# **TPM Main Part 3 Commands**

Specification Version 1.2 Level 2 Revision 116 1 March 2011 TCG Published

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### **TCG Published**

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TPM Main Part 3 Commands

Specification Version 1.2
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
57

### **58Change History**


Version	Date	Description		
Rev 50	Jul 2003	Started 01 Jul 2003 by David Grawrock		
		Breakup into parts and the merge of 1.1 commands  Change history find to part 1 and kept in part 1 (DP)		
Rev 63	Oct 2003	Change history tied to part 1 and kept in part 1 (DP)		
Rev 71	Mar 2004	Change in terms from authorization data to AuthData.		
Rev 91	ev 91 Sept 2005 The following modifications were made by Tasneem Brutch:			
		■ Update to section 6.2 informative, for TPM_OwnerClear.		
		Addtion of action item 15, to section 6.2, for TPM_OwnerClear.		
		Addition of "MAY" to section 20.1, TPM_NV_DefineSpace, Action 1(a).		
		Addition of a new Action (4) to Section 20.2, TPM_NV_WriteValue		
		Addtion of a new Action (3) to Section 20.4, TPM_NV_ReadValue.		
		Typo corrected in Section 21.1		
		<ul> <li>Moved TPM_GetCapabilityOwner from Section the Deleted Commands (section 28.1) to section 7.3. Added information on operands, command description and actions from Rev. 67.</li> </ul>		
		Section 7.3 TPM GetCapabilityOwner		
Rev 92	Sept 2005	Ordinal was added to the outgoing params, which is not returned but is typically included in outParamDigest.		
		Corrected a copy and paste error:		
Rev 92	Sept 2005	Part 3 20.2 TPM_NV_WriteValue		
		Removed the Action		
	"3. If D1 -> TPM_NV_PER_AUTHREAD is TRUE return TPM_AUTH_CONFLICT"  Noved TPM_CertifySelfTest command to the deleted section.			
Rev 93	Sept. 2005			
Rev 100	May 2006	Added deferredPhysicalPresence and its use in TPM_FieldUpgrade, clarified CTR mode, added TPM_NV_INDEX_TRIAL and use in TPM_NV_DefineSpace		
Rev 101	Aug 2006	Changed "set to NULL" to "set to all zeros" in many places. TPM_OwnerClear must affect disableFullDALogicInfo. Clarified that _INFO keys may be used where _SHA1 keys are used. Clarified that a global secret can be used for field upgrade confidentiality. Added TPM_CMK_CreateBlob actions for the migrationType parameter. Added TPM_CertifyKey action to check payload. Clarified that TPM_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegation returns an error if there is no owner and owner authorization is present. Clarified that TPM_NV_DefineSpace cannot define the DIR index. Clarified that the TPM does not have to clean up the effects of a wrapped command upon failure of a transport response. Clarified that TPM_ReleaseCounter does not ignore the continueAuthSession parameter.		
Rev 102	Sept 2006	Reworked TPM_GetPubkey to always check authorization data if present and allow no-authorization for TPM_AUTH_PRIV_USE_ONLY or TPM_AUTH_NEVER. Fixed TPM_LoadContext typo, Action 6.e. returns error if the HMAC does NOT match.		
Rev 103	Oct 2006	Added warning notes where excluding key handle from HMAC can allow an attack. Added warning that delegating TPM_ChangeAuth allows elevation of privilege.		
Rev 104	Nov 2006	Owner clear sets allowMaintenance and readSRKPub to default state. TPM_Unseal can use DSAP.  TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair uses TPM_ES_RSAESOAEP_SHA1_MGF1.		
Rev 105	Feb 2007	TPM_Seal, TPM_CreateWrapKey informative that they lack an identifier. TPM_NV_DefineSpace should check inputs before changing state. TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue, TPM_NV_ReadValue ignore disabled and deactivated when nvLocked is FALSE, MAY always check HMAC. TPM_NV_WriteValue must not return error for DIR data size of 0. TPM_NV_ReadValue partial DIR reads are allowed. Informative that audit occurs twice for transport wrapped command. TPM_Reset must invalidate OSAP and DSAP sessions, must not invalidate sessions saved by TPM_SaveContext.		
Rev 106	April 2007	Removed tpmProof check for non-migratable parent keys.		
Rev 107	July 2007	Removed unused maxNVBufSize. Increment the auditMonotonicCounter before audit response if digest is zero. State should not change on field upgrade authorization failure. PCR values for a key are validated at use, not at load. TPM_StirRandom is not required to check for data < 256 bytes. TPM_ChangeAuth must validate usageAuth. Entity PCRs must be validated each time an OIAP session is used. TPM_ExecuteTransport MUST log public key logs.		
Rev 108	Sept 2007	time an OIAP session is used. TPM_ExecuteTransport MUST log public key logs.  TPM_ForceClear succeeds even with no owner (informative). Audit only occurs when the commands executes successfully. Field upgrade should not change shielded locations. Reordered TPM_NV_DefineSpace, TPM_NV_WriteValue so the NV write cound is not incremented if there is an authorization error.		
Rev 109	Oct 2007	Added PCR index check to TPM_SHA1CompleteExtend, TPM_Extend, TPM_PCRRead.		
Rev 110	May 2008	Minor typo corrections.		

Rev 111	July 2008	TPM_SaveState gives priority to keys where parentPCRStatus is TRUE. Informative security warning when field upgrade adds new features. TPM_MakeIdentity normative that the signing key digestAtRelease is not validated.			
Rev 112	Jan 2009	Create and load storage and migrate key, ownership commands check for default exponent, TPM_CMK_CreateBlob MAY check unused restrictTicket and sigTicket, TPM_NV_WriteValue does auth checks before changing bGlobalLock			
Rev 113	Jan 2009	Identity key checks for default exponent. TPM_SHA1Update actions added. TPM_NV_WriteValue, TPM_NV_ReadValue added checks for disabled, deactivated.			
Rev 114	Jan 2009	No changes			
Rev 116	Aug 2009	No Changes			

## TCG Doc Roadmap - Main Spec



## TCG Main Spec Roadmap



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226		

227End of Introduction do not delete

### 2281. Scope and Audience

229The TPM main specification is an industry specification that enables trust in computing 230platforms in general. The main specification is broken into parts to make the role of each 231document clear. A version of the specification (like 1.2) requires all parts to be a complete 232specification.

233This is Part 3, the commands that the TPM will use.

234This document is an industry specification that enables trust in computing platforms in 235general.

### **2361.1 Key words**

237The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," 238"SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in the chapters 2-10 239normative statements are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

### 240**1.2** Action Order

241 1. The order of ordinal actions is advisory.

242In particular, the order in which errors are checked is vendor specific. The TPM SHOULD 243check for error conditions as much as possible before executing actions that alter the 244TPM state.

245See also Part 2 "Return Codes" for a discussion of error code requirements.

- 246 2. After input parameter parsing errors, the state of the TPM may or may not be
- 247 changed. The TSS can use TPM\_GetCapability to determine what state has been
- affected.

249For example, authorized commands terminate authorization sessions on error, since the 250response cannot roll the nonce. However, if the incoming session handle parameter cannot 251be parsed, the session cannot be terminated.

252

253

65

### 2541.3 Statement Type

255Please note a very important distinction between different sections of text throughout this 256document. You will encounter two distinctive kinds of text: informative comment and 257normative statements. Because most of the text in this specification will be of the kind 258normative statements, the authors have informally defined it as the default and, as such, 259have specifically called out text of the kind informative comment. They have done this by 260flagging the beginning and end of each informative comment and highlighting its text in 261gray. This means that unless text is specifically marked as of the kind informative 262comment, you can consider it of the kind normative statements.

263For example:

### 264Start of informative comment:

265This is the first paragraph of several paragraphs containing text of the kind informative 266comment ...

267This is the second paragraph of text of the kind informative comment ...

268This is the nth paragraph of text of the kind informative comment ...

269To understand the TPM specification the user must read the specification. (This use of 270MUST does not require any action).

#### 271End of informative comment.

272This is the first paragraph of one or more paragraphs (and/or sections) containing the text 273of the kind normative statements ...

274To understand the TPM specification the user MUST read the specification. (This use of 275MUST indicates a keyword usage and requires an action).

### 2762. Description and TODO

277This document is to show the changes necessary to create the 1.2 version of the TCG 278specification. Some of the sections are brand new text; some are rewritten sections of the 2791.1 version. Upon approval of the 1.2 changes, there will be a merging of the 1.1 and 1.2 280versions to create a single 1.2 document.

### 2813. Admin Startup and State

### 282Start of informative comment:

283This section is the commands that start a TPM.

#### 284End of informative comment.

### 285**3.1 TPM** Init

#### 286Start of informative comment:

287TPM\_Init is a physical method of initializing a TPM. There is no TPM\_Init ordinal as this is a 288platform message sent on the platform internals to the TPM. On a PC this command arrives 289at the TPM via the LPC bus and informs the TPM that the platform is performing a boot 290process.

291TPM\_Init puts the TPM into a state where it waits for the command TPM\_Startup (which 292specifies the type of initialization that is required.

#### 293End of informative comment.

### 294**Definition**

```
295TPM_Init(); 296
```

297Operation of the TPM. This is not a command that any software can execute. It is inherent 298in the design of the TPM and the platform that the TPM resides on.

#### 299Parameters

300None

### 301 Description

- 3021. The TPM\_Init signal indicates to the TPM that platform initialization is taking place. The
- 303 TPM SHALL set the TPM into a state such that the only legal command to receive after
- the TPM\_Init is the TPM\_Startup command. The TPM\_Startup will further indicate to the
- 305 TPM how to handle and initialize the TPM resources.
- 3062. The platform design MUST be that the TPM is not the only component undergoing
- initialization. If the TPM\_Init signal forces the TPM to perform initialization then the
- 308 platform MUST ensure that ALL components of the platform receive an initialization
- 309 signal. This is to prevent an attacker from causing the TPM to initialize to a state where
- various masquerades are allowable. For instance, on a PC causing the TPM to initialize
- and expect measurements in PCR0 but the remainder of the platform does not initialize.
- 3123. The design of the TPM MUST be such that the ONLY mechanism that signals TPM\_Init
- also signals initialization to the other platform components.

### 314Actions

3151. The TPM sets TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> postInitialise to TRUE.

### 316**3.2** TPM\_Startup

#### 317Start of informative comment:

- 318TPM\_Startup is always preceded by TPM\_Init, which is the physical indication (a system-319wide reset) that TPM initialization is necessary.
- 320There are many events on a platform that can cause a reset and the response to these
- 321 events can require different operations to occur on the TPM. The mere reset indication does
- 322not contain sufficient information to inform the TPM as to what type of reset is occurring.
- 323Additional information known by the platform initialization code needs transmitting to the 324TPM. The TPM Startup command provides the mechanism to transmit the information.
- 325The TPM can startup in three different modes:
- 326A "clear" start where all variables go back to their default or non-volatile set state
- 327A "save" start where the TPM recovers appropriate information and restores various values 328based on a prior TPM\_SaveState. This recovery requires an invocation of TPM\_Init to be 329successful.
- 330A failing "save" start must shut down the TPM. The CRTM cannot leave the TPM in a state 331where an untrusted upper software layer could issue a "clear" and then extend PCR's and 332thus mimic the CRTM.
- 333A "deactivated" start where the TPM turns itself off and requires another TPM\_Init before 334the TPM will execute in a fully operational state.

#### 335End of informative comment.

### 336Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAI	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal TPM_ORD_Startup
4	2	2S	2	TPM_STARTUP_TYPE	startupType	Type of startup that is occurring

### 337Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Startup

### 338**Description**

339TPM\_Startup MUST be generated by a trusted entity (the RTM or the TPM, for example).

340 1. If the TPM is in failure mode

83

- a. TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> postInitialize is still set to FALSE
- b. The TPM returns TPM FAILEDSELFTEST

### 343Actions

- 3441. If TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> postInitialise is FALSE,
- a. Then the TPM MUST return TPM\_INVALID\_POSTINIT, and exit this capability
- 3462. If  $stType = TPM_ST_CLEAR$
- a. Ensure that sessions associated with resources TPM RT CONTEXT, TPM RT AUTH,
- 348 TPM\_RT\_DAA\_TPM, and TPM\_RT\_TRANS are invalidated
- b. Reset TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[] values to each correct default value
- i. pcrReset is FALSE, set to 0x00..00
- ii. pcrReset is TRUE, set to 0xFF..FF
- 352 c. Set the following TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS to their default state
- i. PhysicalPresence
- ii. PhysicalPresenceLock
- 355 iii. disableForceClear
- 356 d. The TPM MAY initialize auditDigest to all zeros
- i. If not initialized to all zeros, the TPM SHALL ensure that auditDigest contains a valid value.
- ii. If initialization fails, the TPM SHALL set auditDigest to all zeros and SHALL set the internal TPM state so that the TPM returns TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST to all subsequent commands.
- e. The TPM SHALL set TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> deactivated to the same state as TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> deactivated
- 364 f. The TPM MUST set the TPM\_STANY\_DATA fields to:
- i. TPM\_STANY\_DATA->contextNonceSession is set to all zeros
- ii. TPM\_STANY\_DATA->contextCount is set to 0
- iii. TPM STANY DATA->contextList is set to 0
- 368 g. The TPM MUST set TPM STCLEAR DATA fields to:
- i. Invalidate contextNonceKey
- ii. countID to zero
- iii. ownerReference to TPM\_KH\_OWNER
- 372 h. The TPM MUST set the following TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS to
- i. bGlobalLock to FALSE
- i. Determine which keys should remain in the TPM
- i. For each key that has a valid preserved value in the TPM

- 376 (1) if parentPCRStatus is TRUE then call TPM\_FlushSpecific(keyHandle)
- 377 (2) if isVolatile is TRUE then call TPM\_FlushSpecific(keyHandle)
- ii. Keys under control of the OwnerEvict flag MUST stay resident in the TPM
- 3793. If stType = TPM\_ST\_STATE
- a. If the TPM has no state to restore, the TPM MUST set the internal state such that it
- returns TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST to all subsequent commands.
- b. The TPM MAY determine for each session type (authorization, transport, DAA, ...) to
- 383 release or maintain the session information. The TPM reports how it manages sessions
- in the TPM\_GetCapability command.
- 385 c. The TPM SHALL take all necessary actions to ensure that all PCRs contain valid
- 386 preserved values. If the TPM is unable to successfully complete these actions, it SHALL
- 387 enter the TPM failure mode.
- 388 i. For resettable PCR the TPM MUST set the value of TPM STCLEAR DATA ->
- PCR[]to the resettable PCR default value. The TPM MUST NOT restore a resettable
- 390 PCR to a preserved value
- d. The TPM MAY initialize auditDigest to all zeros.
- i. Otherwise, the TPM SHALL take all actions necessary to ensure that
- auditDigest contains a valid value. If the TPM is unable to successfully complete
- these actions, the TPM SHALL initialize auditDigest to all zeros and SHALL set the
- internal state such that the TPM returns TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST to all
- 396 subsequent commands.
- 397 e. The TPM MUST restore the following flags to their preserved states:
- i. All values in TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS
- ii. All values in TPM STCLEAR DATA
- 400 f. The TPM MUST restore all keys that have a valid preserved value.
- 401 g. The TPM resumes normal operation. If the TPM is unable to resume normal
- 402 operation, it SHALL enter the TPM failure mode.
- 4034. If stType = TPM ST DEACTIVATED
- 404 a. Invalidate sessions
- i. Ensure that all resources associated with saved and active sessions are
- 406 invalidated
- b. Set the TPM STCLEAR FLAGS to their default state.
- 408 c. Set TPM STCLEAR FLAGS -> deactivated to TRUE
- 4095. The TPM MUST ensure that state associated with TPM\_SaveState is invalidated
- 4106. The TPM MUST set TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> postInitialise to FALSE

### 411**3.3 TPM\_SaveState**

#### 412Start of informative comment:

- 413This warns a TPM to save some state information.
- 414If the relevant shielded storage is non-volatile, this command need have no effect.
- 415If the relevant shielded storage is volatile and the TPM alone is unable to detect the loss of 416external power in time to move data to non-volatile memory, this command should be 417presented before the TPM enters a low or no power state.
- 418Resettable PCRs are tied to platform state that does not survive a sleep state. If the PCRs 419did not reset, they would falsely indicate that the platform state was already present when it 420came out of sleep. Since some setup is required first, there would be a gap where PCRs 421indicated the wrong state. Therefore, the PCRs must be recreated.
- 422Any loaded keys may be preserved. Keys with parentPCRStatus TRUE are not given priority 423because of security concerns. Rather, since the key might be part of a storage tree that 424requires PCR value transitions, it might not be directly loadable after 425TPM\_Startup(ST\_STATE). For a TPM implementation that does not save all loaded keys, the 426platform should issue a TPM\_SaveContext / TPM\_LoadContext sequence for those loaded 427keys. contextNonceKey will be restored, guaranteeing that the saved key context can be 428restored.

### 429End of informative comment.

### 430Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAR	AM	НМ	IAC	─ Type Name I	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ		Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveState.

### 431Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PA	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveState.

### 432 Description

- 4331. Preserved values MUST be non-volatile.
- 4342. If data is never stored in a volatile medium, that data MAY be used as preserved data. In such cases, no explicit action may be required to preserve that data.

- 4363. If an explicit action is required to preserve data, it MUST be possible for the TPM to
- 437 determine whether preserved data is valid.
- 4384. If a parameter mirrored by any preserved value is altered, all preserved values MUST be
- 439 declared invalid.
- 4405. The TPM MAY declare all preserved values invalid in response to any command other
- 441 than TPM Init.

### 442 Actions

- 4431. Store TPM STCLEAR DATA -> PCR contents except for
- 444 a. If the PCR attribute pcrReset is TRUE
- b. Any platform identified debug PCR
- 4462. The auditDigest MUST be handled according to the audit requirements as reported by
- 447 TPM GetCapability.
- 448 a. If the ordinal Audit Status is TRUE for the TPM\_SaveState ordinal and the audit Digest
- 449 is being stored in the saved state, the saved auditDigest MUST include the
- 450 TPM\_SaveState input parameters and MUST NOT include the output parameters.
- 4513. All values in TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA MUST be preserved.
- 4524. All values in TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS MUST be preserved.
- 4535. The contents of any key that is currently loaded SHOULD be preserved if the key's
- parentPCRStatus indicator is TRUE.
- 4556. The contents of any key that has TPM KEY CONTROL OWNER EVICT set MUST be
- 456 preserved
- 4577. The contents of any key that is currently loaded MAY be preserved.
- 4588. The contents of sessions (authorization, transport, DAA, etc.) MAY be preserved as
- 459 reported by TPM GetCapability.

### 4604. Admin Testing

### 4614.1 TPM\_SelfTestFull

### 462Start of informative comment:

463TPM\_SelfTestFull tests all of the TPM capabilities.

464Unlike TPM\_ContinueSelfTest, which may optionally return immediately and then perform 465the tests, TPM\_SelfTestFull always performs the tests and then returns success or failure.

### 466End of informative comment.

### **467Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAI	RAM	HM	IAC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type		Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SelfTestFull

### 468Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SelfTestFull

### 469Actions

- 4701. TPM\_SelfTestFull SHALL cause a TPM to perform self-test of each TPM internal function.
- a. If the self-test succeeds, return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- b. If the self-test fails, return TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST.
- 4732. Failure of any test results in overall failure, and the TPM goes into failure mode.
- 4743. If the TPM has not executed the action of TPM ContinueSelfTest, the TPM
- 475 a. MAY perform the full self-test.
- b. MAY return TPM\_NEEDS\_SELFTEST.

### 4774.2 TPM ContinueSelfTest

#### 478Start of informative comment:

479TPM\_ContinueSelfTest informs the TPM that it should complete the self-test of all TPM 480functions.

481The TPM may return success immediately and then perform the self-test, or it may perform 482the self-test and then return success or failure.

#### 483End of informative comment.

### 484Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ContinueSelfTest

### **485Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ContinueSelfTest

### 486 Description

- 4871. Prior to executing the actions of TPM\_ContinueSelfTest, if the TPM receives a command 488 C1 that uses an untested TPM function, the TPM MUST take one of these actions:
- 489 a. The TPM MAY return TPM NEEDS SELFTEST
- i. This indicates that the TPM has not tested the internal resources required to execute C1.
- ii. The TPM does not execute C1.
- 493 iii. The caller MUST issue TPM\_ContinueSelfTest before re-issuing the command 494 C1.
- 495 (1) If the TPM permits TPM\_SelfTestFull prior to completing the actions of TPM\_ContinueSelfTest, the caller MAY issue TPM\_SelfTestFull rather than TPM ContinueSelfTest.
- 498 b. The TPM MAY return TPM\_DOING\_SELFTEST
- i. This indicates that the TPM is doing the actions of TPM\_ContinueSelfTest implicitly, as if the TPM\_ContinueSelfTest command had been issued.
- ii. The TPM does not execute C1.

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- 502 iii. The caller MUST wait for the actions of TPM\_ContinueSelfTest to complete 503 before reissuing the command C1.
- 504 c. The TPM MAY return TPM\_SUCCESS or an error code associated with C1.
- 505 i. This indicates that the TPM has completed the actions of TPM\_ContinueSelfTest and has completed the command C1.
- ii. The error code MAY be TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST.

### 508Actions

- 5091. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE or TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> TPMpost 510 is TRUE
- 511 a. The TPM MUST run all self-tests
- 5122. Else
- a. The TPM MUST complete all self-tests that are outstanding
- i. Instead of completing all outstanding self-tests the TPM MAY run all self-tests
- 5153. The TPM either
- a. MAY immediately return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 517 i. When TPM\_ContinueSelfTest finishes execution, it MUST NOT respond to the caller with a return code.
- 519 b. MAY complete the self-test and then return TPM\_SUCCESS or 520 TPM FAILEDSELFTEST.

### 521**4.3** TPM\_GetTestResult

#### 522Start of informative comment:

523TPM\_GetTestResult provides manufacturer specific information regarding the results of the 524self-test. This command will work when the TPM is in self-test failure mode. The reason for 525allowing this command to operate in the failure mode is to allow TPM manufacturers to 526obtain diagnostic information.

#### 527End of informative comment.

### **528Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAI	PARAM HMAC		AC	Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetTestResult

### 529 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		28	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetTestResult
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The size of the outData area
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The outData this is manufacturer specific

### 530Description

531This command will work when the TPM is in self test failure mode or limited operation 532mode.

#### 533Actions

- 5341. The TPM SHALL respond to this command with a manufacturer specific block of
- information that describes the result of the latest self-test
- 5362. The information MUST NOT contain any data that uniquely identifies an individual TPM.

### 537**5. Admin Opt-in**

### 538**5.1 TPM\_SetOwnerInstall**

### 539Start of informative comment:

540When enabled but without an owner this command sets the PERMANENT flag that allows or 541disallows the ability to insert an owner.

### 542End of informative comment.

### **543Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type Name	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOwnerInstall
4	1	2S	1	BOOL	state	State to which ownership flag is to be set.

### **544Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PA	RAM	AM HM.		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOwnerInstall

### 545Action

5461. If the TPM has a current owner, this command immediately returns with 547 TPM\_SUCCESS.

5482. The TPM validates the assertion of physical presence. The TPM then sets the value of TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> ownership to the value in state.

### 550**5.2 TPM\_OwnerSetDisable**

### 551Start of informative comment:

552The TPM owner sets the PERMANENT disable flag to TRUE or FALSE.

### 553End of informative comment.

### **554Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerSetDisable
4	1	2S	1	BOOL	disableState	Value for disable state
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### **555Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Decarintian
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerSetDisable
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20		·	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 556Action

- 5571. The TPM SHALL authenticate the command as coming from the TPM Owner. If unsuccessful, the TPM SHALL return TPM\_AUTHFAIL.
- 5592. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disable flag to the value in the 560 disableState parameter.

### 561**5.3 TPM\_PhysicalEnable**

### 562Start of informative comment:

563Sets the PERMANENT disable flag to FALSE using physical presence as authorization.

### 564End of informative comment.

### **565Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM HMAC		IAC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalEnable

### **566Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalEnable

### 567Action

5681. Validate that physical presence is being asserted, if not return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE

5692. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS.disable value to FALSE.

### 570**5.4** TPM\_PhysicalDisable

### 571Start of informative comment:

572Sets the PERMANENT disable flag to TRUE using physical presence as authorization

### 573End of informative comment.

### **574Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAR	ΔM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalDisable

### **575Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PARA	AM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalDisable

### 576Action

5771. Validate that physical presence is being asserted, if not return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE

5782. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS.disable value to TRUE.

### 579**5.5** TPM\_PhysicalSetDeactivated

### 580Start of informative comment:

- 581 Changes the TPM persistant deactivated flag using physical presence as authorization.
- 582This command is not available when the TPM is disabled.
- 583End of informative comment.

### **584Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalSetDeactivated
4	1	2S	1	BOOL	state	State to which deactivated flag is to be set.

### **585Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PhysicalSetDeactivated

### 586Action

- 5871. Validate that physical presence is being asserted, if not return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 5882. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS.deactivated flag to the value in the
- state parameter.

### 5905.6 TPM\_SetTempDeactivated

### 591Start of informative comment:

592This command allows the operator of the platform to deactivate the TPM until the next boot 593of the platform.

594This command requires operator authentication. The operator can provide the 595authentication by either the assertion of physical presence or presenting the operator 596AuthData value.

### 597End of informative comment.

### 598Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetTempDeactivated
4	4		4	TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Auth handle for operation validation. Session type MUST be OIAP
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20		·	TPM_AUTHDATA	operatorAuth	HMAC key: operatorAuth

### **599Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetTempDeactivated
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: operatorAuth.

### 600Action

- 6011. If tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND
- a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> operator is FALSE return TPM\_NOOPERATOR
- 603 b. Validate command and parameters using operatorAuth, on error return 604 TPM\_AUTHFAIL

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6052. Else

a. If physical presence is not asserted the TPM MUST return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE

6073. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS.deactivated flag to the value TRUE.

### 608**5.7 TPM\_SetOperatorAuth**

### 609Start of informative comment:

- 610This command allows the setting of the operator AuthData value.
- 611There is no confidentiality applied to the operator authentication as the value is sent under
- 612the assumption of being local to the platform. If there is a concern regarding the path
- 613between the TPM and the keyboard then unless the keyboard is using encryption and a
- 614secure channel an attacker can read the values.

#### 615End of informative comment.

### 616Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOperatorAuth
4	20	2S	20	TPM_SECRET	operatorAuth	The operator AuthData

### 617Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOperatorAuth

### 618Action

- 6191. If physical presence is not asserted the TPM MUST return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 6202. The TPM SHALL set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> operatorAuth
- 6213. The TPM SHALL set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> operator to TRUE

### 6226. Admin Ownership

### 623**6.1 TPM\_TakeOwnership**

### 624Start of informative comment:

625This command inserts the TPM Ownership value into the TPM.

### 626End of informative comment.

### **627Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAI	RAM	AM HM.		Time	Name	Decembris
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_TakeOwnership
4	2	2S	2	TPM_PROTOCOL_ID	protocoIID	The ownership protocol in use.
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	encOwnerAuthSize	The size of the encOwnerAuth field
6	<b>&gt;</b>	48	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	encOwnerAuth	The owner AuthData encrypted with PUBEK
7	4	5S	4	UINT32	encSrkAuthSize	The size of the encSrkAuth field
8	<b>\</b>	6S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	encSrkAuth	The SRK AuthData encrypted with PUBEK
9	<b>\$</b>	7S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_KEY	srkParams	Structure containing all parameters of new SRK. pubKey.keyLength & encSize are both 0. This structure MAY be TPM_KEY12.
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for this command
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
11	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
12	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	Authorization session digest for input params. HMAC key: the new ownerAuth value. See actions for validation operations

628

### 629Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_TakeOwnership
4	<b>\\</b>	3S	<b>\</b>	TPM_KEY	srkPub	Structure containing all parameters of new SRK. srkPub.encData is set to 0. This structure MAY be TPM_KEY12.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: the new ownerAuth value

### 630Description

631The type of the output srkPub MUST be the same as the type of the input srkParams, either 632both TPM\_KEY or both TPM\_KEY12.

#### 633Actions

- 6341. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> ownerAuth is valid return TPM\_OWNER\_SET
- 6352. If TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> ownership is FALSE return TPM INSTALL DISABLED
- 6363. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> endorsementKey is invalid return
- 637 TPM\_NO\_ENDORSEMENT
- 6384. Verify that authHandle is of type OIAP on error return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 6395. If protocolID is not TPM\_PID\_OWNER, the TPM MAY return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 6406. Create A1 a TPM SECRET by decrypting encOwnerAuth using PRIVEK as the key
- a. This requires that A1 was encrypted using the PUBEK
- b. Validate that A1 is a length of 20 bytes, on error return TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 6437. Validate the command and parameters using A1 and ownerAuth, on error return
- 644 TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 6458. Validate srkParams
- 646 a. If srkParams -> keyUsage is not TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE return
- 647 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 648 b. If srkParams -> migratable is TRUE return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 649 c. If srkParams -> algorithmParms -> algorithmID is NOT TPM\_ALG\_RSA return
- 650 TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 651 d. If srkParams -> algorithmParms -> encScheme is NOT
- 652 TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1 return TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY

- 163164
- 653 e. If srkParams -> algorithmParms -> sigScheme is NOT TPM\_SS\_NONE return
- 654 TPM BAD KEY PROPERTY
- 655 f. srkParams -> algorithmParms -> parms -> keyLength MUST be greater than or equal
- 656 to 2048, on error return TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 657 g. If srkParams -> algorithmParms -> parms -> exponentSize is not 0, return
- 658 TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 659 h. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE
- i. If srkParams -> authDataUsage specifies TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER return TPM NOTFIPS
- 6629. Generate K1 according to the srkParams, on error return TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- a. This includes copying PCRInfo from srkParams to K1
- 66410. Create A2 a TPM\_SECRET by decrypting encSrkAuth using the PRIVEK
- a. This requires A2 to be encrypted using the PUBEK
- b. Validate that A2 is a length of 20 bytes, on error return TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 667 c. Store A2 in K1 -> usageAuth
- 66811. Store K1 in TPM PERMANENT DATA -> srk
- 66912. Store A1 in TPM PERMANENT DATA -> ownerAuth
- 67013. Create TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> contextKey according to the rules for the algorithm
- in use by the TPM to save context blobs
- 67214. Create TPM PERMANENT DATA -> delegateKey according to the rules for the algorithm
- in use by the TPM to save delegate blobs
- 67415. Create TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof by using the TPM RNG
- 67516.Export TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> srk as srkPub
- 67617.Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> readPubek to FALSE
- 67718. Calculate resAuth using the newly established TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> ownerAuth

# 678**6.2** TPM\_OwnerClear

#### 679Start of informative comment:

680The TPM\_OwnerClear command performs the clear operation under Owner authentication. 681This command is available until the Owner executes the TPM\_DisableOwnerClear, at which 682time any further invocation of this command returns TPM\_CLEAR\_DISABLED.

### 683End of informative comment.

### **684Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerClear
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## **685Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerClear
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Fixed value FALSE
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: old ownerAuth.

- 6871. Verify that the TPM Owner authorizes the command and all of the input, on error return TPM\_AUTHFAIL.
- 6892. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disableOwnerClear is TRUE then return 690 TPM\_CLEAR\_DISABLED.
- 6913. Unload all loaded keys.
- 692 a. This includes owner evict keys

- 173
- 693 b. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE, the memory locations containing
- 694 secret or private keys MUST be set to all zeros.
- 6954. The TPM MUST NOT modify the following TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA items
- 696 a. endorsementKey
- 697 b. revMajor
- 698 c. revMinor
- 699 d. manuMaintPub
- 700 e. auditMonotonicCounter
- 701 f. monotonicCounter
- 702 g. pcrAttrib
- 703 h. rngState
- i. EKReset
- 705 j. lastFamilyID
- 706 k. tpmDAASeed
- 707 1. authDIR[0]
- 708 m. daaProof
- 709 n. daaBlobKey
- 7105. The TPM MUST invalidate the following TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA items and any internal
- 711 resources associated with these items
- 712 a. ownerAuth
- 713 b. srk
- 714 c. delegateKey
- 715 d. delegateTable
- 716 e. contextKey
- 717 f. tpmProof
- 718 g. operatorAuth
- 7196. The TPM MUST reset to manufacturing defaults the following TPM PERMANENT DATA
- 720 items
- a. noOwnerNVWrite MUST be set to 0
- 722 b. ordinalAuditStatus
- 723 c. restrictDelegate
- 7247. The TPM MUST invalidate or reset all fields of TPM\_STANY\_DATA
- a. Nonces SHALL be reset
- 726 b. Lists (e.g. contextList) SHALL be invalidated
- 7278. The TPM MUST invalidate or reset all fields of TPM STCLEAR DATA except the PCR's
- 174 28

- 728 a. Nonces SHALL be reset
- 729 b. Lists (e.g. contextList) SHALL be invalidated
- 730 c. deferredPhysicalPresence MUST be set to 0
- 7319. The TPM MUST set the following TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS to their default values
- 732 a. disable
- 733 b. deactivated
- 734 c. readPubek
- 735 d. disableOwnerClear
- 736 e. disableFullDALogicInfo
- 737 f. allowMaintenance
- 738 g. readSRKPub
- 73910. The TPM MUST set the following TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS
- a. ownership to TRUE
- 741 b. operator to FALSE
- 742 c. maintenanceDone to FALSE
- 74311. The TPM releases all TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> monotonicCounter settings
- 744 a. This includes invalidating all currently allocated counters. The result will be no
- 745 currently allocated counters and the new owner will need to allocate counters. The
- 746 actual count value will continue to increase.
- 74712. The TPM MUST deallocate all defined NV storage areas where
- 748 a. TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE is TRUE if nvIndex does not have the "D" bit set
- 749 b. TPM NV PER OWNERREAD is TRUE if nvIndex does not have the "D" bit set
- 750 c. The TPM MUST NOT deallocate any other currently defined NV storage areas.
- 75113. The TPM MUST invalidate all family Table entries
- 75214. The TPM MUST terminate all sessions, active or saved.

# 753**6.3** TPM\_ForceClear

#### 754Start of informative comment:

755The TPM\_ForceClear command performs the Clear operation under physical access. This 756command is available until the execution of the TPM\_DisableForceClear, at which time any 757further invocation of this command returns TPM\_CLEAR\_DISABLED.

758TPM\_ForceClear can succeed even if no owner is installed. In that case, it does whatever 759TPM OwnerClear actions that it can.

#### 760End of informative comment.

### **761Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PA	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ForceClear

### **762Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PA	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ForceClear

- 7641. The TPM SHALL check for the assertion of physical presence, if not present return 765 TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 7662. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> disableForceClear is TRUE return TPM\_CLEAR\_DISABLED
- 7673. The TPM SHALL execute the actions of TPM\_OwnerClear (except for the TPM Owner authentication check)

# 7696.4 TPM\_DisableOwnerClear

#### 770Start of informative comment:

771The TPM\_DisableOwnerClear command disables the ability to execute the TPM\_OwnerClear 772command permanently. Once invoked the only method of clearing the TPM will require 773physical access to the TPM.

774After the execution of TPM\_ForceClear, ownerClear is re-enabled and must be explicitly 775disabled again by the new TPM Owner.

#### 776End of informative comment.

### 777Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turne	Name	Decarintian
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisableOwnerClear
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 778Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Typo	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisableOwnerClear
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

- 7801. The TPM verifies that the authHandle properly authorizes the owner.
- 7812. The TPM sets the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disableOwnerClear flag to TRUE.

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7823. When this flag is TRUE the only mechanism that can clear the TPM is the 783 TPM\_ForceClear command. The TPM\_ForceClear command requires physical access to the TPM to execute.

#### TPM\_DisableForceClear 785**6.5**

#### 786Start of informative comment:

787The TPM\_DisableForceClear command disables the execution of the TPM\_ForceClear 788command until the next startup cycle. Once this command is executed, the TPM ForceClear 789is disabled until another startup cycle is run.

### 790End of informative comment.

## 791Incoming Operands and Sizes

PA	RAM	HMAC		Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisableForceClear

## 792Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisableForceClear

#### 793Actions

7941. The TPM sets the TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS.disableForceClear flag in the TPM that disables 795 the execution of the TPM\_ForceClear command.

## 7966.6 TSC PhysicalPresence

#### 797Start of informative comment:

798Some TPM operations require the indication of a human's physical presence at the platform. 799The presence of the human either provides another indication of platform ownership or a 800mechanism to ensure that the execution of the command is not the result of a remote 801software process.

802This command allows a process on the platform to indicate the assertion of physical 803presence. As this command is executable by software there must be protections against the 804improper invocation of this command.

805The physicalPresenceHWEnable and physicalPresenceCMDEnable indicate the ability for 806either SW or HW to indicate physical presence. These flags can be reset until the 807physicalPresenceLifetimeLock is set. The platform manufacturer should set these flags to 808indicate the capabilities of the platform the TPM is bound to.

809The command provides two sets of functionality. The first is to enable, permanently, either 810the HW or the SW ability to assert physical presence. The second is to allow SW, if enabled, 811to assert physical presence.

#### 812End of informative comment.

## **813Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PA	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name D	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TSC_ORD_PhysicalPresence.
4	2	2S	2	TPM_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE	physicalPresence	The state to set the TPM's Physical Presence flags.

### **814Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type Name	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TSC_ORD_PhysicalPresence.

#### 815Actions

- 8161. For documentation ease, the bits break into two categories. The first is the lifetime settings and the second is the assertion settings.
- 818 a. Define A1 to be the lifetime settings: TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_LIFETIME\_LOCK,
- 819 TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_ENABLE, TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_CMD\_ENABLE,
- 820 TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_DISABLE,

and

821 TPM PHYSICAL PRESENCE CMD DISABLE

- 822 b. Define A2 to be the assertion settings: TPM PHYSICAL PRESENCE LOCK,
- 823 TPM PHYSICAL PRESENCE PRESENT, and TPM PHYSICAL PRESENCE NOTPRESENT

### 824Lifetime lock settings

- 8252. If any A1 setting is present
- 826 a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceLifetimeLock is TRUE, return
- 827 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- b. If any A2 setting is present return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 829 c. If both physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_ENABLE and
- 830 physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_DISABLE are TRUE, return
- 831 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 832 d. If both physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_CMD\_ENABLE and
- 833 physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_CMD\_DISABLE are TRUE, return
- 834 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 835 e. If physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_ENABLE is TRUE Set
- 836 TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceHWEnable to TRUE
- 837 f. If physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_HW\_DISABLE is TRUE Set
- 838 TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceHWEnable to FALSE
- 839 g. If physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_CMD\_ENABLE is TRUE, Set
- 840 TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceCMDEnable to TRUE.
- 841 h. If physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_CMD\_DISABLE is TRUE, Set
- 842 TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceCMDEnable to FALSE.
- i. If physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_LIFETIME\_LOCK is TRUE
- i. Set TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> physicalPresenceLifetimeLock to TRUE
- 845 j. Return TPM SUCCESS

#### 846SW physical presence assertion

- 8473. If any A2 setting is present
- 848 a. If any A1 setting is present return TPM BAD PARAMETER
- i. This check here just for consistency, the prior checks would have already
- ensured that this was ok
- 851 b. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceCMDEnable is FALSE, return
- 852 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 853 c. If both physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_LOCK and physicalPresence
- -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_PRESENT are TRUE, return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 855 d. If both physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_PRESENT and
- 856 physicalPresence -> TPM\_PHYSICAL\_PRESENCE\_NOTPRESENT are TRUE, return
- 857 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 858 e. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceLock is TRUE, return
- 859 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER

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860	f.	If phy	sicalPresence -> TPM_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_LOCK is TRUE
861		i.	Set TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS -> physicalPresence to FALSE
862		ii.	Set TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS -> physicalPresenceLock to TRUE
863		iii.	Return TPM_SUCCESS
864	g.	If phy	sicalPresence -> TPM_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_PRESENT is TRUE
865		i.	Set TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS -> physicalPresence to TRUE
866	h.	If phy	sicalPresence -> TPM_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_NOTPRESENT is TRUE
867		i.	Set TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS -> physicalPresence to FALSE
868	i.	Retur	n TPM_SUCCESS
8694.	Els	se // T	here were no A1 or A2 parameters set

870

a. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER

## 8716.7 TSC\_ResetEstablishmentBit

### 872Start of informative comment:

873The PC TPM Interface Specification (TIS) specifies setting tpmEstablished to TRUE upon 874execution of the HASH\_START sequence. The setting implies the creation of a Trusted 875Operating System on the platform. Platforms will use the value of tpmEstablished to 876determine if operations necessary to maintain the security perimeter are necessary.

877The tpmEstablished bit provides a non-volatile, secure reporting that a HASH\_START was 878previously run on the platform. When a platform makes use of the tpmEstablished bit, the 879platform can reset tpmEstablished as the operation is no longer necessary.

880For example, a platform could use tpmEstablished to ensure that, if HASH\_START had ever 881been, executed the platform could use the value to invoke special processing. Once the 882processing is complete the platform will wish to reset tpmEstablished to avoid invoking the 883special process again.

884The TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> tpmEstablished bit described in the TPM specifications 885uses positive logic. The TPM\_ACCESS register uses negative logic, so that TRUE is reflected 886as a 0.

#### 887End of informative comment.

### **888Incoming Operands and Sizes**

P/	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TSC_ORD_ResetEstablishmentBit

### 889Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PA	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TSC_ORD_ResetEstablishmentBit

- 8911. Validate the assertion of locality 3 or locality 4
- 8922. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> tpmEstablished to FALSE
- 8933. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 8947. The Capability Commands

#### 895Start of informative comment:

896The TPM has numerous capabilities that a remote entity may wish to know about. These 897 items include support of algorithms, key sizes, protocols and vendor-specific additions. The 898TPM\_GetCapability command allows the TPM to report back to the requestor what type of 899TPM it is dealing with.

900The request for information requires the requestor to specify which piece of information that 901is required. The request does not allow the "merging" of multiple requests and returns only 902a single piece of information.

903In failure mode, the TPM returns a limited set of information that includes the TPM 904manufacturer and version.

905In version 1.2 with the deletion of TPM GetCapabilitySigned the way to obtain a signed 906listing of the capabilities is to create a transport session, perform TPM\_GetCapability 907commands to list the information and then close the transport session using 908TPM ReleaseTransportSigned.

#### 909End of informative comment.

- 9101. The standard information provided in TPM\_GetCapability MUST NOT provide unique 911 information
- 912 a. The TPM has no control of information placed into areas on the TPM like the NV store
- 913 that is reported by the TPM. Configuration information for these areas could conceivably
- 914 be unique

# 915**7.1** TPM\_GetCapability

#### 916Start of informative comment:

- 917This command returns current information regarding the TPM.
- 918The limitation on what can be returned in failure mode restricts the information a 919manufacturer may return when capArea indicates TPM\_CAP\_MFR.
- 920End of informative comment.

## 921Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetCapability
4	4	2S	4	TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA	capArea	Partition of capabilities to be interrogated
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	subCapSize	Size of subCap parameter
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>\\</b>	BYTE[]	subCap	Further definition of information

## 922Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetCapability
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	respSize	The length of the returned capability response
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	resp	The capability response

923

- 9251. The TPM validates the capArea and subCap indicators. If the information is available,
- 926 the TPM creates the response field and fills in the actual information.
- 9272. The structure document contains the list of caparea and subCap values
- 9283. If the TPM is in failure mode or limited operation mode, the TPM MUST return
- 929 a. TPM\_CAP\_VERSION
- 930 b. TPM\_CAP\_VERSION\_VAL
- 931 c. TPM\_CAP\_MFR
- 932 d. TPM CAP PROPERTY -> TPM CAP PROP MANUFACTURER
- 933 e. TPM\_CAP\_PROPERTY -> TPM\_CAP\_PROP\_DURATION
- 934 f. TPM\_CAP\_PROPERTY -> TPM\_CAP\_PROP\_TIS\_TIMEOUT
- 935 g. The TPM MAY return any other capability.

# 936**7.2** TPM\_SetCapability

### 937Start of informative comment:

938This command sets values in the TPM.

939A setValue that is inconsistent with the capArea and subCap is considered a bad 940parameter.

### 941 End of informative comment.

## 942Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	PARAM HMAC		1AC	Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetCapability
4	4	2S	4	TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA	capArea	Partition of capabilities to be set
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	subCapSize	Size of subCap parameter
6	<b>\$</b>	4S	<>	BYTE[]	subCap	Further definition of information
7	4	5S	4	UINT32	setValueSize	The size of the value to set
8	<b>*</b>	6S	<>	BYTE[]	setValue	The value to set
9	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
10	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
12	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: owner.usageAuth.

#### 236

## 943Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	ARAM HMAC		IAC	Tuno	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetCapability
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key:owner.usageAuth.

- 9451. If tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND, validate the command and parameters using ownerAuth, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 9472. The TPM validates the capArea and subCap indicators, including the ability to set value based on any set restrictions
- 9493. If the capArea and subCap indicators conform with one of the entries in the structure 950 TPM\_CAPABILITY\_AREA (Values for TPM\_SetCapability)
- a. The TPM sets the relevant flag/data to the value of setValue parameter.
- 9524. Else
- 953 a. Return the error code TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.

## 954**7.3 TPM\_GetCapabilityOwner**

#### 955Start of informative comment:

956TPM\_GetCapabilityOwner enables the TPM Owner to retrieve all the non-volatile flags and 957the volatile flags in a single operation.

958The flags summarize many operational aspects of the TPM. The information represented by 959some flags is private to the TPM Owner. So, for simplicity, proof of ownership of the TPM 960must be presented to retrieve the set of flags. When necessary, the flags that are not private 961to the Owner can be deduced by Users via other (more specific) means.

962The normal TPM authentication mechanisms are sufficient to prove the integrity of the 963response. No additional integrity check is required.

#### 964End of informative comment.

### 965Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	.,,,,,		2008.pas
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetCapbilityOwner
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization handle used for Owner authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization digest for inputs and owner authorization. HMAC key: OwnerAuth.

966

## 967Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	.,,,,,		2000, p. c
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation. See section 4.3.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetCapabilityOwner
4	4	3S	4	TPM_VERSION	version	A properly filled out version structure.
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	non_volatile_flags	The current state of the non-volatile flags.
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	volatile_flags	The current state of the volatile flags.
7	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: OwnerAuth.

