `size` is zero.

If proper authorization for reading the NV Index is provided, the portion of the NV Index selected by `size` and `offset` are included in an attestation block and signed using the key indicated by `signHandle`. The attestation includes `size` and `offset` so that the range of the data can be determined. It also includes the NV index Name.

For an NV Index with the TPM_NT_COUNTER or TPM_NT_BITS attribute SET, the TPM may ignore the `offset` parameter and use an offset of 0. Therefore, it is recommended that the caller set the `offset` parameter to 0 for interoperability.

If `offset` and `size` add to a value that is greater than the `dataSize` field of the NV Index referenced by `nvIndex`, the TPM shall return an error (`TPM_RC_NV_RANGE`). The implementation may return an error (`TPM_RC_VALUE`) if it performs an additional check and determines that `offset` is greater than the `dataSize` field of the NV Index, or if `size` is greater than `MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE`.

NOTE 1 See 18.1 for description of how the signing scheme is selected.

NOTE 2 If `signHandle` is TPM_RH_NULL, the TPMS_ATTEST structure is returned and `signature` is a NULL Signature.

If `size` and `offset` are both zero (0), then `certifyInfo` in the response will contain a TPMS_NV_DIGEST_CERTIFY_INFO, otherwise, it will contain a TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO. The digest in the TPMS_NV_DIGEST_CERTIFY_INFO is created using the digest of the selected signing scheme.

NOTE 3 TPMS_NV_DIGEST_CERTIFY_INFO was added in revision 01.53. It permits TPM2_NV_Certify() to certify NV Index contents that are larger than `MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE`.


### 31.16.2 Command and Response

**Table 242 — TPM2_NV_Certify Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_NV_Certify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT+</td>
<td>@signHandle</td>
<td>handle of the key used to sign the attestation structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>handle indicating the source of the authorization value for the NV Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX</td>
<td>nvIndex</td>
<td>Index for the area to be certified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>qualifyingData</td>
<td>user-provided qualifying data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIG_SCHEME+</td>
<td>inScheme</td>
<td>signing scheme to use if the scheme for signHandle is TPM_ALG_NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>size</td>
<td>number of octets to certify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT16</td>
<td>offset</td>
<td>octet offset into the NV area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This value shall be less than or equal to the size of the nvIndex data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 243 — TPM2_NV_Certify Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_ATTEST</td>
<td>certifyInfo</td>
<td>the structure that was signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMT_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>the asymmetric signature over certifyInfo using the key referenced by signHandle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31.16.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
#include "NV_Certify_fp.h"

#if CC_NV_Certify // Conditional expansion of this file

Error Return | Meaning
-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------
TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION | the authorization was valid but the authorizing entity (authHandle) is not allowed to read from the Index referenced by nvIndex
TPM_RC_KEY | signHandle does not reference a signing key
TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED | Index referenced by nvIndex is locked for reading
TPM_RC_NV_RANGE | offset plus size extends outside of the data range of the Index referenced by nvIndex
TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED | Index referenced by nvIndex has not been written
TPM_RC_SCHEME | inScheme is not an allowed value for the key definition

TPM_RC

TPM2_NV_Certify(
    NV_Certify_In   *in, // IN: input parameter list
    NV_Certify_Out  *out // OUT: output parameter list
) {
    TPM_RC                   result;
    NV_REF                   locator;
    NV_INDEX                *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(in->nvIndex, &locator);
    TPMS_ATTEST              certifyInfo;
    OBJECT                  *signObject = HandleToObject(in->signHandle);

    // Input Validation
    if(!IsSigningObject(signObject))
        return TPM_RCS_KEY + RC_NV_Certify_signHandle;
    if(!CryptSelectSignScheme(signObject, &in->inScheme))
        return TPM_RCS_SCHEME + RC_NV_Certify_inScheme;

    // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION
    // or TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED
    result = NvReadAccessChecks(in->authHandle, in->nvIndex, nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
    if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
        return result;

    // make sure that the selection is within the range of the Index (cast to avoid
    // any wrap issues with addition)
    if((UINT32)in->size + (UINT32)in->offset > (UINT32)nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize)
        return TPM_RC_NV_RANGE;