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## 969Description

970For 31>=N>=0

- 9711. Bit-N of the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS structure is the Nth bit after the opening bracket
- 972 in the definition of TPM PERMANENT FLAGS in the version of the specification
- 973 indicated by the parameter "version". The bit immediately after the opening bracket is
- 974 the 0<sup>th</sup> bit.
- 9752. Bit-N of the TPM STCLEAR FLAGS structure is the Nth bit after the opening bracket in
- 976 the definition of TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS in the version of the specification indicated by
- 977 the parameter "version". The bit immediately after the opening bracket is the 0<sup>th</sup> bit.
- 9783. Bit-N of non\_volatile\_flags corresponds to the Nth bit in TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS, and
- 979 the lsb of non\_volatile\_flags corresponds to bit0 of TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS
- 9804. Bit-N of volatile\_flags corresponds to the Nth bit in TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS, and the lsb
- 981 of volatile\_flags corresponds to bit0 of TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS

- 9831. The TPM validates that the TPM Owner authorizes the command.
- 9842. The TPM creates the parameter non\_volatile\_flags by setting each bit to the same state
- 985 as the corresponding bit in TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS. Bits in non\_volatile\_flags for
- 986 which there is no corresponding bit in TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS are set to zero.
- 9873. The TPM creates the parameter volatile\_flags by setting each bit to the same state as the
- 988 corresponding bit in TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS. Bits in volatile\_flags for which there is no
- 989 corresponding bit in TPM STCLEAR FLAGS are set to zero.
- 9904. The TPM generates the parameter "version".
- 9915. The TPM returns non\_volatile\_flags, volatile\_flags and version to the caller.

# 9928. Auditing

### 993**8.1** Audit Generation

### 994Start of informative comment:

995The TPM generates an audit event in response to the TPM successfully executing a 996command that has the audit flag set to TRUE for that command ordinal.

997The TPM maintains an extended value for all audited operations.

#### 998End of informative comment.

### 999Description

- 10001. The TPM extends the audit digest whenever the ordinal AuditStatus is TRUE for the 1001 ordinal about to be executed.
- 10022. The TPM extends the audit digest only when a command is successfully executed.
- 1003 a. If the ordinal is unknown, unimplemented, or cannot be determined, no auditing is performed.
- 10053. Corner cases
- 1006 a. TPM\_SaveState: Only the input parameters are audited, and the audit occurs before the state is saved. If an error occurs while or after the state is saved, the audit still
- 1008 occurs.
- b. TPM\_SetOrdinalAuditStatus: In the case where the ordinalToAudit is TPM\_ORD\_SetOrdinalAuditStatus, audit is based on the initial state, not the final state.

#### 1012Actions

1013The TPM will execute the ordinal and perform auditing in the following manner:

- 10141. Execute command
- 1015 a. Execution implies the performance of the listed actions for the ordinal.
- 10162. If the command will return TPM SUCCESS
- a. If TPM STANY DATA -> auditDigest is all zeros
- i. Increment TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> auditMonotonicCounter by 1
- b. Create A1 a TPM\_AUDIT\_EVENT\_IN structure
- i. Set A1 -> inputParms to the digest of the input parameters from the command
- 1. Digest value according to the HMAC digest rules of the "above the line" parameters (i.e. the first HMAC digest calculation).
- ii. Set A1 -> auditCount to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> auditMonotonicCounter

252Copyi 253 254	right @	© TCG	TPM Main Part 3 Commands Specification Version 1.2
1026 1027	c.	Set TPM_STANY_DATA -> auditDigest to SHA-1 auditDigest     A1)	(TPM_STANY_DATA ->
1028	d.	Create A2 a TPM_AUDIT_EVENT_OUT structure	
1029 1030		<ul> <li>i. Set A2 -&gt; outputParms to the digest of the outp command</li> </ul>	ut parameters from the
1031 1032		1. Digest value according to the HMAC digest line" parameters (i.e. the first HMAC digest c	
1033 1034		ii. Set A2 -> auditCount to TPM_PF auditMonotonicCounter	ERMANENT_DATA ->
1035 1036	e.	Set TPM_STANY_DATA -> auditDigest to SHA-1 auditDigest     A2)	(TPM_STANY_DATA ->
1037			

## 1038**8.2** Effect of audit failing

#### 1039Start of informative comment:

1040The TPM audit process could have an internal error when attempting to audit a command. 1041To indicate the audit failure, the TPM will return TPM\_AUDITFAIL\_SUCCESSFUL. This new 1042functionality changes the 1.1 TPM functionality when this condition occurs.

1043Since no audit occurs if the command fails, The TPM\_AUDITFAIL\_UNSUCCESSFUL return 1044code is no longer used.

#### 1045End of informative comment.

- 10461. When, in performing the audit process, the TPM has an internal failure (unable to write,
- 1047 SHA-1 failure etc.) the TPM MUST set the internal TPM state such that the TPM returns
- 1048 the TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST error on subsequent attempts to execute a command.
- 10492. The return code for the command uses the following rules
- 1050 a. Command result success, audit success -> return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 1051 b. Command result failure, no audit -> return command result failure
- 1052 c. Command result success, audit failure -> return TPM AUDITFAIL SUCCESSFUL
- 10533. If the TPM is permanently nonrecoverable after an audit failure, then the TPM MUST
- 1054 always return TPM\_FAILEDSELFTEST for every command other than
- 1055 TPM\_GetTestResult. This state must persist regardless of power cycling, the execution
- of TPM\_Init or any other actions.

## 10578.3 TPM GetAuditDigest

#### 1058Start of informative comment:

1059This returns the current audit digest. The external audit log has the responsibility to track 1060the parameters that constitute the audit digest.

1061This value may be unique to an individual TPM. The value however will be changing at a 1062rate set by the TPM Owner. Those attempting to use this value may find it changing without 1063their knowledge. This value represents a very poor source of tracking uniqueness.

#### 1064End of informative comment.

### 1065Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4			TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetAuditDigest
4	4			UINT32	startOrdinal	The starting ordinal for the list of audited ordinals

## 1066Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	Tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4			TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
5	10			TPM_COUNTER_VALUE	counterValue	The current value of the audit monotonic counter
4	20			TPM_DIGEST	auditDigest	Log of all audited events
5	1			BOOL	more	TRUE if the output does not contain a full list of audited ordinals
5	4			UINT32	ordSize	Size of the ordinal list in bytes
6	<b>\$</b>			UINT32[]	ordList	List of ordinals that are audited.

### 1067Description

10681. This command is never audited.

- 10701. The TPM sets auditDigest to TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> auditDigest
- 10712. The TPM sets counterValue to TPM PERMANENT DATA -> auditMonotonicCounter
- 10723. The TPM creates an ordered list of audited ordinals. The list starts at startOrdinal listing each ordinal that is audited.
- 1074 a. If startOrdinal is 0 then the first ordinal that could be audited would be TPM\_OIAP (ordinal 0x0000000A)

- 1076 b. The next ordinal would be TPM\_OSAP (ordinal 0x0000000B)
- 10774. If the ordered list does not fit in the output buffer the TPM sets more to TRUE
- 10785. Return TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> auditDigest as auditDigest

## 10798.4 TPM\_GetAuditDigestSigned

#### 1080Start of informative comment:

1081The signing of the audit log returns the entire digest value and the list of currently audited 1082commands.

1083The inclusion of the list of audited commands as an atomic operation is to tie the current 1084digest value with the list of commands that are being audited.

#### 1085Note to future architects

1086When auditing functionality is active in a TPM, it may seem logical to remove this ordinal 1087from the active set of ordinals as the signing functionality of this command could be 1088handled in a signed transport session. While true, this command has a secondary affect 1089also, resetting the audit log digest. As the reset requires TPM Owner authentication, there 1090must be some way in this command to reflect the TPM Owner wishes. By requiring that a 1091TPM Identity key be the only key that can sign and reset, the TPM Owner's authentication is 1092implicit in the execution of the command (TPM Identity Keys are created and controlled by 1093the TPM Owner only). Hence, while one might want to remove an ordinal this is not one that 1094can be removed if auditing is functional.

#### 1095 End of informative comment.

## 1096Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	PARAM		IAC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetAuditDigestSigned
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The handle of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures.
5	1	2S	1	BOOL	closeAudit	Indication if audit session should be closed
6	20	3S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	A nonce to prevent replay attacks
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for key authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

## 1097Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	1AC	Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetAuditDigestSigned
4	10	3S	10	TPM_COUNTER_VALUE	counterValue	The value of the audit monotonic counter
5	20	4S	20	TPM_DIGEST	auditDigest	Log of all audited events
6	20	5S	20	TPM_DIGEST	ordinalDigest	Digest of all audited ordinals
7	4	6S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The size of the sig parameter
8	<b></b>	7S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The signature of the area
9	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

- 10991. Validate the AuthData and parameters using keyAuth, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 11002. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY or
- 1101 TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, if not return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 11023. The TPM validates that the key pointed to by keyHandle has a signature scheme of
- 1103 TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 SHA1 or TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 INFO, return
- 1104 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE on error
- 11054. Create D1 a TPM\_SIGN\_INFO structure and set the structure defaults
- 1106 a. Set D1 -> fixed to "ADIG"
- 1107 b. Set D1 -> replay to antiReplay
- 1108 c. Create D3 a list of all audited ordinals as defined in the TPM\_GetAuditDigest
- 1109 UINT32[] ordList outgoing parameter
- 1110 d. Create D4 the SHA-1 of D3
- 1111 e. Set auditDigest to TPM STANY DATA -> auditDigest
- 1112 f. Set counterValue to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> auditMonotonicCounter
- 1113 g. Create D2 the concatenation of auditDigest || counterValue || D4
- 1114 h. Set D1 -> data to D2
- 1115 i. Create a digital signature of the SHA-1 of D1 by using the signature scheme for
- 1116 keyHandle
- 1117 j. Set ordinalDigest to D4
- 11185. If closeAudit == TRUE

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- 1119 a. If keyHandle->keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY
- i. TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> auditDigest MUST be set to all zeros.
- 1121 b. Else
- i. Return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE

# 1123**8.5 TPM\_SetOrdinalAuditStatus**

#### 1124Start of informative comment:

1125Set the audit flag for a given ordinal. Requires the authentication of the TPM Owner.

#### 1126End of informative comment.

## 1127Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		<b>T</b>	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOrdinalAuditStatus
4	4	2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinalToAudit	The ordinal whose audit flag is to be set
5	1	3S	1	BOOL	auditState	Value for audit flag
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 1128Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOrdinalAuditStatus
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

- 11301. Validate the AuthData to execute the command and the parameters
- 11312. Validate that the ordinal points to a valid TPM ordinal, return TPM\_BADINDEX on error
- 1132 a. Valid TPM ordinal means an ordinal that the TPM implementation supports
- 11333. Set the non-volatile flag associated with ordinalToAudit to the value in auditState

# 11349. Administrative Functions - Management

## 1135**9.1 TPM\_FieldUpgrade**

#### 1136Start of informative comment:

1137The TPM needs a mechanism to allow for updating the protected capabilities once a TPM is 1138in the field. Given the varied nature of TPM implementations there will be numerous 1139methods of performing an upgrade of the protected capabilities. This command, when 1140implemented, provides a manufacturer specific method of performing the upgrade.

1141The manufacturer can determine, within the listed requirements, how to implement this 1142command. The command may be more than one command and actually a series of 1143commands.

1144The IDL definition is to create an ordinal for the command. However, the remaining 1145parameters are manufacturer specific.

1146The policy to determine when it is necessary to perform the actions of TPM\_RevokeTrust is 1147outside the TPM spec and determined by other TCG workgroups.

1148TPM\_FieldUpgrade is gated by either owner authorization or deferred assertion of Physical 1149Presence (via the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> deferredPhysicalPresence -> 1150unownedFieldUpgrade flag). This gating is acknowledgement that the entity that sets the 1151security policy for a platform must approve field upgrade for that platform. This gating can 1152block a global attack on TPMs when the TPME's privilege information (private key) has been 1153compromised. For blocking to be effective in an unowned TPM, the TPM's ownership flag 1154must be FALSE. (This prevents software from taking ownership and executing 1155TPM\_FieldUpgrade with owner authorization.)

1156If an owner is present, field upgrade MUST be owner authorized, as the actions indicate. 1157This prevents an attacker from using physical presence to upgrade a TPM without detection 1158by the owner.

1159The advantages of deferred assertion of Physical Presence are that it:

- permits a TPM to be upgraded if taking ownership is undesirable or impractical.
- permits a TPM to be upgraded in the OS environment (where Physical Presence typically cannot be asserted), when the TPM has no owner.

1163If it is acceptable to take ownership of a TPM temporarily, an alternative to deferred 1164assertion of Physical Presence is the process: (1) take ownership; (2) perform an owner 1165authorized field upgrade; (3) clear the owner from the TPM.

1166There is no requirement for patch confidentiality. Confidentiality may be implemented 1167using a manufacturer specific mechanism, and may use a global secret such as a 1168symmetric encryption key.

1169The TPM may set the volatile deactivated flag to TRUE if a reboot is required after the field 1170upgrade. There is no requirement to do so.

1171The TPM must check owner authorization before changing the TPM state or beginning the 1172upgrade. This prevents a non-owner from mounting a denial-of-service attack. It is 1173understood that a TPM may not be able to stage the entire upgrade patch inside the TPM

1174before checking owner authorization. That TPM may be forced to move the patch outside 1175the owner authorization HMAC.

1176Ideally, if the upgrade fails (e.g., due to an authentication failure) the TPM firmware should 1177remain unchanged. It is understood that a TPM may not be able to stage the entire upgrade 1178patch inside the TPM for authentication before beginning the upgrade. On a failure, that 1179TPM may be forced to roll the firmware back to a ROMed version. It may go into an upgrade 1180failure state, where it requires a successful field upgrade before continuing.

1181If a field upgrade adds or deletes features, the security implications must be analyzed. The 1182associated state must be set to prevent attacks. See, for example, allowMaintenance in Part 11832. In addition, if a field upgrade adds maintenance commands, it must atomically install 1184the manufacturer's maintenance public key.

#### 1185End of informative comment.

#### 1186IDL Definition

```
1187TPM_RESULT TPM_FieldUpgrade(
1188 [in, out] TPM_AUTH* ownerAuth,
1189 ...);
```

## 1190**Type**

1191This is an optional command and a TPM is not required to implement this command in any 1192form.

#### 1193Parameters

Type Name		Description		
TPM_AUTH	ownerAuth	Authentication from TPM owner to execute command		
		Remaining parameters are manufacturer specific		

### 1194Description

1195The patch integrity and authenticity verification mechanisms in the TPM MUST not require 1196the TPM to hold a global secret. The definition of global secret is a secret value shared by 1197more than one TPM.

1198The TPME is not allowed to pre-store or use unique identifiers in the TPM for the purpose of 1199field upgrade. The TPM MUST NOT use the endorsement key for identification or encryption 1200in the upgrade process. The upgrade process MAY use a TPM Identity to deliver upgrade 1201information to specific TPM's.

1202The upgrade process SHOULD only change protected capabilities. The upgrade process 1203SHOULD NOT change shielded locations.

1204The upgrade process MUST NOT change the disabled or deactivated state from TRUE to 1205FALSE.

1206The upgrade process SHOULD only access data in shielded locations where this data is 1207necessary to validate the TPM Owner, validate the TPME and manipulate the blob.

- 1208The execution of a TPM\_FieldUpgrade command in a TPM MUST leave the TPM in a state 1209that conforms to a version of TCG's TPM specification and conforms to any extant TCG-1210defined credentials (certificates) that attest to that upgraded TPM.
- 1211The security target used to valuate this TPM MUST include this command in the TOE.
- 1212If the owner authorization fails, the state of the TPM (volatile, nonvolatile, and firmware)
- 1213MUST remain unchanged. The only exception shall be the dictionary attack mitigation 1214state, which should process the authentication failure.

- 1216The TPM SHALL perform the following when executing the command:
- 12171. If TPM Owner is installed
- 1218 a. Validate the command and parameters using TPM owner authentication, return
- 1219 TPM AUTHFAIL on error
- 12202. Else
- 1221 a. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> deferredPhysicalPresence -> unownedFieldUpgrade is
- 1222 FALSE return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE.
- 12233. Validate that the upgrade information was sent by the TPME. The validation mechanism
- 1224 MUST use a strength of function that is at least the same strength of function as a
- digital signature performed using a 2048 bit RSA key.
- 12264. Validate that the upgrade target is the appropriate TPM model and version.
- 12275. Process the upgrade information and update the protected capabilities
- 12286. Set the TPM PERMANENT DATA -> revMajor and TPM PERMANENT DATA -> revMinor
- 1229 to the values indicated in the upgrade. The selection of the value is a manufacturer
- 1230 option.
- 1231 a. The TPM MAY validate that the upgrade major and minor revision are monotonically
- increasing.
- b. The TPM MAY allow upgrade with a major and minor revision that is less than
- 1234 currently installed in the TPM.
- 12357. The TPM MAY set the TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS.deactivated to TRUE

# 1236**9.2** TPM\_SetRedirection

#### 1237Start of informative comment:

1238The redirection command attaches a key to a redirection receiver.

1239When making the connection to a GPIO channel the authorization restrictions are set at 1240connection time and not for each invocation that uses the channel.

### 1241 End of informative comment.

## 1242Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetRedirection
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can implement redirection.
5	4	2S	4	TPM_REDIR_COMMAND	redirCmd	The command to execute
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	inputDataSize	The size of the input data
7	<b></b>	4S	<b>\</b>	BYTE	inputData	Manufacturer parameter
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key ownerAuth

## 1243 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		T	News	Possibility
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetRedirection
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

1244

### 1245Action

12461. If tag == TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND

- 1247 a. Validate the command and parameters using TPM Owner authentication, on error
- 1248 return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 12492. if redirCmd == TPM\_REDIR\_GPIO
- 1250 a. Validate that keyHandle points to a loaded key, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYHANDLE
- 1251 on error
- b. Validate the key attributes specify redirection, return TPM\_BAD\_TYPE on error
- 1253 c. Validate that inputDataSize is 4, return TPM\_BAD\_PARAM\_SIZE on error
- 1254 d. Validate that inputData points to a valid GPIO channel, return
- 1255 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error
- e. Map C1 to the TPM\_GPIO\_CONFIG\_CHANNEL structure indicated by inputData
- 1257 f. If C1 -> attr specifies TPM\_GPIO\_ATTR\_OWNER
- i. If tag != TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 1259 g. If C1 -> attr specifies TPM\_GPIO\_ATTR\_PP
- i. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> physicalPresence == FALSE, then return
- 1261 TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 1262 h. Return TPM SUCCESS
- 12633. The TPM MAY support other redirection types. These types may be specified by TCG or
- provided by the manufacturer.

## 1265**9.3 TPM\_ResetLockValue**

#### 1266Start of informative comment:

1267Command that resets the TPM dictionary attack mitigation values

1268This allows the TPM owner to cancel the effect of a number of successive authorization 1269failures. Dictionary attack mitigation is vendor specific, and the actions here are one 1270possible implementation. The TPM may treat an authorization failure outside the mitigation 1271time as a normal failure and not disable the command.

1272If this command itself has an authorization failure, it is blocked for the remainder of the 1273lock out period. This prevents a dictionary attack on the owner authorization using this 1274command.

1275It is understood that this command allows the TPM owner to perform a dictionary attack on 1276other authorization values by alternating a trial and this command. Similarly, delegating 1277this command allows the owner's delegate to perform a dictionary attack.

#### 1278 End of informative comment.

### 1279Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ResetLockValue
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for TPM Owner authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key TPM Owner auth

### 1280Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ResetLockValue
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	HMAC key: TPM Owner auth

- 12821. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> disableResetLock is TRUE return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 1283 a. The internal dictionary attack mechanism will set TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA ->
- 1284 disableResetLock to FALSE when the timeout period expires
- 12852. If the command and parameters validation using ownerAuth fails
- 1286 a. Set TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> disableResetLock to TRUE
- b. Restart the TPM dictionary attack lock out period
- 1288 c. Return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 12893. Reset the internal TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism
- 1290 a. The mechanism is vendor specific and can include time outs, reboots, and other
- 1291 mitigation strategies

# 1292**10.** Storage functions

## 1293**10.1 TPM\_Seal**

#### 1294Start of informative comment:

1295The SEAL operation allows software to explicitly state the future "trusted" configuration that 1296the platform must be in for the secret to be revealed. The SEAL operation also implicitly 1297includes the relevant platform configuration (PCR-values) when the SEAL operation was 1298performed. The SEAL operation uses the tpmProof value to BIND the blob to an individual 1299TPM.

1300If the UNSEAL operation succeeds, proof of the platform configuration that was in effect 1301when the SEAL operation was performed is returned to the caller, as well as the secret data. 1302This proof may, or may not, be of interest. If the SEALed secret is used to authenticate the 1303platform to a third party, a caller is normally unconcerned about the state of the platform 1304when the secret was SEALed, and the proof may be of no interest. On the other hand, if the 1305SEALed secret is used to authenticate a third party to the platform, a caller is normally 1306concerned about the state of the platform when the secret was SEALed. Then the proof is of 1307interest.

1308For example, if SEAL is used to store a secret key for a future configuration (probably to 1309prove that the platform is a particular platform that is in a particular configuration), the 1310only requirement is that that key can be used only when the platform is in that future 1311configuration. Then there is no interest in the platform configuration when the secret key 1312was SEALed. An example of this case is when SEAL is used to store a network 1313authentication key.

1314On the other hand, suppose an OS contains an encrypted database of users allowed to log 1315on to the platform. The OS uses a SEALED blob to store the encryption key for the user-1316database. However, the nature of SEAL is that any SW stack can SEAL a blob for any other 1317software stack. Hence, the OS can be attacked by a second OS replacing both the SEALED-1318blob encryption key, and the user database itself, allowing untrusted parties access to the 1319services of the OS. To thwart such attacks, SEALED blobs include the past SW 1320configuration. Hence, if the OS is concerned about such attacks, it may check to see 1321whether the past configuration is one that is known to be trusted.

1322TPM\_Seal requires the encryption of one parameter ("Secret"). For the sake of uniformity 1323with other commands that require the encryption of more than one parameter, the string 1324used for XOR encryption is generated by concatenating a nonce (created during the OSAP 1325session) with the session shared secret and then hashing the result.

1326The sealed data blob does not have a protected identifier. On a platform that does not 1327prevent unauthorized access to data, a data blob can be exchanged by a lower layer without 1328detection. The upper layer software must take additional measures to protect the relation 1329between its identifier of the data blob and the blob itself.

#### 1330 End of informative comment.

# 1331Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type Na	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ		Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Seal.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can perform seal operations.
5	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	encAuth	The encrypted AuthData for the sealed data.
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	pcrInfoSize	The size of the pcrInfo parameter. If 0 there are no PCR registers in use
7	<b>&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PCR_INFO	pcrInfo	The PCR selection information. The caller MAY use TPM_PCR_INFO_LONG.
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	inDataSize	The size of the inData parameter
9	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b></b>	BYTE[]	inData	The data to be sealed to the platform and any specified PCRs
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization. Must be an OSAP session for this command.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
11	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
12	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	pubAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

# 1332Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Seal.
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_STORED_DATA	sealedData	Encrypted, integrity-protected data object that is the result of the TPM_Seal operation.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed value of FALSE
7	20		·	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

# 1333 **Description**

1334TPM\_Seal is used to encrypt private objects that can only be decrypted using TPM\_Unseal.

- 13361. Validate the authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 13372. If the inDataSize is 0 the TPM returns TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER

- 13383. If the keyUsage field of the key indicated by keyHandle does not have the value 1339 TPM KEY STORAGE, the TPM must return the error code TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE.
- 12404 If the leavilends rejects to a migratable leave than the TDM MICT nature the amon and
- 13404. If the keyHandle points to a migratable key then the TPM MUST return the error code 1341 TPM INVALID KEY USAGE.
- 13425. Determine the version of pcrInfo
- 1343 a. If pcrInfoSize is 0
- i. set V1 to 1
- 1345 b. Else
- i. Point X1 as TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure to pcrInfo
- ii. If X1 -> tag is TPM\_TAG\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG
- 1348 (1) Set V1 to 2
- iii. Else
- 1350 (1) Set V1 to 1
- 13516. If V1 is 1 then
- 1352 a. Create S1 a TPM\_STORED\_DATA structure
- 13537. else
- a. Create S1 a TPM\_STORED\_DATA12 structure
- 1355 b. Set S1 -> et to 0
- 13568. Set S1 -> encDataSize to 0
- 13579. Set S1 -> encData to all zeros
- 135810. Set S1 -> sealInfoSize to pcrInfoSize
- 135911. If pcrInfoSize is not 0 then
- 1360 a. if V1 is 1 then
- i. Validate pcrInfo as a valid TPM PCR INFO structure, return TPM BADINDEX
- on error
- ii. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> pcrSelection to pcrInfo -> pcrSelection
- iii. Create h1 the composite hash of the PCR selected by pcrInfo -> pcrSelection
- iv. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtCreation to h1
- 1366 v. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtRelease to pcrInfo -> digestAtRelease
- 1367 b. else
- i. Validate pcrInfo as a valid TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure, return
- 1369 TPM\_BADINDEX on error
- ii. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> creationPCRSelection to pcrInfo -> creationPCRSelection
- iii. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> releasePCRSelection to pcrInfo -> releasePCRSelection
- iv. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtRelease to pcrInfo -> digestAtRelease

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- 334
- 335
- v. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> localityAtRelease to pcrInfo -> localityAtRelease
- vi. Create h2 the composite hash of the TPM STCLEAR DATA -> PCR selected by
- pcrInfo -> creationPCRSelection
- vii. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtCreation to h2
- 1377 viii. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> localityAtCreation to TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS ->
- 1378 localityModifier
- 137912. Create a1 by decrypting encAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 138013. The TPM provides NO validation of a1. Well-known values (like all zeros) are valid and 1381 possible.
- 138214. Create S2 a TPM\_SEALED\_DATA structure
- 1383 a. Set S2 -> payload to TPM\_PT\_SEAL
- b. Set S2 -> tpmProof to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- 1385 c. Create h3 the SHA-1 of S1
- d. Set S2 -> storedDigest to h3
- 1387 e. Set S2 -> authData to a1
- 1388 f. Set S2 -> dataSize to inDataSize
- 1389 g. Set S2 -> data to inData
- 139015. Validate that the size of S2 can be encrypted by the key pointed to by keyHandle, return 1391 TPM\_BAD\_DATASIZE on error
- 139216. Create s3 the encryption of S2 using the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 139317. Set continueAuthSession to FALSE
- 139418. Set S1 -> encDataSize to the size of s3
- 139519. Set S1 -> encData to s3
- 139620. Return S1 as sealedData

## 1397**10.2 TPM\_Unseal**

#### 1398Start of informative comment:

1399The TPM\_Unseal operation will reveal TPM\_Seal'ed data only if it was encrypted on this 1400platform and the current configuration (as defined by the named PCR contents) is the one 1401named as qualified to decrypt it. Internally, TPM\_Unseal accepts a data blob generated by a 1402TPM\_Seal operation. TPM\_Unseal decrypts the structure internally, checks the integrity of 1403the resulting data, and checks that the PCR named has the value named during TPM\_Seal. 1404Additionally, the caller must supply appropriate AuthData for blob and for the key that was 1405used to seal that data.

1406If the integrity, platform configuration and authorization checks succeed, the sealed data is 1407returned to the caller; otherwise, an error is generated.

#### 1408End of informative comment.

## 1409Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	T	Nama	Bassintian .
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Unseal.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can unseal the data.
5	<b>\$</b>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_STORED_DATA	inData	The encrypted data generated by TPM_Seal.
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for parentHandle.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	dataAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used to authorize inData.
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	dataLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
11	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	datanonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with entityAuthHandle
12	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueDataSession	Continue usage flag for dataAuthHandle.
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	dataAuth	The authorization session digest for the encrypted entity. HMAC key: entity.usageAuth.

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Nome	Decarintian
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Unseal.
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	secretSize	The used size of the output area for secret
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b></b>	BYTE[]	secret	Decrypted data that had been sealed
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.
9	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	dataNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM.
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	datanonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with dataAuthHandle
10	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueDataSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	dataAuth	The authorization session digest used for the dataAuth session. HMAC key: entity.usageAuth.

- 14121. The TPM MUST validate that parentAuth authorizes the use of the key in parentHandle,
- 1413 on error return TPM AUTHFAIL
- 14142. If the keyUsage field of the key indicated by parentHandle does not have the value
- 1415 TPM KEY STORAGE, the TPM MUST return the error code TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE.
- 14163. The TPM MUST check that the TPM\_KEY\_FLAGS -> Migratable flag has the value FALSE
- in the key indicated by parentHandle. If not, the TPM MUST return the error code
- 1418 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 14194. Determine the version of inData
- 1420 a. If inData -> tag = TPM TAG STORED DATA12
- i. Set V1 to 2
- ii. Map S2 a TPM\_STORED\_DATA12 structure to inData
- 1423 b. Else If inData -> ver = 1.1
- i. Set V1 to 1
- ii. Map S2 a TPM\_STORED\_DATA structure to inData
- 1426 c. Else
- i. Return TPM\_BAD\_VERSION
- 14285. Create d1 by decrypting S2 -> encData using the key pointed to by parentHandle
- 14296. Validate d1
  - 345 66

- 1430 a. d1 MUST be a TPM\_SEALED\_DATA structure
- b. d1 -> tpmProof MUST match TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- 1432 c. Set S2 -> encDataSize to 0
- 1433 d. Set S2 -> encData to all zeros
- 1434 e. Create h1 the SHA-1 of S2
- 1435 f. d1 -> storedDigest MUST match h1
- 1436 g. d1 -> payload MUST be TPM\_PT\_SEAL
- 1437 h. Any failure MUST return TPM\_NOTSEALED\_BLOB
- 14387. If S2 -> sealInfoSize is not 0 then
- 1439 a. If V1 is 1 then
- i. Validate that S2 -> pcrInfo is a valid TPM\_PCR\_INFO structure
- ii. Create h2 the composite hash of the PCR selected by S2 -> pcrInfo -> pcrSelection
- 1443 b. If V1 is 2 then
- i. Validate that S2 -> pcrInfo is a valid TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure
- ii. Create h2 the composite hash of the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR selected by S2 -> pcrInfo -> releasePCRSelection
- iii. Check that S2 -> pcrInfo -> localityAtRelease for TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier is TRUE
- 1449 (1) For example if TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier was 2 then S2 -> 1450 pcrInfo -> localityAtRelease -> TPM\_LOC\_TWO would have to be TRUE
- 1451 c. Compare h2 with S2 -> pcrInfo -> digestAtRelease, on mismatch return
- 1452 TPM\_WRONGPCRVAL
- 14538. The TPM MUST validate authorization to use d1 by checking that the HMAC calculation
- 1454 using d1 -> authData as the shared secret matches the dataAuth. Return
- 1455 TPM\_AUTHFAIL on mismatch.
- 14569. If V1 is 2 and S2 -> et specifies encryption (i.e. is not all zeros) then
- 1457 a. If tag is not TPM TAG RQU AUTH2 COMMAND, return TPM AUTHFAIL
- 1458 b. Verify that the authHandle session type is TPM PID OSAP or TPM PID DSAP, return
- 1459 TPM BAD MODE on error.
- 1460 c. If the MSB of S2 -> et is TPM\_ET\_XOR
- i. Use MGF1 to create string X1 of length sealedDataSize. The inputs to MGF1
- are; authLastnonceEven, nonceOdd, "XOR", and authHandle -> sharedSecret. The
- four concatenated values form the Z value that is the seed for MFG1.
- ii. Create o1 by XOR of d1 -> data and X1
- 1465 d. Else

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1466 1467	i. Creet	reate o1 by encrypting d1 -> data using the algorithm indicated by inData ->					
1468	ii. Ke	ey is from authHandle -> sharedSecret					
1469	iii. IV	is SHA-1 of (authLastNonceEven     nonceOdd)					
1470	e. Se	et continueAuthSession to FALSE					
147110.else							
1472 a. Se	t o1 to	d1 -> data					
147311.Set th	e retur	rn secret as o1					
147412. Retur	47412. Return TPM_SUCCESS						

# 1475**10.3 TPM\_UnBind**

#### 1476Start of informative comment:

1477TPM\_UnBind takes the data blob that is the result of a Tspi\_Data\_Bind command and 1478decrypts it for export to the User. The caller must authorize the use of the key that will 1479decrypt the incoming blob.

1480TPM\_UnBind operates on a block-by-block basis, and has no notion of any relation between 1481one block and another.

### 1482End of informative comment.

# 1483Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_UnBind.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform UnBind operations.
5	4	28	4	UINT32	inDataSize	The size of the input blob
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inData	Encrypted blob to be decrypted
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the inputs and use of keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_UnBind
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The length of the returned decrypted data
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\$</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The resulting decrypted data.
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

### 1485 Description

1486TPM\_UnBind SHALL operate on a single block only.

#### 1487Actions

1488The TPM SHALL perform the following:

- 14891. If the inDataSize is 0 the TPM returns TPM BAD PARAMETER
- 14902. Validate the AuthData to use the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 14913. If the keyUsage field of the key referenced by keyHandle does not have the value
- 1492 TPM KEY BIND or TPM KEY LEGACY, the TPM must return the error code
- 1493 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 14944. Decrypt the inData using the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 14955. if (keyHandle -> encScheme does not equal TPM ES RSAESOAEP SHA1 MGF1) and
- 1496 (keyHandle -> keyUsage equals TPM KEY LEGACY),
- 1497 a. The payload does not have TPM specific markers to validate, so no consistency check
- 1498 can be performed.
- b. Set the output parameter outData to the value of the decrypted value of inData.
- 1500 (Padding associated with the encryption wrapping of inData SHALL NOT be returned.)
- 1501 c. Set the output parameter outDataSize to the size of outData, as deduced from the
- decryption process.
- 15036. else
- 1504 a. Interpret the decrypted data under the assumption that it is a TPM\_BOUND\_DATA
- structure, and validate that the payload type is TPM\_PT\_BIND
- 1506 b. Set the output parameter outData to the value of TPM\_BOUND\_DATA ->
- payloadData. (Other parameters of TPM\_BOUND\_DATA SHALL NOT be returned.
- Padding associated with the encryption wrapping of inData SHALL NOT be returned.)

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- 1509 c. Set the output parameter outDataSize to the size of outData, as deduced from the decryption process and the interpretation of TPM\_BOUND\_DATA.
- 15117. Return the output parameters.

# 1512**10.4 TPM\_CreateWrapKey**

#### 1513Start of informative comment:

- 1514The TPM\_CreateWrapKey command both generates and creates a secure storage bundle for 1515asymmetric keys.
- 1516The newly created key can be locked to a specific PCR value by specifying a set of PCR 1517registers.
- 1518The key blob does not have a protected identifier. On a platform that does not prevent
- 1519unauthorized access to data, a key blob can be exchanged by a lower layer without
- 1520detection. The upper layer software must take additional measures to protect the relation 1521between its identifier of the key blob and the blob itself.
- 1522End of informative comment.

### 1523Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Decemination
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateWrapKey
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can perform key wrapping.
5	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	dataUsageAuth	Encrypted usage AuthData for the key.
6	20	3S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	dataMigrationAuth	Encrypted migration AuthData for the key.
7	<b>\\$</b>	4S	<b>\\$</b>	TPM_KEY	keyInfo	Information about key to be created, pubkey.keyLength and keyInfo.encData elements are 0. MAY be TPM_KEY12
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	parent key authorization. Must be an OSAP session.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	pubAuth	Authorization HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

## 1524Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateWrapKey
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_KEY	wrappedKey	The TPM_KEY structure which includes the public and encrypted private key. MAY be TPM_KEY12
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed at FALSE

7	20		TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

- 1526The TPM SHALL do the following:
- 15271. Validate the AuthData to use the key pointed to by parentHandle. Return
- 1528 TPM\_AUTHFAIL on any error.
- 15292. Validate the session type for parentHandle is OSAP.
- 15303. If the TPM is not designed to create a key of the type requested in keyInfo, return the
- 1531 error code TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 15324. Verify that parentHandle->keyUsage equals TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE
- 15335. If parentHandle -> keyFlags -> migratable is TRUE and keyInfo -> keyFlags -> migratable
- is FALSE then return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 15356. Validate key parameters
- 1536 a. keyInfo -> keyUsage MUST NOT be TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY or
- 1537 TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE. If it is, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 1538 b. If keyInfo -> keyFlags -> migrateAuthority is TRUE then return
- 1539 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 15407. If TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE then
- a. If keyInfo -> keySize is less than 1024 return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- b. If keyInfo -> authDataUsage specifies TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- 1543 c. If keyInfo -> keyUsage specifies TPM KEY LEGACY return TPM NOTFIPS
- 15448. If keyInfo -> keyUsage equals TPM KEY STORAGE or TPM KEY MIGRATE
- i. algorithmID MUST be TPM\_ALG\_RSA
- ii. encScheme MUST be TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1
- iii. sigScheme MUST be TPM\_SS\_NONE
- iv. key size MUST be 2048
- v. exponentSize MUST be 0
- 15509. Determine the version of key
- 1551 a. If keyInfo -> ver is 1.1
- i. Set V1 to 1
- ii. Map wrappedKey to a TPM\_KEY structure
- iii. Validate all remaining TPM\_KEY structures
- b. Else if keyInfo -> tag is TPM\_TAG\_KEY12
- i. Set V1 to 2
- ii. Map wrappedKey to a TPM\_KEY12 structure
- iii. Validate all remaining TPM\_KEY12 structures

- 155910.Create DU1 by decrypting dataUsageAuth according to the ADIP indicated by 1560 authHandle
- 156111.Create DM1 by decrypting dataMigrationAuth according to the ADIP indicated by 1562 authHandle
- 156312. Set continueAuthSession to FALSE
- 156413. Generate asymmetric key according to algorithm information in keyInfo
- 156514. Fill in the wrappedKey structure with information from the newly generated key.
- 1566 a. Set wrappedKey -> encData -> usageAuth to DU1
- 1567 b. If the KeyFlags -> migratable bit is set to 1, the wrappedKey -> encData ->
- migrationAuth SHALL contain the decrypted value from dataMigrationAuth.
- 1569 c. If the KeyFlags -> migratable bit is set to 0, the wrappedKey -> encData ->
- migrationAuth SHALL be set to the value tpmProof
- 157115. If keyInfo->PCRInfoSize is non-zero
- 1572 a. If V1 is 1
- i. Set wrappedKey -> pcrInfo to a TPM\_PCR\_INFO structure using the pcrSelection to indicate the PCR's in use
- 1575 b. Else
- i. Set wrappedKey -> pcrInfo to a TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure
- 1577 c. Set wrappedKey -> pcrInfo to keyInfo -> pcrInfo
- 1578 d. Set wrappedKey -> digestAtCreation to the TPM COMPOSITE HASH indicated by
- 1579 creationPCRSelection
- e. If V1 is 2 set wrappedKey -> localityAtCreation to TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> locality
- 158116. Encrypt the private portions of the wrappedKey structure using the key in parentHandle
- 158217. Return the newly generated key in the wrappedKey parameter

# 1583**10.5 TPM\_LoadKey2**

#### 1584Start of informative comment:

1585Before the TPM can use a key to either wrap, unwrap, unbind, seal, unseal, sign or perform 1586any other action, it needs to be present in the TPM. The TPM\_LoadKey2 function loads the 1587key into the TPM for further use.

1588The TPM assigns the key handle. The TPM always locates a loaded key by use of the handle. 1589The assumption is that the handle may change due to key management operations. It is the 1590responsibility of upper level software to maintain the mapping between handle and any 1591label used by external software.

1592To permit this mapping between handle and upper software labels (called key handle 1593virtualization), the key handle returned by TPM\_LoadKey2 must not be included in the 1594response HMAC. This may cause problems if several keys are authorized using the same 1595authorization data. Care should be taken to assign different authorization data to each key.

1596This command has the responsibility of enforcing restrictions on the use of keys. For 1597example, when attempting to load a STORAGE key it will be checked for the restrictions on 1598a storage key (2048 size etc.).

1599The load command must maintain a record of whether any previous key in the key 1600hierarchy was bound to a PCR using parentPCRStatus.

1601The flag parentPCRStatus enables the possibility of checking that a platform passed 1602through some particular state or states before finishing in the current state. A grandparent 1603key could be linked to state-1, a parent key could linked to state-2, and a child key could be 1604linked to state-3, for example. The use of the child key then indicates that the platform 1605passed through states 1 and 2 and is currently in state 3, in this example. TPM\_Startup 1606with stType == TPM\_ST\_CLEAR indicates that the platform has been reset, so the platform 1607has not passed through the previous states. Hence keys with parentPCRStatus==TRUE 1608must be unloaded if TPM\_Startup is issued with stType == TPM\_ST\_CLEAR.

1609If a TPM\_KEY structure has been decrypted AND the integrity test using "pubDataDigest" 1610has passed AND the key is non-migratory, the key must have been created by the TPM. So 1611there is every reason to believe that the key poses no security threat to the TPM. While there 1612is no known attack from a rogue migratory key, there is a desire to verify that a loaded 1613migratory key is a real key, arising from a general sense of unease about execution of 1614arbitrary data as a key. Ideally a consistency check would consist of an encrypt/decrypt 1615cycle, but this may be expensive. For RSA keys, it is therefore suggested that the 1616consistency test consists of dividing the supposed RSA product by the supposed RSA prime, 1617and checking that there is no remainder.

#### 1618 End of informative comment.

## 1619Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKey2.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	TPM handle of parent key.
5	<b>\</b>	2S	<b>\</b>	TPM_KEY	inKey	Incoming key structure, both encrypted private and clear public portions.  MAY be TPM_KEY12
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for parentHandle authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

## 1620Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKey2
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	inkeyHandle	Internal TPM handle where decrypted key was loaded.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

#### 1621 Actions

1622The TPM SHALL perform the following steps:

- 16231. Validate the command and the parameters using parentAuth and parentHandle -> 1624 usageAuth
- 16252. If parentHandle -> keyUsage is NOT TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE return 1626 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 16273. If the TPM is not designed to operate on a key of the type specified by inKey, return the error code TPM BAD KEY PROPERTY
- 16294. The TPM MUST handle both TPM\_KEY and TPM\_KEY12 structures
- 16305. Decrypt the inKey -> privkey to obtain TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure using the key 1631 in parentHandle

- 16326. Validate the integrity of inKey and decrypted TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY
- 1633 a. Reproduce inKey -> TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY -> pubDataDigest using the fields of
- inKey, and check that the reproduced value is the same as pubDataDigest
- 16357. Validate the consistency of the key and it's key usage.
- 1636 a. If inKey -> keyFlags -> migratable is TRUE, the TPM SHALL verify consistency of the
- public and private components of the asymmetric key pair. If inKey -> keyFlags ->
- 1638 migratable is FALSE, the TPM MAY verify consistency of the public and private
- 1639 components of the asymmetric key pair. The consistency of an RSA key pair MAY be
- verified by dividing the supposed (P\*Q) product by a supposed prime and checking that
- there is no remainder.
- b. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, verify that inKey->keyFlags->migratable
- is FALSE. If it is not, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 1644 c. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- d. If inKey -> keyFlags -> migratable equals 0 then verify that TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY
- -> migrationAuth equals TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- e. Validate the mix of encryption and signature schemes
- 1648 f. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE then
- i. If keyInfo -> keySize is less than 1024 return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- ii. If keyInfo -> authDataUsage specifies TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER return
- 1651 TPM NOTFIPS
- iii. If keyInfo -> keyUsage specifies TPM KEY LEGACY return TPM NOTFIPS
- 1653 g. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE or TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE
- i. algorithmID MUST be TPM\_ALG\_RSA
- ii. Key size MUST be 2048
- iii. exponentSize MUST be 0
- iv. sigScheme MUST be TPM\_SS\_NONE
- 1658 h. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM KEY IDENTITY
- i. algorithmID MUST be TPM ALG RSA
- ii. Key size MUST be 2048
- iii. exponentSize MUST be 0
- iv. encScheme MUST be TPM\_ES\_NONE
- i. If the decrypted inKey -> pcrInfo is NULL,
- i. The TPM MUST set the internal indicator to indicate that the key is not using any PCR registers.
- 1666 j. Else
- i. The TPM MUST store pcrInfo in a manner that allows the TPM to calculate a composite hash whenever the key will be in use

- ii. The TPM MUST handle both version 1.1 TPM\_PCR\_INFO and 1.2 TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structures according to the type of TPM\_KEY structure
- 1671 (1) The TPM MUST validate the TPM\_PCR\_INFO or TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structures for legal values. However, the digestAtRelease and localityAtRelease are not validated for authorization until use time.
- 16748. Perform any processing necessary to make TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY key available for operations
- 16769. Load key and key information into internal memory of the TPM. If insufficient memory exists return error TPM\_NOSPACE.
- 167810. Assign inKeyHandle according to internal TPM rules.
- 167911. Set InKeyHandle -> parentPCRStatus to parentHandle -> parentPCRStatus.
- 168012.If parentHandle indicates that it is using PCR registers, then set inKeyHandle -> 1681 parentPCRStatus to TRUE.

# 1682 10.6 TPM\_GetPubKey

#### 1683Start of informative comment:

1684The owner of a key may wish to obtain the public key value from a loaded key. This 1685information may have privacy concerns so the command must have authorization from the 1686key owner.

### 1687End of informative comment.

## 1688Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Decembrish	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag		
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetPubKey.	
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	TPM handle of key.	
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization.	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle	
8	20	·		TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	Authorization HMAC key: key.usageAuth.	

## 1689Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tuno	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize Total number of output bytes including paramSize and		
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetPubKey.	
4	<b>*</b>	3S	<b>\</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubKey	Public portion of key in keyHandle.	
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs	
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active	
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.	

#### 1690Actions

1691The TPM SHALL perform the following steps:

16921. If tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND then

1693 a. Validate the command parameters using keyHandle -> usageAuth, on error return

1694 TPM\_AUTHFAIL

16952. Else

408 80

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- a. Verify that keyHandle -> authDataUsage is TPM\_NO\_READ\_PUBKEY\_AUTH or TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER, on error return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 16983. If keyHandle == TPM\_KH\_SRK then
- 1699 a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> readSRKPub is FALSE then return
- 1700 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYHANDLE
- 17014. If keyHandle -> pcrInfoSize is not 0
- 1702 a. If keyHandle -> keyFlags has pcrIgnoredOnRead set to FALSE
- i. Create a digestAtRelease according to the specified PCR registers and compare to keyHandle -> digestAtRelease and if a mismatch return TPM\_WRONGPCRVAL
- ii. If specified validate any locality requests
- 17065. Create a TPM\_PUBKEY structure and return

416

## 1707**10.7 TPM\_Sealx**

#### 1708Start of informative comment:

1709The TPM\_Sealx command works exactly like the TPM\_Seal command with the additional 1710requirement of encryption for the inData parameter. This command also places in the 1711sealed blob the information that the TPM\_Unseal also requires encryption.

1712TPM\_Sealx requires the use of 1.2 data structures. The actions are the same as TPM\_Seal 1713without the checks for 1.1 data structure usage.

1714The method of incrementing the symmetric key counter value is different from that used by 1715some standard crypto libraries (e.g. openSSL, Java JCE) that increment the entire counter 1716value. TPM users should be aware of this to avoid errors when the counter wraps.

#### 1717End of informative comment.

## 1718Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tuno	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Sealx	
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can perform seal operations.	
5	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	encAuth	The encrypted AuthData for the sealed data.	
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	pcrInfoSize	The size of the pcrInfo parameter. If 0 there are no PCR registers in use	
7	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	TPM_PCR_INFO	pcrInfo	MUST use TPM_PCR_INFO_LONG.	
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	inDataSize	The size of the inData parameter	
9	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inData	The data to be sealed to the platform and any specified PCRs	
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization.  Must be an OSAP session for this command.	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
11	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
12	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored	
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	pubAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.	

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Sealx
4	<b>\\$</b>	3S	4	TPM_STORED_DATA	sealedData	Encrypted, integrity-protected data object that is the result of the TPM_Sealx operation.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed value of FALSE
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

- 17211. Validate the authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 17222. If the inDataSize is 0 the TPM returns TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 17233. If the keyUsage field of the key indicated by keyHandle does not have the value
- 1724 TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE, the TPM must return the error code TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE.
- 17254. If the keyHandle points to a migratable key then the TPM MUST return the error code
- 1726 TPM\_INVALID\_KEY\_USAGE.
- 17275. Create S1 a TPM STORED DATA12 structure
- 17286. Set S1 -> encDataSize to 0
- 17297. Set S1 -> encData to all zeros
- 17308. Set S1 -> sealInfoSize to pcrInfoSize
- 17319. If pcrInfoSize is not 0 then
- 1732 a. Validate pcrInfo as a valid TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure, return TPM\_BADINDEX
- 1733 on error
- 1734 b. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> creationPCRSelection to pcrInfo -> creationPCRSelection
- 1735 c. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> releasePCRSelection to pcrInfo -> releasePCRSelection
- 1736 d. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtRelease to pcrInfo -> digestAtRelease
- e. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> localityAtRelease to pcrInfo -> localityAtRelease
- 1738 f. Create h2 the composite hash of the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR selected by
- 1739 pcrInfo -> creationPCRSelection
- 1740 g. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> digestAtCreation to h2
- 1741 h. Set S1 -> sealInfo -> localityAtCreation to TPM STANY DATA -> localityModifier
- 174210. Create S2 a TPM\_SEALED\_DATA structure

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- 424
- 425
- 174311. Create al by decrypting encAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 1744 a. If authHandle indicates XOR encryption for the AuthData secrets
- i. Set S1 -> et to TPM\_ET\_XOR | | TPM\_ET\_KEY
- 1746 (1) TPM\_ET\_KEY is added because TPM\_Unseal uses zero as a special value
- indicating no encryption.
- 1748 b. Else
- i. Set S1 -> et to the algorithm indicated by authHandle
- 175012. The TPM provides NO validation of a1. Well-known values (like all zeros) are valid and possible.
- 175213. If authHandle indicates XOR encryption
- 1753 a. Use MGF1 to create string X2 of length inDataSize. The inputs to MGF1 are;
- authLastNonceEven, nonceOdd, "XOR", and authHandle -> sharedSecret. The four
- 1755 concatenated values form the Z value that is the seed for MFG1.
- b. Create o1 by XOR of inData and X2
- 175714.Else
- 1758 a. Create of by decrypting inData using the algorithm indicated by authHandle
- b. Key is from authHandle -> sharedSecret
- 1760 c. CTR is SHA-1 of (authLastNonceEven | | nonceOdd)
- 176115. Create S2 a TPM\_SEALED\_DATA structure
- 1762 a. Set S2 -> payload to TPM PT SEAL
- 1763 b. Set S2 -> tpmProof to TPM PERMANENT DATA -> tpmProof
- 1764 c. Create h3 the SHA-1 of S1
- 1765 d. Set S2 -> storedDigest to h3
- 1766 e. Set S2 -> authData to a1
- 1767 f. Set S2 -> dataSize to inDataSize
- 1768 g. Set S2 -> data to o1
- 176916. Validate that the size of S2 can be encrypted by the key pointed to by keyHandle, return
- 1770 TPM BAD DATASIZE on error
- 177117. Create s3 the encryption of S2 using the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 177218. Set continueAuthSession to FALSE
- 177319. Set S1 -> encDataSize to the size of s3
- 177420. Set S1 -> encData to s3
- 177521.Return S1 as sealedData

# 1776**11. Migration**

### 1777Start of informative comment:

1778The migration of a key from one TPM to another is a vital aspect to many use models of the 1779TPM. The migration commands are the commands that allow this operation to occur.

1780There are two types of migratable keys, the version 1.1 migratable keys and the version 1.2 1781certifiable migratable keys.

1782 End of informative comment.

# 178311.1 TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob

### 1784Start of informative comment:

1785The TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob command implements the first step in the process of moving 1786a migratable key to a new parent or platform. Execution of this command requires 1787knowledge of the migrationAuth field of the key to be migrated.

1788Migrate mode is generally used to migrate keys from one TPM to another for backup, 1789upgrade or to clone a key on another platform. To do this, the TPM needs to create a data 1790blob that another TPM can deal with. This is done by loading in a backup public key that 1791will be used by the TPM to create a new data blob for a migratable key.

1792The TPM Owner does the selection and authorization of migration public keys at any time 1793prior to the execution of TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob by performing the 1794TPM\_AuthorizeMigrationKey command.

1795IReWrap mode is used directly to move the key to a new parent (on either this platform or 1796another). The TPM simply re-encrypts the key using a new parent, and outputs a normal 1797encrypted element that can be subsequently used by a TPM\_LoadKey command.

1798TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob implicitly cannot be used to migrate a non-migratory key. No 1799explicit check is required. Only the TPM knows tpmProof. Therefore, it is impossible for the 1800caller to submit an AuthData value equal to tpmProof and migrate a non-migratory key.

1801End of informative comment.

### 434

# 1802Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateMigrationBlob	
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of the parent key that can decrypt encData.	
5	2	2S	2	TPM_MIGRATE_SCHEME	migrationType	The migration type, either MIGRATE or REWRAP	
6	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_MIGRATIONKEYAUTH	migrationKeyAuth	Migration public key and its authorization session digest.	
7	4	4S	4	UINT32	encDataSize	The size of the encData parameter	
8	<>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	encData	The encrypted entity that is to be modified.	
9	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	parentAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the parent key.	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
10	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle	
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for parent session	
12	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	Authorization HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.	
13	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	entityAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the encrypted entity.	
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitylastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM	
14	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with entityAuthHandle	
15	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueEntitySession	Continue use flag for entity session	
16	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	entityAuth	Authorization HMAC key: entity.migrationAuth.	

1803

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PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tuno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateMigrationBlob
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	randomSize	The used size of the output area for random
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	random	String used for xor encryption
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The modified, encrypted entity.
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		4H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle
9	1	5H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for parent key session
10	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.
11	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entityNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover entity
		4H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with entityAuthHandle
12	1	5 H2	1	BOOL	continueEntitySession	Continue use flag for entity session
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	entityAuth	Authorization HMAC key: entity.migrationAuth.

## 1805 Description

1806The TPM does not check the PCR values when migrating values locked to a PCR.

1807The second authorization session (using entityAuth) MUST be OIAP because OSAP does not 1808have a suitable entityType