    // Make sure the data will fit the return buffer.
    // NOTE: This check may be modified if the output buffer will not hold the
    // maximum sized NV buffer as part of the certified data. The difference in
    // size could be substantial if the signature scheme was produced a large
    // signature (e.g., RSA 4096).
    if(in->size > MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE)
        return TPM_RCS_VALUE + RC_NV_Certify_size;

    // Command Output
    // Fill in attest information common fields
```
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FillInAttestInfo(in->signHandle, &in->inScheme, &in->qualifyingData, &certifyInfo);

// Get the name of the index
NvGetIndexName(nvIndex, &certifyInfo.attested.nv.indexName);

// See if this is old format or new format
if ((in->size != 0) || (in->offset != 0)) {
    // NV certify specific fields
    // Attestation type
    certifyInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV;

    // Set the return size
    certifyInfo.attested.nv.nvContents.t.size = in->size;

    // Set the offset
    certifyInfo.attested.nv.offset = in->offset;

    // Perform the read
    NvGetIndexData(nvIndex, locator, in->offset, in->size, certifyInfo.attested.nv.nvContents.t.buffer);
} else {
    HASH_STATE hashState;
    // This is to sign a digest of the data
    certifyInfo.type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV_DIGEST;

    // Initialize the hash before calling the function to add the Index data to
    // the hash.
    certifyInfo.attested.nvDigest.nvDigest.t.size =
        CryptHashStart(&hashState, in->inScheme.details.any.hashAlg);
    NvHashIndexData(&hashState, nvIndex, locator, 0, nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize);
    CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &certifyInfo.attested.nvDigest.nvDigest.b);
}

// Sign attestation structure. A NULL signature will be returned if
// signObject is NULL.
return SignAttestInfo(signObject, &in->inScheme, &certifyInfo,
        &in->qualifyingData, &out->certifyInfo, &out->signature);
#endif // CC_NV_Certify
32 Attached Components

32.1 Introduction

Clause 1 contains commands that allow interaction with an Attached Component (AC).

NOTE The Attached Component feature was added in revision 01.40.
32.2 TPM2_AC_GetCapability

32.2.1 General Description

The purpose of this command is to obtain information about an Attached Component referenced by an AC handle.

The returned list contains 0 or more values starting at the first tagged value that is equal to or greater than capability.

The list returned in capabilitiesData contains tagged values that indicate the type of the value.

The TPM will return the lesser of a) the available values, b) the number requested in count, or c) the number that will fit within the available response buffer. If additional values with higher capability numbers are available, moreData will be YES.

NOTE TPM2_AC_GetCapability() was added in revision 01.40.
### 32.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 244 — TPM2_AC_GetCapability Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_AC_GetCapability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_AC</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>handle indicating the Attached Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_AT</td>
<td>capability</td>
<td>starting info type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>count</td>
<td>maximum number of values to return</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 245 — TPM2_AC_GetCapability Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>moreData</td>
<td>flag to indicate whether there are more values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPML_AC_CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>capabilitiesData</td>
<td>list of capabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
32.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "AC_GetCapability_fp.h"
#include "AC_spt_fp.h"

#if CC_AC_GetCapability  // Conditional expansion of this file

TPM_RC
TPM2_AC_GetCapability(
    AC_GetCapability_In  *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    AC_GetCapability_Out *out   // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    // Command Output
    out->moreData = AcCapabilitiesGet(in->ac, in->count, &out->capabilitiesData);
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif  // CC_AC_GetCapability
```
32.3  TPM2_AC_Send

32.3.1  General Description

The purpose of this command is to send (copy) a loaded object from the TPM to an Attached Component. The Object referenced by sendObject is required to have fixedTpm, fixedParent, and encryptedDuplication attributes CLEAR (TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES). Authorization for sendObject is required to be a policy session. The policySession→commandCode of the policy session context is required to be TPM_CC_AC_Send (TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL) to demonstrate that the policy is specific for this command.

Authorization to send to the ac is provided by the session associated with authHandle.

If an NV Alias is not defined for ac, then authHandle is required to be either TPM_RH_OWNER or TPM_RH_PLATFORM (TPM_RC_HANDLE).

If an NV Alias is defined for ac, then the authorization for authHandle is required to be compatible with the write authorization attributes (TPMA_NV_PPWRITE, TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE, TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE, and TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE) in the NV Alias (TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION).

NOTE 1  If authorization for authHandle is the handle of an NV Index, then it is required to be the NV Alias value for ac (TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION).