- 18101. Validate that parentAuth authorizes the use of the key pointed to by parentHandle.
- 18112. Validate that parentHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE, if not return
- 1812 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 18133. Create d1 a TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure by decrypting encData using the key
- pointed to by parentHandle.
- 1815 a. Verify that d1 -> payload is TPM PT ASYM.
- 18164. Validate that entityAuth authorizes the migration of d1. The validation MUST use d1 ->
- 1817 migrationAuth as the secret.
- 18185. Validate that migrationKeyAuth -> digest is the SHA-1 hash of (migrationKeyAuth ->
- 1819 migrationKey | | migrationKeyAuth -> migrationScheme | | TPM PERMANENT DATA ->
- 1820 tpmProof).
- 18216. If migrationType == TPM\_MS\_MIGRATE the TPM SHALL perform the following actions:
- 1822 a. Build two byte arrays, K1 and K2:

```
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```

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443

- 1823 i. K1 = d1.privKey[0..19] (d1.privKey.keyLength + 16 bytes of d1.privKey.key),
- 1824 sizeof(K1) = 20
- 1825 ii. K2 = d1.privKey[20..131] (position 16-127 of d1 . privKey.key), sizeof(K2) = 112
- 1826 b. Build M1 a TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY structure
- 1827 i. TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY.payload = TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE
- 1828 ii. TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY.usageAuth = d1.usageAuth
- 1829 iii. TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY.pubDataDigest = d1. pubDataDigest
- 1830 iv. TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY.partPrivKeyLen = 112 - 127.
- 1831 v. TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY.partPrivKey = K2
- 1832 c. Create o1 (which SHALL be 198 bytes for a 2048 bit RSA key) by performing the
- 1833 OAEP encoding of m using OAEP parameters of
- 1834 i. m = M1 the TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY structure
- 1835 ii. pHash = d1->migrationAuth
- 1836 iii. seed = s1 = K1
- 1837 d. Create r1 a random value from the TPM RNG. The size of r1 MUST be the size of o1.
- 1838 Return r1 in the Random parameter.
- 1839 e. Create x1 by XOR of o1 with r1
- 1840 f. Copy r1 into the output field "random".
- 1841 g. Encrypt x1 with the migration public key included in migrationKeyAuth.
- 18427. If migrationType == TPM MS REWRAP the TPM SHALL perform the following actions:
- 1843 a. Rewrap the key using the public key in migrationKeyAuth, keeping the existing
- 1844 contents of that key.
- 1845 b. Set randomSize to 0 in the output parameter array
- 18468. Else
- 1847 a. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER

# 184811.2 TPM\_ConvertMigrationBlob

#### 1849 Start of informative comment:

1850This command takes a migration blob and creates a normal wrapped blob. The migrated 1851blob must be loaded into the TPM using the normal TPM\_LoadKey function.

1852Note that the command migrates private keys, only. The migration of the associated public 1853keys is not specified by TPM because they are not security sensitive. Migration of the 1854associated public keys may be specified in a platform specific specification. A TPM\_KEY 1855structure must be recreated before the migrated key can be used by the target TPM in a 1856TPM\_LoadKey command.

#### 1857End of informative comment.

## 1858Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ConvertMigrationBlob.	
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can decrypt keys.	
5	4	2S	4	UINT32	inDataSize	Size of inData	
6	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inData	ata The XOR'd and encrypted key	
7	4	4S	4	UINT32	randomSize	Size of random	
8	<b></b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	random	Random value used to hide key data.	
9	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle.	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
10	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle	
12	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the inputs and the migration of the key in parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth	

1859

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ConvertMigrationBlob	
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The encrypted private key that can be loaded with TPM_LoadKey
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth

#### 1861Action

1862The TPM SHALL perform the following:

- 18631. Validate the AuthData to use the key in parentHandle
- 18642. If the keyUsage field of the key referenced by parentHandle does not have the value
- 1865 TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE, the TPM must return the error code TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 18663. Create d1 by decrypting the inData area using the key in parentHandle
- 18674. Create of by XOR d1 and random parameter
- 18685. Create m1 a TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY structure, seed and pHash by OAEP decoding o1
- 18696. Create k1 by combining seed and the TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY -> partPrivKey field
- 18707. Create d2 a TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure
- 1871 a. Verify that m1 -> payload == TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE
- 1872 b. Set d2 -> payload = TPM\_PT\_ASYM
- 1873 c. Set d2 -> usageAuth to m1 -> usageAuth
- 1874 d. Set d2 -> migrationAuth to pHash
- 1875 e. Set d2 -> pubDataDigest to m1 -> pubDataDigest
- 1876 f. Set d2 -> privKey field to k1
- 18778. Create outData using the key in parentHandle to perform the encryption

# 187811.3 TPM\_AuthorizeMigrationKey

#### 1879Start of informative comment:

1880This command creates an authorization blob, to allow the TPM owner to specify which 1881migration facility they will use and allow users to migrate information without further 1882involvement with the TPM owner.

1883It is the responsibility of the TPM Owner to determine whether migrationKey is appropriate 1884for migration. The TPM checks just the cryptographic strength of migrationKey.

#### 1885End of informative comment.

## 1886Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_AuthorizeMigrationKey
4	2	2S	2	TPM_MIGRATE_SCHEME	migrationScheme	Type of migration operation that is to be permitted for this key.
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\( \)</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	migrationKey	The public key to be authorized.
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authorization. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 1887Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Toma	Nama	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_AuthorizeMigrationKey
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_MIGRATIONKEYAUTH	outData	Returned public key and authorization session digest.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

1888

#### 1889Action

1890The TPM SHALL perform the following:

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- 18911. Check that the cryptographic strength of migrationKey is at least that of a 2048 bit RSA
- 1892 key. If migrationKey is an RSA key, this means that migrationKey MUST be 2048 bits or
- greater and MUST use the default exponent.
- 18942. Validate the AuthData to use the TPM by the TPM Owner
- 18953. Create a f1 a TPM MIGRATIONKEYAUTH structure
- 18964. Verify that migrationKey-> algorithmParms -> encScheme is
- 1897 TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1, and return the error code
- 1898 TPM INAPPROPRIATE ENC if it is not
- 18995. Set f1 -> migrationKey to the input migrationKey
- 19006. Set f1 -> migrationScheme to the input migrationScheme
- 19017. Create v1 by concatenating (migrationKey || migrationScheme ||
- 1902 TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof)
- 19038. Create h1 by performing a SHA-1 hash of v1
- 19049. Set f1 -> digest to h1
- 190510. Return f1 as outData

# 1906**11.4 TPM\_MigrateKey**

#### 1907Start of informative comment:

1908The TPM\_MigrateKey command performs the function of a migration authority.

1909The command is relatively simple; it just decrypts the input packet (coming from 1910TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob or TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob) and then re-encrypts it with the input 1911public key. The output of this command would then be sent to TPM\_ConvertMigrationBlob 1912or TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration on the target TPM.

1913TPM\_MigrateKey does not make ANY assumptions about the contents of the encrypted blob. 1914Since it does not have the XOR string, it cannot actually determine much about the key 1915that is being migrated.

1916This command exists to permit the TPM to be a migration authority. If used in this way, it is 1917expected that the physical security of the system containing the TPM and the AuthData 1918value for the MA key would be tightly controlled.

1919To prevent the execution of this command using any other key as a parent key, this 1920command works only if keyUsage for maKeyHandle is TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE.

#### 1921End of informative comment.

## 1922Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_MigrateKey
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	maKeyHandle	Handle of the key to be used to migrate the key.
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubKey	Public key to which the blob is to be migrated
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	inDataSize	The size of inData
7	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	inData	The input blob
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	maAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for maKeyHandle.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and key to be signed. HMAC key: maKeyHandle.usageAuth.

Par	Param		AC	T	Nome	Decarintian
#	Sz	#	Sz	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_MigrateKey
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The re-encrypted blob
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for cert key session
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest for the target key. HMAC key: maKeyHandle.usageAuth

- 19251. Validate that keyAuth authorizes the use of the key pointed to by maKeyHandle
- 19262. The TPM validates that the key pointed to by maKeyHandle has a key usage value of
- 1927 TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE, and that the allowed encryption scheme is
- 1928 TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1.
- 19293. The TPM validates that pubKey is of a size supported by the TPM and that its size is
- 1930 consistent with the input blob and makeyHandle.
- 19314. The TPM decrypts inData and re-encrypts it using pubKey.

# 1932**11.5 TPM\_CMK\_SetRestrictions**

### 1933Start of informative comment:

1934This command is used by the Owner to dictate the usage of a certified-migration key with 1935delegated authorization (authorization other than actual owner authorization).

1936This command is provided for privacy reasons and must not itself be delegated, because a 1937certified-migration-key may involve a contractual relationship between the Owner and an 1938external entity.

1939Since restrictions are validated at DSAP session use, there is no need to invalidate DSAP 1940sessions when the restriction value changes.

#### 1941End of informative comment.

### 1942Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	AM HMAC		Turne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	- Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_SetRestrictions
4	4	2S	4	TPM_CMK_DELEGATE	restriction	The bit mask of how to set the restrictions on CMK keys
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle TPM Owner authentication
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest. HMAC key:ownerAuth

## 1943 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	PARAM		AC	Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_SetRestrictions
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key: ownerAuth.

#### 1944Description

1945TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> restrictDelegate is used as follows

19461. If the session type is TPM\_PID\_DSAP and TPM\_KEY -> keyFlags -> migrateAuthority is 1947 TRUE

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1948 a. If

1949TPM\_KEY\_USAGE is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING and restrictDelegate -> 1950TPM CMK DELEGATE SIGNING is TRUE, or

1951TPM\_KEY\_USAGE is TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE and restrictDelegate -> 1952TPM\_CMK\_DELEGATE\_STORAGE is TRUE, or

1953TPM\_KEY\_USAGE is TPM\_KEY\_BIND and restrictDelegate -> TPM\_CMK\_DELEGATE\_BIND 1954is TRUE, or

1955TPM\_KEY\_USAGE is TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY and restrictDelegate -> 1956TPM CMK DELEGATE LEGACY is TRUE, or

1957TPM\_KEY\_USAGE is TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE and restrictDelegate -> 1958TPM\_CMK\_DELEGATE\_MIGRATE is TRUE

1959then the key can be used.

1960 b. Else return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE.

#### 1961Actions

19621. Validate the ordinal and parameters using TPM Owner authentication, return 1963 TPM AUTHFAIL on error

19642. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> TPM\_CMK\_DELEGATE -> restrictDelegate = restriction

19653. Return TPM SUCCESS

# 196611.6 TPM\_CMK\_ApproveMA

### 1967Start of informative comment:

1968This command creates an authorization ticket, to allow the TPM owner to specify which 1969Migration Authorities they approve and allow users to create certified-migration-keys 1970without further involvement with the TPM owner.

1971It is the responsibility of the TPM Owner to determine whether a particular Migration 1972Authority is suitable to control migration

#### 1973End of informative comment.

### 1974Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	PARAM HMAC		AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_ApproveMA
4	20	2S	20	TPM_DIGEST	migrationAuthorityDigest	A digest of a TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure (itself one or more digests of public keys belonging to migration authorities)
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	Authorization HMAC, key: ownerAuth.

## 1975Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Toma	Name	Decemination
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_ApproveMA
4	20	3S	20	TPM_HMAC	outData	HMAC of migrationAuthorityDigest
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC, key: ownerAuth.

#### 1976Action

1977The TPM SHALL perform the following:

19781. Validate the AuthData to use the TPM by the TPM Owner

19792. Create M2 a TPM\_CMK\_MA\_APPROVAL structure

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1980 a. Set M2 ->migrationAuthorityDigest to migrationAuthorityDigest

19813. Set outData = HMAC(M2) using tpmProof as the secret

19824. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

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#### **TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey** 1983**11.7**

#### 1984Start of informative comment:

1985The TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey command both generates and creates a secure storage bundle for 1986asymmetric keys whose migration is controlled by a migration authority.

1987TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey is very similar to TPM\_CreateWrapKey, but: (1) the resultant key must 1988be a migratable key and can be migrated only by TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob; (2) the command is 1989Owner authorized via a ticket.

1990TPM CMK CreateKey creates an otherwise normal migratable key except that (1) 1991migrationAuth is an HMAC of the migration authority and the new key's public key, signed 1992by tpmProof (instead of being tpmProof); (2) the migrationAuthority bit is set TRUE; (3) the 1993payload type is TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED.

1994The migration-selection/migration authority is specified by passing in a public key (actually 1995the digests of one or more public keys, so more than one migration authority can be 1996specified).

#### 1997End of informative comment.

## 1998Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	T	Name	Decembris
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateKey
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can perform key wrapping.
5	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	dataUsageAuth	Encrypted usage AuthData for the key.
6	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_KEY12	keyInfo	Information about key to be created, pubkey.keyLength and keyInfo.encData elements are 0. MUST be TPM_KEY12
7	20	4S	20	TPM_HMAC	migrationAuthorityApproval	A ticket, created by the TPM Owner using TPM_CMK_ApproveMA, approving a TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure
8	20	5S	20	TPM_DIGEST	migrationAuthorityDigest	The digest of a TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure
9	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for parent key authorization.  Must be an OSAP session.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
10	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
12	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	pubAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of the public key in parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

### 1999Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateKey
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\\$</b>	TPM_KEY12	wrappedKey	The TPM_KEY structure which includes the public and encrypted private key. MUST be TPM_KEY12
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed at FALSE
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

#### 2000Actions

2001The TPM SHALL do the following:

- 20021. Validate the AuthData to use the key pointed to by parentHandle. Return 2003 TPM AUTHFAIL on any error
- 2005 II W\_NO IIII MID OII ally CITO
- 20042. Validate the session type for parentHandle is OSAP
- 20053. If the TPM is not designed to create a key of the type requested in keyInfo, return the error code TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 20074. Verify that parentHandle->keyUsage equals TPM KEY STORAGE
- 20085. Verify that parentHandle-> keyFlags-> migratable == FALSE
- 20096. If keyInfo -> keyFlags -> migratable is FALSE, return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 20107. If keyInfo -> keyFlags -> migrateAuthority is FALSE, return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 20118. Verify that the migration authority is authorized
- 2012 a. Create M1 a TPM\_CMK\_MA\_APPROVAL structure
- i. Set M1 ->migrationAuthorityDigest to migrationAuthorityDigest
- 2014 b. Verify that migrationAuthorityApproval == HMAC(M1) using tpmProof as the secret
- and return error TPM\_MA\_AUTHORITY on mismatch
- 20169. Validate key parameters
- 2017 a. keyInfo -> keyUsage MUST NOT be TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY or
- 2018 TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE. If it is, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 201910.If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE then
- 2020 a. If keyInfo -> keySize is less than 1024 return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- 2021 b. If keyInfo -> authDataUsage specifies TPM AUTH NEVER return TPM NOTFIPS
- 2022 c. If keyInfo -> keyUsage specifies TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY return TPM\_NOTFIPS

- 202311.If keyInfo -> keyUsage equals TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE or TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE
- a. algorithmID MUST be TPM\_ALG\_RSA
- b. encScheme MUST be TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1
- 2026 c. sigScheme MUST be TPM\_SS\_NONE
- 2027 d. key size MUST be 2048
- 2028 e. exponentSize MUST be 0
- 202912.If keyInfo -> tag is NOT TPM\_TAG\_KEY12 return error TPM\_INVALID\_STRUCTURE
- 203013. Map wrappedKey to a TPM KEY12 structure
- 203114.Create DU1 by decrypting dataUsageAuth according to the ADIP indicated by 2032 authHandle.
- 203315. Set continueAuthSession to FALSE
- 203416. Generate asymmetric key according to algorithm information in keyInfo
- 203517. Fill in the wrappedKey structure with information from the newly generated key.
- 2036 a. Set wrappedKey -> encData -> usageAuth to DU1
- b. Set wrappedKey -> encData -> payload to TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED
- 2038 c. Create thisPubKey, a TPM\_PUBKEY structure containing wrappedKey's public key and algorithm parameters
- 2040 d. Create M2 a TPM\_CMK\_MIGAUTH structure
- i. Set M2 -> msaDigest to migrationAuthorityDigest
- ii. Set M2 -> pubKeyDigest to SHA-1 (thisPubKey)
- e. Set wrappedKey -> encData -> migrationAuth equal to HMAC(M2), using tpmProof as
- the shared secret
- 204518. If keyInfo->PCRInfoSize is non-zero
- 2046 a. Set wrappedKey -> pcrInfo to a TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structure
- b. Set wrappedKey -> pcrInfo to keyInfo -> pcrInfo
- 2048 c. Set wrappedKey -> digestAtCreation to the TPM\_COMPOSITE\_HASH indicated by
- 2049 creationPCRSelection
- 2050 d. Set wrappedKey -> localityAtCreation to TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> localityModifier
- 205119. Encrypt the private portions of the wrappedKey structure using the key in parentHandle
- 205220. Return the newly generated key in the wrappedKey parameter

# 205311.8 TPM\_CMK\_CreateTicket

#### 2054Start of informative comment:

2055The TPM\_CMK\_CreateTicket command uses a public key to verify the signature over a 2056digest.

2057TPM\_CMK\_CreateTicket returns a ticket that can be used to prove to the same TPM that 2058signature verification with a particular public key was successful.

### 2059 End of informative comment.

## 2060Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateTicket
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	verificationKey	The public key to be used to check signatureValue
5	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	signedData	The data to be verified
6	4	4S	4	UINT32	signatureValueSize	The size of the signatureValue
7	<b>\$</b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	signatureValue	The signatureValue to be verified
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	pubAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2061Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateTicket
4	20	3S	20	TPM_HMAC	sigTicket	Ticket that proves digest created on this TPM
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key:. ownerAuth.

#### 2062Actions

2063The TPM SHALL do the following:

- 20641. Validate the TPM Owner authentication to use the command
- 20652. Validate that the key type and algorithm are correct
- 2066 a. Validate that verificationKey -> algorithmParms -> algorithmID == TPM\_ALG\_RSA
- b. Validate that verificationKey -> algorithmParms ->encScheme == TPM\_ES\_NONE
- 2068 c. Validate that verificationKey ->algorithmParms ->sigScheme is
- 2069 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 or TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO
- 20703. Use verificationKey to verify that signatureValue is a valid signature on signedData, and
- 2071 return error TPM BAD SIGNATURE on mismatch
- 20724. Create M2 a TPM\_CMK\_SIGTICKET
- 2073 a. Set M2 -> verKeyDigest to the SHA-1 (verificationKey)
- 2074 b. Set M2 -> signedData to signedData
- 20755. Set sigTicket = HMAC(M2) signed by using tpmProof as the secret
- 20766. Return TPM SUCCESS

## 207711.9 TPM CMK CreateBlob

#### 2078Start of informative comment:

2079TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob command is very similar to TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob, except that it: 2080(1) uses an extra ticket (restrictedKeyAuth) instead of a migrationAuth authorization 2081session; (2) uses the migration options TPM\_MS\_RESTRICT\_MIGRATE or 2082TPM\_MS\_RESTRICT\_APPROVE; (3) produces a wrapped key blob whose migrationAuth is 2083independent of tpmProof.

2084If the destination (parent) public key is the MA, migration is implicitly permitted. Further 2085checks are required if the MA is not the destination (parent) public key, and merely selects 2086a migration destination: (1) sigTicket must prove that restrictTicket was signed by the MA; 2087(2) restrictTicket must vouch that the target public key is approved for migration to the 2088destination (parent) public key. (Obviously, this more complex method may also be used by 2089an MA to approve migration to that MA.) In both cases, the MA must be one of the MAs 2090implicitly listed in the migrationAuth of the target key-to-be-migrated.

2091When the migrationType is TPM\_MS\_RESTRICT\_MIGRATE, restrictTicket and sigTicket are 2092unused. The TPM may test that the corresponding sizes are zero, so the caller should set 2093them to zero for interoperability.

2094End of informative comment.

# 2095Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	_		
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateBlob
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of the parent key that can decrypt encData.
5	2	2S	2	TPM_MIGRATE_SCHEME	migrationType	The migration type, either TPM_MS_RESTRICT_MIGRATE or TPM_MS_RESTRICT_APPROVE
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_MIGRATIONKEYAUTH	migrationKeyAuth	Migration public key and its authorization session digest.
7	20	4S	20	TPM_DIGEST	pubSourceKeyDigest	The digest of the TPM_PUBKEY of the entity to be migrated
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	msaListSize	The size of the msaList parameter, which is a variable length TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure
9	<b>&gt;</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE	msaList	One or more digests of public keys belonging to migration authorities
10	4	7S	4	UINT32	restrictTicketSize	The size of the restrictTicket parameter
11	<b>\</b>	8S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	restrictTicket	If migrationType is TPM_MS_RESTRICT_APPROVE, a TPM_CMK_AUTH structure, containing the digests of the public keys belonging to the Migration Authority, the destination parent key and the key-to-be-migrated.
12	4	98	4	UINT32	sigTicketSize	The size of the sigTicket parameter
13	<b>\$</b>	108	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	вуте[]	sigTicket	If migrationType is TPM_MS_RESTRICT_APPROVE, a TPM_HMAC structure, generated by the TPM, signaling a valid signature over restrictTicket
14	4	11S	4	UINT32	encDataSize	The size of the encData parameter
15	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	12S	<>	BYTE[]	encData	The encrypted entity that is to be modified.
16	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	parentAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the parent key.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
17	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle
18	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for parent session
19	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

### 2096Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	T	Name	Baranintian
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateBlob
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	randomSize	The used size of the output area for random
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b></b>	BYTE[]	random	String used for xor encryption
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
7	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>&lt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The modified, encrypted entity.
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		4H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle
9	1	5H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for parent key session
10	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

### 2097 Description

2098The TPM does not check the PCR values when migrating values locked to a PCR.

#### 2099Actions

- 21001. Validate that parentAuth authorizes the use of the key pointed to by parentHandle.
- 21012. The TPM MAY verify that migrationType == migrationKeyAuth -> migrationScheme and 2102 return TPM BAD MODE on error.
- 2103 a. The TPM MAY ignore migrationType.
- 21043. Verify that parentHandle-> keyFlags-> migratable == FALSE
- 21054. Create d1 by decrypting encData using the key pointed to by parentHandle.
- 21065. Verify that the digest within migrationKeyAuth is legal for this TPM and public key
- 21076. Verify that d1 -> payload == TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED or 2108 TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_EXTERNAL
- 21097. Verify that the migration authorities in msaList are authorized to migrate this key
- 2110 a. Create M2 a TPM\_CMK\_MIGAUTH structure
- i. Set M2 -> msaDigest to SHA-1[msaList]
- ii. Set M2 -> pubKeyDigest to pubSourceKeyDigest
- 2113 b. Verify that d1 -> migrationAuth == HMAC(M2) using tpmProof as the secret and
- 2114 return error TPM\_MA\_AUTHORITY on mismatch
- 21158. If migrationKeyAuth -> migrationScheme == TPM\_MS\_RESTRICT\_MIGRATE
- 2116 a. Verify that intended migration destination is an MA:

- i. For one of n=1 to n=(msaList -> MSAlist), verify that SHA-1[migrationKeyAuth -> migrationKey] == msaList -> migAuthDigest[n]
- 2119 b. Validate that the MA key is the correct type
- i. Validate that migrationKeyAuth -> migrationKey -> algorithmParms -> algorithmID == TPM ALG RSA
- ii. Validate that migrationKeyAuth -> migrationKey -> algorithmParms -> encScheme is an encryption scheme supported by the TPM
- iii. Validate that migrationKeyAuth -> migrationKey ->algorithmParms -> sigScheme is TPM SS NONE
- c. The TPM MAY validate that restrictTicketSize is zero.
- d. The TPM MAY validate that sigTicketSize is zero.
- 21289. else If migrationKeyAuth -> migrationScheme == TPM\_MS\_RESTRICT\_APPROVE
- 2129 a. Verify that the intended migration destination has been approved by the MSA:
- i. Verify that for one of the n=1 to n=(msaList -> MSAlist) values of msaList -> migAuthDigest[n], sigTicket == HMAC (V1) using tpmProof as the secret where V1 is a TPM CMK SIGTICKET structure such that:
- 2133 (1) V1 -> verKeyDigest = msaList -> migAuthDigest[n]
- 2134 (2) V1 -> signedData = SHA-1[restrictTicket]
- ii. If [restrictTicket -> destinationKeyDigest] != SHA-1[migrationKeyAuth -> migrationKey], return error TPM MA DESTINATION
- 2137 iii. If [restrictTicket -> sourceKeyDigest] != pubSourceKeyDigest, return error TPM\_MA\_SOURCE
- 213910. Else return with error TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 214011. Build two bytes array, K1 and K2, using d1:
- 2141 a. K1 = TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY.privKey[0..19]
- 2142 (TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY.privKey.keyLength + 16 bytes of
- 2143 TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY.privKey.key), sizeof(K1) = 20
- 2144 b. K2 = TPM STORE ASYMKEY.privKey[20..131] (position 16-127 of
- 2145 TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY . privKey.key), sizeof(K2) = 112
- 214612.Build M1 a TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY structure
- 2147 a. TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY.payload = TPM PT CMK MIGRATE
- 2148 b. TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY.usageAuth = TPM STORE ASYMKEY.usageAuth
- c. TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY.pubDataDigest = TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY.pubDataDigest
- 2150 d. TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY.partPrivKeyLen = 112 127.
- 2151 e. TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY.partPrivKey = K2
- 215213. Create o1 (which SHALL be 198 bytes for a 2048 bit RSA key) by performing the OAEP
- 2153 encoding of m using OAEP parameters m, pHash, and seed
- a. m is the previously created M1

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- b. pHash = SHA-1(SHA-1[msaList] | | pubSourceKeyDigest)
- 2156 c. seed = s1 = the previously created K1
- 215714. Create r1 a random value from the TPM RNG. The size of r1 MUST be the size of o1.
- 2158 Return r1 in the random parameter
- 215915. Create x1 by XOR of o1 with r1
- 216016. Copy r1 into the output field "random"
- 216117. Encrypt x1 with the migrationKeyAuth-> migrationKey

## 216211.10 TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration

#### 2163Start of informative comment:

- 2164TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration completes the migration of certified migration blobs.
- 2165This command takes a certified migration blob and creates a normal wrapped blob with 2166payload type TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_EXTERNAL. The migrated blob must be loaded into the 2167TPM using the normal TPM\_LoadKey function.
- 2169keys is not specified by TPM because they are not security sensitive. Migration of the 2170associated public keys may be specified in a platform specific specification. A TPM\_KEY 2171structure must be recreated before the migrated key can be used by the target TPM in a 2172TPM\_LoadKey command.
- 2173TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration checks that one of the MAs implicitly listed in the 2174migrationAuth of the target key has approved migration of the target key to the destination 2175(parent) key, and that the settings (flags etc.) in the target key are those of a CMK.

#### 2176End of informative comment.

## 2177Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	<b>T</b>	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_ConvertMigration
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of a loaded key that can decrypt keys.
5	60	28	60	TPM_CMK_AUTH	restrictTicket	The digests of public keys belonging to the Migration Authority, the destination parent key and the key-to-be-migrated.
6	20	3S	20	TPM_HMAC	sigTicket	A signature ticket, generated by the TPM, signaling a valid signature over restrictTicket
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_KEY12	migratedKey	The public key of the key-to-be-migrated. The private portion MUST be TPM_MIGRATE_ASYMKEY properly XOR'd
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	msaListSize	The size of the msaList parameter, which is a variable length TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure
9	<>	6S	<>	TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE	msaList	One or more digests of public keys belonging to migration authorities
10	4	7S	4	UINT32	randomSize	Size of random
11	<b>\$</b>	8S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	random	Random value used to hide key data.
12	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
13	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
14	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
15	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	Authorization HMAC: parentKey.usageAuth

### 2178Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CMK_ConvertMigration
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\$</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The encrypted private key that can be loaded with TPM_LoadKey
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key .usageAuth

#### 2179Action

- 21801. Validate the AuthData to use the key in parentHandle
- 21812. If the keyUsage field of the key referenced by parentHandle does not have the value
- 2182 TPM KEY STORAGE, the TPM must return the error code TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 21833. Create d1 by decrypting the migratedKey -> encData area using the key in parentHandle
- 21844. Create o1 by XOR d1 and random parameter
- 21855. Create m1 a TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY, seed and pHash by OAEP decoding o1
- 21866. Create migratedPubKey a TPM\_PUBKEY structure corresponding to migratedKey
- 2187 a. Verify that pHash == SHA-1(SHA-1[msaList] | SHA-1(migratedPubKey)
- 21887. Create k1 by combining seed and the TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY -> partPrivKey field
- 21898. Create d2 a TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure.
- 2190 a. Set the TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY -> privKey field to k1
- 2191 b. Set d2 -> usageAuth to m1 -> usageAuth
- 2192 c. Set d2 -> pubDataDigest to m1 -> pubDataDigest
- 21939. Verify that parentHandle-> keyFlags -> migratable == FALSE
- 219410. Verify that m1 -> payload == TPM\_PT\_CMK\_MIGRATE then set d2-> payload = 2195 TPM PT MIGRATE EXTERNAL
- 219611. Verify that for one of the n=1 to n=(msaList -> MSAlist) values of msaList ->
- 2197 migAuthDigest[n] sigTicket == HMAC (V1) using tpmProof as the secret where V1 is a
- 2198 TPM CMK SIGTICKET structure such that:
- 2199 a. V1 -> verKeyDigest = msaList -> migAuthDigest[n]
- 2200 b. V1 -> signedData = SHA-1[restrictTicket]
- 220112. Create parentPubKey, a TPM\_PUBKEY structure corresponding to parentHandle

- 220213.If [restrictTicket -> destinationKeyDigest] != SHA-1(parentPubKey), return error 2203 TPM\_MA\_DESTINATION
- 220414. Verify that migratedKey is corresponding to d2
- 220515.If migratedKey -> keyFlags -> migratable is FALSE, and return error 2206 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 220716.If migratedKey -> keyFlags -> migrateAuthority is FALSE, return error 2208 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 220917.If [restrictTicket -> sourceKeyDigest] != SHA-1(migratedPubKey), return error 2210 TPM\_MA\_SOURCE
- 221118.Create M2 a TPM\_CMK\_MIGAUTH structure
- 2212 a. Set M2 -> msaDigest to SHA-1[msaList]
- b. Set M2 -> pubKeyDigest to SHA-1[migratedPubKey]
- 221419. Set d2 -> migrationAuth = HMAC(M2) using tpmProof as the secret
- 221520. Create outData using the key in parentHandle to perform the encryption

551

# 2216**12.** Maintenance Functions (optional)

#### 2217Start of informative comment:

2218When a maintenance archive is created with generateRandom FALSE, the maintenance blob 2219is XOR encrypted with the owner authorization before encryption with the maintenance 2220public key. This prevents the manufacturer from obtaining plaintext data. The receiving 2221TPM must have the same owner authorization as the sending TPM in order to XOR decrypt 2222the archive.

2223When generateRandom is TRUE, the maintenance blob is XOR encrypted with random data, 2224which is also returned. This permits someone trusted by the Owner to load the 2225maintenance archive into the replacement platform in the absence of the Owner and 2226manufacturer, without the Owner having to reveal information about his auth value. The 2227receiving and sending TPM's may have different owner authorizations. The random data is 2228transferred from the sending TPM owner to the receiving TPM owner out of band, so the 2229maintenance blob remains hidden from the manufacturer.

## 2230This is a typical maintenance sequence:

- 22311. Manufacturer:
- 2232• generates maintenance key pair
- 2233• gives public key to TPM1 owner
- 22342. TPM1: TPM LoadManuMaintPub
- 2235 load maintenance public key
- 22363. TPM1: TPM CreateMaintenanceArchive
- 2237• XOR encrypt with owner auth or random
- 2238• encrypt the maintenance archive with maintenance public key
- 22394. TPM2:
- 2240• Take ownership
- 2241 Create and activate an AIK
- 2242• Certify the SRK with the AIK, proving that the SRK came from a legitimate TPM
- 22434. Manufacturer:
- 2244• decrypt maintenance archive with maintenance private key
- 2245• (still XOR encrypted with owner auth or random)
- 2246• validate the TPM2 SRK certification
- 2247• encrypt the maintenance archive with TPM2 SRK public key
- 22485. TPM2: TPM LoadMaintenanceArchive
- 2249• decrypt the maintenance archive with SRK private key
- 2250 XOR decrypt with owner auth or random
- 2251End of informative comment.

2252

## 225412.1 TPM\_CreateMaintenanceArchive

#### 2255Start of informative comment:

2256This command creates the maintenance archive. It can only be executed by the owner, and 2257may be shut off with the TPM\_KillMaintenanceFeature command.

#### 2258End of informative comment.

## 2259Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Cmd ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateMaintenanceArchive
4	1	2S	1	BOOL	generateRandom	Use RNG or Owner auth to generate 'random'.
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2260Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ		Ivanie	Безаприон
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Cmd ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateMaintenanceArchive
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	randomSize	Size of the returned random data. Will be 0 if generateRandom is FALSE.
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	random	Random data to XOR with result.
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	archiveSize	Size of the encrypted archive
7	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>\\</b>	BYTE[]	archive	Encrypted key archive.
8	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 2261Actions

2262Upon authorization being confirmed this command does the following:

- 22631. Validates that the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> allowMaintenance is TRUE. If it is
- FALSE, the TPM SHALL return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD and exit this capability.
- 22652. Validates the TPM Owner AuthData.
- 22663. If the value of TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> manuMaintPub is zero, the TPM MUST
- return the error code TPM KEYNOTFOUND
- 22684. Build at a TPM\_KEY structure using the SRK. The encData field is not a normal
- 2269 TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure but rather a TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY structure built
- 2270 using the following actions.
- 22715. Build a TPM\_STORE\_PRIVKEY structure from the SRK. This privKey element should be
- 2272 132 bytes long for a 2K RSA key.
- 22736. Create k1 and k2 by splitting the privKey element created in step 4 into 2 parts. k1 is
- the first 20 bytes of privKey, k2 contains the remainder of privKey.
- 22757. Build m1 by creating and filling in a TPM\_MIGRATE\_ASYMKEY structure
- 2276 a. m1 -> usageAuth is set to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- b. m1 -> pubDataDigest is set to the digest value of the SRK fields from step 4
- 2278 c. m1 -> payload is set to TPM\_PT\_MAINT
- 2279 d. m1 -> partPrivKey is set to k2
- 22808. Create o1 (which SHALL be 198 bytes for a 2048 bit RSA key) by performing the OAEP
- 2281 encoding of m using OAEP parameters of
- 2282 a. m = TPM MIGRATE ASYMKEY structure (step 7)
- b. pHash = TPM PERMANENT DATA -> ownerAuth
- 2284 c. seed = s1 = k1 (step 6)
- 22859. If generateRandom = TRUE
- 2286 a. Create r1 by obtaining values from the TPM RNG. The size of r1 MUST be the same
- size as o1. Set random parameter to r1
- 228810. If generateRandom = FALSE
- 2289 a. Create r1 by applying MGF1 to the TPM Owner AuthData. The size of r1 MUST be the
- 2290 same size as o1. Set randomSize to 0.
- 229111. Create x1 by XOR of o1 with r1
- 229212. Encrypt x1 with the manuMaintPub key using the TPM\_ES\_RSAESOAEP\_SHA1\_MGF1
- 2293 encryption scheme.
- 229413. Set a1 -> encData to the encryption of x1
- 229514. Set TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> maintenanceDone to TRUE
- 229615. Return a1 in the archive parameter

## 229712.2 TPM\_LoadMaintenanceArchive

#### 2298Start of informative comment:

2299This command loads in a Maintenance archive that has been massaged by the 2300manufacturer to load into another TPM.

2301If the maintenance archive was created using the owner authorization for XOR encryption, 2302the current owner authorization must be used for decryption. The owner authorization does 2303not change.

2304If the maintenance archive was created using random data for the XOR encryption, the 2305vendor specific arguments must include the random data. The owner authorization may 2306change.

#### 2307End of informative comment.

## 2308Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	- Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadMaintenanceArchive
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	archiveSize	Sice of the encrypted archive
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	archive	Encrypted key archive
						Vendor specific arguments
-	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
			20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
-	20		20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
-	1		1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
-	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

2309

## 2310Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4		4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
			4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadMaintenanceArchive
						Vendor specific arguments
-	20		20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
			20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
-	1		1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
-	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth, the original value and not the new auth value

### 2311 Description

- 2312The maintenance mechanisms in the TPM MUST not require the TPM to hold a global 2313secret. The definition of global secret is a secret value shared by more than one TPM.
- 2314The TPME is not allowed to pre-store or use unique identifiers in the TPM for the purpose of
- 2315maintenance. The TPM MUST NOT use the endorsement key for identification or encryption
- 2316in the maintenance process. The maintenance process MAY use a TPM Identity to deliver 2317maintenance information to specific TPM's.
- 2318The maintenance process can only change the SPK tomPro
- 2318The maintenance process can only change the SRK, tpmProof and TPM Owner AuthData 2319fields.
- 2320The maintenance process can only access data in shielded locations where this data is 2321necessary to validate the TPM Owner, validate the TPME and manipulate the blob
- 2322The TPM MUST be conformant to the TPM specification, protection profiles and security 2323targets after maintenance. The maintenance MAY NOT decrease the security values from 2324the original security target.
- 2325The security target used to evaluate this TPM MUST include this command in the TOE.

### 2326Actions

- 2327The TPM SHALL perform the following when executing the command
- 23281. Validate the TPM Owner's AuthData
- 23292. Validate that the maintenance information was sent by the TPME. The validation
- 2330 mechanism MUST use a strength of function that is at least the same strength of
- function as a digital signature performed using a 2048 bit RSA key.
- 23323. The packet MUST contain m2 as defined in section 12.1.
- 23334. Ensure that only the target TPM can interpret the maintenance packet. The protection
- 2334 mechanism MUST use a strength of function that is at least the same strength of
- 2335 function as a digital signature performed using a 2048 bit RSA key.

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23365. Execute the actions of TPM_OwnerClear.	

- 23376. Process the maintenance information2338 a. Update the SRK
- i. Set the SRK usageAuth to be the same as the source TPM owner's AuthData
- b. Update TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- c. Update TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> ownerAuth
- 23427. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> maintenanceDone to TRUE
- 2343

## 234412.3 TPM\_KillMaintenanceFeature

#### 2345Start of informative comment:

2346The TPM\_KillMaintencanceFeature is a permanent action that prevents ANYONE from 2347creating a maintenance archive. This action, once taken, is permanent until a new TPM 2348Owner is set.

2349This action is to allow those customers who do not want the maintenance feature to not 2350allow the use of the maintenance feature.

2351At the discretion of the Owner, it should be possible to kill the maintenance feature in such 2352a way that the only way to recover maintainability of the platform would be to wipe out the 2353root keys. This feature is mandatory in any TPM that implements the maintenance feature.

#### 2354End of informative comment.

### 2355Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tuno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_KillMaintenanceFeature
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2356Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tuno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_KillMaintenanceFeature
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

#### 2357Actions

23581. Validate the TPM Owner AuthData

23592. Set the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS.allowMaintenance flag to FALSE.

## 2360**12.4** TPM\_LoadManuMaintPub

#### 2361Start of informative comment:

2362The TPM\_LoadManuMaintPub command loads the manufacturer's public key for use in the 2363maintenance process. The command installs manuMaintPub in PERMANENT data storage 2364inside a TPM. Maintenance enables duplication of non-migratory data in protected storage. 2365There is therefore a security hole if a platform is shipped before the maintenance public key 2366has been installed in a TPM.

2367The command is expected to be used before installation of a TPM Owner or any key in TPM 2368protected storage. It therefore does not use authorization.

#### 2369End of informative comment.

## 2370Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadManuMaintPub
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	AntiReplay and validation nonce
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubKey	The public key of the manufacturer to be in use for maintenance

## 2371 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ			Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadManuMaintPub	
4	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	checksum	Digest of pubKey and antiReplay	

#### 2372 Description

- 2373The pubKey MUST specify an algorithm whose strength is not less than the RSA algorithm 2374with 2048bit keys.
- 2375pubKey SHOULD unambiguously identify the entity that will perform the maintenance 2376process with the TPM Owner.
- 2377TPM PERMANENT DATA -> manuMaintPub SHALL exist in a TPM-shielded location, only.
- 2378If an entity (Platform Entity) does not support the maintenance process but issues a 2379platform credential for a platform containing a TPM that supports the maintenance process, 2380the value of TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> manuMaintPub MUST be set to zero before the 2381platform leaves the entity's control. That is, this ordinal can only be run once, and used to 2382either load the key or load a NULL key.

### 2383Actions

- 2384The first valid TPM\_LoadManuMaintPub command received by a TPM SHALL
- 23851. Store the parameter pubKey as TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> manuMaintPub.
- 23862. Set checksum to SHA-1 of (pubKey | | antiReplay)
- 23873. Export the checksum
- 23884. Subsequent calls to TPM\_LoadManuMaintPub SHALL return code
- 2389 TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD.

## 239012.5 TPM ReadManuMaintPub

#### 2391Start of informative comment:

2392The TPM\_ReadManuMaintPub command is used to check whether the manufacturer's 2393public maintenance key in a TPM has the expected value. This may be useful during the 2394manufacture process. The command returns a digest of the installed key, rather than the 2395key itself. This hinders discovery of the maintenance key, which may (or may not) be useful 2396for manufacturer privacy.

2397The command is expected to be used before installation of a TPM Owner or any key in TPM 2398protected storage. It therefore does not use authorization.

#### 2399End of Informative Comments

## 2400Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tymo	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadManuMaintPub	
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	AntiReplay and validation nonce	

## 2401 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tyme	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadManuMaintPub
4	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	checksum	Digest of pubKey and antiReplay

### 2402 Description

2403This command returns the hash of the antiReplay nonce and the previously loaded 2404manufacturer's maintenance public key.

#### 2405Actions

2406The TPM ReadManuMaintPub command SHALL

24071. Create "checksum" by concatenating data to form (TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> 2408 manuMaintPub | | antiReplay) and passing the concatenated data through SHA-1.

24092. Export the checksum

# 2410**13.** Cryptographic Functions

## 2411**13.1 TPM\_SHA1Start**

#### 2412 Start of informative comment:

2413This capability starts the process of calculating a SHA-1 digest.

2414The exposure of the SHA-1 processing is a convenience to platforms in a mode that do not 2415have sufficient memory to perform SHA-1 themselves. As such, the use of SHA-1 is 2416restrictive on the TPM.

2417The TPM may not allow any other types of processing during the execution of a SHA-1 2418session. There is only one SHA-1 session active on a TPM. The exclusivity of a SHA-1 2419context is due to the relatively large volatile buffer it requires in order to hold the 2420intermediate results between the SHA-1 context commands. This buffer can be in 2421contradiction to other command needs.

2422After the execution of TPM\_SHA1Start, and prior to TPM\_SHA1Complete or 2423TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend, the receipt of any command other than TPM\_SHA1Update will 2424cause the invalidation of the SHA-1 session.

#### 2425End of informative comment.

#### 2426Incoming Operands and Sizes

PA	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Departmen
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Start

## 2427 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Start	
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	maxNumBytes	Maximum number of bytes that can be sent to TPM_SHA1Update. Must be a multiple of 64 bytes.	

## 2428 Description

24291. This capability prepares the TPM for a subsequent TPM\_SHA1Update, 2430 TPM\_SHA1Complete or TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend command. The capability SHALL open a thread that calculates a SHA-1 digest.

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- 24322. After receipt of TPM\_SHA1Start, and prior to the receipt of TPM\_SHA1Complete or 2433 TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend, receipt of any command other than TPM\_SHA1Update
- invalidates the SHA-1 session.
- 2435 a. If the command received is TPM\_ExecuteTransport, the SHA-1 session invalidation is
- based on the wrapped command, not the TPM\_ExecuteTransport ordinal.
- b. A SHA-1 thread (start, update, complete) MUST take place either completely outside
- 2438 a transport session or completely within a single transport session.

## 2439**13.2 TPM\_SHA1Update**

#### 2440Start of informative comment:

2441This capability inputs complete blocks of data into a pending SHA-1 digest. At the end of 2442the process, the digest remains pending.

#### 2443 End of informative comment.

## 2444Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	IAC	Tyme	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Update	
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	numBytes	The number of bytes in hashData. Must be a multiple of 64 bytes.	
5	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE []	hashData	Bytes to be hashed	

## 2445 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HM	AC	Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ			Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Update

#### 2446 Description

2447This command SHALL incorporate complete blocks of data into the digest of an existing 2448SHA-1 thread. Only integral numbers of complete blocks (64 bytes each) can be processed.

#### 2449 Actions

- 24501. If there is no existing SHA-1 thread, return TPM\_SHA\_THREAD
- 24512. If numBytes is not a multiple of 64
- 2452 a. Return TPM SHA ERROR
- b. The TPM MAY terminate the SHA-1 thread
- 24543. If numBytes is greater than maxNumBytes returned by TPM\_SHA1Start
- 2455 a. Return TPM\_SHA\_ERROR
- 2456 b. The TPM MAY terminate the SHA-1 thread
- 24574. Incorporate hashData into the digest of the existing SHA-1 thread.

2458

## 2459**13.3 TPM\_SHA1Complete**

#### 2460Start of informative comment:

2461This capability terminates a pending SHA-1 calculation.

#### 2462 End of informative comment.

## 2463Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Complete
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	hashDataSize	Number of bytes in hashData, MUST be 64 or less
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	hashData	Final bytes to be hashed

## 2464Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1Complete
4	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	hashValue	The output of the SHA-1 hash.

## 2465 Description

2466This command SHALL incorporate a partial or complete block of data into the digest of an 2467existing SHA-1 thread, and terminate that thread. hashDataSize MAY have values in the 2468range of 0 through 64, inclusive.

2469If the SHA-1 thread has received no bytes the TPM SHALL calculate the SHA-1 of the empty 2470buffer.

## 247113.4 TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend

#### 2472Start of informative comment:

2473This capability terminates a pending SHA-1 calculation and EXTENDS the result into a 2474Platform Configuration Register using a SHA-1 hash process.

2475This command is designed to complete a hash sequence and extend a PCR in memory-less 2476environments.

#### 2477End of informative comment.

## 2478Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1CompleteExtend
4	4	2S	4	TPM_PCRINDEX	pcrNum	Index of the PCR to be modified
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	hashDataSize	Number of bytes in hashData, MUST be 64 or less
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;</b>	BYTE[]	hashData	Final bytes to be hashed

### 2479 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SHA1CompleteExtend
4	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	hashValue	The output of the SHA-1 hash.
5	20	4S	20	TPM_PCRVALUE	outDigest	The PCR value after execution of the command.

#### 2480 Description

2481This command SHALL incorporate a partial or complete block of data into the digest of an 2482existing SHA-1 thread, EXTEND the resultant digest into a PCR, and terminate the SHA-1 2483session. hashDataSize MAY have values in the range of 0 through 64, inclusive.

2484The SHA-1 session MUST terminate even if the command returns an error, e.g. 2485TPM\_BAD\_LOCALITY.

#### 2486Actions

24875. Validate that pcrNum represents a legal PCR number. On error, return TPM\_BADINDEX.

24886. Map V1 to TPM\_STANY\_DATA

24897. Map L1 to V1 -> localityModifier

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24908. If the current locality, held in L1, is not selected in TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> pcrAttrib [pcrNum]. pcrExtendLocal, return TPM\_BAD\_LOCALITY

24929. Create H1 the TPM\_DIGEST of the SHA-1 session ensuring that hashData, if any, is added to the SHA-1 session

249410.Perform the actions of TPM\_Extend using H1 as the data and pcrNum as the PCR to 2495 extend

## 2496**13.5** TPM\_Sign

#### 2497Start of informative comment:

2498The Sign command signs data and returns the resulting digital signature.

2499The TPM does not allow TPM\_Sign with a TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY (AIK) because TPM\_Sign can 2500sign arbitrary data and could be used to fake a quote. (This could have been relaxed to 2501allow TPM\_Sign with an AIK if the signature scheme is \_INFO For an \_INFO key, the 2502metadata prevents TPM\_Sign from faking a quote.)

#### 2503End of informative comment.

### 2504Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	AM HM/		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Sign.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures.
5	4	2s	4	UINT32	areaToSignSize	The size of the areaToSign parameter
6	<b>\$</b>	3s	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	areaToSign	The value to sign
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

## 2505Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tuno	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Sign.
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The length of the returned digital signature
5	<b>\$</b>	48	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The resulting digital signature.
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

631 632

### 2506Description

2507The TPM MUST support all values of areaToSignSize that are legal for the defined signature 2508scheme and key size. The maximum value of areaToSignSize is determined by the defined 2509signature scheme and key size.

2510In the case of PKCS1v15\_SHA1 the areaToSignSize MUST be TPM\_DIGEST (the hash size of 2511a SHA-1 operation - see 8.5.1 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1). In the case of 2512PKCS1v15\_DER the maximum size of areaToSign is k-11 octets, where k is limited by the 2513key size (see TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_DER).

#### 2514Actions

- 25151. The TPM validates the AuthData to use the key pointed to by keyHandle.
- 25162. If the areaToSignSize is 0 the TPM returns TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 25173. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING or TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, if not
- 2518 return the error code TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 25194. The TPM verifies that the signature scheme and key size can properly sign the
- areaToSign parameter.
- 25215. If signature scheme is TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 then
- 2522 a. Validate that areaToSignSize is 20 return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error
- 2523 b. Set S1 to areaToSign
- 25246. Else if signature scheme is TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 DER then
- 2525 a. Validate that areaToSignSize is at least 11 bytes less than the key size, return
- 2526 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error
- b. Set S1 to areaToSign
- 25287. else if signature scheme is TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 INFO then
- 2529 a. Create S2 a TPM SIGN INFO structure
- 2530 b. Set S2 -> fixed to "SIGN"
- 2531 c. Set S2 -> replay to nonceOdd
- i. If nonceOdd is not present due to an unauthorized command return
- 2533 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 2534 d. Set S2 -> dataLen to areaToSignSize
- e. Set S2 -> data to areaToSign
- 2536 f. Set S1 to the SHA-1(S2)
- 25378. Else return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 25389. The TPM computes the signature, sig, using the key referenced by keyHandle using S1
- as the value to sign
- 254010. Return the computed signature in Sig

## 2541**13.6 TPM\_GetRandom**

### 2542 Start of informative comment:

2543TPM\_GetRandom returns the next bytesRequested bytes from the random number 2544generator to the caller.

2545It is recommended that a TPM implement the RNG in a manner that would allow it to return 2546RNG bytes such that the frequency of bytesRequested being more than the number of bytes 2547available is an infrequent occurrence.

#### 2548End of informative comment.

### 2549Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Hallie	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetRandom.
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	bytesRequested	Number of bytes to return

### 2550Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetRandom.
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	randomBytesSize	The number of bytes returned
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	randomBytes	The returned bytes

#### 2551Actions

- 25521. The TPM determines if amount bytesRequested is available from the TPM.
- 25532. Set randomBytesSize to the number of bytes available from the RNG. This number MAY
- be less than bytesRequested.
- 25553. Set randomBytes to the next randomBytesSize bytes from the RNG

## 2556**13.7** TPM\_StirRandom

#### 2557Start of informative comment:

2558TPM\_StirRandom adds entropy to the RNG state.

#### 2559 End of informative comment.

## 2560Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_StirRandom
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	dataSize	Number of bytes of input
5	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b></b>	BYTE[]	inData	Data to add entropy to RNG state

## 2561 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_StirRandom

## 2562Actions

25631. If dataSize is not less than 256 bytes, the TPM MAY return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.

25642. The TPM updates the state of the current RNG using the appropriate mixing function.

## 2565**13.8** TPM\_CertifyKey

#### 2566Start of informative comment:

2567The TPM\_CertifyKey operation allows one key to certify the public portion of another key.

2568A TPM identity key may be used to certify non-migratable keys but is not permitted to 2569certify migratory keys or certified migration keys. As such, it allows the TPM to make the 2570statement "this key is held in a TPM-shielded location, and it will never be revealed." For 2571this statement to have veracity, the Challenger must trust the policies used by the entity 2572that issued the identity and the maintenance policy of the TPM manufacturer.

2573Signing and legacy keys may be used to certify both migratable and non-migratable keys. 2574Then the usefulness of a certificate depends on the trust in the certifying key by the 2575recipient of the certificate.

2576The key to be certified must be loaded before TPM\_CertifyKey is called.

2577The determination to use the TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO or TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO2 on the output is 2578based on which PCRs and what localities the certified key is restricted to. A key to be 2579certified that does not have locality restrictions and which uses no PCRs greater than PCR 2580#15 will cause this command to return and sign a TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO structure, which 2581provides compatibility with V1.1 TPMs.

2582When this command is run to certify all other keys (those that use PCR #16 or higher, as 2583well as those limited by locality in any way), it will return and sign a TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO2 2584structure.

2585TPM\_CertifyKey does not support the case where (a) the certifying key requires a usage 2586authorization to be provided but (b) the key-to-be-certified does not. In such cases, 2587TPM\_CertifyKey2 must be used. TPM\_CertifyKey cannot be used to certify CMKs.

2588If a command tag (in the parameter array) specifies only one authorisation session, then the 2589TPM convention is that the first session listed is ignored (authDataUsage must be 2590TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER for this key) and the incoming session data is used for the second auth 2591session in the list. In TPM\_CertifyKey, the first session is the certifying key and the second 2592session is the key-to-be-certified. In TPM\_CertifyKey2, the first session is the key-to-be-2593certified and the second session is the certifying key.

2594The key handles of both the certifying key and the key to be certified are not included in the 2595HMAC protecting the command. This permits key handle virtualization (swapping of keys 2596in and out of the TPM that results in different key handles while at the same time 2597maintaining key identifiers of upper layer software). In environments where the interface to 2598the TPM is accessible by other parties, the key handles not being protected allows an 2599attacker to change the handle of the key to be certified. This can be avoided by processing 2600this command within a transport session and making sure that antiReplay indeed contains 2601a nonce.

2602End of informative comment.

# 2603Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifyKey
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	certHandle	Handle of the key to be used to certify the key.
5	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle of the key to be certified.
6	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	160 bits of externally supplied data (typically a nonce provided to prevent replay-attacks)
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	certAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for certHandle.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	certAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and certHandle. HMAC key: certKey.auth.
11	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	keyAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the key to be signed.
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	keylastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
12	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	keynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with keyAuthHandle
13	1_	4H2	1	BOOL	continueKeySession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
14	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and key to be signed. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.

## 2604Outgoing Operands and Sizes

Pai	ram	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	Sz	#	Sz	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifyKey
4	<>	3S	<b>\\$</b>	TPM_CERTIFY_INFO	certifyInfo	TPM_CERTIFY_INFO or TPM_CERTIFY_INFO2 structure that provides information relative to keyhandle
5	4	48	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
6	<>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The signature of certifyInfo
7	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag for cert key session
9	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters and parentHandle. HMAC key: certKey -> auth.
10	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	keyNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	keynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with keyAuthHandle
11	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueKeySession	Continue use flag for target key session
12	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest for the target key. HMAC key: key.auth.

- 26061. The TPM validates that the key pointed to by certHandle has a signature scheme of TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 or TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO
- 26082. Verify command and key AuthData values:
- 2609 a. If tag is TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH2\_COMMAND
- i. The TPM verifies the AuthData in certAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by certHandle, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- ii. The TPM verifies the AuthData in keyAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle, return TPM\_AUTH2FAIL on error
- 2614 b. else if tag is TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND
- i. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER for the key referenced by certHandle, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error.
- ii. The TPM verifies the AuthData in keyAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 2619 c. else if tag is TPM TAG RQU COMMAND
- i. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER for the key referenced by certHandle, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error.

657 <b>Co</b> 658 659	pyright © TCG  TPM Main Part 3 Commands Specification Version 1.2
2622 2623 2624	ii. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM_AUTH_NEVER or TPM_NO_READ_PUBKEY_AUTH for the key referenced by keyHandle, return TPM_AUTHFAIL on error.
26253.	If keyHandle -> payload is not TPM_PT_ASYM, return TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE.
26264. 2627	If the key pointed to by certHandle is an identity key (certHandle -> keyUsage is TPM_KEY_IDENTITY)
2628	a. If keyHandle -> keyFlags -> migratable is TRUE return TPM_MIGRATEFAIL
26295. 2630	Validate that certHandle -> keyUsage is TPM_KEY_SIGN, TPM_KEY_IDENTITY or TPM_KEY_LEGACY, if not return TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE
26316. 2632 2633	Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM_KEY_SIGN, TPM_KEY_STORAGE, TPM_KEY_IDENTITY, TPM_KEY_BIND or TPM_KEY_LEGACY, if not return TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE
26347. 2635	If keyHandle -> digestAtRelease requires the use of PCRs 16 or higher to calculate or if keyHandle -> localityAtRelease is not 0x1F
2636	a. Set V1 to 1.2
26378.	Else
2638	a. Set V1 to 1.1
26399.	If keyHandle -> pcrInfoSize is not 0
2640	a. If keyHandle -> keyFlags has pcrIgnoredOnRead set to FALSE
2641 2642 2643	i. Create a digestAtRelease according to the specified TPM_STCLEAR_DATA -> PCR registers and compare to keyHandle -> digestAtRelease and if a mismatch return TPM_WRONGPCRVAL
2644	ii. If specified validate any locality requests on error TPM_BAD_LOCALITY
2645	b. If V1 is 1.1
2646	i. Create C1 a TPM_CERTIFY_INFO structure
2647	ii. Fill in C1 with the information from the key pointed to by keyHandle
2648	iii. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfoSize to 44.
2649 2650	iv. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfo to a TPM_PCR_INFO structure properly filled out using the information from keyHandle.
2651	v. The TPM MUST set c1 -> digestAtCreation to 20 bytes of 0x00.
2652	c. Else
2653	i. Create C1 a TPM_CERTIFY_INFO2 structure
2654	ii. Fill in C1 with the information from the key pointed to by keyHandle

- e intormation from the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 2655 iii. Set C1 -> pcrInfoSize to the size of an appropriate TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_SHORT 2656 structure.
- iv. Set C1 -> pcrInfo to a properly filled out TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_SHORT structure, 2657 using the information from keyHandle. 2658
- v. Set C1 -> migrationAuthoritySize to 0 2659

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### 266010.Else

- 2661 a. Create C1 a TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO structure
- b. Fill in C1 with the information from the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 2663 c. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfoSize to 0
- 266411.Create TPM\_DIGEST H1 which is the SHA-1 hash of keyHandle -> pubKey -> key. Note
- 2665 that <key> is the actual public modulus, and does not include any structure formatting.
- 266612. Set C1 -> pubKeyDigest to H1
- 266713. The TPM copies the antiReplay parameter to c1 -> data.
- 266814. The TPM sets certifyInfo to C1.
- 266915. The TPM creates m1, a message digest formed by taking the SHA-1 of c1.
- 2670 a. The TPM then computes a signature using certHandle -> sigScheme. The resulting
- signed blob is returned in outData.

## 267213.9 TPM\_CertifyKey2

### 2673Start of informative comment:

2674This command is based on TPM\_CertifyKey, but includes the ability to certify a Certifiable 2675Migration Key (CMK), which requires extra input parameters.

2676TPM\_CertifyKey2 always produces a TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO2 structure.

2677TPM\_CertifyKey2 does not support the case where (a) the key-to-be-certified requires a 2678usage authorization to be provided but (b) the certifying key does not.

2679If a command tag (in the parameter array) specifies only one authorisation session, then the 2680TPM convention is that the first session listed is ignored (authDataUsage must be 2681TPM\_NO\_READ\_PUBKEY\_AUTH or TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER for this key) and the incoming 2682session data is used for the second auth session in the list. In TPM\_CertifyKey2, the first 2683session is the key to be certified and the second session is the certifying key.

2684The key handles of both the certifying key and the key to be certified are not included in the 2685HMAC protecting the command. This permits key handle virtualization (swapping of keys 2686in and out of the TPM that results in different key handles while at the same time 2687maintaining key identifiers of upper layer software). In environments where the interface to 2688the TPM is accessible by other parties, the key handles not being protected allows an 2689attacker to change the handle of the key to be certified. This can be avoided by processing 2690this command within a transport session and making sure that antiReplay indeed contains 2691a nonce.

### 2692 End of informative comment.

### 2693Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		T	Name	December 1
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifyKey2
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle of the key to be certified.
5	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	certHandle	Handle of the key to be used to certify the key.
6	20	28	20	TPM_DIGEST	migrationPubDigest	The digest of a TPM_MSA_COMPOSITE structure, containing at least one public key of a Migration Authority
7	20	3S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	160 bits of externally supplied data (typically a nonce provided to prevent replay-attacks)
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	keyAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the key to be signed.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	keylastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	keynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with keyAuthHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueKeySession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and key to be signed. HMAC key: key.usageAuth.
12	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	certAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for certHandle.
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs

13	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
14	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
15	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	certAuth	Authorization HMAC key: certKey.auth.

## 2694Outgoing Operands and Sizes

Pai	ram	HMAC		Tuno	Nama	Description
#	Sz	#	Sz	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifyKey2
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b></b>	TPM_CERTIFY_INFO2	certifyInfo	TPM_CERTIFY_INFO2 relative to keyHandle
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
6	<b></b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The signed public key.
7	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	keyNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	keyNonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	keyContinueAuthSession	Continue use flag for cert key session
9	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	keyResAuth	Authorization HMAC key: keyHandle -> auth.
10	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	certNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	AuthLastNonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with certAuthHandle
11	1	4H2	1	BOOL	CertContinueAuthSession	Continue use flag for cert key session
12	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	certResAuth	Authorization HMAC key: certHandle -> auth.

- 26961. The TPM validates that the key pointed to by certHandle has a signature scheme of TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 SHA1 or TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 INFO
- 26982. Verify command and key AuthData values:
- 2699 a. If tag is TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH2\_COMMAND
- i. The TPM verifies the AuthData in keyAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- ii. The TPM verifies the AuthData in certAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by certHandle, return TPM\_AUTH2FAIL on error
- b. else if tag is TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND
- i. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER or TPM\_NO\_READ\_PUBKEY\_AUTH for the key referenced by keyHandle, return TPM AUTHFAIL on error
- ii. The TPM verifies the AuthData in certAuthHandle provides authorization to use the key pointed to by certHandle, return TPM\_AUTH2FAIL on error
- 2710 c. else if tag is TPM TAG RQU COMMAND
- i. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER or TPM\_NO\_READ\_PUBKEY\_AUTH for the key referenced by keyHandle, return TPM AUTHFAIL on error

- ii. Verify that authDataUsage is TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER for the key referenced by certHandle, return TPM AUTHFAIL on error.
- 27163. If the key pointed to by certHandle is an identity key (certHandle -> keyUsage is 2717 TPM KEY IDENTITY)
- 2718 a. If keyHandle -> keyFlags -> migratable is TRUE and [keyHandle -> keyFlags->
- 2719 migrateAuthority is FALSE or (keyHandle -> payload != TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED
- 2720 and keyHandle -> payload != TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_EXTERNAL)] return
- 2721 TPM MIGRATEFAIL
- 27224. Validate that certHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY or
- 2723 TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, if not return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 27245. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE,
- 2725 TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, TPM\_KEY\_BIND or TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, if not return
- 2726 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 27276. The TPM SHALL create a c1 a TPM\_CERTIFY\_INFO2 structure from the key pointed to
- 2728 by keyHandle
- 27297. Create TPM DIGEST H1 which is the SHA-1 hash of keyHandle -> pubKey -> key. Note
- that <key> is the actual public modulus, and does not include any structure formatting.
- 27318. Set C1 -> pubKeyDigest to H1
- 27329. Copy the antiReplay parameter to c1 -> data
- 273310. Copy other keyHandle parameters into C1
- 273411.If keyHandle -> payload == TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED or
- 2735 TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_EXTERNAL
- 2736 a. create this PubKey, a TPM\_PUBKEY structure containing the public key, algorithm
- 2737 and parameters corresponding to keyHandle
- 2738 b. Verify that the migration authorization is valid for this key
- i. Create M2 a TPM CMK MIGAUTH structure
- ii. Set M2 -> msaDigest to migrationPubDigest
- 2741 iii. Set M2 -> pubkeyDigest to SHA-1[thisPubKey]
- iv. Verify that [keyHandle -> migrationAuth] == HMAC(M2) signed by using
- 2743 tpmProof as the secret and return error TPM\_MA\_SOURCE on mismatch
- 2744 c. Set C1 -> migrationAuthority = SHA-1(migrationPubDigest | | keyHandle -> payload)
- 2745 d. if keyHandle -> payload == TPM PT MIGRATE RESTRICTED
- i. Set C1 -> payloadType = TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_RESTRICTED
- e. if keyHandle -> payload == TPM\_PT\_MIGRATE\_EXTERNAL
- i. Set C1 -> payloadType = TPM PT MIGRATE EXTERNAL
- 274912.Else
- 2750 a. set C1 -> migrationAuthority = NULL
- b. set C1 -> migrationAuthoritySize =0

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- 2752 c. Set C1 -> payloadType = TPM PT ASYM
- 275313. If keyHandle -> pcrInfoSize is not 0
- 2754 a. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfoSize to match the pcrInfoSize from the keyHandle 2755 key.
- 2756 b. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfo to match the pcrInfo from the keyHandle key
- 2757 c. If keyHandle -> keyFlags has pcrIgnoredOnRead set to FALSE
- 2758 i. Create a digestAtRelease according to the specified TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> 2759 PCR registers and compare to keyHandle -> digestAtRelease and if a mismatch 2760 return TPM WRONGPCRVAL
- 2761 ii. If specified validate any locality requests on error TPM\_BAD\_LOCALITY

276214.Else

- 2763 a. The TPM MUST set c1 -> pcrInfoSize to 0
- 276415. The TPM creates m1, a message digest formed by taking the SHA-1 of c1
- 2765 a. The TPM then computes a signature using certHandle -> sigScheme. The resulting 2766 signed blob is returned in outData

## 276714. Endorsement Key Handling

### 2768Start of informative comment:

2769There are two create EK commands. The first matches the 1.1 functionality. The second 2770provides the mechanism to enable revokeEK.

2771The TPM and platform manufacturer decide on the inclusion or exclusion of the ability to 2772execute revokeEK.

2773The restriction to have the TPM generate the EK does not remove the manufacturing option 2774to "squirt" the EK. During manufacturing, the TPM does not enforce all protections or 2775requirements; hence, the restriction on only TPM generation of the EK is also not in force.

### 2776End of informative comment.

27771. A TPM SHALL NOT install an EK unless generated on the TPM by execution of 2778 TPM\_CreateEndorsementKeyPair or TPM\_CreateRevocableEK

## 2779**14.1 TPM\_CreateEndorsementKeyPair**

#### 2780Start of informative comment:

2781This command creates the TPM endorsement key. It returns a failure code if an 2782endorsement key already exists.

### 2783 End of informative comment.

## 2784Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Arbitrary data
5	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_KEY_PARMS	keyInfo	Information about key to be created, this includes all algorithm parameters

## 2785 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>\( \)</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubEndorsementKey	The public endorsement key
5	20	4S	20	TPM_DIGEST	checksum	Hash of pubEndorsementKey and antiReplay

- 27871. If an EK already exists, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 27882. Validate the keyInfo parameters for the key description
- a. If the algorithm type is RSA the key length MUST be a minimum of 2048. For interoperability the key length SHOULD be 2048
- b. If the algorithm type is other than RSA the strength provided by the key MUST be comparable to RSA 2048
- 2793 c. The other parameters of keyInfo (encScheme, sigScheme, etc.) are ignored.
- 27943. Create a key pair called the "endorsement key pair" using a TPM-protected capability.
- 2795 The type and size of key are that indicated by keyInfo. Set encScheme to
- 2796 TPM ES RSAESOAEP SHA1 MGF1.
- 27974. Create checksum by performing SHA-1 on the concatenation of (PUBEK | | antiReplay)
- 27985. Store the PRIVEK
- 27996. Create TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmDAASeed from the TPM RNG

- 28007. Create TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> daaProof from the TPM RNG
- 28018. Create TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> daaBlobKey from the TPM RNG
- 28029. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> CEKPUsed to TRUE
- 280310.Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> enableRevokeEK to FALSE

## 280414.2 TPM CreateRevocableEK

### 2805Start of informative comment:

2806This command creates the TPM endorsement key. It returns a failure code if an 2807endorsement key already exists. The TPM vendor may have a separate mechanism to create 2808the EK and "squirt" the value into the TPM.

2809The input parameters specify whether the EK is capable of being reset, whether the 2810AuthData value to reset the EK will be generated by the TPM, and the new AuthData value 2811itself if it is not to be generated by the TPM. The output parameter is the new AuthData 2812value that must be used when resetting the EK (if it is capable of being reset).

2813The command TPM\_RevokeTrust must be used to reset an EK (if it is capable of being 2814reset).

2815Owner authorisation is unsuitable for authorizing resetting of an EK: someone with 2816Physical Presence can remove a genuine Owner, install a new Owner, and revoke the EK. 2817The genuine Owner can reinstall, but the platform will have lost its original attestation and 2818may not be trusted by challengers. Therefore if a password is to be used to revoke an EK, it 2819must be a separate password, given to the genuine Owner.

2820In v1.2 an OEM has extra choices when creating EKs.

2821a) An OEM could manufacture all of its TPMs with enableRevokeEK==TRUE.

2822If the OEM has tracked the EKreset passwords for these TPMs, the OEM can give the 2823passwords to customers. The customers can use the passwords as supplied, change the 2824passwords, or clear the EKs and create new EKs with new passwords.

2825If EKreset passwords are random values, the OEM can discard those values and not give 2826them to customers. There is then a low probability (statistically zero) chance of a local DOS 2827attack to reset the EK by guessing the password. The chance of a remote DOS attack is zero 2828because Physical Presence must also be asserted to use TPM\_RevokeTrust.

2829b) An OEM could manufacture some of its TPMs with enableRevokeEK==FALSE. Then the 2830EK can never be revoked, and the chance of even a local DOS attack on the EK is 2831eliminated.

### 2832 End of informative comment.

2833This is an optional command

## 2834Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateRevocableEK
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Arbitrary data
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>♦</b>	TPM_KEY_PARMS	keyInfo	Information about key to be created, this includes all algorithm parameters
6	1	4S	1	BOOL	generateReset	If TRUE use TPM RNG to generate EKreset. If FALSE use the passed value inputEKreset
7	20	5S	20	TPM_NONCE	inputEKreset	The authorization value to be used with TPM_RevokeTrust if generateReset==FALSE, else the parameter is present but ignored

### 2835Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type Name	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	ivame	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateRevocableEK
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>\</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubEndorsementKey	The public endorsement key
5	20	4S	20	TPM_DIGEST	checksum	Hash of pubEndorsementKey and antiReplay
6	20	5S	20	TPM_NONCE	outputEKreset	The AuthData value to use TPM_RevokeTrust

- 28371. If an EK already exists, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 28382. Perform the actions of TPM\_CreateEndorsementKeyPair, if any errors return with error
- 28393. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> enableRevokeEK to TRUE
- 2840 a. If generateReset is TRUE then
- i. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> EKreset to the next value from the TPM RNG
- 2842 b. Else
- i. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> EKreset to inputEKreset
- 28444. Return PUBEK, checksum and Ekreset
- 28455. The outputEKreset AuthData is sent in the clear. There is no uniqueness on the TPM
- available to actually perform encryption or use an encrypted channel. The assumption is
- 2847 that this operation is occurring in a controlled environment and sending the value in the
- 2848 clear is acceptable.

## 284914.3 TPM RevokeTrust

#### 2850Start of informative comment:

2851This command clears the EK and sets the TPM back to a pure default state. The generation 2852of the AuthData value occurs during the generation of the EK. It is the responsibility of the 2853EK generator to properly protect and disseminate the RevokeTrust AuthData.

### 2854End of informative comment.

2855This is an optional command

## 2856Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_RevokeTrust
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	EKReset	The value that will be matched to EK Reset

## 2857Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_RevokeTrust

- 28591. The TPM MUST validate that TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> enableRevokeEK is TRUE,
- 2860 return TPM PERMANENTEK on error
- 28612. The TPM MUST validate that the EKReset matches TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> EKReset
- return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error.
- 28633. Ensure that physical presence is being asserted
- 28644. Perform the actions of TPM\_OwnerClear (excepting the command authentication)
- 2865 a. NV items with the publinfo -> nvIndex D value set MUST be deleted. This changes the
- 2866 TPM OwnerClear handling of the same NV areas
- 2867 b. Set TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> nvLocked to FALSE
- 28685. Invalidate TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmDAASeed
- 28696. Invalidate TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> daaProof
- 28707. Invalidate TPM PERMANENT DATA -> daaBlobKey
- 28718. Invalidate the EK and any internal state associated with the EK

## 2872**14.4** TPM ReadPubek

### 2873Start of informative comment:

2874Return the endorsement key public portion. This value should have controls placed upon 2875access, as it is a privacy sensitive value.

2876The readPubek flag is set to FALSE by TPM\_TakeOwnership and set to TRUE by 2877TPM\_OwnerClear, thus mirroring if a TPM Owner is present.

2878End of informative comment.

## 2879Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadPubek
4	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Arbitrary data

## 2880Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type Name	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadPubek
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>♦</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubEndorsementKey	The public endorsement key
5	20	4S	20	TPM_DIGEST	checksum	Hash of pubEndorsementKey and antiReplay

## 2881 Description

2882This command returns the PUBEK.

### 2883Actions

2884The TPM\_ReadPubek command SHALL

- 28851. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> readPubek is FALSE return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 28862. If no EK is present the TPM MUST return TPM\_NO\_ENDORSEMENT
- 28873. Create checksum by performing SHA-1 on the concatenation of (pubEndorsementKey | | 2888 antiReplay).
- 28894. Export the PUBEK and checksum.

## 289014.5 TPM\_OwnerReadInternalPub

### 2891Start of informative comment:

2892A TPM Owner authorized command that returns the public portion of the EK or SRK.

2893The keyHandle parameter is included in the incoming session authorization to prevent 2894alteration of the value, causing a different key to be read. Unlike most key handles, which 2895can be mapped by higher layer software, this key handle has only two fixed values.

### 2896End of informative comment.

## 2897Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerReadInternalPub
4	4	2S	4	TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle for either PUBEK or SRK
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2898Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerReadInternalPub
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	publicPortion	The public portion of the requested key
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 2899Actions

29001. Validate the parameters and TPM Owner AuthData for this command

29012. If keyHandle is TPM\_KH\_EK

2902 a. Set publicPortion to PUBEK

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- 29033. Else If keyHandle is TPM\_KH\_SRK
- 2904 a. Set publicPortion to the TPM\_PUBKEY of the SRK
- 29054. Else return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 29065. Export the public key of the referenced key

## 290715. Identity Creation and Activation

## 290815.1 TPM\_MakeIdentity

### 2909 Start of informative comment:

2910Generate a new Attestation Identity Key (AIK).

2911labelPrivCADigest identifies the privacy CA that the owner expects to be the target CA for 2912the AIK. The selection is not enforced by the TPM. It is advisory only. It is included 2913because the TSS cannot be trusted to send the AIK to the correct privacy CA. The privacy 2914CA can use this parameter to validate that it is the target privacy CA and label intended by 2915the TPM owner at the time the key was created. The label can be used to indicate an 2916application purpose.

### 2917End of informative comment.

## 2918Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_MakeIdentity.
4	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	identityAuth	Encrypted usage AuthData for the new identity
5	20	3S	20	TPM_CHOSENID_HASH	labelPrivCADigest	The digest of the identity label and privacy CA chosen for the AIK
6	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_KEY	idKeyParams	Structure containing all parameters of new identity key. pubKey.keyLength & idKeyParams.encData are both 0 MAY be TPM_KEY12
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	srkAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for SRK authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	srkLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	srknonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with srkAuthHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueSrkSession	Ignored
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	srkAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and the SRK. HMAC key: srk.usageAuth.
11	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication. Session type MUST be OSAP.
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
12	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
13	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
14	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2919Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal:TPM_ORD_MakeIdentity.
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_KEY	idKey	The newly created identity key. MAY be TPM_KEY12
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	identityBindingSize	The used size of the output area for identityBinding
6	<b>\$</b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	identityBinding	Signature of TPM_IDENTITY_CONTENTS using idKey.private.
7	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	srkNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM.
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	srknonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with srkAuthHandle
8	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueSrkSession	Continue use flag. Fixed value of FALSE
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	srkAuth	The authorization session digest used for the outputs and srkAuth session. HMAC key: srk.usageAuth.
10	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag. Fixed value of FALSE
12	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2920Description

2921The public key of the new TPM identity SHALL be identityPubKey. The private key of the 2922new TPM identity SHALL be tpm\_signature\_key.

## 2923Properties of the new identity

Туре	Name	Description
TPM_PUBKEY	identityPubKey	This SHALL be the public key of a previously unused asymmetric key pair.
TPM_STORE_ASYMKEY	tpm_signature_key	This SHALL be the private key that forms a pair with identityPubKey and SHALL be extant only in a TPM-shielded location.

2924

2925This capability also generates a TPM\_KEY containing the tpm\_signature\_key.

2926If identityPubKey is stored on a platform it SHALL exist only in storage to which access is 2927controlled and is available to authorized entities.

2928The signing of TPM\_ID\_CONTENTS is not an authorized use of the key. The 2929TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_xxx "...AtRelease" values are not validated.

### 2930Actions

2931A Trusted Platform Module that receives a valid TPM\_MakeIdentity command SHALL do the 2932following:

29331. Validate the idKeyParams parameters for the key description

- a. If the algorithm type is RSA, the key length MUST be a minimum of 2048 and MUST
- use the default exponent. For interoperability the key length SHOULD be 2048.
- 2936 b. If the algorithm type is other than RSA the strength provided by the key MUST be
- 2937 comparable to RSA 2048
- 2938 c. If the TPM is not designed to create a key of the requested type, return the error code
- 2939 TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 2940 d. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE then
- i. If authDataUsage specifies TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- 29422. Use authHandle to verify that the Owner authorized all TPM\_MakeIdentity input 2943 parameters.
- 29443. Use srkAuthHandle to verify that the SRK owner authorized all TPM\_MakeIdentity input parameters.
- 29464. Verify that idKeyParams -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY. If it is not, return 2947 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 29485. Verify that idKeyParams -> keyFlags -> migratable is FALSE. If it is not, return 2949 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 29506. Create a1 by decrypting identityAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 29517. Set continueAuthSession and continueSRKSession to FALSE.
- 29528. Determine the structure version
- 2953 a. If idKeyParams -> tag is TPM TAG KEY12
- 2954 i. Set V1 to 2
- ii. Create idKey a TPM\_KEY12 structure using idKeyParams as the default values for the structure
- 2957 b. If idKeyParams -> ver is 1.1
- 2958 i. Set V1 to 1
- 2959 ii. Create idKey a TPM\_KEY structure using idKeyParams as the default values for the structure
- 29619. Set the digestAtCreation values for pcrInfo
- a. For TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG include the locality of the current command
- 296310. Create an asymmetric key pair (identityPubKey and tpm\_signature\_key) using a TPM-
- protected capability, in accordance with the algorithm specified in idKeyParams
- 296511.Ensure that the AuthData information in A1 is properly stored in the idKey as 2966 usageAuth.
- 296712. Attach identityPubKey and tpm\_signature\_key to idKey
- 296813. Set idKey -> migrationAuth to TPM PERMANENT DATA-> tpmProof
- 296914. Ensure that all TPM\_PAYLOAD\_TYPE structures identify this key as TPM\_PT\_ASYM
- 297015. Encrypt the private portion of idKey using the SRK as the parent key

- 297116.Create a TPM\_IDENTITY\_CONTENTS structure named idContents using 2972 labelPrivCADigest and the information from idKey
- 297317.Sign idContents using tpm\_signature\_key and TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1. Store 2974 the result in identityBinding.

## 2975**15.2 TPM\_ActivateIdentity**

#### 2976Start of informative comment:

2977The purpose of TPM\_ActivateIdentity is to twofold. The first purpose is to obtain assurance 2978that the credential in the TPM\_SYM\_CA\_ATTESTATION is for this TPM. The second purpose 2979is to obtain the session key used to encrypt the TPM\_IDENTITY\_CREDENTIAL.

2980This is an extension to the 1.1 functionality of TPM\_ActivateIdentity. The blob sent to from 2981the CA can be in the 1.1 format or the 1.2 format. The TPM determines the type from the 2982size or version information in the blob.

2983TPM\_ActivateIdentity checks that the symmetric session key corresponds to a TPM-identity 2984before releasing that session key.

2985Only the Owner of the TPM has the privilege of activating a TPM identity. The Owner is 2986required to authorize the TPM\_ActivateIdentity command. The owner may authorize the 2987command using either the TPM\_OIAP or TPM\_OSAP authorization protocols.

2988The creator of the ActivateIdentity package can specify if any PCR values are to be checked 2989before releasing the session key.

### 2990End of informative comment.

## 2991Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ActivateIdentity
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	idKeyHandle	Identity key to be activated
5	4	2S	4	UINT32	blobSize	Size of encrypted blob from CA
6	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	blob	The encrypted ASYM_CA_CONTENTS or TPM_EK_BLOB
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	idKeyAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for ID key authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	idKeyLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	idKeynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with idKeyAuthHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueldKeySession	Continue usage flag for idKeyAuthHandle.
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	idKeyAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and ID key. HMAC key: idKey.usageAuth.
11	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
12	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
13	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
14	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 2992Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal:TPM_ORD_ActivateIdentity
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b></b>	TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY	symmetricKey	The decrypted symmetric key.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	idKeyNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM.
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	idKeynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with idKeyAuthHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueldKeySession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	idKeyAuth	The authorization session digest used for the returned parameters and idKeyAuth session. HMAC key: idKey.usageAuth.
8	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
10	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 2993 Description

- 29941. The command TPM\_ActivateIdentity activates a TPM identity created using the command 2995 TPM MakeIdentity.
- 29962. The command assumes the availability of the private key associated with the identity.
- The command will verify the association between the keys during the process.
- 29983. The command will decrypt the input blob and extract the session key and verify the
- 2999 connection between the public and private keys. The input blob can be in 1.1 or 1.2
- 3000 format.

- 3002A Trusted Platform Module that receives a valid TPM\_ActivateIdentity command SHALL do 3003the following:
- 30041. Using the authHandle field, validate the owner's AuthData to execute the command and all of the incoming parameters.
- 30062. Using the idKeyAuthHandle, validate the AuthData to execute command and all of the incoming parameters
- 30083. Validate that the idKey is the public key of a valid TPM identity by checking that
- 3009 idKeyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on
- 3010 mismatch
- 30114. Create H1 the digest of a TPM\_PUBKEY derived from idKey
- 30125. Decrypt blob creating B1 using PRIVEK as the decryption key
- 30136. Determine the type and version of B1

758

- 3014 a. If B1 -> tag is TPM TAG EK BLOB then
- 3015 i. B1 is a TPM EK BLOB
- b. Else 3016
- 3017 i. B1 is a TPM\_ASYM\_CA\_CONTENTS. As there is no tag for this structure it is possible for the TPM to make a mistake here but other sections of the structure 3018
- 3019 undergo validation
- 30207. If B1 is a version 1.1 TPM\_ASYM\_CA\_CONTENTS then
- 3021 a. Compare H1 to B1 -> idDigest on mismatch return TPM BAD PARAMETER
- 3022 b. Set K1 to B1 -> sessionKey
- 30238. If B1 is a TPM EK BLOB then
- 3024 a. Validate that B1 -> ekType is TPM\_EK\_TYPE\_ACTIVATE, return TPM\_BAD\_TYPE if
- 3025 not.
- 3026 b. Assign A1 as a TPM EK BLOB ACTIVATE structure from B1 -> blob
- 3027 c. Compare H1 to A1 -> idDigest on mismatch return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 3028 d. If A1 -> pcrSelection is not NULL
- 3029 i. Compute a composite hash C1 using the PCR selection A1 -> pcrSelection
- 3030 ii. Compare C1 to A1 pcrInfo->digestAtRelease and return
- 3031 TPM WRONGPCRVAL on a mismatch
- 3032 e. If A1 -> pcrInfo specifies a locality ensure that the appropriate locality has
- 3033 been asserted, return TPM BAD LOCALITY on error
- 3034 f. Set K1 to A1 -> symmetricKey
- 30359. Return K1

# 303616. Integrity Collection and Reporting

## 3037Start of informative comment:

3038This section deals with what commands have direct access to the PCR

### 3039End of informative comment.

- 30401. The TPM SHALL only allow the following commands to alter the value of 3041 TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR
- 3042 a. TPM\_Extend
- 3043 b. TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend
- 3044 c. TPM\_Startup
- 3045 d. TPM\_PCR\_Reset

## **304616.1 TPM\_Extend**

### 3047Start of informative comment:

3048This adds a new measurement to a PCR

### 3049End of informative comment.

### 3050Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Extend.
4	4	2S	4	TPM_PCRINDEX	pcrNum	The PCR to be updated.
5	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	inDigest	The 160 bit value representing the event to be recorded.

### 3051Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Extend.
4	20	3S	20	TPM_PCRVALUE	outDigest	The PCR value after execution of the command.

### 3052 Description

3053Add a measurement value to a PCR

- 30551. Validate that pcrNum represents a legal PCR number. On error, return TPM\_BADINDEX.
- 30562. Map L1 to TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> localityModifier
- 30573. Map P1 to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> pcrAttrib [pcrNum]. pcrExtendLocal
- 30584. If, for the value of L1, the corresponding bit is not set in the bit map P1, return
- 3059 TPM BAD LOCALITY
- 30605. Create c1 by concatenating (TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[pcrNum] | | inDigest). This
- takes the current PCR value and concatenates the inDigest parameter.
- 30626. Create h1 by performing a SHA-1 digest of c1.
- 30637. Store h1 to TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[pcrNum]
- 30648. If TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> disable is TRUE or TPM STCLEAR FLAGS -> deactivated
- 3065 is TRUE

3066 a. Set outDigest to 20 bytes of 0x00

30679. Else

3068 a. Set outDigest to h1

## **306916.2 TPM\_PCRRead**

### 3070Start of informative comment:

3071The TPM\_PCRRead operation provides non-cryptographic reporting of the contents of a 3072named PCR.

### 3073End of informative comment.

## **3074Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	vpe Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PCRRead.
4	4	2S	4	TPM_PCRINDEX	pcrIndex	Index of the PCR to be read

## **3075Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	IVAIIIG	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PCRRead.
4	20	3S	20	TPM_PCRVALUE	outDigest	The current contents of the named PCR

### 3076Description

3077The TPM\_PCRRead operation returns the current contents of the named register to the 3078caller.

### 3079Actions

30801. Validate that pcrIndex represents a legal PCR number. On error, return 3081 TPM\_BADINDEX.

30822. Set outDigest to TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[pcrIndex]

30833. Return TPM SUCCESS

3084

#### 3085**16.3 TPM Quote**

### 3086Start of informative comment:

3087The TPM\_Quote operation provides cryptographic reporting of PCR values. A loaded key is 3088 required for operation. TPM Quote uses a key to sign a statement that names the current 3089 value of a chosen PCR and externally supplied data (which may be a nonce supplied by a 3090Challenger).

3091The term "ExternalData" is used because an important use of TPM\_Quote is to provide a 3092digital signature on arbitrary data, where the signature includes the PCR values of the 3093 platform at time of signing. Hence the "ExternalData" is not just for anti-replay purposes, 3094although it is (of course) used for that purpose in an integrity challenge.

3095TPM Quote should not use a TPM KEY SIGNING, because there is no way for the remote 3096party to tell whether TPM Quote or TPM Sign created the signature. The exception is a 3097TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING key with the \_INFO signature scheme, because the metadata 3098differentiates TPM\_Sign from TPM\_Quote.

### 3099End of informative comment.

### 3100Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Quote.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can sign the PCR values.
5	20	28	20	TPM_NONCE	externalData	160 bits of externally supplied data (typically a nonce provided by a server to prevent replay-attacks)
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PCR_SELECTION	targetPCR	The indices of the PCRs that are to be reported.
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and keyHandle. HMAC key: key -> usageAuth.

## 3101Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Quote.
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_PCR_COMPOSITE	pcrData	A structure containing the same indices as targetPCR, plus the corresponding current PCR values.
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The used size of the output area for the signature
6	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The signed data blob.
7	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: Key -> usageAuth.

- 31031. The TPM MUST validate the AuthData to use the key pointed to by keyHandle.
- 31042. Validate that keyHandle -> sigScheme is TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 or
- 3105 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO, if not return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_SIG.
- 31063. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, or
- 3107 TPM KEY LEGACY, if not return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 31084. Validate targetPCR
- 3109 a. targetPCR is a valid TPM PCR SELECTION structure
- 3110 b. On errors return TPM\_INVALID\_PCR\_INFO
- 31115. Create H1 a SHA-1 hash of a TPM\_PCR\_COMPOSITE using the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA ->
- 3112 PCR indicated by targetPCR -> pcrSelect
- 31136. Create Q1 a TPM\_QUOTE\_INFO structure
- 3114 a. Set O1 -> version to 1.1.0.0
- 3115 b. Set Q1 -> fixed to "QUOT"
- 3116 c. Set Q1 -> digestValue to H1
- 3117 d. Set Q1 -> externalData to externalData
- 31187. Sign SHA-1 hash of Q1 using keyHandle as the signature key
- 31198. Return the signature in sig

## 3120**16.4** TPM PCR Reset

### 3121Start of informative comment:

- 3122For PCR with the pcrReset attribute set to TRUE, this command resets the PCR back to the
- 3123default value, this mimics the actions of TPM\_Init. The PCR may have restrictions as to
- 3124which locality can perform the reset operation.
- 3125Sending a null perSelection results in an error is due to the requirement that the command
- 3126actually do something. If perSelection is null there are no PCR to reset and the command
- 3127would then do nothing.
- 3128For PCR that are resettable, the presence of a Trusted Operating System (TOS) can change
- 3129the behavior of TPM\_PCR\_Reset. The following pseudo code shows how the behavior
- 3130changes
- 3131At TPM\_Startup
- 3132 If TPM\_PCR\_ATTRIBUTES->pcrReset is FALSE
- 3133 Set PCR to 0x00...00
- 3134 Else
- 3135 Set PCR to 0xFF...FF
- 3136At TPM\_PCR\_Reset
- 3137 If TPM\_PCR\_ATTRIBUTES->pcrReset is TRUE
- 3138 If TOSPresent
- 3139 Set PCR to 0x00...00
- 3140 Else
- 3141 Set PCR to 0xFF...FF
- 3142 Else
- 3143 Return error
- 3144The above pseudocode is for example only, for the details of a specific platform, the reader
- 3145 must review the platform specific specification. The purpose of the above pseudocode is to
- 3146show that both pcrReset and the TOSPresent bit control the value in use to when the PCR
- 3147resets.

#### 3148End of informative comment.

## 3149Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PCR_Reset
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	2S	<b>&gt;</b>	TPM_PCR_SELECTION	pcrSelection	The PCR's to reset

## 3150Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_PCR_Reset

## 3151 **Description**

- 3152This command resets PCR values back to the default value. The command MUST validate 3153that all PCR registers that are selected are available to be reset before resetting any PCR.
- 3154This command MUST either reset all selected PCR registers or none of the PCR registers.

- 31561. Validate that pcrSelection is valid
- 3157 a. is a valid TPM\_PCR\_SELECTION structure
- 3158 b. pcrSelection -> pcrSelect is non-zero
- 3159 c. On errors return TPM INVALID PCR INFO
- 31602. Map L1 to TPM\_STANY\_FLAGS -> localityModifier
- 31613. For each PCR selected perform the following
- 3162 a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> pcrAttrib[pcrIndex].pcrReset is FALSE, return
- 3163 TPM NOTRESETABLE
- 3164 b. If, for the value L1, the corresponding bit is clear in the bit map
- 3165 TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> pcrAttrib[pcrIndex].pcrResetLocal, return TPM\_NOTLOCAL
- 31664. For each PCR selected perform the following
- a. The PCR MAY only reset to 0x00...00 or 0xFF...FF
- 3168 b. The logic to determine which value to use MUST be described by a platform specific
- 3169 specification

#### 3170**16.5 TPM Quote2**

### 3171Start of informative comment:

- 3172The TPM\_Quote2 operation provides cryptographic reporting of PCR values. A loaded key is 3173required for operation. TPM Quote2 uses a key to sign a statement that names the current 3174 value of a chosen PCR and externally supplied data (which may be a nonce supplied by a 3175Challenger).
- 3176The term "externalData" is used because an important use of TPM\_Quote2 is to provide a 3177digital signature on arbitrary data, where the signature includes the PCR values of the 3178 platform at time of signing. Hence the "external Data" is not just for anti-replay purposes, 3179although it is (of course) used for that purpose in an integrity challenge.
- 3180TPM\_Quote2 differs from TPM\_Quote in that TPM\_Quote2 uses TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_SHORT to 3181hold information relative to the PCR registers. TPM PCR INFO SHORT includes locality 3182information to provide the requestor a more complete view of the current platform 3183 configuration.

### 3184End of informative comment.

## 3185Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Quote2
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can sign the PCR values.
5	20	28	20	TPM_NONCE	externalData	160 bits of externally supplied data (typically a nonce provided by a server to prevent replay-attacks)
6	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PCR_SELECTION	targetPCR	The indices of the PCRs that are to be reported.
7	1	4S	1	BOOL	addVersion	When TRUE add TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO to the output
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and keyHandle. HMAC key: key -> usageAuth.

## 3186Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyma	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Quote2
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT	pcrData	The value created and signed for the quote
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	versionInfoSize	Size of the version info
6	<b>\$</b>	5S	<b>\$</b>	TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO	versionInfo	The version info
7	4	6S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The used size of the output area for the signature
8	<b>\$</b>	7S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The signed data blob.
9	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: Key -> usageAuth.

- 31881. The TPM MUST validate the AuthData to use the key pointed to by keyHandle.
- 31892. Validate that keyHandle -> sigScheme is TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 or
- 3190 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO, if not return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_SIG.
- 31913. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, or
- 3192 TPM KEY LEGACY, if not return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 31934. Validate targetPCR is a valid TPM\_PCR\_SELECTION structure, on errors return
- 3194 TPM\_INVALID\_PCR\_INFO
- 31955. Create H1 a SHA-1 hash of a TPM PCR COMPOSITE using the TPM STCLEAR DATA ->
- 3196 PCR[] indicated by targetPCR -> pcrSelect
- 31976. Create S1 a TPM PCR INFO SHORT
- 3198 a. Set S1->pcrSelection to targetPCR
- 3199 b. Set S1->localityAtRelease to TPM STANY DATA -> localityModifier
- 3200 c. Set S1->digestAtRelease to H1
- 32017. Create Q1 a TPM\_QUOTE\_INFO2 structure
- 3202 a. Set Q1 -> fixed to "QUT2"
- 3203 b. Set Q1 -> infoShort to S1
- 3204 c. Set Q1 -> externalData to externalData
- 32058. If addVersion is TRUE
- 3206 a. Concatenate to Q1 a TPM CAP VERSION INFO structure

- 3207 b. Set the output parameters for versionInfo
- 32089. Else
- 3209 a. Set versionInfoSize to 0
- 3210 b. Return no bytes in versionInfo
- 321110. Sign a SHA-1 hash of Q1 using keyHandle as the signature key
- 321211. Return the signature in sig

# 3213**17.** Changing AuthData

## 3214**17.1** TPM\_ChangeAuth

#### 3215 Start of informative comment:

- 3216The TPM\_ChangeAuth command allows the owner of an entity to change the AuthData for 3217the entity.
- 3218This command cannot invalidate the old entity. Therefore, the authorization change is only 3219effective if the application can guarantee that the old entity can be securely destroyed. If 3220not, two valid entities will exist, one with the old and one with the new authorization secret.
- 3221If this command is delegated, the delegated party can expand its key use privileges. That 3222party can create a copy of the key with known authorization, and it can then use the key 3223without any ordinal restrictions.
- 3224TPM\_ChangeAuth requires the encryption of one parameter ("NewAuth"). For the sake of 3225uniformity with other commands that require the encryption of more than one parameter, 3226the parameters used for used encryption are generated from the authLastNonceEven 3227(created during the OSAP session), nonceOdd, and the session shared secret.
- 3228The parameter list to this command must always include two authorization sessions, 3229regardless of the state of authDataUsage for the respective keys.
- 3230End of informative comment.

# 3231

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC		N	B
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuth
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	Handle of the parent key to the entity.
5	2	2 S	2	TPM_PROTOCOL_ID	protocoIID	The protocol in use.
6	20	3 S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	newAuth	The encrypted new AuthData for the entity
7	2	4 S	2	TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of entity to be modified
8	4	5 S	4	UINT32	encDataSize	The size of the encData parameter
9	<b>\$</b>	6 S	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	encData	The encrypted entity that is to be modified.
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	parentAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the parent key.
		2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
11	20	3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle
12	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored, parentAuthHandle is always terminated.
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.
14	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	entityAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the encrypted entity. The session type MUST be OIAP
		2 H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitylastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
15	20	3 H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with entityAuthHandle
16	1	4 H2	1	BOOL	continueEntitySession	Ignored, entityAuthHandle is always terminated.
17	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	entityAuth	The authorization session digest for the inputs and encrypted entity. HMAC key: entity.usageAuth.

### 3232Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation. See section 4.3.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuth
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The modified, encrypted entity.
6	20	2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with parentAuthHandle
7	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed value of FALSE
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.
9	20	2 H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entityNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover entity
		3 H2	20	TPM_NONCE	entitynonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with entityAuthHandle
10	1	4 H2	1	BOOL	continueEntitySession	Continue use flag, fixed value of FALSE
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	entityAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters and entity. HMAC key: entity.usageAuth, the original and not the new auth value

### 3233 **Description**

- 32341. The parentAuthHandle session type MUST be TPM\_PID\_OSAP.
- 32352. In this capability, the SRK cannot be accessed as entityType TPM\_ET\_KEY, since the 3236 SRK is not wrapped by a parent key.

- 32381. Verify that entityType is one of TPM\_ET\_DATA, TPM\_ET\_KEY and return the error 3239 TPM\_WRONG\_ENTITYTYPE if not.
- 32402. Verify that parentAuthHandle session type is TPM\_PID\_OSAP return TPM\_BAD\_MODE 3241 on error
- 32423. Verify that entityAuthHandle session type is TPM\_PID\_OIAP return TPM\_BAD\_MODE on 3243 error
- 32444. If protocolID is not TPM\_PID\_ADCP, the TPM MUST return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 32455. The encData parameter MUST be the encData field from either the TPM\_STORED\_DATA or TPM\_KEY structures.
- 32476. Create decryptAuth by decrypting newAuth according to the ADIP indicated by 3248 parentHandle.
- 32497. The TPM MUST validate the command using the AuthData in the parentAuth parameter
- 32508. Validate that parentHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE, if not return 3251 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE

- 32529. After parameter validation, the TPM creates b1 by decrypting encData using the key 3253 pointed to by parentHandle.
- 325410. The TPM MUST validate that b1 is a valid TPM structure, either a 3255 TPM STORE ASYMKEY or a TPM SEALED DATA
- 3256 a. Check the length and payload, return TPM\_INVALID\_STRUCTURE on any mismatch
- 3257 b. The TPM must validate the command using the authorization data entityAuth
- 3258 parameter. The HMAC key is TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY -> usageAuth or
- 3259 TPM SEALED DATA -> authData.
- 326011. The TPM replaces the AuthData for b1 with decryptAuth created above.
- 326112. The TPM encrypts b1 using the appropriate mechanism for the type using the 3262 parentKeyHandle to provide the key information.
- 326313. The TPM MUST enforce the destruction of both the parentAuthHandle and 3264 entityAuthHandle sessions.

# 3265**17.2 TPM\_ChangeAuthOwner**

#### 3266Start of informative comment:

3267The TPM\_ChangeAuthOwner command allows the owner of an entity to change the 3268AuthData for the TPM Owner or the SRK.

3269This command requires authorization from the current TPM Owner to execute.

3270TPM's targeted for an environment (e.g. a server) with long lasting sessions should not 3271invalidate all sessions.

#### 3272End of informative comment.

# **3273Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	- Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthOwner
4	2	2S	2	TPM_PROTOCOL_ID	protocoIID	The protocol in use.
5	20	3S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	newAuth	The encrypted new AuthData for the entity
6	2	4S	2	TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of entity to be modified
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	ownerAuthHandle	The authorization session handle used for the TPM Owner.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with ownerAuthHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag the TPM ignores this value
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and ownerHandle. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

# **3274Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthOwner
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with ownerAuthHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed value of FALSE
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters and ownerHandle. HMAC key: ownerAuth, the original value and not the new auth value

- 32761. The TPM MUST validate the command using the AuthData in the ownerAuth parameter
- 32772. The ownerAuthHandle session type MUST be TPM\_PID\_OSAP
- 32783. If protocolID is not TPM\_PID\_ADCP, the TPM MUST return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER.
- 32794. Verify that entityType is either TPM\_ET\_OWNER or TPM\_ET\_SRK, and return the error
- 3280 TPM\_WRONG\_ENTITYTYPE if not.
- 32815. Create decryptAuth by decrypting newAuth according to the ADIP indicated by
- 3282 ownerAuthHandle.
- 32836. The TPM MUST enforce the destruction of the ownerAuthHandle session upon
- 3284 completion of this command (successful or unsuccessful). This includes setting
- 3285 continueAuthSession to FALSE
- 32867. Set the AuthData for the indicated entity to decryptAuth
- 32878. The TPM MUST invalidate all owner authorized OSAP and DSAP sessions, active or
- 3288 saved.
- 32899. The TPM MAY invalidate all sessions, active or saved

# 329018. Authorization Sessions

## **329118.1 TPM\_OIAP**

### 3292Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OIAP.

### 3293 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OIAP.
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Handle that TPM creates that points to the authorization state.
5	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Nonce generated by TPM and associated with session.

- 32951. The TPM\_OIAP command allows the creation of an authorization session handle and the tracking of the handle by the TPM. The TPM generates the handle and nonce.
- 32972. The TPM has an internal limit as to the number of handles that may be open at one time, so the request for a new handle may fail if there is insufficient space available.
- 32993. Internally the TPM will do the following:
- a. TPM allocates space to save handle, protocol identification, both nonces and any other information the TPM needs to manage the session.
- 3302 b. TPM generates authHandle and nonceEven, returns these to caller
- 33034. On each subsequent use of the OIAP session the TPM MUST generate a new nonceEven value.
- 33055. When TPM\_OIAP is wrapped in an encrypted transport session, no input or output 3306 parameters are encrypted.

3307

### 330818.1.1 Actions to validate an OIAP session

#### 3309Start of informative comment:

- 3310This section describes the authorization-related actions of a TPM when it receives a 3311command that has been authorized with the OIAP protocol.
- 551 redifficial that has been authorized with the Othir protocol.
- 3312Many commands use OIAP authorization. The following description is therefore necessarily 3313abstract.
- 3314End of informative comment.

- 3316The TPM MUST perform the following operations:
- 33171. The TPM MUST verify that the authorization session handle (H, say) referenced in the
- 3318 command points to a valid session. If it does not, the TPM returns the error code
- 3319 TPM INVALID AUTHHANDLE
- 33202. The TPM SHALL retrieve the latest version of the caller's nonce (nonceOdd) and
- 3321 continueAuthSession flag from the input parameter list, and store it in internal TPM
- 3322 memory with the authSession 'H'.
- 33233. The TPM SHALL retrieve the latest version of the TPM's nonce stored with the
- 3324 authorization session H (authLastNonceEven) computed during the previously executed
- 3325 command.
- 33264. The TPM MUST retrieve the secret AuthData (SecretE, say) of the target entity. The entity
- and its secret must have been previously loaded into the TPM.
- 3328 a. If the command using the OIAP session requires owner authorization
- i. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> ownerReference is TPM\_KH\_OWNER, the secret
- 3330 AuthData is TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> ownerAuth
- ii. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> ownerReference is pointing to a delegate row
- 3332 (1) Set R1 a row index to TPM STCLEAR DATA -> ownerReference
- 3333 (2) Set D1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_TABLE\_ROW to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 3334 delegateTable -> delRow[R1]
- 3335 (3) Set the secret AuthData to D1 -> authValue
- 3336 (4) Validate the TPM DELEGATE PUBLIC D1 -> pub
- 3337 (a) Validate D1 -> pub -> permissions based on the command ordinal
- 3338 (b) Validate D1 -> pub -> pcrInfo based on the PCR values
- 33395. The TPM SHALL perform a HMAC calculation using the entity secret data, ordinal, input
- 3340 command parameters and authorization parameters per Part 1 Object-Independent
- 3341 Authorization Protocol.
- 33426. The TPM SHALL compare HM to the AuthData value received in the input parameters. If
- 3343 they are different, the TPM returns the error code TPM\_AUTHFAIL if the authorization
- 3344 session is the first session of a command, or TPM AUTH2FAIL if the authorization

- session is the second session of a command. Otherwise, the TPM executes the command which (for this example) produces an output that requires authentication.
- 33477. The TPM SHALL generate a nonce (nonceEven).
- 33488. The TPM creates an HMAC digest to authenticate the return code, return values and
- 3349 authorization parameters to the same entity secret per Part 1 Object-Independent
- 3350 Authorization Protocol.
- 33519. The TPM returns the return code, output parameters, authorization parameters and
- 3352 authorization session digest.
- 335310.If the output continueUse flag is FALSE, then the TPM SHALL terminate the session.
- Future references to H will return an error.
- 335511. Each time that access to an entity (e.g., key) is authorized using OIAP, the TPM MUST
- validate the TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_xxx "...AtRelease" values if specified for the entity
- 3357 a. The TPM SHOULD validate the values before using the shared secret to validate the
- 3358 command parameters. This prevents a dictionary attack on the shared secret when the
- 3359 values are invalid for the entity.

# 3360**18.2** TPM OSAP

#### 3361Start of informative comment:

3362The TPM\_OSAP command creates the authorization session handle, the shared secret and 3363generates nonceEven and nonceEvenOSAP.

#### 3364End of informative comment.

### **3365Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OSAP.
4	2			TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of entity in use
5	4			UINT32	entityValue	The selection value based on entityType, e.g. a keyHandle #
6	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceOddOSAP	The nonce generated by the caller associated with the shared secret.

### 3366Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OSAP.
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Handle that TPM creates that points to the authorization state.
5	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Nonce generated by TPM and associated with session.
6	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceEvenOSAP	Nonce generated by TPM and associated with shared secret.

### 3367**Description**

- 33681. The TPM\_OSAP command allows the creation of an authorization session handle and the
- tracking of the handle by the TPM. The TPM generates the handle, nonceEven and
- 3370 nonceEvenOSAP.
- 33712. The TPM has an internal limit on the number of handles that may be open at one time,
- 3372 so the request for a new handle may fail if there is insufficient space available.
- 33733. The TPM\_OSAP allows the binding of an authorization to a specific entity. This allows
- 3374 the caller to continue to send in AuthData for each command but not have to request
- 3375 the information or cache the actual AuthData.
- 33764. When TPM\_OSAP is wrapped in an encrypted transport session, no input or output 3377 parameters are encrypted.
- 33785. If the owner pointer is pointing to a delegate row, the TPM internally MUST treat the
- 3379 OSAP session as a DSAP session

- 33806. TPM\_ET\_SRK or TPM\_ET\_KEYHANDLE with a value of TPM\_KH\_SRK MUST specify the 3381 SRK.
- 33827. If the entity is tied to PCR values, the PCR's are not validated during the TPM\_OSAP ordinal session creation. The PCR's are validated when the OSAP session is used.

- 33851. The TPM creates S1 a storage area that keeps track of the information associated with
- 3386 the authorization.
- 33872. S1 MUST track the following information
- 3388 a. Protocol identification (i.e. TPM PID OSAP)
- 3389 b. nonceEven
- i. Initialized to the next value from the TPM RNG
- 3391 c. shared secret
- d. ADIP encryption scheme from TPM\_ENTITY\_TYPE entityType
- e. Any other internal TPM state the TPM needs to manage the session
- 33943. The TPM MUST create and MAY track the following information
- 3395 a. nonceEvenOSAP
- i. Initialized to the next value from the TPM RNG
- 33974. The TPM calculates the shared secret using an HMAC calculation. The key for the HMAC
- 3398 calculation is the secret AuthData assigned to the key handle identified by entityValue.
- 3399 The input to the HMAC calculation is the concatenation of nonces nonceEvenOSAP and
- 3400 nonceOddOSAP. The output of the HMAC calculation is the shared secret which is saved
- in the authorization area associated with authHandle
- 34025. Check if the ADIP encryption scheme specified by entityType is supported, if not return
- 3403 TPM INAPPROPRIATE ENC.
- 34046. If entityType = TPM\_ET\_KEYHANDLE
- 3405 a. The entity to authorize is a key held in the TPM. entityValue contains the keyHandle
- 3406 that holds the key.
- 3407 b. If entityValue is TPM KH OPERATOR return TPM BAD HANDLE
- 34087. else if entityType = TPM\_ET\_OWNER
- 3409 a. This value indicates that the entity is the TPM owner. entityValue is ignored
- 3410 b. The HMAC key is the secret pointed to by ownerReference (owner secret or delegated
- 3411 secret)
- 34128. else if entityType = TPM\_ET\_SRK
- 3413 a. The entity to authorize is the SRK. entityValue is ignored.
- 34149. else if entityType = TPM\_ET\_COUNTER
- 3415 a. The entity is a monotonic counter, entity Value contains the counter handle
- 341610.else if entityType = TPM\_ET\_NV

- 3417 a. The entity is a NV index, entity Value contains the NV index
- 341811.else return TPM BAD PARAMETER
- 341912.On each subsequent use of the OSAP session the TPM MUST generate a new nonce 3420 value.
- 342113. The TPM MUST ensure that OSAP shared secret is only available while the OSAP session 3422 is valid.
- 342314. The session MUST terminate upon any of the following conditions:
- 3424 a. The command that uses the session returns an error
- 3425 b. The resource is evicted from the TPM or otherwise invalidated
- 3426 c. The session is used in any command for which the shared secret is used to encrypt
- an input parameter (TPM\_ENCAUTH)
- 3428 d. The TPM Owner is cleared
- 3429 e. TPM\_ChangeAuthOwner is executed and this session is attached to the owner
- 3430 authorization
- 3431 f. The session explicitly terminated with continueAuth, TPM\_Reset or
- 3432 TPM FlushSpecific
- 3433 g. All OSAP sessions associated with the delegation table MUST be invalidated when
- 3434 any of the following commands execute:
- i. TPM\_Delegate\_Manage
- 3436 ii. TPM Delegate CreateOwnerDelegation with Increment==TRUE
- 3437 iii. TPM Delegate LoadOwnerDelegation

### 343918.2.1 Actions to validate an OSAP session

#### 3440Start of informative comment:

- 3441This section describes the authorization-related actions of a TPM when it receives a 3442command that has been authorized with the OSAP protocol.
- 3443Many commands use OSAP authorization. The following description is therefore necessarily 3444abstract.

#### 3445End of informative comment

- 34471. On reception of a command with ordinal C1 that uses an authorization session, the TPM
- 3448 SHALL perform the following actions:
- 34492. The TPM MUST have been able to retrieve the shared secret (Shared, say) of the target
- entity when the authorization session was established with TPM\_OSAP. The entity and
- its secret must have been previously loaded into the TPM.
- 34523. The TPM MUST verify that the authorization session handle (H, say) referenced in the
- 3453 command points to a valid session. If it does not, the TPM returns the error code
- 3454 TPM\_INVALID\_AUTHHANDLE.
- 34554. The TPM MUST calculate the HMAC (HM1, say) of the command parameters according
- 3456 to Part 1 Object-Specific Authorization Protocol.
- 34575. The TPM SHALL compare HM1 to the AuthData value received in the command. If they
- are different, the TPM returns the error code TPM\_AUTHFAIL if the authorization session
- 3459 is the first session of a command, or TPM AUTH2FAIL if the authorization session is the
- second session of a command., the TPM executes command C1 which produces an
- output (O, say) that requires authentication and uses a particular return code (RC, say).
- 34626. The TPM SHALL generate the latest version of the even nonce (nonceEven).
- 34637. The TPM MUST calculate the HMAC (HM2) of the return parameters according to section
- 3464 Part 1 Object-Specific Authorization Protocol.
- 34658. The TPM returns HM2 in the parameter list.
- 34669. The TPM SHALL retrieve the continue flag from the received command. If the flag is
- 3467 FALSE, the TPM SHALL terminate the session and destroy the thread associated with
- 3468 handle H.
- 346910.If the shared secret was used to provide confidentiality for data in the received
- command, the TPM SHALL terminate the session and destroy the thread associated with
- 3471 handle H.
- 347211. Each time that access to an entity (e.g., key) is authorized using OSAP, the TPM MUST
- a. ensure that the OSAP shared secret is that derived from the entity using TPM\_OSAP
- b. validate the TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_xxx "...AtRelease" values if specified for the entity

3475 i. The TPM SHOULD validate the values before using the shared secret to validate the command parameters. This prevents a dictionary attack on the shared secret when the values are invalid for the entity.

# 3478**18.3** TPM DSAP

### 3479Start of informative comment:

3480The TPM\_DSAP command creates the authorization session handle using a delegated 3481AuthData value passed into the command as an encrypted blob or from the internal 3482delegation table. It can be used to start an authorization session for a user key or the 3483owner.

3484As in TPM\_OSAP, it generates a shared secret and generates nonceEven and 3485nonceEvenOSAP.

#### 3486End of informative comment.

### **3487Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DSAP.
4	2			TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of delegation information to use
5	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Key for which delegated authority corresponds, or 0 if delegated owner activity. Only relevant if entityValue equals TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB
6	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceOddDSAP	The nonce generated by the caller associated with the shared secret.
7	4			UINT32	entityValueSize	The size of entityValue.
8	<b>\</b>	2S	<b>◊</b>	BYTE[]	entityValue	TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB or TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER_BLOB or index MUST not be empty  If entityType is TPM_ET_DEL_ROW then entityValue is a TPM_DELEGATE_INDEX

### 3488Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DSAP.
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Handle that TPM creates that points to the authorization state.
5	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Nonce generated by TPM and associated with session.
6	20			TPM_NONCE	nonceEvenDSAP	Nonce generated by TPM and associated with shared secret.

### 3489 Description

34901. The TPM\_DSAP command allows the creation of an authorization session handle and the tracking of the handle by the TPM. The TPM generates the handle, nonceEven and nonceEvenOSAP.

- 34932. The TPM has an internal limit on the number of handles that may be open at one time,
- so the request for a new handle may fail if there is insufficient space available.
- 34953. The TPM\_DSAP allows the binding of a delegated authorization to a specific entity. This
- 3496 allows the caller to continue to send in AuthData for each command but not have to
- request the information or cache the actual AuthData.
- 34984. Each ordinal that uses the DSAP session MUST validate that TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA
- 3499 -> restrictDelegate does not restrict delegation, based on keyHandle -> keyUsage and
- 3500 keyHandle -> keyFlags, return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE on error.
- 35015. On each subsequent use of the DSAP session the TPM MUST generate a new nonce
- 3502 value and check if the ordinal to be executed has delegation to execute. The TPM MUST
- ensure that the DSAP shared secret is only available while the DSAP session is valid.
- 35046. When TPM\_DSAP is wrapped in an encrypted transport session
- a. For input the only parameter encrypted is entityValue
- 3506 b. For output no parameters are encrypted
- 35077. The DSAP session MUST terminate under any of the following conditions
- 3508 a. The command that uses the session returns an error
- b. If attached to a key, when the key is evicted from the TPM or otherwise invalidated
- 3510 c. The session is used in any command for which the shared secret is used to encrypt
- an input parameter (TPM\_ENCAUTH)
- 3512 d. The TPM Owner is cleared
- 3513 e. TPM ChangeAuthOwner is executed and this session is attached to the owner
- 3514 authorization
- 3515 f. The session explicitly terminated with continueAuth, TPM\_Reset or
- 3516 TPM FlushSpecific
- 3517 g. All DSAP sessions MUST be invalidated when any of the following commands
- 3518 execute:
- i. TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation
- 3520 ii. When Increment is TRUE
- iii. TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation
- iv. TPM\_Delegate\_Manage
- 3523entityType = TPM ET DEL OWNER BLOB
- 3524 The entityValue parameter contains an owner delegation blob structure.
- 3525entityType = TPM\_ET\_DEL\_ROW
- 3526 The entityValue parameter contains a row number in the nv Delegation table which
- 3527 should be used for the AuthData value.
- 3528entityType = TPM\_DEL\_KEY\_BLOB
- 3529 The entityValue parameter contains a key delegation blob structure.

- 35311. If entityType == TPM\_ET\_DEL\_OWNER\_BLOB
- a. Map entityValue to B1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB
- 3533 b. Validate that B1 is a valid TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB, return
- 3534 TPM\_WRONG\_ENTITYTYPE on error
- 3535 c. Locate B1 -> pub -> familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to
- 3536 indicate row, return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found
- 3537 d. Set FR to TPM FAMILY TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- e. If FR -> flags TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 3539 f. Verify that B1->verificationCount equals FR -> verificationCount.
- 3540 g. Validate the integrity of the blob
- i. Copy B1 -> integrityDigest to H2
- ii. Set B1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- iii. Create H3 the HMAC of B1 using tpmProof as the secret
- iv. Compare H2 to H3 return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on mismatch
- 3545 h. Create S1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE by decrypting B1 -> sensitiveArea using
- 3546 TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY
- 3547 i. Validate S1 values
- i. S1 -> tag is TPM TAG DELEGATE SENSITIVE
- ii. Return TPM BAD DELEGATE on error
- 3550 j. Set A1 to S1 -> authValue
- 35512. Else if entityType == TPM ET DEL ROW
- 3552 a. Verify that entityValue points to a valid row in the delegation table.
- b. Set D1 to the delegation information in the row.
- 3554 c. Set A1 to D1->authValue.
- 3555 d. Locate D1 -> familyID in the TPM FAMILY TABLE and set familyRow to indicate that
- 3556 row, return TPM BADINDEX if not found
- e. Set FR to TPM FAMILY TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- 3558 f. If FR -> flags TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 3559 g. Verify that D1->verificationCount equals FR -> verificationCount.
- 35603. Else if entityType == TPM\_ET\_DEL\_KEY\_BLOB
- a. Map entityValue to K1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY\_BLOB
- 3562 b. Validate that K1 is a valid TPM DELEGATE KEY BLOB, return
- 3563 TPM WRONG ENTITYTYPE on error
- 3564 c. Locate K1 -> pub -> familyID in the TPM FAMILY TABLE and set familyRow to
- indicate that row, return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found

- d. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- 3567 e. If FR -> flags TPM FAMFLAG ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM DISABLED CMD
- 3568 f. Verify that K1 -> pub -> verificationCount equals FR -> verificationCount.
- 3569 g. Validate the integrity of the blob
- i. Copy K1 -> integrityDigest to H2
- ii. Set K1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- iii. Create H3 the HMAC of K1 using tpmProof as the secret
- iv. Compare H2 to H3 return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on mismatch
- 3574 h. Validate that K1 -> pubKeyDigest identifies keyHandle, return TPM\_KEYNOTFOUND
- 3575 on error
- 3576 i. Create S1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE by decrypting K1 -> sensitiveArea using
- 3577 TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY
- 3578 j. Validate S1 values
- i. S1 -> tag is TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE
- 3580 ii. Return TPM BAD DELEGATE on error
- 3581 k. Set A1 to S1 -> authValue
- 35824. Else return TPM BAD PARAMETER
- 35835. Generate a new authorization session handle and reserve space to save protocol
- 3584 identification, shared secret, pcrInfo, both nonces, ADIP encryption scheme, delegated
- 3585 permission bits and any other information the TPM needs to manage the session.
- 35866. Read two new values from the RNG to generate nonceEven and nonceEvenOSAP.
- 35877. The TPM calculates the shared secret using an HMAC calculation. The key for the HMAC
- 3588 calculation is A1. The input to the HMAC calculation is the concatenation of nonces
- 3589 nonceEvenOSAP and nonceOddOSAP. The output of the HMAC calculation is the shared
- secret which is saved in the authorization area associated with authHandle.

# 3591**18.4** TPM SetOwnerPointer

#### 3592Start of informative comment:

3593This command will set a reference to which secret the TPM will use when executing an 3594owner secret related OIAP or OSAP session.

3595This command should only be used to provide an owner delegation function for legacy code 3596that does not itself support delegation. Normally, TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA->ownerReference 3597points to TPM\_KH\_OWNER, indicating that OIAP and OSAP sessions should use the owner 3598authorization. This command allows ownerReference to point to an index in the delegation 3599table, indicating that OIAP and OSAP sessions should use the delegation authorization.

3600In use, a TSS supporting delegation would create and load the owner delegation and set the 3601owner pointer to that delegation. From then on, a legacy TSS application would use its OIAP 3602and OSAP sessions with the delegated owner authorization.

3603Since this command is not authorized, the ownerReference is open to DoS attacks. 3604Applications can attempt to recover from a failing owner authorization by resetting 3605ownerReference to an appropriate value.

3606This command intentionally does not clear OSAP sessions. A TPM 1.1 application gets the 3607benefit of owner delegation, while the original owner can use a pre-existing OSAP session 3608with the actual owner authorization.

#### 3609 End of informative comment.

### **3610Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_ COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOwnerPointer
4	2	2S	2	TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of entity in use
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	entityValue	The selection value based on entityType

## 3611Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре		
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_ COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_SetOwnerPointer

#### 3612Actions

36131. Map TPM STCLEAR DATA to V1

36142. If entityType = TPM\_ET\_DEL\_ROW

- 3615 a. This value indicates that the entity is a delegate row. entity Value is a delegate index
- in the delegation table.
- 3617 b. Validate that entity Value points to a legal row within the delegate table stored within
- 3618 the TPM. If not return TPM BADINDEX
- i. Set D1 to the delegation information in the row.
- 3620 c. Locate D1 -> familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate that
- row, return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found.
- d. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- e. If FR -> flags TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 3624 f. Verify that B1->verificationCount equals FR -> verificationCount.
- 3625 g. The TPM sets V1-> ownerReference to entityValue
- 3626 h. Return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 36273. else if entityType = TPM\_ET\_OWNER
- 3628 a. This value indicates that the entity is the TPM owner. entityValue is ignored.
- 3629 b. The TPM sets V1-> ownerReference to TPM\_KH\_OWNER
- 3630 c. Return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 36314. Return TPM BAD PARAMETER

# 3632**19.** Delegation Commands

# 3633**19.1 TPM\_Delegate\_Manage**

#### 3634Start of informative comment:

3635TPM\_Delegate\_Manage is the fundamental process for managing the Family tables, 3636including enabling/disabling Delegation for a selected Family. Normally 3637TPM\_Delegate\_Manage must be executed at least once (to create Family tables for a 3638particular family) before any other type of Delegation command in that family can succeed.

3639TPM\_Delegate\_Manage is authorized by the TPM Owner if an Owner is installed, because 3640changing a table is a privileged Owner operation. If no Owner is installed, 3641TPM\_Delegate\_Manage requires no privilege to execute. This does not disenfranchise an 3642Owner, since there is no Owner, and simplifies loading of tables during platform 3643manufacture or on first-boot. Burn-out of TPM non-volatile storage by inappropriate use is 3644mitigated by the TPM's normal limits on NV-writes in the absence of an Owner. Tables can 3645be locked after loading, to prevent subsequent tampering, and only unlocked by the Owner, 3646his delegate, or the act of removing the Owner (even if there is no Owner).

3647TPM\_Delegate\_Manage command is customized by opCode:

3648(1) TPM\_FAMILY\_ENABLE enables/disables use of a family and all the rows of the delegate 3649table belonging to that family,

3650(2) TPM\_FAMILY\_ADMIN can be used to prevent further management of the Tables until an 3651Owner is installed, or until the Owner is removed from the TPM. (Note that the Physical 3652Presence command TPM\_ForceClear always enables further management, even if 3653TPM\_ForceClear is used when no Owner is installed.)

3654 (3) TPM\_FAMILY\_CREATE creates a new family. Sessions are invalidated even in this case 3655because the lastFamilyID could wrap.

3656(4) TPM\_FAMILY\_INVALIDATE invalidates an existing family. The TPM\_SELFTEST\_FAILED 3657error code is returned because the familyRow has already been validated earlier. Failure 3658here indicates a malfunction of the TPM.

3659The rationale for Action 19.1 is that invalidating the family ID prevents the use of 3660associated delegate rows, whether or not those delegate rows are themselves invalidated. 3661Omitting the delegate row invalidation avoids an NV write.

#### 3662End of informative comment.

### **3663Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_Manage
4	4	2S	4	TPM_FAMILY_ID	familyID	The familyID that is to be managed
5	4	3s	4	TPM_FAMILY_OPERATION	opCode	Operation to be performed by this command.
6	4	4s	4	UINT32	opDataSize	Size in bytes of opData
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	5s	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	opData	Data necessary to implement opCode
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### **3664Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Turne	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_Manage
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	retDataSize	Size in bytes of retData
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	retData	Returned data
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth.

- 36661. If opCode != TPM\_FAMILY\_CREATE
- a. Locate familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate row, return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found
- 3669 b. Set FR, a TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE\_ENTRY, to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE. famTableRow
- 3669 b. Set FR, a TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE\_ENTRY, to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE. famTableRow 3670 [familyRow]
- 36712. If tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND
- 3672 a. Validate the command and parameters using ownerAuth, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on
- 3673 error

```
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```

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3674 b. If the command is delegated (authHandle session type is TPM\_PID\_DSAP or through ownerReference delegation)

- i. If opCode = TPM\_FAMILY\_CREATE
- 3677 (1) The TPM MUST ignore familyID
- 3678 ii. Else
- 3679 (1) Verify that the familyID associated with authHandle matches the familyID parameter, return TPM\_DELEGATE\_FAMILY on error
- 36813. Else
- a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> ownerAuth is valid, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 3683 b. If opCode != TPM\_FAMILY\_CREATE and FR -> flags ->
- 3684 TPM\_DELEGATE\_ADMIN\_LOCK is TRUE, return TPM\_DELEGATE\_LOCK
- 3685 c. Validate max NV writes without an owner
- i. Set NV1 to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite
- ii. Increment NV1 by 1
- iii. If NV1 > TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER return TPM\_MAXNVWRITES
- iv. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite to NV1
- 36904. The TPM invalidates sessions
- a. MUST invalidate all DSAP sessions
- b. MUST invalidate all OSAP sessions associated with the delegation table
- 3693 c. MUST set TPM STCLEAR DATA -> ownerReference to TPM KH OWNER
- d. MAY invalidate any other session
- 36955. If opCode == TPM FAMILY CREATE
- a. Validate that sufficient space exists within the TPM to store an additional family and
- map F2 to the newly allocated space.
- 3698 b. Validate that opData is a TPM\_FAMILY\_LABEL
- i. If opDataSize != sizeof(TPM\_FAMILY\_LABEL) return TPM\_BAD\_PARAM\_SIZE
- 3700 c. Map F2 to a TPM FAMILY TABLE ENTRY
- i. Set F2 -> tag to TPM\_TAG\_FAMILY\_TABLE\_ENTRY
- ii. Set F2 -> familyLabel to opData
- 3703 d. Increment TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> lastFamilyID by 1
- 3704 e. Set F2 -> familyID = TPM PERMANENT DATA -> lastFamilyID
- 3705 f. Set F2 -> verificationCount = 1
- 3706 g. Set F2 -> flags -> TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED to FALSE
- 3707 h. Set F2 -> flags -> TPM\_DELEGATE\_ADMIN\_LOCK to FALSE
- 3708 i. Set retDataSize = 4

- 3709 j. Set retData = F2 -> familyID
- 3710 k. Return TPM SUCCESS
- 37116. If authHandle is of type DSAP then continueAuthSession MUST set to FALSE
- 37127. If opCode == TPM\_FAMILY\_ADMIN
- 3713 a. Validate that opDataSize == 1, and that opData is a Boolean value.
- 3714 b. Set (FR -> flags -> TPM\_DELEGATE\_ADMIN\_LOCK) = opData
- 3715 c. Set retDataSize = 0
- 3716 d. Return TPM SUCCESS
- 37178. else If opCode == TPM\_FAMILY\_ENABLE
- 3718 a. Validate that opDataSize == 1, and that opData is a Boolean value.
- 3719 b. Set FR -> flags-> TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED = opData
- 3720 c. Set retDataSize = 0
- 3721 d. Return TPM SUCCESS
- 37229. else If opCode == TPM\_FAMILY\_INVALIDATE
- 3723 a. Invalidate all data associated with familyRow
- i. All data is all information pointed to by FR
- ii. return TPM\_SELFTEST\_FAILED on failure
- b. The TPM MAY invalidate delegate rows that contain the same familyID.
- 3727 c. Set retDataSize = 0
- 3728 d. Return TPM SUCCESS
- 372910. Else return TPM BAD PARAMETER

# 373019.2 TPM Delegate CreateKeyDelegation

#### 3731Start of informative comment:

- 3732This command delegates privilege to use a key by creating a blob that can be used by 3733TPM\_DSAP.
- 3734There is no check for appropriateness of the key's key usage against the key permission 3735settings. If the key usage is incorrect, this command succeeds, but the delegated command 3736will fail.
- 3737These blobs CANNOT be used as input data for TPM\_LoadOwnerDelegation because the 3738internal TPM delegate table can store owner delegations only.
- 3739(TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation must be used to delegate Owner privilege.)
- 3740The publicInfo -> familyID can specify a disabled family row. The family row is checked 3741when the key delegation is used in a DSAP session, not when it is created.

#### 3742 End of informative comment.

### **3743Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key.
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	28	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_DELEGATE_PUBLIC	publicInfo	The public information necessary to fill in the blob
6	20	3S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	delAuth	The encrypted new AuthData for the blob. The encryption key is the shared secret from the authorization session protocol.
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

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### **3745Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	blobSize	The length of the returned blob
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB	blob	The partially encrypted delegation information.
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag. Fixed value of FALSE
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

### 3746 Description

- 37471. The use restrictions that may be present on the key pointed to by keyHandle are not
- enforced for this command. Stated another way, TPM\_CreateKeyDelegation is not a use
- of the key.

- 37511. Verify AuthData for the command and parameters using privAuth
- 37522. Locate publicInfo -> familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate
- 3753 row, return TPM BADINDEX if not found
- 37543. If the key authentication is in fact a delegation, then the TPM SHALL validate the
- 3755 command and parameters using Delegation authorisation, then
- 3756 a. Validate that authHandle -> familyID equals publicInfo -> familyID return
- 3757 TPM DELEGATE FAMILY on error
- 3758 b. If TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[ authHandle -> familyID] -> flags ->
- 3759 TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return error TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD.
- 3760 c. Verify that the delegation bits in publicInfo do not grant more permissions then
- 3761 currently delegated. Otherwise return error TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 37624. Check that publicInfo -> delegateType is TPM\_DEL\_KEY\_BITS
- 37635. Verify that authHandle indicates an OSAP or DSAP session return
- 3764 TPM INVALID AUTHHANDLE on error
- 37656. Create a1 by decrypting delAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 37667. Create h1 the SHA-1 of TPM\_STORE\_PUBKEY structure of the key pointed to by
- 3767 keyHandle
- 37688. Create M1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE structure
- 3769 a. Set M1 -> tag to TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE

- 928 929
- 929
- 3770 b. Set M1 -> authValue to a1
- 3771 c. The TPM MAY add additional information of a sensitive nature relative to the
- 3772 delegation
- 37739. Create M2 the encryption of M1 using TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY
- 377410. Create P1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY\_BLOB
- 3775 a. Set P1 -> tag to TPM\_TAG\_DELG\_KEY\_BLOB
- 3776 b. Set P1 -> pubKeyDigest to H1
- 3777 c. Set P1 -> pub to PublicInfo
- 3778 d. Set P1 -> pub -> verificationCount to familyRow -> verificationCount
- e. Set P1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- 3780 f. The TPM sets additional Area and additional Area Size appropriate for this TPM. The
- 3781 information MAY include symmetric IV, symmetric mode of encryption and other data
- 3782 that allows the TPM to process the blob in the future.
- 3783 g. Set P1 -> sensitiveSize to the size of M2
- 3784 h. Set P1 -> sensitiveArea to M2
- 378511. Calculate H2 the HMAC of P1 using tpmProof as the secret
- 378612. Set P1 -> integrityDigest to H2
- 378713. Ignore continueAuthSession on input set continueAuthSession to FALSE on output
- 378814. Return P1 as blob

## 378919.3 TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation

#### 3790Start of informative comment:

3791TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation delegates the Owner's privilege to use a set of 3792command ordinals, by creating a blob. Such blobs can be used as input data for TPM\_DSAP 3793or TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation.