If authorization succeeds, the TPM will attempt to send acDataIn and relevant portions of sendObject to the AC referenced by ac.

The TPM will return TPM_RC_SUCCESS if it succeeds in performing all the required authorizations and validations. If problems occur in the process of sending the object from the TPM to the AC, the response code will be TPM_RC_SUCCESS with the AC-dependent error reported in acDataOut.

NOTE 2  TPM2_AC_Send() was added in revision 01.40.
### 32.3.2 Command and Response

**Table 246 — TPM2_AC_Send Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_AC_Send</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_DH_OBJECT</td>
<td>@sendObject</td>
<td>handle of the object being sent to ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: DUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH</td>
<td>@authHandle</td>
<td>the handle indicating the source of the authorization value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_AC</td>
<td>ac</td>
<td>handle indicating the Attached Component to which the object will be sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER</td>
<td>acDataIn</td>
<td>Optional non sensitive information related to the object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 247 — TPM2_AC_Send Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMS_AC_OUTPUT</td>
<td>acDataOut</td>
<td>May include AC specific data or information about an error.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 32.3.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "AC_Send_fp.h"
#include "AC_spt_fp.h"

#if CC_AC_Send  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td>key to duplicate has fixedParent SET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HASH</td>
<td>for an RSA key, the nameAlg digest size for the newParent is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compatible with the key size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_HIERARCHY</td>
<td>encryptedDuplication is SET and newParentHandle specifies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Null Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_KEY</td>
<td>newParentHandle references invalid ECC key (public point not on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>curve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SIZE</td>
<td>input encryption key size does not match the size specified in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>symmetric algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC</td>
<td>encryptedDuplication is SET but no symmetric algorithm is provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_TYPE</td>
<td>newParentHandle is neither a storage key nor TPM_RH_NULL; or the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>has a NULL nameAlg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>for an RSA newParent, the sizes of the digest and the encryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>are too large to be OAEP encoded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c

```c
TPM_RC

TPM2_AC_Send(
    AC_Send_In *in,  // IN: input parameter list
    AC_Send_Out *out  // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    NV_REF    locator;
    TPM_HANDLE nvAlias = ((in->ac - AC_FIRST) + NV_AC_FIRST);
    NV_INDEX  *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(nvAlias, &locator);
    OBJECT    *object = HandleToObject(in->sendObject);
    TPM_RC    result;

    // Input validation
    // If there is an NV alias, then the index must allow the authorization provided
    if(nvIndex != NULL)
    {
        // Common access checks, NvWriteAccessCheck() may return
        // TPM_RC_NV AUTHORIZATION or TPM_RC_NV LOCKED
        result = NvWriteAccessChecks(in->authHandle, nvAlias,
                                      nvIndex->publicArea.attributes);
        if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
            return result;
    }
    else if(HandleGetType(in->authHandle) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
    {
        return TPM_RC_HANDLE + RC_AC_Send_authHandle;
    }

    // Make sure that the object to be duplicated has the right attributes
    if(IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes,
                        TPMA_OBJECT, encryptedDuplication)
```
|| IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedParent)
  || IS_ATTRIBUTE(object->publicArea.objectAttributes, TPMA_OBJECT, fixedTPM))
  return TPM_RCS_ATTRIBUTES + RC_AC_Send_sendObject;
// Command output
  // Do the implementation dependent send
  return AcSendObject(in->ac, object, &out->acDataOut);
}
#endif // TPM_CC_AC_Send
32.4 TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect

32.4.1 General Description

This command allows qualification of the sending (copying) of an Object to an Attached Component (AC). Qualification includes selection of the receiving AC and the method of authentication for the AC, and, in certain circumstances, the Object to be sent may be specified.

If this command is not used in conjunction with TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(), then only the authHandleName and acName are selected and includeObject should be CLEAR.

NOTE 1 In the absence of TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(), a policy session cannot create a policyDigest that simultaneously equals the authPolicy in an Object and names that Object. This is because the authPolicy recorded in an Object is unable to include the Name of the Object as the Name of an Object depends on the Object’s authPolicy.

NOTE 2 An object’s authPolicy can incorporate the use of TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(). If the authorizing entity for the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() command specifies only the ac and the authHandle, then the resultant policyDigest may be applied to the sending of any number of Objects. If the authorizing entity for the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize() specifies also the Name of the Object to be sent, then the resultant policyDigest applies only to that specific Object.