3794TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation includes the ability to void all existing delegations 3795(by incrementing the verification count) before creating the new delegation. This ensures 3796that the new delegation will be the only delegation that can operate at Owner privilege in 3797this family. This new delegation could be used to enable a security monitor (a local separate 3798entity, or remote separate entity, or local host entity) to reinitialize a family and perhaps 3799perform external verification of delegation settings. Normally the ordinals for a delegated 3800security monitor would include TPM Delegate CreateOwnerDelegation (this command) in 3801order monitor further delegations. permit the to create and 3802TPM\_Delegate\_UpdateVerification to reactivate some previously voided delegations.

3803If the verification count is incremented and the new delegation does not delegate any 3804privileges (to any ordinals) at all, or uses an authorisation value that is then discarded, this 3805family's delegations are all void and delegation must be managed using actual Owner 3806authorisation.

3807(TPM\_Delegate\_CreateKeyDelegation must be used to delegate privilege to use a key.)

3808End of informative comment.

### **3809Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation.
4	1	2S	1	BOOL	increment	Flag dictates whether verificationCount will be incremented
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b></b>	TPM_DELEGATE_PUBLIC	publicInfo	The public parameters for the blob
6	20	4S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	delAuth	The encrypted new AuthData for the blob. The encryption key is the shared secret from the OSAP protocol.
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle TPM Owner authentication
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
10	20		·	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest. HMAC key:ownerAuth

### 3810Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	T	Name	December 1
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	blobSize	The length of the returned blob
5	<b>\</b>	4S	<b>\\$</b>	TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER_B LOB	blob	The partially encrypted delegation information.
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag. Fixed value of FALSE
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth

#### 3811Action

- 38121. The TPM SHALL authenticate the command using TPM Owner authentication. Return
- 3813 TPM AUTHFAIL on failure.
- 38142. Locate publicInfo -> familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate
- 3815 the row return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found
- 3816 a. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- 38173. If the TPM Owner authentication is in fact a delegation
- 3818 a. Validate that authHandle -> familyID equals publicInfo -> familyID return
- 3819 TPM\_DELEGATE\_FAMILY on error
- 3820 b. If FR -> flags -> TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return error
- 3821 TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD.
- 3822 c. Verify that the delegation bits in publicInfo do not grant more permissions then
- 3823 currently delegated. Otherwise, return error TPM\_AUTHFAIL.
- 38244. Check that publicInfo -> delegateType is TPM\_DEL\_OWNER\_BITS
- 38255. Verify that authHandle indicates an OSAP or DSAP session return
- 3826 TPM\_INVALID\_AUTHHANDLE on error
- 38276. If increment == TRUE
- 3828 a. Increment FR -> verificationCount
- 3829 b. Set TPM STCLEAR DATA-> ownerReference to TPM KH OWNER
- 3830 c. The TPM invalidates sessions
- i. MUST invalidate all DSAP sessions
- 3832 ii. MUST invalidate all OSAP sessions associated with the delegation table
- 3833 iii. MAY invalidate any other session

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- 38347. Create a1 by decrypting delAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 38358. Create M1 a TPM DELEGATE SENSITIVE structure
- 3836 a. Set M1 -> tag to TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE
- 3837 b. Set M1 -> authValue to a1
- 3838 c. Set other M1 fields as determined by the TPM vendor
- 38399. Create M2 the encryption of M1 using TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY
- 384010. Create B1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB
- 3841 a. Set B1 -> tag to TPM\_TAG\_DELG\_OWNER\_BLOB
- 3842 b. Set B1 -> pub to publicInfo
- 3843 c. Set B1 -> sensitiveSize to the size of M2
- 3844 d. Set B1 -> sensitiveArea to M2
- 3845 e. Set B1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- 3846 f. Set B1 -> pub -> verificationCount to FR -> verificationCount
- 384711. The TPM sets additional Area and additional Area Size appropriate for this TPM. The
- 3848 information MAY include symmetric IV, symmetric mode of encryption and other data
- that allows the TPM to process the blob in the future.
- 385012. Create H1 the HMAC of B1 using tpmProof as the secret
- 385113. Set B1 -> integrityDigest to H1
- 385214. Ignore continueAuthSession on input set continueAuthSession to FALSE on output
- 385315. Return B1 as blob

# 385419.4 TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation

#### 3855Start of informative comment:

3856This command loads a delegate table row blob into a non-volatile delegate table row. 3857TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation can be used during manufacturing or on first boot 3858(when no Owner is installed), or after an Owner is installed. If an Owner is installed, 3859TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation requires Owner authorisation, and sensitive 3860information must be encrypted.

3861Burn-out of TPM non-volatile storage by inappropriate use is mitigated by the TPM's normal 3862limits on NV-writes in the absence of an Owner. Tables can be locked after loading using 3863TPM\_Delegate\_Manage, to prevent subsequent tampering.

3864A management system outside the TPM is expected to manage the delegate table rows 3865stored on the TPM, and can overwrite any previously stored data. There is no way to 3866explicitly delete a delegation entry. A new entry can overwrite an invalid entry.

3867This command cannot be used to load key delegation blobs into the TPM

#### 3868End of informative comment.

### **3869Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM HMAC		AC	<b>T</b>	Nama	December 1
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegation
4	4	3S	4	TPM_DELEGATE_INDEX	index	The index of the delegate row to be written
4						
3S						
4						
TP						
M_ DE						
LE GA						
TE						
_l ND						
EX						
ind ex						
Th						
е						
ind ex						
of the						
del eg						
ate						
ro						

w to be writte n						
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	blobSize	The size of the delegate blob
6	<>	5S	<b>\</b>	TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER _BLOB	blob	Delegation information, including encrypted portions as appropriate
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle TPM Owner authentication
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest. HMAC key:ownerAuth

### **3870Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	TPM_ORD_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegation
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key: ownerAuth.

#### 3871 Actions

- 38721. Map blob to D1 a TPM DELEGATE OWNER BLOB.
- 3873 a. Validate that D1 -> tag == TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB
- 38742. Locate D1 -> pub -> familyID in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate
- 3875 row, return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found
- 38763. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE -> famTableRow[familyRow]
- 38774. If TPM Owner is installed
- 3878 a. Validate the command and parameters using TPM Owner authentication, return
- 3879 TPM AUTHFAIL on error
- 3880 b. If the command is delegated (authHandle session type is TPM\_PID\_DSAP or through
- 3881 ownerReference delegation), verify that D1 -> pub -> familyID matches authHandle ->
- familyID, on error return TPM\_DELEGATE\_FAMILY
- 38835. Else
- 3884 a. If tag is not TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_COMMAND, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 3885 b. If FR -> flags -> TPM\_DELEGATE\_ADMIN\_LOCK is TRUE return
- 3886 TPM DELEGATE LOCK
- 3887 c. Validate max NV writes without an owner
- 3888 i. Set NV1 to PD -> noOwnerNVWrite
- 3889 ii. Increment NV1 by 1
- 3890 iii. If NV1 > TPM MAX NV WRITE NOOWNER return TPM MAXNVWRITES
- iv. Set PD -> noOwnerNVWrite to NV1
- 38926. If FR -> flags -> TPM FAMFLAG ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM DISABLED CMD
- 38937. If TPM Owner is installed, validate the integrity of the blob
- 3894 a. Copy D1 -> integrityDigest to H2
- 3895 b. Set D1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros

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- 3896 c. Create H3 the HMAC of D1 using tpmProof as the secret
- d. Compare H2 to H3, return TPM AUTHFAIL on mismatch
- 38988. If TPM Owner is installed, create S1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE area by decrypting
- 3899 D1 -> sensitiveArea using TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY. Otherwise set S1 = D1 -> sensitiveArea
- 39009. Validate S1
- 3901 a. Validate that S1 -> tag == TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE, return
- 3902 TPM\_INVALID\_STRUCTURE on error
- 390310. Validate that index is a valid value for delegate Table, return TPM\_BADINDEX on error
- 390411. The TPM invalidates sessions
- 3905 a. MUST invalidate all DSAP sessions
- b. MUST invalidate all OSAP sessions associated with the delegation table
- 3907 c. MAY invalidate any other session
- 390812. Copy data to the delegate table row
- 3909 a. Copy the TPM\_DELEGATE\_PUBLIC from D1 -> pub to TPM\_DELEGATE\_TABLE ->
- 3910 delRow[index] -> pub.
- 3911 b. Copy the TPM\_SECRET from S1 -> authValue to TPM\_DELEGATE\_TABLE ->
- 3912 delRow[index] -> authValue.
- 3913 c. Set TPM STCLEAR DATA-> ownerReference to TPM KH OWNER
- 3914 d. If authHandle is of type DSAP then continueAuthSession MUST set to FALSE
- 391513. Return TPM SUCCESS

# 391619.5 TPM\_Delegate\_ReadTable

#### 3917Start of informative comment:

3918This command reads from the TPM the public contents of the family and delegate tables 3919that are stored on the TPM. Such data is required during external verification of tables.

3920There are no restrictions on the execution of this command; anyone can read this 3921information regardless of the state of the PCRs, regardless of whether they know any 3922specific AuthData value and regardless of whether or not the enable and admin bits are set 3923one way or the other.

#### 3924End of informative comment.

### 3925Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_ReadTable

### 3926Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_ReadTable
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	familyTableSize	Size in bytes of familyTable
5	<b>&gt;</b>	4S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	familyTable	Array of TPM_FAMILY_TABLE_ENTRY elements
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	delegateTableSize	Size in bytes of delegateTable
7	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>\\$</b>	BYTE[]	delegateTable	Array of TPM_DELEGATE_INDEX and TPM_DELEGATE_PUBLIC elements

- 39281. Set familyTableSize to the number of valid families on the TPM times 3929 sizeof(TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE\_ELEMENT).
- 39302. Copy the valid entries in the internal family table to the output array familyTable
- 39313. Set delegateTableSize to the number of valid delegate table entries on the TPM times 3932 (sizeof(TPM\_DELEGATE\_PUBLIC) + 4).
- 39334. For each valid entry
- 3934 a. Write the TPM DELEGATE INDEX to delegateTable
- b. Copy the TPM\_DELEGATE\_PUBLIC to delegateTable

39365. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 393719.6 TPM\_Delegate\_UpdateVerification

#### 3938Start of informative comment:

3939TPM\_UpdateVerification sets the verificationCount in an entity (a blob or a delegation row) 3940to the current family value, in order that the delegations represented by that entity will 3941continue to be accepted by the TPM.

## 3942 End of informative comment.

## **3943Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	- Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_UpdateVerification
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	inputSize	The size of inputData
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	3S	<b>\</b>	BYTE	inputData	TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB or TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER_BLOB or TPM_DELEGATE_INDEX
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	Authorization HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 3944Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Delegate_UpdateVerification
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outputSize	The size of the output
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&gt;</b>	BYTE	outputData	TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB or TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER_BLOB
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

- 39461. Verify the TPM Owner, directly or indirectly through delegation, authorizes the command and parameters, on error return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 39482. Determine the type of inputData (TPM\_DELEGATE\_TABLE\_ROW or 3949 TPM DELEGATE OWNER BLOB or TPM DELEGATE KEY BLOB) and map D1 to that
- 3950 structure
- 3951 a. Mapping to TPM\_DELEGATE\_TABLE\_ROW requires taking inputData as a tableIndex
- and locating the appropriate row in the table
- 39533. If D1 is a TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB or TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY\_BLOB, validate the integrity of D1
- 3955 a. Copy D1 -> integrityDigest to H2
- 3956 b. Set D1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- 3957 c. Create H3 the HMAC of D1 using tpmProof as the secret
- 3958 d. Compare H2 to H3 return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on mismatch
- 39594. Locate (D1 -> pub -> familyID) in the TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE and set familyRow to indicate
- 3960 row, return TPM BADINDEX if not found
- 39615. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- 39626. If delegated, verify that family of the delegated Owner-auth is the same as D1:
- 3963 (authHandle -> familyID) == (D1 -> pub -> familyID); otherwise return error
- 3964 TPM DELEGATE FAMILY
- 39657. If delegated, verify that the family of the delegated Owner-auth is enabled: if (authHandle
- 3966 -> familyID -> flags TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED) is FALSE, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 39678. Set D1 -> verificationCount to FR -> verificationCount

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 $39689.\ If\ D1$  is a TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB or TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY\_BLOB set the 3969 integrity of D1

- 3970 a. Set D1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- 3971 b. Create H1 the HMAC of D1 using tpmProof as the secret
- 3972 c. Set D1 -> integrityDigest to H1
- 397310. If D1 is a blob recreate the blob and return it

# 3974**19.7 TPM\_Delegate\_VerifyDelegation**

### 3975Start of informative comment:

3976TPM\_VerifyDelegation interprets a delegate blob and returns success or failure, depending 3977on whether the blob is currently valid. The delegate blob is NOT loaded into the TPM.

#### 3978 End of informative comment.

## 3979Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal, TPM_Delegate_VerifyDelegation
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	delegationSize	The length of the delegated information blob
5	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	delegation	TPM_DELEGATE_KEY_BLOB or TPM_DELEGATE_OWNER_BLOB

## 3980Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal, TPM_Delegate_VerifyDelegation

- 39821. Determine the type of blob, If delegation -> tag is equal to 3983 TPM TAG DELGATE OWNER BLOB then
- a. Map D1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_OWNER\_BLOB to delegation
- 39852. Else if delegation -> tag = TPM\_TAG\_DELG\_KEY\_BLOB
- 3986 a. Map D1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY\_BLOB to delegation
- 39873. Else return TPM BAD PARAMETER
- 39884. Locate D1 -> familyID in the TPM FAMILY TABLE and set familyRow to indicate row,
- 3989 return TPM\_BADINDEX if not found
- 39905. Set FR to TPM\_FAMILY\_TABLE.famTableRow[familyRow]
- 39916. If FR -> flags TPM\_FAMFLAG\_ENABLED is FALSE, return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 39927. Validate that D1 -> pub -> verificationCount matches FR -> verificationCount, on
- 3993 mismatch return TPM\_FAMILYCOUNT
- 39948. Validate the integrity of D1
- 3995 a. Copy D1 -> integrityDigest to H2

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- 3996 b. Set D1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
- 3997 c. Create H3 the HMAC of D1 using tpmProof as the secret
- 3998 d. Compare H2 to H3 return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on mismatch
- 39999. Create S1 a TPM\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE area by decrypting D1 -> sensitiveArea using
- 4000 TPM\_DELEGATE\_KEY
- 400110. Validate S1 values
- 4002 a. S1 -> tag is TPM\_TAG\_DELEGATE\_SENSITIVE
- 4003 b. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error
- 400411. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

#### 4005**20.** Non-volatile Storage

## 4006 Start of informative comment:

4007This section handles the allocation and use of the TPM non-volatile storage.

### 4008End of informative comment.

4009If nvIndex refers to the DIR, the TPM ignores actions containing access control checks that 4010have no meaning for the DIR. The TPM only checks the owner authorization.

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# 4012**20.1** TPM\_NV\_DefineSpace

#### 4013 Start of informative comment:

4014This establishes the space necessary for the indicated index. The definition will include the 4015access requirements for writing and reading the area.

Previously defined space at the index and new size is non-zero (and space is available,

4017 etc.) -> redefine the index

4018 No previous space at the index and new size is non-zero (and space is available,

4019 etc.)-> define the index

4020 Previously defined space at the index and new size is 0 -> delete the index

4021 No previous space at the index and new size is 0 -> error

4022The space definition size does not include the area needed to manage the space.

4023Setting TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked TRUE when it is already TRUE is not an 4024error.

4025End of informative comment.

## **4026Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Decarintian
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_DefineSpace
4	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC	publnfo	The public parameters of the NV area
5	20	3S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	encAuth	The encrypted AuthData, only valid if the attributes require subsequent authorization
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for ownerAuth
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest HMAC key: ownerAuth

## **4027Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_DefineSpace
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs

		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, fixed to FALSE
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest HMAC key: ownerAuth

## 4028 Description

4029For the case where publinfo -> dataSize is 0, publinfo -> pcrInfoRead and publinfo -> 4030pcrInfoWrite are not used. However, since the general principle is to validate parameters 4031before changing state, the TPM SHOULD parse publinfo completely before invalidating the 4032data area.

- 40341. If publinfo -> nvIndex == TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_LOCK and tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_COMMAND
- 4035 a. If pubInfo -> dataSize is not 0, the command MAY return TPM\_BADINDEX.
- 4036 b. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked to TRUE
- 4037 c. Return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 40382. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked is FALSE then all authorization checks except
- 4039 for the Max NV writes are ignored
- 4040 a. Ignored checks include physical presence, owner authorization, 'D' bit check,
- bGlobalLock, no authorization with a TPM owner present, bWriteSTClear, the check that
- 4042 pubInfo -> dataSize is 0 in Action 5.c. (the no-authorization case), disabled and
- 4043 deactivated.
- i. The check that pubInfo -> dataSize is 0 is still enforced in Action 6.f.
- 4045 (returning after deleting a previously defined storage area) and Action 9.f. (not
- allowing a space of size 0 to be defined).
- 4047 ii. If ownerAuth is present, the TPM MAY check the authorization HMAC.
- b. The check for publinfo -> nvIndex == TPM\_NV\_INDEX0 in Action 3. is not ignored.
- 40493. If publinfo -> nvlndex has the D bit (bit 28) set to a 1 or publinfo -> nvlndex ==
- 4050 TPM NV INDEX0 then
- 4051 a. Return TPM\_BADINDEX
- 4052 b. The D bit specifies an index value that is set in manufacturing and can never be
- 4053 deleted or added to the TPM
- 4054 c. Index value TPM NV INDEX0 is reserved and cannot be defined
- 40554. If tag = TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND then
- 4056 a. The TPM MUST validate the command and parameters using the TPM Owner
- 4057 authentication and ownerAuth, on error return TPM AUTHFAIL
- 4058 b. authHandle session type MUST be OSAP
- 4059 c. Create A1 by decrypting encAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 40605. else
- 4061 a. Validate the assertion of physical presence. Return TPM BAD PRESENCE on error.

- 1010
- b. If TPM Owner is present then return TPM\_OWNER\_SET.
- c. If publinfo -> dataSize is 0 then return TPM\_BAD\_DATASIZE. Setting the size to 0 represents an attempt to delete the value without TPM Owner authentication.
- 4065 d. Validate max NV writes without an owner
- i. Set NV1 to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite
- 4067 ii. Increment NV1 by 1
- 4068 iii. If NV1 > TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER return TPM\_MAXNVWRITES
- 4069 iv. Set NV1 INCREMENTED to TRUE
- 4070 e. Set A1 to encAuth. There is no nonce or authorization to create the encryption string,
- 4071 hence the AuthData value is passed in the clear
- 40726. If publnfo -> nvlndex points to a valid previously defined storage area then
- 4073 a. Map D1 a TPM\_NV\_DATA\_SENSITIVE to the storage area
- 4074 b. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_GLOBALLOCK then
- 4075 i. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> bGlobalLock is TRUE then return 4076 TPM\_AREA\_LOCKED
- 4077 c. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR
- i. If D1 -> pubInfo -> bWriteSTClear is TRUE then return TPM\_AREA\_LOCKED
- d. Invalidate the data area currently pointed to by D1 and ensure that if the area is reallocated no residual information is left
- 4081 e. If NV1 INCREMENTED is TRUE
- i. Set TPM PERMANENT DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite to NV1
- 4083 f. The TPM invalidates authorization sessions
- 4084 i. MUST invalidate all authorization sessions associated with D1
- 4085 ii. MAY invalidate any other authorization session
- 4086 g. If pubInfo -> dataSize is 0 then return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 40877. Parse publinfo -> pcrlnfoRead
- 4088 a. Validate pcrInfoRead structure on error return TPM INVALID STRUCTURE
- i. Validation includes proper PCR selections and locality selections
- 40908. Parse publinfo -> pcrlnfoWrite
- 4091 a. Validate pcrInfoWrite structure on error return TPM\_INVALID\_STRUCTURE
- 4092 i. Validation includes proper PCR selections and locality selections
- b. If pcrInfoWrite -> localityAtRelease disallows some localities
- 4094 i. Set writeLocalities to TRUE
- 4095 c. Else
- i. Set writeLocalities to FALSE

- 40979. Validate that the attributes are consistent
- 4098 a. The TPM SHALL ignore the bReadSTClear, bWriteSTClear and bWriteDefine
- 4099 attributes during the execution of this command
- 4100 b. If TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE is TRUE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE is TRUE
- 4101 return TPM AUTH CONFLICT
- 4102 c. If TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD is TRUE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD is TRUE
- 4103 return TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- 4104 d. If TPM NV PER OWNERWRITE and TPM NV PER AUTHWRITE and
- 4105 TPM NV PER WRITEDEFINE and TPM NV PER PPWRITE and writeLocalities are all
- 4106 FALSE
- i. Return TPM\_PER\_NOWRITE
- 4108 e. Validate pubInfo -> nvIndex
- i. Make sure that the index is applicable for this TPM. Return TPM\_BADINDEX
- on error. A valid index is platform and context sensitive. That is, attempting to
- validate an index may be successful in one configuration and invalid in another
- 4112 configuration. The individual index values MUST indicate if there are any
- 4113 restrictions on the use of the index.
- ii. TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR is always an invalid defined index.
- 4115 f. If dataSize is 0 return TPM\_BAD\_PARAM\_SIZE
- 411610. Create D1 a TPM NV DATA SENSITIVE structure
- 4117 a. Set D1 -> pubInfo to pubInfo
- 4118 b. Set D1 -> authValue to A1
- 4119 c. Set D1 -> pubInfo -> bReadSTClear to FALSE
- 4120 d. Set D1 -> pubInfo -> bWriteSTClear to FALSE
- 4121 e. Set D1 -> pubInfo -> bWriteDefine to FALSE
- 412211. Validate that sufficient NV is available to store D1 and pubInfo -> dataSize bytes of data
- 4123 a. Return TPM NOSPACE if publnfo -> dataSize is not available in the TPM
- 412412. If publinfo -> nvlndex is not TPM NV INDEX TRIAL
- 4125 a. Reserve NV space for pubInfo -> dataSize
- 4126 b. Set all bytes in the newly defined area to 0xFF
- 4127 c. If NV1\_INCREMENTED is TRUE
- i. Set TPM PERMANENT DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite to NV1
- 412913. Ignore continue Auth Session on input and set to FALSE on output
- 413014. Return TPM SUCCESS

# 4131**20.2 TPM NV WriteValue**

#### 4132Start of informative comment:

- 4133This command writes the value to a defined area. The write can be TPM Owner authorized 4134or unauthorized and protected by other attributes and will work when no TPM Owner is
- 4135 present.
- 4136The action setting bGlobalLock to TRUE is intentionally before the action checking the
- 4137owner authorization. This allows code (e.g., a BIOS) to lock NVRAM without knowing the
- 4138owner authorization.
- 4139The DIR (TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR) has the attributes TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE and 4140TPM\_NV\_WRITEALL.
- 4141Certain platform manufacturers or software might require specific error handling in Action 414220.2.
- 4143Owner authorization is not required when nvLocked is FALSE. If the host does send owner
- 4144authorization, Action 20.2 indicates that it should be correct, since some TPM
- 4145implementations may validate it.

### 4146End of informative comment.

## 4147Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type Nan	Nome	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ		Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValue
4	4	2S	4	TPM_NV_INDEX	nvIndex	The index of the area to set
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	offset	The offset into the NV Area
6	4	4S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data parameter
7	<b>\$</b>	5S	<b>\( \)</b>	BYTE	data	The data to set the area to
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for TPM Owner
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest HMAC key: ownerAuth

## 4148Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tuno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValue

4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest HMAC key: ownerAuth

## 4149 Description

4150For TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR, the ordinal MUST NOT set an error code for the "if dataSize = 0" 4151action. However, the flags set in this case are not applicable to the DIR.

- 41531. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked is FALSE then all authorization checks except
- 4154 for the max NV writes are ignored
- 4155 a. Ignored checks include physical presence, owner authorization,
- 4156 TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE, PCR, bWriteDefine, bGlobalLock, bWriteSTClear, locality,
- 4157 disabled and deactivated.
- 4158 b. TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE is not ignored.
- 4159 c. If ownerAuth is present, the TPM MAY check the authorization HMAC.
- 41602. Locate and set D1 to the TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA that corresponds to nvIndex, return
- 4161 TPM BADINDEX on error
- 4162 a. If nvIndex = TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR, set D1 to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> authDir[0]
- 41633. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked is TRUE
- 4164 a. If D1 -> permission -> TPM NV PER OWNERWRITE is TRUE
- 4165 i. If TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> disable is TRUE, return TPM DISABLED
- 4166 ii. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> deactivated is TRUE, return TPM\_DEACTIVATED
- 4167 b. If D1 -> permission -> TPM NV PER OWNERWRITE is FALSE
- i. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disable is TRUE, the TPM MAY return
- 4169 TPM\_DISABLED
- 4170 ii. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> deactivated is TRUE, the TPM MAY return
- 4171 TPM DEACTIVATED
- 41724. If tag = TPM TAG RQU AUTH1 COMMAND then
- 4173 a. If D1 -> permission -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE is FALSE return
- 4174 TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- i. This check is ignored if nvIndex is TPM\_NV\_INDEX0.
- 4176 b. Validate command and parameters using ownerAuth HMAC with TPM Owner
- 4177 authentication as the secret, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 41785. Else
- 4179 a. If D1 -> permission -> TPM NV PER OWNERWRITE is TRUE return
- 4180 TPM AUTH CONFLICT
- i. This check is ignored if nvIndex is TPM\_NV\_INDEX0.

- 1027
- 1028
- 4182 b. If no TPM Owner validate max NV writes without an owner
- i. Set NV1 to TPM PERMANENT DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite
- 4184 ii. Increment NV1 by 1
- 4185 iii. If NV1 > TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER return TPM\_MAXNVWRITES
- 4186 iv. Set NV1 INCREMENTED to TRUE
- 41876. If nvIndex is TPM NV INDEX0 then
- 4188 a. If dataSize is not 0, the TPM MAY return TPM\_BADINDEX.
- 4189 b. Set TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> bGlobalLock to TRUE
- 4190 c. Return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 41917. If D1 -> permission -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE is TRUE return
- 4192 TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- 41938. Check that D1 -> pcrInfoWrite -> localityAtRelease for TPM\_STANY\_DATA ->
- 4194 localityModifier is TRUE
- 4195 a. For example if TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier was 2 then D1 -> pcrInfo ->
- 4196 localityAtRelease -> TPM\_LOC\_TWO would have to be TRUE
- 4197 b. On error return TPM\_BAD\_LOCALITY
- 41989. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE then validate physical presence is
- 4199 asserted if not return TPM BAD PRESENCE
- 420010.If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEDEFINE
- 4201 a. If D1 -> bWriteDefine is TRUE return TPM AREA LOCKED
- 420211.If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM NV PER GLOBALLOCK
- 4203 a. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> bGlobalLock is TRUE return TPM\_AREA\_LOCKED
- 420412.If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR
- 4205 a. If D1 ->bWriteSTClear is TRUE return TPM\_AREA\_LOCKED
- 420613.If D1 -> pcrInfoWrite -> pcrSelection specifies a selection of TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA ->
- 4207 PCR[]
- 4208 a. Create P1 a composite hash of the TPM STCLEAR DATA -> PCR[] specified by D1 ->
- 4209 pcrInfoWrite
- 4210 b. Compare P1 to D1 -> pcrInfoWrite -> digestAtRelease return TPM WRONGPCRVAL
- 4211 on mismatch
- 421214. If dataSize = 0 then
- 4213 a. Set D1 -> bWriteSTClear to TRUE
- 4214 b. Set D1 -> bWriteDefine to TRUE
- 421515.Else
- 4216 a. Set S1 to offset + dataSize
- 4217 b. If S1 > D1 -> dataSize return TPM NOSPACE

- 4218 c. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEALL
- i. If dataSize != D1 -> dataSize return TPM\_NOT\_FULLWRITE
- 4220 d. Write the new value into the NV storage area
- 4221 e. If NV1\_INCREMENTED is TRUE
- i. Set TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> noOwnerNVWrite to NV1
- 422316.Set D1 -> bReadSTClear to FALSE
- 422417. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 4225**20.3** TPM\_NV\_WriteValueAuth

#### 4226Start of informative comment:

4227This command writes to a previously defined area. The area must require authorization to 4228write. Use this command when authorization other than the owner authorization is to be 4229used. Otherwise, use TPM\_NV\_WriteValue.

4230The Part 2 ordinal table indicates that TPM\_NV\_WriteValueAuth requires an owner present. 4231This is normative, although it was a mistake.

#### 4232End of informative comment.

## 4233Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	Tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValueAuth
4	4	2S	4	TPM_NV_INDEX	nvIndex	The index of the area to set
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	offset	The offset into the chunk
6	4	4S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data area
7	<b>&lt;</b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE	data	The data to set the area to
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for NV element authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	authValue	HMAC key: NV element auth value

## 4234Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValueAuth
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	NonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	authValue	HMAC key: NV element auth value

#### 4235Actions

42361. Locate and set D1 to the TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA that corresponds to nvIndex, return 4237 TPM\_BADINDEX on error

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- 42382. If D1 -> attributes does not specify TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE then return
- 4239 TPM AUTH CONFLICT
- 42403. Validate authValue using D1 -> authValue, return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 42414. Check that D1 -> pcrInfoWrite -> localityAtRelease for TPM\_STANY\_DATA ->
- 4242 localityModifier is TRUE
- 4243 a. For example if TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier was 2 then D1 -> pcrInfo ->
- 4244 localityAtRelease -> TPM\_LOC\_TWO would have to be TRUE
- 4245 b. On error return TPM BAD LOCALITY
- 42465. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM NV PER PPWRITE then validate physical presence is
- 4247 asserted if not return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 42486. If D1 -> pcrInfoWrite -> pcrSelection specifies a selection of PCR
- 4249 a. Create P1 a composite hash of the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[] specified by D1 ->
- 4250 pcrInfoWrite
- b. Compare P1 to digestAtRelease return TPM\_WRONGPCRVAL on mismatch
- 42527. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEDEFINE
- 4253 a. If D1 -> bWriteDefine is TRUE return TPM AREA LOCKED
- 42548. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_GLOBALLOCK
- 4255 a. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> bGlobalLock is TRUE return TPM\_AREA\_LOCKED
- 42569. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR
- 4257 a. If D1 -> bWriteSTClear is TRUE return TPM AREA LOCKED
- 425810.If dataSize = 0 then
- 4259 a. Set D1 -> bWriteSTClear to TRUE
- 4260 b. Set D1 -> bWriteDefine to TRUE
- 426111.Else
- 4262 a. Set S1 to offset + dataSize
- 4263 b. If S1 > D1 -> dataSize return TPM\_NOSPACE
- 4264 c. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM NV PER WRITEALL
- i. If dataSize != D1 -> dataSize return TPM\_NOT\_FULLWRITE
- 4266 d. Write the new value into the NV storage area
- 426712. Set D1 -> bReadSTClear to FALSE
- 426813. Return TPM SUCCESS

# 4269**20.4** TPM\_NV\_ReadValue

#### 4270Start of informative comment:

4271Read a value from the NV store. This command uses optional owner authentication.

4272Action 1 indicates that if the NV area is not locked then reading of the NV area continues 4273without ANY authorization. This is intentional, and allows a platform manufacturer to set 4274the NV areas, read them back, and then lock them all without having to install a TPM 4275owner.

4276Certain platform manufacturers or software might require specific error handling in Action 427720.4.

4278Owner authorization is not required when nvLocked is FALSE. If the host does send owner 4279authorization, Action 20.4 indicates that it should be correct, since some TPM 4280implementations may validate it.

#### 4281End of informative comment.

## 4282Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValue
4	4	2S	4	TPM_NV_INDEX	nvIndex	The index of the area to set
5	4	3S	4	UINT32	offset	The offset into the area
6	4	4S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data area
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for TPM Owner authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth

## 4283 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S		TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValue
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data area
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE	data	The data to set the area to
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs

		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC key: ownerAuth

- 42851. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> nvLocked is FALSE then all authorization checks are 4286 ignored.
- 4287 a. Ignored checks include physical presence, owner authorization, PCR, bReadSTClear,
- 4288 locality, TPM NV PER OWNERREAD, disabled and deactivated.
- 4289 b. TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD is not ignored.
- 4290 c. If ownerAuth is present, the TPM MAY check the authorization HMAC.
- 42912. Set D1 a TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA structure to the area pointed to by nvIndex, if not found return TPM BADINDEX
- 4293 a. If nvIndex = TPM NV INDEX DIR, set D1 to TPM PERMANENT DATA -> authDir[0]
- 42943. If TPM PERMANENT FLAGS -> nvLocked is TRUE
- 4295 a. If D1 -> permission -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD is TRUE
- i. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disable is TRUE, return TPM\_DISABLED
- ii. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> deactivated is TRUE, return TPM\_DEACTIVATED
- 4298 b. If D1 -> permission -> TPM NV PER OWNERREAD is FALSE
- i. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> disable is TRUE, the TPM MAY return TPM DISABLED
- 4301 ii. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS -> deactivated is TRUE, the TPM MAY return 4302 TPM DEACTIVATED
- 43034. If tag = TPM TAG RQU AUTH1 COMMAND then
- 4304 a. If D1 -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD is FALSE return TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- 4305 b. Validate command and parameters using TPM Owners authentication on error return
- 4306 TPM AUTHFAIL
- 43075. Else
- 4308 a. If D1 -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD is TRUE return TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- 4309 b. If D1 -> TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD is TRUE return TPM\_AUTH\_CONFLICT
- 43106. Check that D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> localityAtRelease for TPM\_STANY\_DATA ->
- 4311 localityModifier is TRUE
- 4312 a. For example if TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier was 2 then D1 -> pcrInfo ->
- 4313 localityAtRelease -> TPM LOC TWO would have to be TRUE
- 4314 b. On error return TPM BAD LOCALITY
- 43157. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD then validate physical presence is
- 4316 asserted if not return TPM\_BAD\_PRESENCE
- 43178. If D1 -> TPM NV PER READ STCLEAR then

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- 4318 a. If D1 -> bReadSTClear is TRUE return TPM DISABLED CMD
- 43199. If D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> pcrSelection specifies a selection of PCR
- 4320 a. Create P1 a composite hash of the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[] specified by D1 ->
- 4321 pcrInfoRead
- b. Compare P1 to D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> digestAtRelease return TPM\_WRONGPCRVAL on
- 4323 mismatch
- 432410. If dataSize is 0 then
- 4325 a. Set D1 -> bReadSTClear to TRUE
- 4326 b. Set data to NULL (output parameter dataSize to 0)
- 432711.Else
- 4328 a. Set S1 to offset + dataSize
- 4329 b. If S1 > D1 -> dataSize return TPM\_NOSPACE
- 4330 c. Set data to area pointed to by offset
- i. This includes partial reads of TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR.
- 433212. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 433320.5 TPM\_NV\_ReadValueAuth

#### 4334Start of informative comment:

- 4335This command requires that the read be authorized by a value set with the blob.
- 4336The Part 2 ordinal table indicates that TPM\_NV\_ReadValueAuth requires an owner present. 4337This is normative, although it was a mistake.
- 4338 End of informative comment.

## 4339Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		T	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValueAuth
4	4	2S	4	TPM_NV_INDEX	nvIndex	The index of the area to set
5	4	3S	4	UNIT32	offset	The offset from the data area
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data area
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	authThe auth handle for the NV element authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	authContinueSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	authHmac	HMAC key: nv element authorization

## 4340Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Toma	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	ordinal, TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValueAuth
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	dataSize	The size of the data area
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\$</b>	BYTE	data	The data
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	authContinueSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	authHmacOut	HMAC key: nv element authorization

#### 4341 Actions

43421. Locate and set D1 to the TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA that corresponds to nvIndex, on error return TPM\_BADINDEX

- 43442. If D1 -> TPM NV PER AUTHREAD is FALSE return TPM AUTH CONFLICT
- 43453. Validate authHmac using D1 -> authValue on error return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 43464. If D1 -> attributes specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD then validate physical presence is
- 4347 asserted if not return TPM BAD PRESENCE
- 43485. Check that D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> localityAtRelease for TPM\_STANY\_DATA ->
- 4349 localityModifier is TRUE
- 4350 a. For example if TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> localityModifier was 2 then D1 -> pcrInfo ->
- 4351 localityAtRelease -> TPM\_LOC\_TWO would have to be TRUE
- 4352 b. On error return TPM BAD LOCALITY
- 43536. If D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> pcrSelection specifies a selection of PCR
- 4354 a. Create P1 a composite hash of the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> PCR[] specified by D1 ->
- 4355 pcrInfoRead
- b. Compare P1 to D1 -> pcrInfoRead -> digestAtRelease return TPM\_WRONGPCRVAL on
- 4357 mismatch
- 43587. If D1 specifies TPM\_NV\_PER\_READ\_STCLEAR then
- 4359 a. If D1 -> bReadSTClear is TRUE return TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD
- 43608. If dataSize is 0 then
- 4361 a. Set D1 -> bReadSTClear to TRUE
- 4362 b. Set data to all zeros
- 43639. Else
- 4364 a. Set S1 to offset + dataSize
- 4365 b. If S1 > D1 -> dataSize return TPM NOSPACE
- 4366 c. Set data to area pointed to by offset
- 436710. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 4368**21**. Session Management

### 4369Start of informative comment:

- 4370Three TPM\_RT\_CONTEXT session resources located in TPM\_STANY\_DATA work together to 4371control session save and load: contextNonceSession, contextCount, and contextList[].
- 4372All three MUST initialized at TPM\_Startup(ST\_CLEAR) and TPM\_Startup(ST\_DEACTIVATED)
- 4373and MAY be initialized at TPM\_Startup(ST\_STATE). Initializing invalidates all saved
- 4374sessions. They MAY be restored by TPM Startup(ST STATE). This case would allow saved
- 4375 sessions to be loaded. The actual ST\_STATE operation is reported by the
- 4376TPM\_RT\_CONTEXT startup effect.
- 4377TPM\_SaveContext creates a contextBlob containing an encrypted contextNonceSession. The
- 4378nonce is checked by TPM\_LoadContext. So initializing contextNonceSession invalidates all
- 4379saved contexts. The nonce is large and protected, making a replay infeasible.
- 4380The contextBlob also contains a public but protected contextCount. The count increments
- 4381for each saved contextBlob. The TPM also saves contextCount in contextList[]. The TPM
- 4382validates contextBlob against the contextList[] during TPM\_LoadContext. Since the
- 4383contextList[] is finite, it limits the number of valid saved sessions. Since the contextCount
- 4384cannot be allowed to wrap, it limits the total number of saved sessions.
- 4385After a contextBlob is loaded, its contextCount entry is removed from contextList[]. This
- 4386releases space in the context list for future entries. It also invalidates the contextBlob. So a
- 4387saved contextBlob can be loaded only once.
- 4388TPM\_FlushSpecific can also specify a contextCount to be removed from the contextList[],
- 4389allowing invalidation of an individual contextBlob. This is different from TPM\_FlushSpecific
- 4390specifying a session handle, which invalidates a loaded session, not a saved contextBlob.
- 4391End of informative comment.

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# 4393**21.1** TPM\_KeyControlOwner

#### 4394Start of informative comment:

- 4395This command controls some attributes of keys that are stored within the TPM key cache.
- 4396OwnerEvict: If this bit is set to true, this key remains in the TPM non-volatile storage
- 4397through all TPM\_Startup events. The only way to evict this key is for the TPM Owner to
- 4398execute this command again, setting the owner control bit to false and then executing
- 4399TPM\_FlushSpecific.
- 4400The key handle does not reference an authorized entity and is not validated.
- 4401The check for two remaining key slots ensures that users can load the two keys required to
- 4402execute many commands. Since only the owner can flush owner evict keys, non-owner
- 4403 commands could be blocked if this test was not performed.
- 4404End of informative comment.

## 4405Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PARAW   TIWAC   IVDE   Name   Description	PARAM	HMAC	Type	Name	Description
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#	SZ	#	SZ			
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_KeyControlOwner
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The handle of a loaded key.
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubKey	The public key associated with the loaded key
6	4	3S	4	TPM_KEY_CONTROL	bitName	The name of the bit to be modified
7	1	48	1	BOOL	bitValue	The value to set the bit to
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
9		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
10	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
11	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
12	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	HMAC authorization: key ownerAuth

## 4406Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tymo	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal:TPM_ORD_KeyControlOwner
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM.
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	HMAC authorization: key ownerAuth

## 4407 Description

44081. Set an internal bit within the key cache that controls some attribute of a loaded key.

- 44101. Validate the AuthData using the owner authentication value, on error return
- 4411 TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 44122. Validate that keyHandle refers to a loaded key, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYHANDLE on
- 4413 error.
- 44143. Validate that pubKey matches the key held by the TPM pointed to by keyHandle, return
- 4415 TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on mismatch
- 4416 a. This check is added so that virtualization of the keyHandle does not result in attacks,
- 4417 as the keyHandle is not associated with an authorization value
- 44184. Validate that bitName is valid, return TPM\_BAD\_MODE on error.
- 44195. If bitName == TPM\_KEY\_CONTROL\_OWNER\_EVICT

- 4420 a. If bitValue == TRUE
- i. Verify that after this operation at least two key slots will be present within the
- TPM that can store any type of key both of which do NOT have the OwnerEvict bit
- set, on error return TPM\_NOSPACE
- 4424 ii. Verify that for this key handle, parentPCRStatus is FALSE and isVolatile is
- FALSE. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error.
- iii. Set ownerEvict within the internal key storage structure to TRUE.
- b. Else if bitValue == FALSE
- i. Set ownerEvict within the internal key storage structure to FALSE.
- 44296. Return TPM\_SUCCESS

# 443021.2 TPM SaveContext

#### 4431Start of informative comment:

4432TPM\_SaveContext saves a loaded resource outside the TPM. After successful execution of 4433the command, the TPM automatically releases the internal memory for sessions but leaves 4434keys in place.

4435There is no assumption that a saved context blob is stored in a safe, protected area. Since 4436the context blob can be loaded at any time, do not rely on TPM\_SaveContext to restrict 4437access to an entity such as a key. If use of the entity should be restricted, means such as 4438authorization secrets or PCR's should be used.

4439In general, TPM\_SaveContext can save a transport session. However, it cannot save an 4440exclusive transport session, because any ordinal other than TPM\_ExecuteTransport 4441terminates the exclusive transport session. This action prevents the exclusive transport 4442session from being saved and reloaded while intervening commands are hidden from the 4443transport log.

#### 4444End of informative comment.

## 4445Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveContext
4	4			TPM_HANDLE	handle	Handle of the resource being saved.
5	4	2S	4	TPM_RESOURCE_TYPE	resourceType	The type of resource that is being saved
6	16	3S	16	BYTE[16]	label	Label for identification purposes

## 4446Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		28	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveContext
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	contextSize	The actual size of the outgoing context blob
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_CONTEXT_BLOB	contextBlob	The context blob

## 4447 Description

44481. The caller of the function uses the label field to add additional sequencing, anti-replay or other items to the blob. The information does not need to be confidential but needs to be part of the blob integrity.

- 44521. Map V1 to TPM\_STANY\_DATA
- 44532. Validate that handle points to resource that matches resourceType, return
- 4454 TPM INVALID RESOURCE on error
- 44553. Validate that resourceType is a resource from the following list if not return
- 4456 TPM\_INVALID\_RESOURCE
- 4457 a. TPM\_RT\_KEY
- 4458 b. TPM\_RT\_AUTH
- 4459 c. TPM\_RT\_TRANS
- 4460 d. TPM\_RT\_DAA\_TPM
- 44614. Locate the correct nonce
- 4462 a. If resourceType is TPM RT KEY
- i. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> contextNonceKey is all zeros
- 4464 (1) Set TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> contextNonceKey to the next value from the TPM RNG
- 4466 ii. Map N1 to TPM STCLEAR DATA -> contextNonceKey
- 4467 iii. If the key has TPM\_KEY\_CONTROL\_OWNER\_EVICT set then return 4468 TPM\_OWNER\_CONTROL
- 4469 b. Else
- i. If V1 -> contextNonceSession is all zeros
- 4471 (1) Set V1 -> contextNonceSession to the next value from the TPM RNG
- ii. Map N1 to V1 -> contextNonceSession
- 44735. Set K1 to TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> contextKey
- 44746. Create R1 by putting the sensitive part of the resource pointed to by handle into a
- 4475 structure. The structure is a TPM manufacturer option. The TPM MUST ensure that ALL
- sensitive information of the resource is included in R1.
- 44777. Create C1 a TPM CONTEXT SENSITIVE structure
- 4478 a. C1 forms the inner encrypted wrapper for the blob. All saved context blobs MUST
- 4479 include a TPM\_CONTEXT\_SENSITIVE structure and the TPM\_CONTEXT\_SENSITIVE
- 4480 structure MUST be encrypted.
- 4481 b. Set C1 -> contextNonce to N1
- 4482 c. Set C1 -> internalData to R1
- 44838. Create B1 a TPM\_CONTEXT\_BLOB
- 4484 a. Set B1 -> tag to TPM TAG CONTEXTBLOB
- 4485 b. Set B1 -> resourceType to resourceType
- 4486 c. Set B1 -> handle to handle
- 4487 d. Set B1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros

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- 4488 e. Set B1 -> label to label
- 4489 f. Set B1 -> additionalData to information determined by the TPM manufacturer. This
- data will help the TPM to reload and reset context. This area MUST NOT hold any data
- that is sensitive (symmetric IV are fine, prime factors of an RSA key are not).
- i. For OSAP sessions and for DSAP sessions attached to keys, the hash of the
- entity MUST be included in additionalData
- 4494 g. Set B1 -> additionalSize to the size of additionalData
- 4495 h. Set B1 -> sensitiveSize to the size of C1
- 4496 i. Set B1 -> sensitiveData to C1
- 44979. If resourceType is TPM\_RT\_KEY
- 4498 a. Set B1 -> contextCount to 0
- 449910.Else
- 4500 a. If V1 -> contextCount >  $2^{32}$ -2 then
- i. Return with TPM\_TOOMANYCONTEXTS
- 4502 b. Else
- i. Validate that the TPM can still manage the new count value
- 4504 (1) If the distance between the oldest saved context and the contextCount
- 4505 is too large return TPM\_CONTEXT\_GAP
- 4506 ii. Find contextIndex such that V1 -> contextList[contextIndex] equals 0. If not
- 4507 found exit with TPM NOCONTEXTSPACE
- 4508 iii. Increment V1 -> contextCount by 1
- iv. Set V1-> contextList[contextIndex] to V1 -> contextCount
- 4510 v. Set B1 -> contextCount to V1 -> contextCount
- 4511 c. The TPM MUST invalidate all information regarding the resource except for
- 4512 information needed for reloading
- 451311.Calculate B1 -> integrityDigest the HMAC of B1 using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 4514 tpmProof as the secret
- 451512. Create E1 by encrypting C1 using K1 as the key
- 4516 a. Set B1 -> sensitiveSize to the size of E1
- 4517 b. Set B1 -> sensitiveData to E1
- 451813. Set contextSize to the size of B1
- 451914. Return B1 in contextBlob

# 4520**21.3** TPM LoadContext

#### 4521Start of informative comment:

4522TPM\_LoadContext loads into the TPM a previously saved context. The command returns a 4523handle.

#### 4524End of informative comment.

## **4525Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadContext
4	4			TPM_HANDLE	entityHandle	The handle the TPM MUST use to locate the entity tied to the OSAP/DSAP session
5	1	2S	1	BOOL	keepHandle	Indication if the handle MUST be preserved
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	contextSize	The size of the following context blob.
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>\</b>	TPM_CONTEXT_BLOB	contextBlob	The context blob

## 4526Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		28	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadContext
4	4			TPM_HANDLE	handle	The handle assigned to the resource after it has been successfully loaded.

- 45281. Map contextBlob to B1, a TPM CONTEXT BLOB structure
- 45292. Map V1 to TPM\_STANY\_DATA
- 45303. Create M1 by decrypting B1 -> sensitiveData using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 4531 contextKey
- 45324. Create C1 and R1 by splitting M1 into a TPM\_CONTEXT\_SENSITIVE structure and
- 4533 internal resource data
- 45345. Check contextNonce
- 4535 a. If B1 -> resourceType is NOT TPM\_RT\_KEY
- i. If C1 -> contextNonce does not equal V1 -> contextNonceSession return
- 4537 TPM\_BADCONTEXT

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4538 ii. Validate that the resource pointed to by the context is loaded (i.e. for OSAP the key referenced is loaded and DSAP connected to the key) return 4540 TPM_RESOURCEMISSING
(1) For OSAP sessions and for DSAP sessions attached to keys, the TPM MUST validate that the hash of the entity matches the entity held by the TPM
4543 (2) For OSAP and DSAP sessions referring to a key, verify that entityHandle identifies the key linked to this OSAP/DSAP session, if not return TPM_BAD_HANDLE.
4546 b. Else
i. If C1 -> internalData -> parentPCRStatus is FALSE and C1 -> internalData -> isVolatile is FALSE
4549 (1) Ignore C1 -> contextNonce
4550 ii. else
4551 (1) If C1 -> contextNonce does not equal TPM_STCLEAR_DATA -> contextNonceKey return TPM_BADCONTEXT
45536. Validate the structure
4554 a. Set H1 to B1 -> integrityDigest
4555 b. Set B1 -> integrityDigest to all zeros
4556 c. Copy M1 to B1 -> sensitiveData
d. Create H2 the HMAC of B1 using TPM_PERMANENT_DATA -> tpmProof as the HMAC key
e. If H2 does not equal H1 return TPM_BADCONTEXT
45607. If keepHandle is TRUE
4561 a. Set handle to B1 -> handle
b. If the TPM is unable to restore the handle the TPM MUST return TPM_BAD_HANDLE
45638. Else
4564 a. The TPM SHOULD attempt to restore the handle but if not possible it MAY set the

- 4565 handle to any valid for B1 -> resourceType
- 45669. If B1 -> resourceType is NOT TPM\_RT\_KEY
- 4567 a. Find contextIndex such that V1 -> contextList[contextIndex] equals B1 ->
- TPM\_CONTEXT\_BLOB -> contextCount 4568
- 4569 b. If not found then return TPM\_BADCONTEXT
- c. Set V1 -> contextList[contextIndex] to 0 4570
- 457110. Process B1 to return the resource back into TPM use

# 4572**22.** Eviction

### 4573 Start of informative comment:

4574The TPM has numerous resources held inside of the TPM that may need eviction. The need 4575for eviction occurs when the number or resources in use by the TPM exceed the available 4576space. For resources that are hard to reload (i.e. keys tied to PCR values) the outside entity 4577should first perform a context save before evicting items.

4578In version 1.1 there were separate commands to evict separate resource types. This new 4579command set uses the resource types defined for context saving and creates a generic 4580command that will evict all resource types.

### 4581End of informative comment.

4582The TPM MUST NOT flush the EK or SRK using this command.

4583Version 1.2 deprecates the following commands:

4584 • TPM\_Terminate\_Handle

4585 ◆ TPM\_EvictKey

4586● TPM\_Reset

# 458722.1 TPM FlushSpecific

#### 4588Start of informative comment:

4589TPM\_FlushSpecific flushes from the TPM a specific handle.

#### 4590End of informative comment.

## 4591Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	PARAM		IAC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_FlushSpecific
4	4		·	TPM_HANDLE	handle	The handle of the item to flush
5	4	2S	4	TPM_RESOURCE_TYPE	resourceType	The type of resource that is being flushed

## 4592 Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PARA	PARAM			Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_FlushSpecific

## 4593 Description

4594TPM\_FlushSpecific releases the resources associated with the given handle.

- 45961. If resourceType is TPM\_RT\_CONTEXT
- 4597 a. The handle for a context is not a handle but the "context count" value. The TPM uses
- 4598 the "context count" value to locate the proper contextList entry and sets R1 to the
- 4599 contextList entry
- 46002. Else if resourceType is TPM\_RT\_KEY
- 4601 a. Set R1 to the key pointed to by handle
- b. If R1 -> ownerEvict is TRUE return TPM\_KEY\_OWNER\_CONTROL
- 46033. Else if resourceType is TPM\_RT\_AUTH
- 4604 a. Set R1 to the authorization session pointed to by handle
- 46054. Else if resourceType is TPM\_RT\_TRANS
- 4606 a. Set R1 to the transport session pointed to by handle
- 46075. Else if resourceType is TPM\_RT\_DAA\_TPM

- 4608 a. Set R1 to the DAA session pointed to by handle
- 46096. Else return TPM\_INVALID\_RESOURCE
- 46107. Validate that R1 determined by resourceType and handle points to a valid allocated 4611 resource. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER on error.
- 46128. Invalidate R1 and all internal resources allocated to R1
- 4613 a. Resources include authorization sessions

# 4614**23**. Timing Ticks

### 4615Start of informative comment:

4616The TPM timing ticks are always available for use. The association of timing ticks to actual 4617time is a protocol that occurs outside of the TPM. See the design document for details.

4618The setting of the clock type variable is a one time operation that allows the TPM to be 4619configured to the type of platform that is installed on.

4620The ability for the TPM to continue to increment the timer ticks across power cycles of the 4621platform is a TPM and platform manufacturer decision.

4622 End of informative comment.

# 4623**23.1 TPM\_GetTicks**

#### 4624Start of informative comment:

4625This command returns the current tick count of the TPM.

4626End of informative comment.

# 4627Incoming Parameters and Sizes

P	ARAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetTicks

## 4628Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tuna	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetTicks
4	32	3S	32	TPM_CURRENT_TICKS	currentTime	The current time held in the TPM

## 4629 Description

4630This command returns the current time held in the TPM. It is the responsibility of the 4631external system to maintain any relation between this time and a UTC value or local real 4632time value.

#### 4633Actions

46341. Set T1 to the internal TPM\_CURRENT\_TICKS structure

46352. Return T1 as currentTime.

# 463623.2 TPM\_TickStampBlob

### 4637Start of informative comment:

4638This command applies a time stamp to the passed blob. The TPM makes no representation 4639regarding the blob merely that the blob was present at the TPM at the time indicated.

## 4640 End of informative comment.

# **4641Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyma	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, fixed value of TPM_ORD_TickStampBlob
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures.
5	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Anti replay value added to signature
6	20	3S	20	TPM_DIGEST	digestToStamp	The digest to perform the tick stamp on
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

## 4642Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	- Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Ordinal, fixed value of TPM_ORD_TickStampBlob
4	32	3S	32	TPM_CURRENT_TICKS	currentTicks	The current time according to the TPM
5	4	4S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The length of the returned digital signature
6	<>	5S	<>	BYTE[]	sig	The resulting digital signature.
7	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

### 4643 Description

4644The function performs a digital signature on the hash of digestToStamp and the current tick 4645count.

4646It is the responsibility of the external system to maintain any relation between tick count 4647and a UTC value or local real time value.

- 46491. The TPM validates the AuthData to use the key pointed to by keyHandle.
- 46502. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY or
- 4651 TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, if not return the error code TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE.
- 46523. Validate that keyHandle -> sigScheme is TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15 SHA1 or
- 4653 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO, if not return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_SIG.
- 46544. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> currentTicks is not properly initialized
- 4655 a. Initialize the TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> currentTicks
- 46565. Create T1, a TPM\_CURRENT\_TICKS structure.
- 46576. Create H1 a TPM SIGN INFO structure and set the structure defaults
- 4658 a. Set H1 -> fixed to "TSTP"
- 4659 b. Set H1 -> replay to antiReplay
- 4660 c. Create H2 the concatenation of digestToStamp | | T1
- 4661 d. Set H1 -> dataLen to the length of H2
- 4662 e. Set H1 -> data to H2

- 46637. The TPM computes the signature, sig, using the key referenced by keyHandle, using 4664 SHA-1 of H1 as the information to be signed
- 46658. The TPM returns T1 as currentTicks parameter

# 466624. Transport Sessions

4667

4668See Part 1 for rationale and security issues.

## 466924.1 TPM\_EstablishTransport

#### 4670Start of informative comment:

4671This establishes the transport session. Depending on the attributes specified for the session 4672this may establish shared secrets, encryption keys, and session logs. The session will be in 4673use for by the TPM\_ExecuteTransport command.

4674The only restriction on what can happen inside of a transport session is that there is no 4675"nesting" of sessions. It is permissible to perform operations that delete internal state and 4676make the TPM inoperable.

#### 4677End of informative comment.

### 4678Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type Name	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_EstablishTransport
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	encHandle	The handle to the key that encrypted the blob
5	<>	2S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC	transPublic	The public information describing the transport session
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	secretSize	The size of the secret Area
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>\</b>	BYTE[]	secret	The encrypted secret area
8	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
9	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
10	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
11	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: encKey.usageAuth

## **4680Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_EstablishTransport
4	4			TPM_TRANSHANDLE	transHandle	The handle for the transport session
5	4	3S	4	TPM_MODIFIER_INDICATOR	locality	The locality that called this command
6	32	4S	32	TPM_CURRENT_TICKS	currentTicks	The current tick count
7	20	5S	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceEven	The even nonce in use for subsequent execute transport
8	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

### 4681 Description

4682This command establishes the transport sessions shared secret. The encryption of the 4683shared secret uses the public key of the key loaded in encKey.

- 46851. If encHandle is TPM\_KH\_TRANSPORT then
- 4686 a. If tag is NOT TPM TAG RQU COMMAND return TPM BADTAG
- 4687 b. If transPublic -> transAttributes specifies TPM\_TRANSPORT\_ENCRYPT return
- 4688 TPM BAD SCHEME
- 4689 c. If secretSize is not 20 return TPM BAD PARAM SIZE
- 4690 d. Set A1 to secret
- 46912. Else
- 4692 a. encHandle -> keyUsage MUST be TPM KEY STORAGE or TPM KEY LEGACY return
- 4693 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE on error
- b. If encHandle -> authDataUsage does not equal TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER and tag is NOT
- 4695 TPM\_TAG\_RQU\_AUTH1\_COMMAND return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 4696 c. Using encHandle -> usageAuth validate the AuthData to use the key and the
- 4697 parameters to the command
- d. Create K1 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_AUTH structure by decrypting secret using the key
- pointed to by encHandle
- 4700 e. Validate K1 for tag
- 4701 f. Set A1 to K1 -> authData

- 47023. If transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM\_TRANSPORT\_ENCRYPT
- 4703 a. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is true and transPublic -> algId is equal to
- 4704 TPM\_ALG\_MGF1 return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_ENC
- 4705 b. Check if the transPublic -> algId is supported, if not return
- 4706 TPM BAD KEY PROPERTY
- 4707 c. If transPublic -> algid is TPM\_ALG\_AESXXX, check that transPublic -> encScheme is
- 4708 supported, if not return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_ENC
- 4709 d. Perform any initializations necessary for the algorithm
- 47104. Generate transNonceEven from the TPM RNG
- 47115. Create T1 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_INTERNAL structure
- 4712 a. Ensure that the TPM has sufficient internal space to allocate the transport session,
- 4713 return TPM RESOURCES on error
- 4714 b. Assign a T1 -> transHandle value. This value is assigned by the TPM
- 4715 c. Set T1 -> transDigest to all zeros
- 4716 d. Set T1 -> transPublic to transPublic
- 4717 e. Set T1-> transNonceEven to transNonceEven
- 4718 f. Set T1 -> authData to A1
- 47196. If TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> currentTicks is not properly initialized
- 4720 a. Initialize the TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> currentTicks
- 47217. Set currentTicks to TPM STANY DATA -> currentTicks
- 47228. If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM TRANSPORT LOG set then
- 4723 a. Create L1 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_LOG\_IN structure
- i. Set L1 -> parameters to SHA-1 (ordinal | transPublic | secretSize | secret)
- ii. Set L1 -> pubKeyHash to all zeros
- 4726 iii. Set T1 -> transDigest to SHA-1 (T1 -> transDigest | L1)
- 4727 b. Create L2 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_LOG\_OUT structure
- i. Set L2 -> parameters to SHA-1 (returnCode || ordinal || locality || 4729 currentTicks || transNonceEven)
- 4730 ii. Set L2 -> locality to the locality of this command
- iii. Set L2 -> currentTicks to currentTicks, this MUST be the same value that is
- 4732 returned in the currentTicks parameter
- iv. Set T1 -> transDigest to SHA-1 (T1 -> transDigest | L2)
- 47349. If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM\_TRANSPORT\_EXCLUSIVE then set
- 4735 TPM STANY FLAGS -> transportExclusive to TRUE
- 4736 a. Execution of any command other than TPM ExecuteTransport or
- 4737 TPM\_ReleaseTransportSigned targeting this transport session will cause the abnormal
- 4738 invalidation of this transport session transHandle

4739 b. The TPM gives no indication, other than invalidation of transHandle, that the session is terminated

474110. Return T1 -> transHandle as transHandle

## 4742**24.2 TPM ExecuteTransport**

#### 4743Start of informative comment:

4744Delivers a wrapped TPM command to the TPM where the TPM unwraps the command and 4745then executes the command.

4746TPM\_ExecuteTransport uses the same rolling nonce paradigm as other authorized TPM 4747commands. The even nonces start in TPM\_EstablishTransport and change on each 4748invocation of TPM\_ExecuteTransport.

4749The only restriction on what can happen inside of a transport session is that there is no 4750"nesting" of sessions. It is permissible to perform operations that delete internal state and 4751make the TPM inoperable.

4752Because, in general, key handles are not logged, a digest of the corresponding public key is 4753logged. In cases where the key handle is logged (e.g. TPM\_OwnerReadInternalPub), the 4754public key is also logged.

4755The wrapped command is audited twice – once according to the actions of 4756TPM\_ExecuteTransport and once within the wrapped command itself according to the 4757special rules for auditing a command wrapped in an encrypted transport session.

4758The method of incrementing the symmetric key counter value is different from that used by 4759some standard crypto libraries (e.g. openSSL, Java JCE) that increment the entire counter 4760value. TPM users should be aware of this to avoid errors when the counter wraps.

#### 4761 End of informative comment.

## 4762Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	ARAM HI		AC	Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ExecuteTransport
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	wrappedCmdSize	Size of the wrapped command
5	<>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	wrappedCmd	The wrapped command
6	4			TPM_TRANSHANDLE	transHandle	The transport session handle
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	transLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueTransSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	transAuth	HMAC for transHandle key: transHandle -> authData

## **4764Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Type N	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ		Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the ExecuteTransport command. This does not reflect the status of wrapped command.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ExecuteTransport
4	8	3S	8	UINT64	currentTicks	The current ticks when the command was executed
5	4	4S	4	TPM_MODIFIER_INDICATOR	locality	The locality that called this command
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	wrappedRspSize	Size of the wrapped response
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	6S	<>	BYTE[]	wrappedRsp	The wrapped response
8	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueTransSession	The continue use flag for the session
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	transAuth	HMAC for transHandle key: transHandle -> authData

### 4765Description

- 47661. This command executes a TPM command using the transport session.
- 47672. Prior to execution of the wrapped command (action 11 below) failure of the transport
- 4768 session MUST have no effect on the resources referenced by the wrapped command. The
- 4769 exception is when the TPM goes into failure mode and return FAILED\_SELFTEST for all
- 4770 subsequent commands.
- 47713. After execution of the wrapped command, failure of the transport session MAY NOT
- 4772 affect wrapped command resources. That is, the TPM is not required to clean up the
- 4773 effects of the wrapped command. Sessions and keys MAY remain loaded. It is
- 4774 understood that the transport session will be returning an error code and not reporting
- 4775 any session nonces. Therefore, wrapped sessions are no longer useful to the caller. It is
- 4776 the responsibility of the caller to clean up the result of the wrapped command.
- 47774. Execution of the wrapped command (action 11) SHOULD have no effect on the transport
- 4778 session.
- 4779 a. The wrapped command SHALL use no resources of the transport session, this
- 4780 includes authorization sessions
- 4781 b. If the wrapped command execution returns an error (action 11 below) then the
- 4782 sessions for TPM\_ExecuteTransport still operate properly.
- 4783 c. The exception to this is when the wrapped command causes the TPM to go into
- 4784 failure mode and return TPM\_FAILSELFTEST for all subsequent commands
- 47855. Field layout
- 4786 a. Notation
- 4787i. et indicates the outer TPM\_**E**xecute**T**ransport command and response

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1162
1163
4788ii. w indicates the inner command and response that is wrapped by the
4789
     TPM ExecuteTransport.
4790iii. (o) indicates optional parameters that may or may not be present in the wrapped
4791
     command.
4792
     b. Command representation
     4793
4794
     d. TAGet | LENet | ORDet | wrappedCmdSize | wrappedCmd | AUTHet
     4795
4796
     f. wrappedCmd looks like the following
       ********************************
4797
4798
     h. TAGW | LENW | ORDW | HANDLESW(0) | DATAW | AUTH1W (0) | AUTH2W (0)
       4799
4800
                                   | LEN1 |
     į.
4801
                                    E1
                                         | (encrypted)
     k.
4802
                                   | C1
     1.
                                         (decrypted)
4803
     m. Response representation
     4804
4805
     o. TAGet | LENet | RCet | ... | wrappedRspSize | wrappedRsp | AUTHet
     4806
4807
     q. wrappedRsp looks like the following
     4808
4809
     s. TAGw | LENw | RCw | HANDLESw(o) | DATAw | AUTH1w (o) | AUTH2w (o)
       ******************************
4810
4811
                                 | LEN2 |
     u.
     4812
4813
                                 | S2 | (decrypted)
4814
                                   E2 | (encrypted)
     x.
4815
     y. The only command and response parameter that is possibly encrypted is DATAw.
48166. Additional DATAw comments
4817
     a. For TPM_FlushSpecific and TPM_SaveContext
4818
         i. The DATAw part of these commands does not include the handle.
4819
         (1) It is understood that encrypting the resourceType prevents a determination of
4820
         the handle type.
4821
         ii. If the resourceType is TPM_RT_KEY, then the public key MUST be logged.
4822
     b. For TPM DAA_Join and TPM_DAA_Sign
     248
1164
                                        Level 2 Revision 116 28 February 2011
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- i. The DATAw part of these commands does not include the input handle. The output handle from stage 0 is included in DATAW.
- 4825 c. For TPM\_LoadKey2
- i. The outgoing handle is not part of the outgoing DATAw and is not encrypted or logged by the outgoing transport.
- 4828 d. For TPM\_LoadKey
- i. The outgoing handle is part of the outgoing DATAw and is encrypted and logged.
- 4831 e. For TPM LoadContext
- i. The outgoing handle is not part of the outgoing DATAw and is not encrypted or logged by the outgoing transport.
- 4834 (1) It is understood that encrypting the contextBlob prevents a determination of the handle type.
- f. For TPM\_OIAP and TPM\_OSAP, no input or output parameters are encrypted or logged.
- i. For TPM\_OSAP, the public key MUST NOT be logged. During a logged transport session, when a wrapped command uses the key, the public key referenced by the key handle will be logged in the transport. Thus, the audit trail is established for any key usage at that time.
- 4842 g. For TPM DSAP
- i. For input, only entityValue is encrypted and logged.
- 4844 ii. For output no parameters are encrypted or logged.
- 48457. TPM\_ExecuteTransport returns an implementation defined result when the wrapped command would cause termination of the transport session. Implementation defined
- 4847 possibilities include but are not limited to: the wrapped command may execute,
- 4848 completely, partially, or not at all, the transport session may or may not be terminated,
- 4849 continueTransSession may not be processed or returned correctly, and an error may or
- 4850 may not be returned. The wrapped commands include:
- 4851 a. TPM\_FlushSpecific, TPM\_SaveContext targeting the transport session
- 4852 b. TPM\_OwnerClear, TPM\_ForceClear, TPM\_RevokeTrust

- 48541. Using transHandle locate the TPM\_TRANSPORT\_INTERNAL structure T1
- 48552. Parse wrappedCmd
- 4856 a. Set TAGw, LENw, and ORDw to the parameters from wrappedCmd
- 4857 b. Set E1 to DATAw
- i. This pointer is ordinal dependent and requires the execute transport command to parse wrappedCmd
- 4860 c. Set LEN1 to the length of DATAw

- 1171
- i. DATAw always ends at the start of AUTH1w if AUTH1w is present
- 48623. If LEN1 is less than 0, or if ORDw is unknown, unimplemented, or cannot be determined
- 4863 a. Return TPM\_BAD\_PARAMETER
- 48644. If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM\_TRANSPORT\_ENCRYPT set then
- 4865 a. If T1 -> transPublic -> algId is TPM ALG MGF1
- i. Using the MGF1 function, create string G1 of length LEN1. The inputs to the MGF1 are transLastNonceEven, transNonceOdd, "in", and T1 -> authData. These four values concatenated together form the Z value that is the seed for the MGF1.
- ii. Create C1 by performing an XOR of G1 and wrappedCmd starting at E1.
- 4870 b. If the encryption algorithm requires an IV or CTR, calculate the IV or CTR value
- i. Using the MGF1 function, create string IV1 or CTR1 with a length set by the block size of the encryption algorithm. The inputs to the MGF1 are transLastNonceEven, transNonceOdd, and "in". These three values concatenated together form the Z value that is the seed for the MGF1. Note that any terminating characters within the string "in" are ignored, so a total of 42 bytes are hashed.
- ii. The symmetric key is taken from the first bytes of T1 -> authData.
- 4878 iii. Decrypt DATAw and replace the DATAw area of E1 creating C1
- 4879 c. TPM\_OSAP, TPM\_OIAP have no parameters encrypted
- 4880 d. TPM DSAP has special rules for parameter encryption
- 48815. Else
- 4882 a. Set C1 to the DATAw area E1 of wrappedCmd
- 48836. Create H1 the SHA-1 of (ORDw | C1).
- 4884 a. C1 MUST point at the decrypted DATAw area of E1
- 4885 b. The TPM MAY use this calculation for both execute transport authorization,
- 4886 authorization of the wrapped command and transport log creation
- 48877. Validate the incoming transport session authorization
- 4888 a. Set inParamDigest to SHA-1 (ORDet | | wrappedCmdSize | | H1)
- 4889 b. Calculate the HMAC of (inParamDigest | | transLastNonceEven | | transNonceOdd | |
- 4890 continueTransSession) using T1 -> authData as the HMAC key
- 4891 c. Validate transAuth, on errors return TPM\_AUTHFAIL
- 48928. If TPM ExecuteTransport requires auditing
- 4893 a. Create TPM\_AUDIT\_EVENT\_IN using H1 as the input parameter digest and update
- 4894 auditDigest
- b. On any error return TPM\_AUDITFAIL\_UNSUCCESSFUL
- 48969. If ORDw is from the list of following commands return TPM\_NO\_WRAP\_TRANSPORT
- 4897 a. TPM\_EstablishTransport

- 4898 b. TPM\_ExecuteTransport
- 4899 c. TPM\_ReleaseTransportSigned
- 490010.If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM\_TRANSPORT\_LOG set then
- 4901 a. Create L2 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_LOG\_IN structure
- 4902 b. Set L2 -> parameters to H1
- 4903 c. If ORDw is a command with no key handles
- i. Set L2 -> pubKeyHash to all zeros
- 4905 d. If ORDw is a command with one key handle
- i. Create K2 the hash of the TPM\_STORE\_PUBKEY structure of the key pointed to by the key handle.
- 4908 ii. Set L2 -> pubKeyHash to SHA-1 (K2)
- 4909 e. If ORDw is a command with two key handles
- i. Create K2 the hash of the TPM\_STORE\_PUBKEY structure of the key pointed to by the first key handle.
- 4912 ii. Create K3 the hash of the TPM\_STORE\_PUBKEY structure of the key pointed to by the second key handle.
- 4914 iii. Set L2 -> pubKeyHash to SHA-1 (K2 | | K3)
- 4915 f. Set T1 -> transDigest to the SHA-1 (T1 -> transDigest | | L2)
- 4916 g. If ORDw is a command with key handles, and the key is not loaded, return
- 4917 TPM INVALID KEYHANDLE.
- 491811. Send the wrapped command to the normal TPM command parser, the output is C2 and
- 4919 the return code is RCw
- 4920 a. If ORDw is a command that is audited then the TPM MUST perform the input and
- output audit of the command as part of this action.
- b. The TPM MAY use H1 as the data value in the authorization and audit calculations
- 4923 during the execution of C1
- 492412. Set CT1 to TPM STANY DATA -> currentTicks -> currentTicks and return CT1 in the
- 4925 currentTicks output parameter
- 492613. Calculate S2 the pointer to the DATAw area of C2
- 4927 a. Calculate LEN2 the length of S2 according to the same rules that calculated LEN1
- 492814. Create H2 the SHA-1 of (RCw | | ORDw | | S2)
- 4929 a. The TPM MAY use this calculation for execute transport authorization and transport
- 4930 log out creation
- 493115. Calculate the outgoing transport session authorization
- 4932 a. Create the new transNonceEven for the output of the command
- 4933 b. Set outParamDigest to SHA-1 (RCet | | ORDet | | TPM\_STANY\_DATA -> currentTicks
- 4934 -> currentTicks | | locality | | wrappedRspSize | | H2)