If either policySession→cpHash or policySession→nameHash has been previously set, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_CPHASH. Otherwise, policySession→nameHash will be set to:

\[ \text{nameHash} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(|\text{objectName}|\text{authHandleName}|\text{acName}) \]  

(42)

NOTE 3 A policy cannot specify both cpHash and nameHash because policySession→nameHash and policySession→cpHash may share the same memory space.

If the command succeeds, policySession→policyDigest will be updated according to the setting of the input parameter includeObject. If includeObject is SET, policySession→policyDigest is updated by:

\[ \text{policyDigest}_{new} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{old}||\text{TPM_CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect}||\text{objectName}||\text{authHandleName}||\text{acName}||\text{includeObject}) \]  

(43)

but if includeObject is CLEAR, policySession→policyDigest is updated by:

\[ \text{policyDigest}_{new} := H_{\text{policyAlg}}(\text{policyDigest}_{old}||\text{TPM_CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect}||\text{authHandleName}||\text{acName}||\text{includeObject}) \]  

(44)

NOTE 4 policySession→nameHash receives the digest of all Names so that the check performed in TPM2_AC_Send() may be the same regardless of which Names are included in policySession→policyDigest. This means that, when TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect() is executed, it is only valid for a specific triple of objectName, authHandleName, and acName.

If the command succeeds, policySession→commandCode is set to TPM_CC_AC_Send.

NOTE 5 The normal use of TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect() is before a TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(). An authorized entity would approve a policyDigest that allows sending to a specific Attached Component. The authorizing entity may want to limit the authorization so that the approval allows only a specific Object to be sent to the Attached Component. In that case, the authorizing entity would approve the policyDigest of equation (44).

NOTE 6 TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect() was added in revision 01.40.
### 32.4.2 Command and Response

#### Table 248 — TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_SH_POLICY</td>
<td>policySession</td>
<td>handle for the policy session being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>objectName</td>
<td>the Name of the Object to be sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>authHandleName</td>
<td>the Name associated with authHandle used in the TPM2_AC_Send() command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_NAME</td>
<td>acName</td>
<td>the Name of the Attached Component to which the Object will be sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_YES_NO</td>
<td>includeObject</td>
<td>if SET, objectName will be included in the value in policySession→policyDigest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 249 — TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "Policy_AC_SendSelect_fp.h"

#if CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE</td>
<td>commandCode of policySession is not empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_CPHASH</td>
<td>cpHash of policySession is not empty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC
TPM2_Policy_AC_SendSelect(
    Policy_AC_SendSelect_In  *in     // IN: input parameter list
) {

// Internal Data Update

// Get pointer to the session structure
SESSION         *session;
HASH_STATE      hashState;
TPM_CC          commandCode = TPM_CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect;

// Input Validation

// cpHash in session context must be empty
if(session->u1.cpHash.t.size != 0)
    return TPM_RC_CPHASH;

// commandCode in session context must be empty
if(session->commandCode != 0)
    return TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE;

// Update name hash
session->u1.cpHash.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add objectName
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);

// add authHandleName
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->authHandleName.b);

// add ac name
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->acName.b);

// complete hash
CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u1.cpHash.b);

// Old policyDigest size should be the same as the new policyDigest size since they are using the same hash algorithm
session->u2.policyDigest.t.size = CryptHashStart(&hashState, session->authHashAlg);

// add old policy
CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);

// add command code
CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), commandCode);

// add objectName
if(in->includeObject == YES)
    CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->objectName.b);
55     // add authHandleName
56     CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->authHandleName.b);
57
58     // add acName
59     CryptDigestUpdate2B(&hashState, &in->acName.b);
60
61     // add includeObject
62     CryptDigestUpdateInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPMT yes_no), in->includeObject);
63
64     // complete digest
65     CryptHashEnd2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
66
67     // set commandCode in session context
68     session->commandCode = TPM_CC_AC_Send;
69
70     return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
71 }
72 #endif // CC_Policy_AC_SendSelect
33 Authenticated Countdown Timer

33.1 Introduction

Clause 1 contains commands that allow interaction with an Authenticated Countdown Timer (ACT).

NOTE The Authenticated Countdown Timer was added in revision 01.56.

33.2 TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout

33.2.1 General Description

This command is used to set the time remaining before an Authenticated Countdown Timer (ACT) expires.

This command sets TPMS_ACT_DATA.timeout (ACT Timeout) to startTimeout. The startTimeout value is an integer number of seconds and may be zero. The startTimeout parameter may be greater, equal, or less than the current value of ACT Timeout.

When ACT Timeout is non-zero, it will count down, once per second until it reaches zero, at which time the signaled attribute of the TPMA_ACT associated with actHandle is SET.

When ACT Timeout is zero and the signaled attribute is SET, writing a startTimeout of FF FF FF FF\textsubscript{16} will clear signaled and stop the counting.

There are four states for ACT Timeout and startTimeout. The signaled attribute will be set as follows:

1) If ACT Timeout is zero and startTimeout is non-zero, then signaled will be CLEAR.
2) If ACT Timeout is non-zero and startTimeout is non-zero, then signaled will be CLEAR.
3) If ACT Timeout is zero and startTimeout is zero, then signaled will be unchanged.
4) If ACT Timeout is non-zero and startTimeout is zero, then signaled will be SET.

When this command is successful, preserveSignaled will be CLEAR.

NOTE 1 The ACT signals on a transition from non-zero to zero. The transition can occur either due to TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout() or a decrement. The effect of signaled is platform dependent.

NOTE 2 It may take up to one second until ACT Timeout will be set and signaled will be CLEAR or SET by TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout() or TPM2_Startup(STATE). This allows the counting and signaling to take place synchronously with the hardware clock tick.

NOTE 3 TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout() was added in revision 01.56.
### 33.2.2 Command and Response

#### Table 250 — TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_ACT_SetTimeout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_RH_ACT</td>
<td>@actHandle</td>
<td>Handle of the selected ACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Index: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auth Role: USER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>startTimeout</td>
<td>the start timeout value for the ACT in seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 251 — TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"
#include "ACT_SetTimeout_fp.h"

#if CC_ACT_SetTimeout  // Conditional expansion of this file

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Return</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_RETRY</td>
<td>returned when an update for the selected ACT is already pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC_VALUE</td>
<td>attempt to disable signaling from an ACT that has not expired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPM_RC

TPM2_ACT_SetTimeout(
  ACT_SetTimeout_In *in  // IN: input parameter list
)
{
  // If 'startTimeout' is UINT32_MAX, then this is an attempt to disable the ACT
  // and turn off the signaling for the ACT. This is only valid if the ACT
  // is signaling.
  if((in->startTimeout == UINT32_MAX) & !ActGetSignaled(in->actHandle))
    return TPM_RC_VALUE + RC_ACT_SetTimeout_startTimeout;
  return ActCounterUpdate(in->actHandle, in->startTimeout);
}
#endif  // CC_ACT_SetTimeout
```
34 Vendor Specific

34.1 Introduction

Clause 1 contains commands that are vendor specific but made public in order to prevent proliferation. This specification does define TPM2_Vendor_TCG_Test() in order to have at least one command that can be used to ensure the proper operation of the command dispatch code when processing a vendor-specific command.

34.2 TPM2_Vendor_TCG_Test

34.2.1 General Description

This is a placeholder to allow testing of the dispatch code.
### 34.2.2 Command and Response

**Table 252 — TPM2_Vendor_TCG_Test Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>TPM_ST_SESSIONS if an audit session is present; otherwise, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>commandSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_CC</td>
<td>commandCode</td>
<td>TPM_CC_Vendor_TCG_Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>inputData</td>
<td>dummy data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 253 — TPM2_Vendor_TCG_Test Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM_ST</td>
<td>tag</td>
<td>see clause 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UINT32</td>
<td>responseSize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM_RC</td>
<td>responseCode</td>
<td>TPM_RC_SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM2B_DATA</td>
<td>outputData</td>
<td>dummy data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
34.2.3 Detailed Actions

```c
#include "Tpm.h"

#if CC_Vendor_TCG_Test // Conditional expansion of this file
#include "Vendor_TCG_Test_fp.h"
#endif

TPM_RC
TPM2_Vendor_TCG_Test(
    Vendor_TCG_Test_In *in, // IN: input parameter list
    Vendor_TCG_Test_Out *out // OUT: output parameter list
)
{
    out->outputData = in->inputData;
    return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif // CC_Vendor_TCG_Test
```