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1181
4935
       c. Calculate transAuth, the HMAC of (outParamDigest || transNonceEven ||
4936
       transNonceOdd | | continueTransSession) using T1 -> authData as the HMAC key
493716.If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM_TRANSPORT_LOG set then
4938
       a. Create L3 a TPM_TRANSPORT_LOG_OUT structure
4939
       b. Set L3 -> parameters to H2
4940
       c. Set L3 -> currentTicks to TPM_STANY_DATA -> currentTicks
4941
       d. Set L3 -> locality to TPM_STANY_DATA -> localityModifier
4942
       e. Set T1 -> transDigest to the SHA-1 (T1 -> transDigest | L3)
494317. If T1 -> transPublic -> transAttributes has TPM TRANSPORT ENCRYPT set then
4944
       a. If T1 -> transPublic -> algId is TPM ALG MGF1
4945
             i. Using the MGF1 function, create string G2 of length LEN2. The inputs to the
```

- four values concatenated together form the Z value that is the seed for the MGF1.

  ii. Create E2 by performing an XOR of G2 and C2 starting at S2.
- 4949 b. Else
- i. Create IV2 or CTR2 using the same algorithm as IV1 or CTR1 with the input values transNonceEven, transNonceOdd, and "out". Note that any terminating characters within the string "out" are ignored, so a total of 43 bytes are hashed.

MGF1 are transNonceEven, transNonceOdd, "out", and T1 -> authData. These

- ii. The symmetric key is taken from the first bytes of T1 -> authData
- 4954 iii. Create E2 by encrypting C2 starting at S2

495518.Else

- 4956 a. Set E2 to the DATAw area S2 of wrappedRsp
- 495719. If continue Trans Session is FALSE
- 4958 a. Invalidate all session data related to transHandle
- 495920. If TPM\_ExecuteTranport requires auditing
- 4960 a. Create TPM\_AUDIT\_EVENT\_OUT using H2 for the parameters and update the 4961 auditDigest
- 4962 b. On any errors return TPM\_AUDITFAIL\_SUCCESSFUL or 4963 TPM\_AUDITFAIL\_UNSUCCESSFUL depending on RCw
- 496421. Return C2 but with S2 replaced by E2 in the wrappedRsp parameter

## 496524.3 TPM\_ReleaseTransportSigned

#### 4966Start of informative comment:

4967This command completes the transport session. If logging for this session is turned on, then 4968this command returns a digital signature of the hash of all operations performed during the 4969session.

4970This command serves no purpose if logging is turned off, and results in an error if 4971attempted.

4972This command uses two authorization sessions, the key that will sign the log and the 4973authorization from the session. Having the session authorization proves that the requestor 4974that is signing the log is the owner of the session. If this restriction is not put in then an 4975attacker can close the log and sign using their own key.

4976The hash of the session log includes the information associated with the input phase of 4977execution of the TPM\_ReleaseTransportSigned command. It cannot include the output 4978phase information.

#### 4979End of informative comment.

## 4980Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	- Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseTransportSigned
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	Handle of a loaded key that will perform the signing
5	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Value provided by caller for anti-replay protection
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session to use key
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of key. HMAC key: key -> usageAuth
10	4			TPM_TRANSHANDLE	transHandle	The transport session handle
		2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	transLastNonceEven	Even nonce in use by execute Transport
11	20	3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceOdd	Nonce supplied by caller for transport session
12	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueTransSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	transAuth	HMAC for transport session key: transHandle -> authData

### 4981 Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Time	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseTransportSigned
4	4	3S	4	TPM_MODIFIER_INDICATOR	locality	The locality that called this command
5	32	4S	32	TPM_CURRENT_TICKS	currentTicks	The current ticks when the command executed
6	4	5S	4	UINT32	signSize	The size of the signature area
7	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	6S	<>	BYTE[]	signature	The signature of the digest
8	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the session
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	keyAuth	HMAC: key -> usageAuth
11	20	2H2	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM
		3H2	20	TPM_NONCE	transNonceOdd	Nonce generated by caller
12	1	4H2	1	BOOL	continueTransSession	The continue use flag for the session
13	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	transAuth	HMAC: transHandle -> authData

### 4982 Description

4983This command releases a transport session and signs the transport log

- 49851. Using transHandle locate the TPM\_TRANSPORT\_INTERNAL structure T1
- 49862. Validate that keyHandle -> sigScheme is TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 or TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_INFO, if not return TPM\_INAPPROPRIATE\_SIG. 4987
- 49883. Validate that keyHandle -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, if not return
- 4989 TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 49904. Using key -> authData validate the command and parameters, on error return 4991 TPM AUTHFAIL
- 49925. Using transHandle -> authData validate the command and parameters, on error return
- 4993 TPM AUTH2FAIL
- 49946. If T1 -> transAttributes has TPM TRANSPORT LOG set then
- 4995 a. Create A1 a TPM\_TRANSPORT\_LOG\_OUT structure
- 4996 b. Set A1 -> parameters to the SHA-1 (ordinal | | antiReplay)
- 4997 c. Set A1 -> currentTicks to TPM STANY DATA -> currentTicks
- 4998 d. Set A1 -> locality to the locality modifier for this command

- 4999 e. Set T1 -> transDigest to SHA-1 (T1 -> transDigest | | A1)
- 50007. Else
- 5001 a. Return TPM\_BAD\_MODE
- 50028. Create H1 a TPM\_SIGN\_INFO structure and set the structure defaults
- 5003 a. Set H1 -> fixed to "TRAN"
- 5004 b. Set H1 -> replay to antiReplay
- 5005 c. Set H1 -> data to T1 -> transDigest
- 5006 d. Sign SHA-1 hash of H1 using the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 50079. Invalidate all session data related to T1
- 500810. Set continueTransSession to FALSE
- 500911.Return TPM\_SUCCESS

## 5010**25.** Monotonic Counter

## 5011**25.1 TPM\_CreateCounter**

#### 5012 Start of informative comment:

5013This command creates the counter but does not select the counter. Counter creation 5014assigns an AuthData value to the counter and sets the counters original start value. The 5015original start value is the current internal base value plus one. Setting the new counter to 5016the internal base avoids attacks on the system that are attempting to use old counter 5017values.

#### 5018End of informative comment.

## **5019Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM		AC	- Type	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateCounter
4	20	2S	20	TPM_ENCAUTH	encAuth	The encrypted auth data for the new counter
5	4	3s	4	BYTE	label	Label to associate with counter
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Ignored
10	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	Authorization ownerAuth.

## **5020Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Tyna	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CreateCounter
4	4	3s	4	TPM_COUNT_ID	countID	The handle for the counter
5	10	4S	10	TPM_COUNTER_VALUE	counterValue	The starting counter value
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Fixed value of FALSE
8	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 5021 Description

5022This command creates a new monotonic counter. The TPM MUST support a minimum of 4 5023concurrent counters.

#### 5024Actions

#### 5025The TPM SHALL do the following:

- 50261. Using the authHandle field, validate the owner's AuthData to execute the command and
- all of the incoming parameters. The authorization session MUST be OSAP or DSAP 5027
- 50282. Ignore continueAuthSession on input and set continueAuthSession to FALSE on output
- 50293. Create a1 by decrypting encAuth according to the ADIP indicated by authHandle.
- 50304. Validate that there is sufficient internal space in the TPM to create a new counter. If
- there is insufficient space, the command returns an error. 5031
- 5032 a. The TPM MUST provide storage for a1, TPM\_COUNTER\_VALUE, countID, and any
- other internal data the TPM needs to associate with the counter 5033
- 50345. Increment the max counter value
- 50356. Set the counter to the max counter value
- 50367. Set the counter label to label
- 50378. Create a countID

## 503825.2 TPM\_IncrementCounter

#### 5039Start of informative comment:

5040This authorized command increments the indicated counter by one. Once a counter has 5041been incremented then all subsequent increments must be for the same handle until a 5042successful TPM\_Startup(ST\_CLEAR) is executed.

5043The order for checking validation of the command parameters when no counter is active, 5044keeps an attacker from creating a denial-of-service attack.

#### 5045End of informative comment.

### 5046Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_IncrementCounter
4	4	2s	4	TPM_COUNT_ID	countID	The handle of a valid counter
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for counter authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	counterAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of countID. HMAC key: countID -> authData

## **5047Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_IncrementCounter
5	10	3S	10	TPM_COUNTER_VALUE	count	The counter value
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: countID -> authData

### 5048 Description

5049This function increments the counter by 1.

5050The TPM MAY implement increment throttling to avoid burn problems

- 50521. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID is 0
- 5053 a. Validate that countID is a valid counter, return TPM\_BAD\_COUNTER on mismatch
- 5054 b. Validate the command parameters using counterAuth
- 5055 c. Set TPM STCLEAR DATA -> countID to countID
- 50562. else
- a. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID does not equal countID
- i. Return TPM\_BAD\_COUNTER
- 5059 b. Validate the command parameters using counterAuth
- 50603. Increments the counter by 1
- 50614. Return new count value in count

## 5062**25.3** TPM ReadCounter

#### 5063 Start of informative comment:

5064Reading the counter provides the caller with the current number in the sequence.

#### 5065 End of informative comment.

## **5066Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAI	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadCounter
4	4	2S	4	TPM_COUNT_ID	countID	ID value of the counter

## **5067Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReadCounter
4	10	3S	10	TPM_COUNTER_VALUE	count	The counter value

## 5068 Description

5069This returns the current value for the counter indicated. The counter MAY be any valid 5070counter.

#### 5071Actions

50721. Validate that countID points to a valid counter. Return TPM\_BAD\_COUNTER on error.

50732. Return count

## 5074**25.4** TPM ReleaseCounter

#### 5075Start of informative comment:

5076This command releases a counter such that no reads or increments of the indicated counter 5077will succeed.

#### 5078 End of informative comment.

### 5079Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PAF	PARAM		AC	T	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounter	
4	4	2s	4	TPM_COUNT_ID	countID	ID value of the counter	
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for countID authorization	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce associated with countID	
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle	
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	counterAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the use of countID. HMAC key: countID -> authData	

## **5080Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM		AC	Type	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounter	
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs	
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active	
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: countID -> authData	

#### 5081 Actions

5082The TPM uses countID to locate a valid counter.

- 50831. Authenticate the command and the parameters using the AuthData pointed to by 5084 countID. Return TPM\_AUTHFAIL on error
- 50852. The TPM invalidates all internal information regarding the counter. This includes releasing countID such that any subsequent attempts to use countID will fail.
- 50873. The TPM invalidates sessions

- 5088 a. MUST invalidate all OSAP sessions associated with the counter
- 5089 b. MAY invalidate any other session
- 50904. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID equals countID,
- a. Set TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID to an illegal value (not the zero value)

## 5092**25.5** TPM\_ReleaseCounterOwner

#### 5093Start of informative comment:

5094This command releases a counter such that no reads or increments of the indicated counter 5095will succeed.

#### 5096End of informative comment.

### **5097Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM		AC	Time	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounterOwner	
4	4	2s	4	TPM_COUNT_ID	countID	ID value of the counter	
5	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication	
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
6	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle	
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the inputs. HMAC key: ownerAuth	

## **5098Outgoing Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM HMA		AC	Time	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounterOwner	
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs	
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active	
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth	

## 5099Description

5100This invalidates all information regarding a counter.

- 51021. Validate that ownerAuth properly authorizes the command and parameters
- 51032. The TPM uses countID to locate a valid counter. Return TPM\_BAD\_COUNTER if not 5104 found.

- 1235
- 51053. The TPM invalidates all internal information regarding the counter. This includes 5106 releasing countID such that any subsequent attempts to use countID will fail.
- 51074. The TPM invalidates sessions
- 5108 a. MUST invalidate all OSAP sessions associated with the counter
- 5109 b. MAY invalidate any other session
- 51105. If TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID equals countID,
- a. Set TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA -> countID to an illegal value (not the zero value)

## 5112**26.** DAA commands

## 5113**26.1 TPM\_DAA\_Join**

### 5114Start of informative comment:

- 5115TPM\_DAA\_Join is the process that establishes the DAA parameters in the TPM for a specific 5116DAA issuing authority.
- 5117outputSize and outputData are always included in the outParamDigest. This includes stage 51180, where the outputData contains the DAA session handle.
- 5119 End of informative comment.

## **5120Incoming Parameters and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag	
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DAA_Join.	
4	4			TPM_HANDLE	handle	Session handle	
5	1	2S	1	BYTE	stage	Processing stage of join	
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	inputSize0	Size of inputData0 for this stage of JOIN	
7	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inputData0	Data to be used by this capability	
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	inputSize1	Size of inputData1 for this stage of JOIN	
9	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inputData1	Data to be used by this capability	
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication	
		2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs	
11	20	3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
12	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active	
13	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner. HMAC key: ownerAuth.	

# 5121Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	PARAM		AC	T	Name	Description	
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description	
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND	
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes incl. paramSize and tag	
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation	
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DAA_Join.	
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outputSize	Size of outputData	
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>♦</b>	BYTE[]	outputData	Data produced by this capability	
6	20	2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs	
		3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle	
7	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active	
8	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization HMAC key: ownerAuth.	

## 5122**Description**

5123This table summaries the input, output and saved data that is associated with each stage of 5124processing.

Stage	Input Data0	Input Data1	Operation	Output Data	Scratchpad
0	DAA_count (used as # repetitions of stage 1)	NULL	initialise	Session Handle	NULL
1	n0	signatureValue	rekeying	NULL	n0
2	DAA_issuerSettings	signatureValue	issuer settings	NULL	NULL
3	DAA_count	NULL	DAA_join_uo, DAA_join_u1	NULL	NULL
4	DAA_generic_R0	DAA_generic_n	P1=R0^f0 mod n	NULL	P1
5	DAA_generic_R1	DAA_generic_n	$P2 = P1*(R1^{f1}) \mod n$	NULL	P2
6	DAA_generic_S0	DAA_generic_n	$P3 = P2*(S0^u0) \mod n$	NULL	P3
7	DAA_generic_S1	DAA_generic_n	$U = P3*(S1^u1) \mod n$	U	NULL
8	NE	NULL	U2	U2	NULL
9	DAA_generic_R0	DAA_generic_n	P1=R0^r0 mod n	NULL	P1
10	DAA_generic_R1	DAA_generic_n	$P2 = P1*(R1^r1) \mod n$	NULL	P2
11	DAA_generic_S0	DAA_generic_n	P3 = P2*(S0^r2) mod n	NULL	P3
12	DAA_generic_S1	DAA_generic_n	P4 = P3*(S1^r3) mod n	P4	NULL
13	DAA_generic_gamma	w	w1 = w^q mod gamma	NULL	w
14	DAA_generic_gamma	NULL	E = w^f mod gamma	Е	w
15	DAA_generic_gamma	NULL	$r = r0 + (2^npower0)^*r1 \mod q$ , E1 = $w^nr \mod gamma$	E1	NULL
16	c1	NULL	c = hash(c1    NT)	nt	NULL
17	NULL	NULL	s0 = r0 + c*f0	s0	NULL
18	NULL	NULL	s1 = r1 + c*f1	s1	NULL
19	NULL	NULL	$s2 = r2 + c*u0$ mod 2^power1	s2	NULL
20	NULL	NULL	s12 = r2 + c*u0 >> power1	С	s12
21	NULL	NULL	s3 = r3 + c*u1 + s12	s3	NULL
22	u2	NULL	v0 = u2 + u0 mod 2^power1 v10 = u2 + u0 >> power1	enc(v0)	v10
23	u3	NULL	V1 = u3 + u1 + v10	enc(v1)	NULL
24	NULL	NULL	enc(DAA_tpmSpecific)	enc(DAA_tpmSpecific)	NULL

#### 5126Actions

- 5127A Trusted Platform Module that receives a valid TPM\_DAA\_Join command SHALL:
- 51281. Use ownerAuth to verify that the Owner authorized all TPM\_DAA\_Join input parameters.
- 51292. Any error return results in the TPM invalidating all resources associated with the join
- 51303. Constant values of 0 or 1 are 1 byte integers, stages affected are
- 5131 a. 4(j), 5(j), 14(f), 17(e)
- 51324. Representation of the strings "r0" to "r4" are 2-byte ASCII encodings, stages affected are
- 5133 a. 9(i), 10(h), 11(h), 12(h), 15(f), 15(g), 17(d), 18(d), 19(d), 20(d), 21(d)

#### 5134Start of informative comment:

- 51355. Variable DAA\_Count
- a. In stage 0, DAA\_Count denotes the length of the RSA key chain, which certifies the
- main DAA public key and which will be loaded in stage 1. It also denotes the number of
- 5138 times stage 1 is executed.
- b. In stage 3 the variable DAA\_count denotes the actual DAA counter. It allows a DAA
- issuer to keep track of the number of times it has issued 'different' DAA credentials to
- 5141 the same platform. (The counter does not need to be equal to the actual number.)

#### 5142End of informative comment.

### 5143Stages

- 51440. If stage==0
- 5145 c. Determine that sufficient resources are available to perform a TPM\_DAA\_Join.
- 5146 i. The TPM MUST support sufficient resources to perform one (1) 5147 TPM\_DAA\_Join/ TPM\_DAA\_Sign. The TPM MAY support additional TPM DAA Join/ TPM DAA Sign sessions.
- 5149 ii. The TPM may share internal resources between the DAA operations and other variable resource requirements:
- 5151 iii. If there are insufficient resources within the stored key pool (and one or more keys need to be removed to permit the DAA operation to execute) return 5153 TPM NOSPACE
- 5154 iv. If there are insufficient resources within the stored session pool (and one or more authorization or transport sessions need to be removed to permit the DAA operation to execute), return TPM\_RESOURCES.
- 5157 d. Set all fields in DAA\_issuerSettings = NULL
- 5158 e. set all fields in DAA\_tpmSpecific = NULL
- 5159 f. set all fields in DAA session = NULL
- 5160 g. Set all fields in DAA\_joinSession = NULL
- 5161 h. Verify that sizeOf(inputData0) == sizeOf(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count) and return
- 5162 error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 1254 **268**

- 5163 i. Verify that inputData0 > 0, and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5164 j. Set DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count = inputData0
- 5165 k. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5166 DAA\_joinSession)
- 5167 l. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage = 1
- 5168 m. Assign session handle for TPM\_DAA\_Join
- 5169 n. set outputData = new session handle
- i. The handle in outputData is included the output HMAC.
- o. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 51726. If stage==1
- 5173 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==1. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5174 on mismatch
- 5175 b. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5176 DAA\_joinSession) and return TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5177 c. Verify that sizeOf(inputData0) == DAA\_SIZE\_issuerModulus and return error
- 5178 TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5179 d. If DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch == NULL:
- 5180 i. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = inputData0
- ii. set DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_digest\_n0 = SHA-1(DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch)
- 5182 iii. set DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey = SHA-1(tpmDAASeed | | DAA\_joinSession
- 5183 -> DAA\_digest\_n0)
- 5184 e. Else (If DAA session -> DAA scratch != NULL):
- 5185 i. Set signedData = inputData0
- 5186 ii. Verify that sizeOf(inputData1) == DAA SIZE issuerModulus and return error
- 5187 TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5188 iii. Set signatureValue = inputData1
- 5189 iv. Use the RSA key == [DAA session -> DAA scratch] to verify that
- 5190 signatureValue is a signature on signedData using
- 5191 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1 (RSA PKCS1.5 with SHA-1), and return error
- 5192 TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_VALIDITY on mismatch
- v. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = signedData
- f. Decrement DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA count by 1 (unity)
- 5195 g. If DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count == 0:
- i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5197 h. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5198 DAA\_joinSession)
- 5199 i. set outputData = NULL

- 1261
- 1262
- 5200 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 52017. If stage==2
- 5202 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==2. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5203 on mismatch
- 5204 b. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5205 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5206 c. Verify that sizeOf(inputData0) == sizeOf(TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER) and return error
- 5207 TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5208 d. Set DAA\_issuerSettings = inputData0. Verify that all fields in DAA\_issuerSettings are
- 5209 present and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 if not.
- 5210 e. Verify that sizeOf(inputData1) == DAA\_SIZE\_issuerModulus and return error
- 5211 TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5212 f. Set signatureValue = inputData1
- 5213 g. Set signedData = (DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_digest\_n0 | | DAA\_issuerSettings)
- 5214 h. Use the RSA key [DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch] to verify that signatureValue is a
- 5215 signature on signedData using TPM SS RSASSAPKCS1v15 SHA1 (RSA PKCS1.5 with
- 5216 SHA-1),, and return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_VALIDITY on mismatch
- 5217 i. Set DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings)
- 5218 j. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5219 DAA joinSession)
- 5220 k. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = NULL
- 5221 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5222 m. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 52238. If stage==3
- 5224 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage==3. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5225 on mismatch
- 5226 b. Verify that DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA issuerSettings) and
- 5227 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5228 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5229 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5230 d. Verify that sizeOf(inputData0) == sizeOf(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count) and return
- 5231 error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5232 e. Set DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count = inputData0
- 5233 f. Obtain random data from the RNG and store it as DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u0
- 5234 g. Obtain random data from the RNG and store it as DAA joinSession -> DAA join u1
- 5235 h. set outputData = NULL
- 5236 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1

- 5237 j. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5238 DAA\_joinSession)
- 5239 k. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 52409. If stage==4,
- 5241 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage == 4. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5242 on mismatch
- 5243 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5245 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5246 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5247 d. Set DAA\_generic\_R0 = inputData0
- 5248 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic R0) == DAA issuerSettings -> DAA digest R0 and
- 5249 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on mismatch
- 5250 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5251 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5252 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5253 h. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R0
- 5254 i. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- 5255 j. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5256 0) | SHA-1(DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA rekey | DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA count | 1)
- 5257 mod DAA issuerSettings -> DAA generic q
- 5258 k. Set f0 = f mod 2^DAA\_power0 (erase all but the lowest DAA\_power0 bits of f)
- 5259 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $(X^6)$  mod n
- 5260 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5261 n. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- o. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 526310. If stage==5
- 5264 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==5. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush handle
- 5265 on mismatch
- 5266 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5268 c. Verify that DAA session -> DAA digestContext == SHA-1(DAA tpmSpecific | |
- 5269 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5270 d. Set DAA\_generic\_R1 = inputData0
- 5271 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic R1) == DAA issuerSettings -> DAA digest R1 and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5273 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1

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- 5274 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5275 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5276 h. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R1
- 5277 i. Set n = DAA\_generic\_n
- 5278 j. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5279 0 ) | SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | 1 )
- 5280 mod DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_generic\_q.
- 5281 k. Shift f right by DAA\_power0 bits (discard the lowest DAA\_power0 bits) and label the
- 5282 result f1
- 5283 1. Set Z = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5284 m. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^f1)$  mod n
- 5285 n. set outputData = NULL
- o. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5287 p. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 528811.If stage==6
- 5289 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage == 6. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush handle
- 5290 on mismatch
- 5291 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5293 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5294 DAA joinSession) and return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5295 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S0 = inputData0
- 6296 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_S0) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_S0 and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5298 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5299 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5300 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5301 h. Set X = DAA generic S0
- 5302 i. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- 5303 j. Set Z = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5304 k. Set Y = DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u0
- 5305 1. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5306 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5307 n. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5308 o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 530912.If stage==7

- 5310 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage == 7. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5311 on mismatch
- 5312 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5313 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5314 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5315 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5316 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S1 = inputData0
- 6. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic S1) == DAA issuerSettings -> DAA digest S1 and
- 5318 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5320 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5322 h. Set X = DAA\_generic\_S1
- 5323 i. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- j. Set Y = DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u1
- 5325 k. Set Z = DAA session -> DAA scratch
- 5326 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5327 m. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest to the SHA-1 (DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch ||
- 5328 DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count || DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_digest\_n0)
- 5329 n. set outputData = DAA session -> DAA scratch
- o. set DAA session -> DAA scratch = NULL
- p. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- g. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 533313.If stage==8
- a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage==8. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5335 on mismatch
- 5336 b. Verify that DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA issuerSettings) and
- 5337 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5338 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific | |
- 5339 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- d. Verify inputSize0 == DAA SIZE NE and return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on
- 5341 mismatch
- 5342 e. Set NE = decrypt(inputData0, privEK)
- f. set outputData = SHA-1(DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest | | NE)
- g. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest = NULL
- 5345 h. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5346 i. return TPM\_SUCCESS

- 1279
- 1280
- 534714.If stage==9
- 5348 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage==9. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5349 on mismatch
- 5350 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5352 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5353 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5354 d. Set DAA generic R0 = inputData0
- 6355 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_R0) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_R0 and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5358 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic n) == DAA issuerSettings -> DAA digest n and
- 5359 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5360 h. Obtain random data from the RNG and store it as DAA session -> DAA contextSeed
- 5361 i. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r0" ||
- 5362 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5363 j. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R0
- 5364 k. Set n = DAA\_generic\_n
- 5365 l. Set DAA\_session  $\rightarrow$  DAA\_scratch = (X^Y) mod n
- 5366 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5367 n. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- 5368 o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 536915.If stage==10
- 5370 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==10. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5371 handle on mismatch h
- 5372 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5373 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5374 c. Verify that DAA session -> DAA digestContext == SHA-1(DAA tpmSpecific | |
- 5375 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5376 d. Set DAA\_generic\_R1 = inputData0
- 6. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_R1) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_R1 and
- 5378 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on mismatch
- 5379 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5380 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5381 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5382 h. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r1" ||
- 5383 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5384 i. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R1
- 1281 274

- 5385 j. Set n = DAA\_generic\_n
- 5386 k. Set Z = DAA session -> DAA scratch
- 5387 l. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5388 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5389 n. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- 5390 o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 539116.If stage==11
- 5392 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==11. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5393 handle on mismatch
- 5394 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5396 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5397 DAA joinSession) and return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5398 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S0 = inputData0
- 6. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_S0) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_S0 and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5401 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5402 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5404 h. Obtain DAA SIZE r2 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r2" ||
- 5405 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5406 i. Set X = DAA generic S0
- 5407 j. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- 5408 k. Set Z = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5409 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5410 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5411 n. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 541317.If stage==12
- 5414 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==12. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5415 handle on mismatch
- 5416 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5418 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5419 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5420 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S1 = inputData0

- e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_S1) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_S1 and
- 5422 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5423 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5424 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5425 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5426 h. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r3 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r3" ||
- 5427 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5428 i. Set X = DAA\_generic\_S1
- 5429 j. Set  $n = DAA\_generic\_n$
- 5430 k. Set Z = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5431 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- m. set outputData = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5433 n. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = NULL
- o. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5435 p. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 543618.If stage==13
- 5437 a. Verify that DAA\_session->DAA\_stage==13. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5438 handle on mismatch
- 5439 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5440 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5441 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5442 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5443 d. Set DAA\_generic\_gamma = inputData0
- 5444 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_gamma) == DAA\_issuerSettings ->
- 5445 DAA\_digest\_gamma and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5446 f. Verify that inputSize1 == DAA\_SIZE\_w and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on
- 5447 mismatch
- 5448 g. Set w = inputData1
- 5449 h. Set w1 = w^( DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_generic\_q) mod (DAA\_generic\_gamma)
- i. If w1 != 1 (unity), return error TPM\_DAA\_WRONG\_W
- 5451 j. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = w
- 5452 k. set outputData = NULL
- 5453 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5454 m. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 545519.If stage==14
- 5456 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==14. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5457 handle on mismatch
- 1290 276

- 5458 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5459 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5460 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5461 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- d. Set DAA\_generic\_gamma = inputData0
- 5463 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_gamma) == DAA\_issuerSettings ->
- 5464 DAA\_digest\_gamma and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5465 f. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5466 0 ) | | SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | | 1 )
- 5467 mod DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_generic\_q.
- 5468 g. Set E = ((DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch)^f) mod (DAA\_generic\_gamma).
- 5469 h. Set outputData = E
- 5470 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5471 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 547220.If stage==15
- 5473 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==15. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5474 handle on mismatch
- 5475 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5477 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5478 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5479 d. Set DAA\_generic\_gamma = inputData0
- 5480 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_gamma) == DAA\_issuerSettings ->
- 5481 DAA digest gamma and return error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5482 f. Obtain DAA SIZE r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r0. "r0" | |
- 5483 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5484 g. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r1. "r1" ||
- 5485 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5486 h. set  $r = r0 + 2^DAA_power0 * r1 mod (DAA_issuerSettings -> DAA_generic_q)$ .
- 5487 i. set E1 = ((DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch)^r) mod (DAA\_generic\_gamma).
- 5488 j. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = NULL
- 5489 k. Set outputData = E1
- 5490 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- m. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 549221.If stage==16
- 5493 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==16. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5494 handle on mismatch

- 5495 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5497 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5498 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5499 d. Verify that inputSize0 == sizeOf(TPM\_DIGEST) and return error
- 5500 TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- e. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest = inputData0
- 5502 f. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_NT bytes from the RNG and label them NT
- g. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest to the SHA-1 (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest | NT)
- 5504 h. Set outputData = NT
- 5505 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5506 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 550722.If stage==17
- 5508 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==17. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5509 handle on mismatch
- 5510 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5511 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5512 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5513 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5514 d. Obtain DAA SIZE r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r0. "r0" ||
- 5515 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- e. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5517 0 ) | SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | 1 )
- 5518 mod DAA issuerSettings -> DAA generic q.
- 5519 f. Set f0 = f mod 2^DAA power0 (erase all but the lowest DAA power0 bits of f)
- 5520 g. Set  $s0 = r0 + (DAA\_session \rightarrow DAA\_digest) * f0 in$ **Z**. Compute over the integers. The
- computation is not reduced with a modulus.
- 5522 h. set outputData = s0
- i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5524 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 552523.If stage==18
- 5526 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==18. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5527 handle on mismatch
- 5528 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5530 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5531 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch

- d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r1. "r1" ||
- 5533 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- e. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey || DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count ||
- 5535 0) | SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | 1)
- 5536 mod DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_generic\_q.
- 5537 f. Shift f right by DAA\_power0 bits (discard the lowest DAA\_power0 bits) and label the
- 5538 result f1
- 5539 g. Set s1 = r1 + (DAA session -> DAA digest)\* f1 in  $\mathbf{Z}$ . Compute over the integers. The
- computation is not reduced with a modulus.
- 5541 h. set outputData = s1
- 5542 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- j. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 554424.If stage==19
- 5545 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==19. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5546 handle on mismatch
- 5547 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5549 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5550 DAA joinSession) and return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5551 d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r2 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r2. "r2" ||
- 5552 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- e. Set s2 = r2 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)\*( DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u0) mod
- 5554 2^DAA\_power1 (Erase all but the lowest DAA\_power1 bits of s2)
- 5555 f. set outputData = s2
- 5556 g. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5557 h. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 555825.If stage==20
- 5559 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==20. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5560 handle on mismatch
- 5561 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5562 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5563 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5564 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5565 d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r2 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r2. "r2" ||
- 5566 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5567 e. Set s12 = r2 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)\*( DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u0)
- 5568 f. Shift s12 right by DAA\_power1 bit (discard the lowest DAA\_power1 bits).
- 5569 g. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = s12

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- 1307
- 5570 h. Set outputData = DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest
- i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5572 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 557326.If stage==21
- 5574 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==21. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5575 handle on mismatch
- 5576 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5577 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5578 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5579 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5580 d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r3 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r3. "r3" ||
- 5581 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- e. Set s3 = r3 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)\*( DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u1) +
- 5583 (DAA session -> DAA scratch).
- 5584 f. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = NULL
- 5585 g. set outputData = s3
- 5586 h. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5587 i. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 558827.If stage==22
- 5589 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==22. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5590 handle on mismatch
- b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5593 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5594 DAA joinSession) and return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5595 d. Verify inputSize0 == DAA\_SIZE\_v0 and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on
- 5596 mismatch
- 5597 e. Set u2 = inputData0
- 5598 f. Set v0 = u2 + (DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u0) mod 2^DAA\_power1 (Erase all but
- 5599 the lowest DAA\_power1 bits of v0).
- 5600 g. Set DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA digest v0 = SHA-1(v0)
- 5601 h. Set v10 = u2 + (DAA joinSession -> DAA join u0) in  $\mathbf{Z}$ . Compute over the integers.
- 5602 The computation is not reduced with a modulus.
- 5603 i. Shift v10 right by DAA\_power1 bits (erase the lowest DAA\_power1 bits).
- 5604 j. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = v10
- 5605 k. Set outputData
- i. Fill in TPM\_DAA\_BLOB with a type of TPM\_RT\_DAA\_V0 and encrypt the v0
- 5607 parameters using TPM PERMANENT DATA -> daaBlobKey
- 1308 280

- ii. set outputData to the encrypted TPM\_DAA\_BLOB
- 5609 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5610 m. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5611 DAA\_joinSession)
- 5612 n. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 561328.If stage==23
- 5614 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==23. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5615 handle on mismatch
- 5616 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5618 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5619 DAA joinSession) and return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5620 d. Verify inputSize0 == DAA SIZE v1 and return error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on
- 5621 mismatch
- 5622 e. Set u3 = inputData0
- f. Set v1 = u3 + DAA\_joinSession -> DAA\_join\_u1 + DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- g. Set DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digest\_v1 = SHA-1(v1)
- 5625 h. Set outputData
- i. Fill in TPM\_DAA\_BLOB with a type of TPM\_RT\_DAA\_V1 and encrypt the v1
- 5627 parameters using TPM PERMANENT DATA -> daaBlobKey
- ii. set outputData to the encrypted TPM DAA BLOB
- i. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = NULL
- 5630 j. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5631 k. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific ||
- 5632 DAA\_joinSession)
- 5633 1. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 563429.If stage==24
- 5635 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==24. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5636 handle on mismatch
- 5637 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5639 c. Verify that DAA session -> DAA digestContext == SHA-1(DAA tpmSpecific ||
- 5640 DAA\_joinSession) and return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5641 d. set outputData = enc(DAA\_tpmSpecific) using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 5642 daaBlobKey
- e. Terminate the DAA session and all resources associated with the DAA join session
- 5644 handle.
- 5645 f. return TPM\_SUCCESS

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564630.If stage > 24, return error: TPM\_DAA\_STAGE

## 5647**26.2 TPM\_DAA\_Sign**

#### 5648Start of informative comment:

5649outputSize and outputData are always included in the outParamDigest. This includes stage 56500, where the outputData contains the DAA session handle.

### 5651 End of informative comment.

5652TPM protected capability; user must provide authorizations from the TPM Owner.

## 5653Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Toma	Nama	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	Tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	Ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DAA_Sign
4	4			TPM_HANDLE	handle	Handle to the sign session
5	1	2S	1	BYTE	stage	Stage of the sign process
6	4	3S	4	UINT32	inputSize0	Size of inputData0 for this stage of DAA_Sign
7	<b>*</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inputData0	Data to be used by this capability
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	inputSize1	Size of inputData1 for this stage of DAA_Sign
9	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	inputData1	Data to be used by this capability
10	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication
		2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
11	20	3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
12	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
13	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## **5654Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	PARAM HMA		AC	Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes incl. paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal:TPM_ORD_DAA_Sign
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outputSize	Size of outputData
5	<>	4S	<b>\$</b>	BYTE[]	outputData	Data produced by this capability
6	20	2 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3 H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4 H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20		20	TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 5655 Description

5656This table summaries the input, output and saved data that is associated with each stage of 5657 processing.

Stage	Input Data0	Input Data1	Operation	<b>Output Data</b>	Scratchpad
0	DAA_issuerSettings	NULL	initialise	handle	NULL
1	enc(DAA_tpmSpecific)	NULL	initialise	NULL	NULL
2	DAA_generic_R0	DAA_generic_n	P1=R0^r0 mod n	NULL	P1
3	DAA_generic_R1	DAA_generic_n	P2 = P1*(R1^r1) mod n	NULL	P2
4	DAA_generic_S0	DAA_generic_n	$P3 = P2*(S0^r2) \mod n$	NULL	P3
5	DAA_generic_S1	DAA_generic_n	$T = P3*(S1^r4) \mod n$	T	NULL
6	DAA_generic_gamma	W	w1 = w^q mod gamma	NULL	w
7	DAA_generic_gamma	NULL	E = w^f mod gamma	E	w
8	DAA_generic_gamma	NULL	$r = r0 + (2^{\text{power0}})^*r1$ $mod q,$	E1	NULL
0	-4	All III I	E1 = w^r mod gamma	NT	NII II I
9	c1	NULL	c = hash(c1    NT)	NT	NULL
10	b (selector)	m or handle to AIK	c = hash(c    1    m)	С	NULL
			or c = hash(c    0    AlK- modulus)		
11	NULL	NULL	s0 = r0 + c*f0	s0	NULL
12	NULL	NULL	s1 = r1 + c*f1	s1	NULL
13	enc(v0)	NULL	s2 = r2 + c*v0 mod 2^power1	s2	NULL
14	enc(v0)	NULL	s12 = r2 + c*v0 >> power1	NULL	s12
15	enc(v1)	NULL	s3 = r4 + c*v1 + s12	s3	NULL

5658

5659When a TPM receives an Owner authorized command to input enc(DAA\_tpmSpecific) or 5660enc(v0) or enc(v1), the TPM MUST verify that the TPM created the data and that neither the 5661data nor the TPM's daaProof has been changed since the data was created. Loading one of 5662these wrapped blobs does not require authorization, since correct blobs were created by the 5663TPM under Owner authorization, and unwrapped blobs cannot be used without Owner 5664authorisation. The TPM MUST NOT restrict the number of times that the contents of 5665enc(DAA\_tpmSpecific) or enc(v0) or enc(v1) can be used by the same combination of TPM 5666and daaProof that created them.

#### 5667Actions

5668A Trusted Platform Module that receives a valid TPM\_DAA\_Sign command SHALL:

- 56691. Use ownerAuth to verify that the Owner authorized all TPM\_DAA\_Sign input parameters.
- 56702. Any error results in the TPM invalidating all resources associated with the command
- 56713. Constant values of 0 or 1 are 1 byte integers, stages affected are
- 5672 a. 7(f), 11(e), 12(e)

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- 56734. Representation of the strings "r0" to "r4" are 2-byte ASCII encodings, stages affected are
- 5674 a. 2(h), 3(h), 4(h), 5(h), 12(d), 13(f), 14(f), 15(f)

### 5675**Stages**

- 56760. If stage==0
- 5677 b. Determine that sufficient resources are available to perform a TPM DAA Sign.
- i. The TPM MUST support sufficient resources to perform one (1) TPM\_DAA\_Join/ TPM\_DAA\_Sign. The TPM MAY support addition TPM\_DAA\_Join/
- 5680 TPM DAA Sign sessions.
- ii. The TPM may share internal resources between the DAA operations and other
- variable resource requirements:
- iii. If there are insufficient resources within the stored key pool (and one or more
- keys need to be removed to permit the DAA operation to execute) return
- 5685 TPM\_NOSPACE
- iv. If there are insufficient resources within the stored session pool (and one or
- more authorization or transport sessions need to be removed to permit the DAA
- operation to execute), return TPM\_RESOURCES.
- 5689 c. Set DAA\_issuerSettings = inputData0
- 5690 d. Verify that all fields in DAA\_issuerSettings are present and return error
- 5691 TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 if not.
- e. set all fields in DAA session = NULL
- 5693 f. Assign new handle for session
- 5694 g. Set outputData to new handle
- i. The handle in outputData is included the output HMAC.
- 5696 h. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage = 1
- i. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 56985. If stage==1
- a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==1. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush handle
- 5700 on mismatch
- 5701 b. Set DAA\_tpmSpecific = unwrap(inputData0) using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 5702 daaBlobKey
- 5703 c. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5704 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5705 d. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific)
- 5706 e. set outputData = NULL
- 5707 f. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage =2
- 5708 g. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 57096. If stage==2

- 5710 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==2. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5711 on mismatch
- 5712 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5713 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5714 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5715 return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5716 d. Set DAA\_generic\_R0 = inputData0
- 5717 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic R0) == DAA issuerSettings -> DAA digest R0 and
- 5718 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on mismatch
- 5719 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5720 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5721 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5722 h. Obtain random data from the RNG and store it as DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed
- 5723 i. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r0" ||
- 5724 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5725 j. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R0
- 5726 k. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- 5727 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5728 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5729 n. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 57317. If stage==3
- 5732 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage==3. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5733 on mismatch
- 5734 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5735 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5736 c. Verify that DAA session -> DAA digestContext == SHA-1(DAA tpmSpecific) and
- 5737 return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5738 d. Set DAA\_generic\_R1 = inputData0
- 6. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_R1) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_R1 and
- 5740 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on mismatch
- 5741 f. Set DAA generic n = inputData1
- 5742 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5743 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5744 h. Obtain DAA SIZE r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r1" | |
- 5745 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5746 i. Set X = DAA\_generic\_R1
- 5747 j. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$

- 5748 k. Set Z = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5749 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5750 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5751 n. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5752 o. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 57538. If stage==4
- a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage == 4. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5755 on mismatch
- 5756 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5757 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5758 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5759 return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5760 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S0 = inputData0
- e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_S0) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_S0 and
- 5762 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5763 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5764 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5765 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5766 h. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r2 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r2" ||
- 5767 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5768 i. Set X = DAA generic S0
- 5769 j. Set n = DAA\_generic\_n
- 5770 k. Set Z = DAA session -> DAA scratch
- 5771 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5772 m. set outputData = NULL
- 5773 n. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- o. return TPM SUCCESS
- 57759. If stage==5
- 5776 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage == 5. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush handle
- 5777 on mismatch
- 5778 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5779 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5780 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5782 d. Set DAA\_generic\_S1 = inputData0
- 6. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_S1) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_S1 and
- 5784 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch

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- 1342
- 1343
- 5785 f. Set DAA\_generic\_n = inputData1
- 5786 g. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_n) == DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_digest\_n and
- 5787 return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on mismatch
- 5788 h. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r4 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them Y. "r4" ||
- 5789 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5790 i. Set X = DAA\_generic\_S1
- 5791 j. Set  $n = DAA_generic_n$
- 5792 k. Set Z = DAA session -> DAA scratch
- 5793 1. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch =  $Z^*(X^Y)$  mod n
- 5794 m. set outputData = DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch
- 5795 n. set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = NULL
- o. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- p. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 579810. If stage==6
- 5799 a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage == 6. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5800 on mismatch
- 5801 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5803 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5804 return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5805 d. Set DAA generic gammma = inputData0
- 5806 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_gamma) == DAA\_issuerSettings ->
- 5807 DAA\_digest\_gamma and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5808 f. Verify that inputSize1 == DAA\_SIZE\_w and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA1 on
- 5809 mismatch
- 5810 g. Set w = inputData1
- 5811 h. Set w1 = w^( DAA issuerSettings -> DAA generic q) mod (DAA generic gamma)
- 5812 i. If w1!= 1 (unity), return error TPM DAA WRONG W
- 5813 i. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = w
- 5814 k. set outputData = NULL
- 5815 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5816 m. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 581711.If stage==7
- 5818 a. Verify that DAA session -> DAA stage==7. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush handle
- 5819 on mismatch
- 5820 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5821 return error TPM DAA ISSUER SETTINGS on mismatch
- 1344 288

- 5822 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5823 return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5824 d. Set DAA\_generic\_gamma = inputData0
- 5825 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_generic\_gamma) == DAA\_issuerSettings ->
- 5826 DAA\_digest\_gamma and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5827 f. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5828 0 ) || SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey || DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count || 1 )
- 5829 mod DAA issuerSettings -> DAA generic q.
- 5830 g. Set E = ((DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch)^f) mod (DAA\_generic\_gamma).
- 5831 h. Set outputData = E
- 5832 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5833 j. return TPM SUCCESS.
- 583412.If stage==8
- 5835 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==8. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5836 on mismatch
- 5837 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5838 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5839 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5841 d. Set DAA\_generic\_gamma = inputData0
- 5842 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA generic gamma) == DAA issuerSettings ->
- 5843 DAA\_digest\_gamma and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5844 f. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r0. "r0" ||
- 5845 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5846 g. Obtain DAA SIZE r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r1. "r1" | |
- 5847 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5848 h. set  $r = r0 + 2^DAA_power0 * r1 mod (DAA_issuerSettings -> DAA_generic_q)$ .
- i. Set E1 = ((DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch)^r) mod (DAA\_generic\_gamma)
- 5850 j. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = NULL
- 5851 k. Set outputData = E1
- 5852 1. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5853 m. return TPM SUCCESS.
- 585413.If stage==9
- a. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage==9. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush handle
- 5856 on mismatch
- 5857 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5858 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch

- 5859 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5860 return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5861 d. Verify that inputSize0 == sizeOf(TPM\_DIGEST) and return error
- 5862 TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5863 e. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest = inputData0
- 5864 f. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_NT bytes from the RNG and label them NT
- g. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest to the SHA-1 (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest | NT)
- 5866 h. Set outputData = NT
- 5867 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5868 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS.
- 586914.If stage==10
- 5870 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==10. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5871 handle on mismatch
- 5872 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5874 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5875 return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5876 d. Verify that inputSize0 == sizeOf(BYTE), and return error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on
- 5877 mismatch
- 5878 e. Set selector = inputData0, verify that selector == 0 or 1, and return error
- 5879 TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5880 f. If selector == 1, verify that inputSize1 == sizeOf(TPM\_DIGEST), and return error
- 5881 TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5882 g. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest to SHA-1 (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest || 1 ||
- 5883 inputData1)
- 5884 h. If selector == 0, verify that inputData1 is a handle to a TPM identity key (AIK), and
- 5885 return error TPM DAA INPUT DATA1 on mismatch
- 5886 i. Set DAA session -> DAA digest to SHA-1 (DAA session -> DAA digest | 0 | | n2)
- 5887 where n2 is the modulus of the AIK
- 5888 j. Set outputData = DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest
- 5889 k. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- 5890 1. return TPM SUCCESS.
- 589115.If stage==11
- 5892 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==11. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5893 handle on mismatch
- 5894 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch

- 5896 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5898 d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r0 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r0. "r0" ||
- 5899 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 6900 e. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5901 0 ) || SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey || DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count || 1 )
- 5902 mod DAA\_issuerSettings -> DAA\_generic\_q.
- 5903 f. Set f0 = f mod 2^DAA\_power0 (erase all but the lowest DAA\_power0 bits of f)
- 5904 g. Set  $s0 = r0 + (DAA\_session \rightarrow DAA\_digest)*(f0)$
- 5905 h. set outputData = s0
- 5906 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5907 j. return TPM SUCCESS
- 590816.If stage==12
- 5909 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==12. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5910 handle on mismatch
- 5911 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5913 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5915 d. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r1 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r1. "r1" ||
- 5916 DAA session -> DAA contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 6. Set f = SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | |
- 5918 0) | SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_rekey | DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_count | | 1)
- 5919 mod DAA issuerSettings -> DAA generic q.
- 5920 f. Shift f right by DAA\_power0 bits (discard the lowest DAA\_power0 bits) and label the
- 5921 result f1
- 5922 g. Set  $s1 = r1 + (DAA\_session \rightarrow DAA\_digest)*(f1)$
- 5923 h. set outputData = s1
- 5924 i. increment DAA\_session -> DAA\_stage by 1
- 5925 j. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 592617.If stage==13
- 5927 a. Verify that DAA session ->DAA stage==13. Return TPM DAA STAGE and flush
- 5928 handle on mismatch
- 5929 b. Verify that DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA\_issuerSettings) and
- 5930 return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5931 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5933 d. Set DAA private v0= unwrap(inputData0) using TPM PERMANENT DATA ->
- 5934 daaBlobKey

- 6935 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_private\_v0) == DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digest\_v0 and return
- 5936 error TPM\_DAA\_INPUT\_DATA0 on mismatch
- 5937 f. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r2 bytes from the MGF1 function and label them r2. "r2" ||
- 5938 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5939 g. Set s2 = r2 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)\*( DAA\_private\_v0) mod 2^DAA\_power1
- 5940 (erase all but the lowest DAA\_power1 bits of s2)
- 5941 h. set outputData = s2
- 5942 i. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- 5943 j. return TPM SUCCESS
- 594418.If stage==14
- 5945 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==14. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5946 handle on mismatch
- 5947 b. Verify that DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5949 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- 5950 return error TPM DAA TPM SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5951 d. Set DAA\_private\_v0= unwrap(inputData0) using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 5952 daaBlobKey
- e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_private\_v0) == DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digest\_v0 and return
- 5954 error TPM DAA INPUT DATA0 on mismatch
- 5955 f. Obtain DAA SIZE r2 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r2. "r2" | |
- 5956 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5957 g. Set  $s12 = r2 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)*(DAA\_private\_v0)$ .
- 5958 h. Shift s12 right by DAA\_power1 bits (erase the lowest DAA\_power1 bits).
- 5959 i. Set DAA session -> DAA scratch = s12
- 5960 j. set outputData = NULL
- 5961 k. increment DAA session -> DAA stage by 1
- 5962 1. return TPM SUCCESS
- 596319.If stage==15
- 5964 a. Verify that DAA\_session ->DAA\_stage==15. Return TPM\_DAA\_STAGE and flush
- 5965 handle on mismatch
- 5966 b. Verify that DAA tpmSpecific -> DAA digestIssuer == SHA-1(DAA issuerSettings) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_ISSUER\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5968 c. Verify that DAA\_session -> DAA\_digestContext == SHA-1(DAA\_tpmSpecific) and
- return error TPM\_DAA\_TPM\_SETTINGS on mismatch
- 5970 d. Set DAA\_private\_v1 = unwrap(inputData0) using TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA ->
- 5971 daaBlobKey

- 6972 e. Verify that SHA-1(DAA\_private\_v1) == DAA\_tpmSpecific -> DAA\_digest\_v1 and return
- 5973 error TPM DAA INPUT DATAO on mismatch
- 5974 f. Obtain DAA\_SIZE\_r4 bytes using the MGF1 function and label them r4. "r4" ||
- 5975 DAA\_session -> DAA\_contextSeed is the Z seed.
- 5976 g. Set s3 = r4 + (DAA\_session -> DAA\_digest)\*(DAA\_private\_v1) + (DAA\_session ->
- 5977 DAA\_scratch).
- 5978 h. Set DAA\_session -> DAA\_scratch = NULL
- 5979 i. set outputData = s3
- 5980 j. Terminate the DAA session and all resources associated with the DAA sign session
- 5981 handle.
- 5982 k. return TPM\_SUCCESS
- 598320.If stage > 15, return error: TPM\_DAA\_STAGE

# 598427. Deprecated commands

### 5985 Start of informative comment:

5986This section covers the commands that were in version 1.1 but now have new functionality 5987in other functions. The deprecated commands are still available in 1.2 but all new software 5988should use the new functionality.

5989There is no requirement that the deprecated commands work with new structures.

#### 5990End of informative comment.

- 59911. Commands deprecated in version 1.2 MUST work with version 1.1 structures
- 59922. Commands deprecated in version 1.2 MAY work with version 1.2 structures

## **599327.1 Key commands**

#### 5994Start of informative comment:

5995The key commands are deprecated as the new way to handle keys is to use the standard 5996context commands. So TPM\_EvictKey is now handled by TPM\_FlushSpecific, 5997TPM\_Terminate\_Handle by TPM\_FlushSpecific.

#### 5998 End of informative comment.

## **599927.1.1 TPM EvictKey**

## 6000Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_EvictKey
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	evictHandle	The handle of the key to be evicted.

## 6001 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_EvictKey

### 6002Actions

6003The TPM will invalidate the key stored in the specified handle and return the space to the 6004available internal pool for subsequent query by TPM\_GetCapability and usage by 6005TPM\_LoadKey. If the specified key handle does not correspond to a valid key, an error will 6006be returned.

## 6007New 1.2 functionality

6008The command must check the status of the ownerEvict flag for the key and if the flag is 6009TRUE return TPM\_KEY\_CONTROL\_OWNER

## **TPM Terminate Handle**

#### 6011Start of informative comment:

6012This allows the TPM manager to clear out information in a session handle.

6013The TPM may maintain the authorization session even though a key attached to it has been 6014unloaded or the authorization session itself has been unloaded in some way. When a

6015 command is executed that requires this session, it is the responsibility of the external

6016software to load both the entity and the authorization session information prior to 6017command execution.

#### 6018 End of informative comment.

## 6019Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Terminate_Handle.
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	handle	The handle to terminate

## 6020Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Terminate_Handle.

#### 6021 Description

6022The TPM SHALL terminate the session and destroy all data associated with the session 6023indicated.

#### 6024Actions

6025A TPM SHALL unilaterally perform the actions of TPM\_Terminate\_Handle upon detection of 6026the following events:

- 60271. Completion of a received command whose authorization "continueUse" flag is FALSE.
- 60282. Completion of a received command when a shared secret derived from the authorization
- session was exclusive-or'ed with data (to provide confidentiality for that data). This
- occurs during execution of a TPM\_ChangeAuth command, for example.
- 60313. When the associated entity is destroyed (in the case of TPM Owner or SRK, for example)
- 60324. Upon execution of TPM\_Init

- 60335. When the command returns an error. This is due to the fact that when returning an error the TPM does not send back nonceEven. There is no way to maintain the rolling
- 6035 nonces, hence the TPM MUST terminate the authorization session.
- 60366. Failure of an authorization check belonging to that authorization session.

## 603727.2 Context management

#### 6038Start of informative comment:

6039The 1.1 context commands were written for specific resource types. The 1.2 commands are 6040generic for all resource types. So the Savexxx commands are replaced by TPM\_SaveContext 6041and the LoadXXX commands by TPM\_LoadContext.

#### 6042End of informative comment.

## 604327.2.1 TPM SaveKeyContext

## 6044Start of informative comment:

6045TPM\_SaveKeyContext saves a loaded key outside the TPM. After creation of the key context 6046blob the TPM automatically releases the internal memory used by that key. The format of 6047the key context blob is specific to a TPM.

#### 6048End of informative comment.

## 6049Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Ivaille	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveKeyContext
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The key which will be kept outside the TPM

## 6050Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveKeyContext
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	keyContextSize	The actual size of the outgoing key context blob. If the command fails the value will be 0
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	keyContextBlob	The key context blob.

#### 6051 Description

- 60521. This command allows saving a loaded key outside the TPM. After creation of the 6053 keyContextBlob, the TPM automatically releases the internal memory used by that key.
- The format of the key context blob is specific to a TPM.
- 60552. A TPM protected capability belonging to the TPM that created a key context blob MUST
- 6056 be the only entity that can interpret the contents of that blob. If a cryptographic
- 6057 technique is used for this purpose, the level of security provided by that technique
- 6058 SHALL be at least as secure as a 2048 bit RSA algorithm. Any secrets (such as keys)

- used in such a cryptographic technique MUST be generated using the TPM's random
- 6060 number generator. Any symmetric key MUST be used within the power-on session
- during which it was created, only.
- 60623. A key context blob SHALL enable verification of the integrity of the contents of the blob
- by a TPM protected capability.
- 60644. A key context blob SHALL enable verification of the session validity of the contents of the
- blob by a TPM protected capability. The method SHALL ensure that all key context blobs
- are rendered invalid if power to the TPM is interrupted.

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## 606827.2.2 TPM\_LoadKeyContext

#### 6069 Start of informative comment:

6070TPM\_LoadKeyContext loads a key context blob into the TPM previously retrieved by a 6071TPM\_SaveKeyContext call. After successful completion the handle returned by this 6072command can be used to access the key.

#### 6073End of informative comment.

## **6074Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKeyContext
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	keyContextSize	The size of the following key context blob.
5	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>&lt;</b>	BYTE[]	keyContextBlob	The key context blob.

## 6075Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKeyContext
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The handle assigned to the key after it has been successfully loaded.

## 6076Description

- 60771. This command allows loading a key context blob into the TPM previously retrieved by a 6078 TPM\_SaveKeyContext call. After successful completion the handle returned by this command can be used to access the key.
- 60802. The contents of a key context blob SHALL be discarded unless the contents have passed an integrity test. This test SHALL (statistically) prove that the contents of the blob are the same as when the blob was created.
- 60833. The contents of a key context blob SHALL be discarded unless the contents have passed a session validity test. This test SHALL (statistically) prove that the blob was created by this TPM during this power-on session.

## 608727.2.3 TPM\_SaveAuthContext

#### 6088Start of informative comment:

6089TPM\_SaveAuthContext saves a loaded authorization session outside the TPM. After creation 6090of the authorization context blob, the TPM automatically releases the internal memory used 6091by that session. The format of the authorization context blob is specific to a TPM.

#### 6092End of informative comment.

## 6093Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveAuthContext
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Authorization session which will be kept outside the TPM

## 6094Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_SaveAuthContext
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	authContextSize	The actual size of the outgoing authorization context blob. If the command fails the value will be $0. $
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	4	BYTE[]	authContextBlob	The authorization context blob.

#### 6095 Description

6096This command allows saving a loaded authorization session outside the TPM. After creation 6097of the authContextBlob, the TPM automatically releases the internal memory used by that 6098session. The format of the authorization context blob is specific to a TPM.

6099A TPM protected capability belonging to the TPM that created an authorization context blob 6100MUST be the only entity that can interpret the contents of that blob. If a cryptographic 6101technique is used for this purpose, the level of security provided by that technique SHALL 6102be at least as secure as a 2048 bit RSA algorithm. Any secrets (such as keys) used in such a 6103cryptographic technique MUST be generated using the TPM's random number generator. 6104Any symmetric key MUST be used within the power-on session during which it was created, 6105only.

6106An authorization context blob SHALL enable verification of the integrity of the contents of 6107the blob by a TPM protected capability.

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6108An authorization context blob SHALL enable verification of the session validity of the 6109contents of the blob by a TPM protected capability. The method SHALL ensure that all 6110authorization context blobs are rendered invalid if power to the TPM is interrupted.

## 611127.2.4 TPM\_LoadAuthContext

#### 6112Start of informative comment:

- 6113TPM\_LoadAuthContext loads an authorization context blob into the TPM previously
- 6114retrieved by a TPM\_SaveAuthContext call. After successful completion, the handle returned
- 6115by this command can be used to access the authorization session.

#### 6116End of informative comment.

### 6117Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	IVAIIIE	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadAuthContext
4	4	2S	4	UINT32	authContextSize	The size of the following authorization context blob.
5	<b>&gt;</b>	3S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	authContextBlob	The authorization context blob.

## 6118Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadAuthContext
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	authHandle	The handle assigned to the authorization session after it has been successfully loaded.

### 6119 Description

- 6120This command allows loading an authorization context blob into the TPM previously 6121retrieved by a TPM\_SaveAuthContext call. After successful completion, the handle returned 6122by this command can be used to access the authorization session.
- 6123The contents of an authorization context blob SHALL be discarded unless the contents have 6124passed an integrity test. This test SHALL (statistically) prove that the contents of the blob 6125are the same as when the blob was created.
- 6126The contents of an authorization context blob SHALL be discarded unless the contents have 6127passed a session validity test. This test SHALL (statistically) prove that the blob was created 6128by this TPM during this power-on session.
- 6129For an OSAP authorization context blob referring to a key, verify that the key linked to this 6130session is resident in the TPM.

## 6132**27.3 DIR commands**

#### 6133Start of informative comment:

- 6134The DIR commands are replaced by the NV storage commands.
- 6135The DIR [0] in 1.1 is now TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> authDIR[0] and is always available for 6136the TPM to use. It is accessed by DIR commands using dirIndex 0 and by NV commands 6137using nvIndex TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR.
- 6138If the TPM vendor supports additional DIR registers, the TPM vendor may return errors or 6139provide vendor specific mappings for those DIR registers to NV storage locations.

#### 6140End of informative comment.

- 61411. A dirIndex value of 0 MUST corresponds to an NV storage nvIndex value 6142 TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR.
- 61432. The TPM vendor MAY return errors or MAY provide vendor specific mappings for DIR dirIndex values greater than 0 to NV storage locations.

## 6145**27.3.1** TPM\_DirWriteAuth

#### 6146Start of informative comment:

- 6147The TPM\_DirWriteAuth operation provides write access to the Data Integrity Registers. DIRs
- 6148are non-volatile memory registers held in a TPM-shielded location. Owner authentication is
- 6149required to authorize this action.
- 6150Access is also provided through the NV commands with nvIndex TPM\_NV\_INDEX\_DIR.
- 61510wner authorization is not required when nvLocked is FALSE.
- 6152Version 1.2 requires only one DIR. If the DIR named does not exist, the TPM\_DirWriteAuth
- 6153 operation returns TPM\_BADINDEX.
- 6154End of informative comment.

### 6155Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DirWriteAuth.
4	4	2S	4	TPM_DIRINDEX	dirIndex	Index of the DIR
5	20	3S	20	TPM_DIRVALUE	newContents	New value to be stored in named DIR
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for command.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 6156Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyme	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DirWriteAuth
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

#### 6157Actions

- 1424
- 61581. Validate that authHandle contains a TPM Owner AuthData to execute the 6159 TPM\_DirWriteAuth command
- 61602. Validate that dirIndex points to a valid DIR on this TPM
- 61613. Write newContents into the DIR pointed to by dirIndex

## 6163**27.3.2 TPM\_DirRead**

#### 6164Start of informative comment:

6165The TPM\_DirRead operation provides read access to the DIRs. No authentication is required 6166to perform this action because typically no cryptographically useful AuthData is available 6167early in boot. TSS implementers may choose to provide other means of authorizing this 6168action. Version 1.2 requires only one DIR. If the DIR named does not exist, the 6169TPM\_DirRead operation returns TPM\_BADINDEX.

### 6170 End of informative comment.

### 6171Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type Nan	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DirRead.
4	4	2S	4	TPM_DIRINDEX	dirIndex	Index of the DIR to be read

## 6172Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DirRead.
4	20	3S	20	TPM_DIRVALUE	dirContents	The current contents of the named DIR

#### 6173Actions

- 61741. Validate that dirIndex points to a valid DIR on this TPM
- 61752. Return the contents of the DIR in dirContents

# 6176**27.4** Change Auth

### 6177 Start of informative comment:

6178The change auth commands can be duplicated by creating a transport session with 6179confidentiality and issuing the changeAuth command.

6180 End of informative comment.

## 618227.4.1 TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart

#### 6183 Start of informative comment:

6184The TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart starts the process of changing AuthData for an entity. It 6185sets up an OIAP session that must be retained for use by its twin 6186TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymFinish command.

6187TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart creates a temporary asymmetric public key "tempkey" to 6188provide confidentiality for new AuthData to be sent to the TPM. TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart 6189certifies that tempkey was generated by a genuine TPM, by generating a certifyInfo 6190structure that is signed by a TPM identity. The owner of that TPM identity must cooperate 6191to produce this command, because TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart requires authorization to 6192use that identity.

6193It is envisaged that tempkey and certifyInfo are given to the owner of the entity whose 6194authorization to be changed. That owner uses certifyInfo is 6195TPM IDENTITY CREDENTIAL to verify that tempkey was generated by a genuine TPM. This 6196is done by verifying the TPM\_IDENTITY\_CREDENTIAL using the public key of a CA, 6197verifying the signature on the certifyInfo structure with the public key of the identity in 6198TPM\_IDENTITY\_CREDENTIAL, and verifying tempkey by comparing its digest with the value 6199inside certifyInfo. The owner uses tempkey to encrypt the desired new AuthData and inserts 6200that encrypted data in a TPM ChangeAuthAsymFinish command, in the knowledge that 6201 only a TPM with a specific identity can interpret the new AuthData.

#### 6202 End of informative comment.

#### 6203Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tyne	Name	December 1
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymStart.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	idHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded identity ID key
5	20	2s	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	The nonce to be inserted into the certifyInfo structure
6	<b>\</b>	3S	<b>\</b>	TPM_KEY_PARMS	tempKey	Structure contains all parameters of ephemeral key.
7	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for idHandle authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
8	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	idAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: idKey.usageAuth.

## 6204Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Tyne	Name	Decembring
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymStart
7	95	3S	95	TPM_CERTIFY_INFO	certifyInfo	The certifyInfo structure that is to be signed.
8	4	4S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The used size of the output area for the signature
9	<b>\$</b>	5S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The signature of the certifyInfo parameter.
10	4	6s	4	TPM_KEY_HANDLE	ephHandle	The keyHandle identifier to be used by ChangeAuthAsymFinish for the ephemeral key
11	<b>\$</b>	7S	<b>\\</b>	TPM_KEY	tempKey	Structure containing all parameters and public part of ephemeral key. TPM_KEY.encSize is set to 0.
12	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
13	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
14	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	Authorization. HMAC key: idKey.usageAuth.

#### 6205Actions

- 62061. The TPM SHALL verify the AuthData to use the TPM identity key held in idHandle. The 6207 TPM MUST verify that the key is a TPM identity key.
- 62082. The TPM SHALL validate the algorithm parameters for the key to create from the 6209 tempKey parameter.
- 62103. Recommended key type is RSA
- 62114. Minimum RSA key size MUST is 512 bits, recommended RSA key size is 1024
- 62125. For other key types the minimum key size strength MUST be comparable to RSA 512
- 62136. If the TPM is not designed to create a key of the requested type, return the error code
- 6214 TPM\_BAD\_KEY\_PROPERTY
- 62157. The TPM SHALL create a new key (k1) in accordance with the algorithm parameter. The
- 6216 newly created key is pointed to by ephHandle.
- 62178. The TPM SHALL fill in all fields in tempKey using k1 for the information. The TPM\_KEY 6218 -> encSize MUST be 0.
- 62199. The TPM SHALL fill in certifyInfo using k1 for the information. The certifyInfo -> data 6220 field is supplied by the antiReplay.
- 622110. The TPM then signs the certifyInfo parameter using the key pointed to by idHandle. The 6222 resulting signed blob is returned in sig parameter

# 6223Field Descriptions for certifyInfo parameter

Туре	Name	Description		
TPM_VERSION	Version	TPM version structure; Part 2 TPM_VERSION		
keyFlags	Redirection	This SHALL be set to FALSE		
	Migratable	This SHALL be set to FALSE		
	Volatile	This SHALL be set to TRUE		
TPM_AUTH_DATA_USAGE	authDataUsage	This SHALL be set to TPM_AUTH_NEVER		
TPM_KEY_USAGE	KeyUsage	This SHALL be set to TPM_KEY_AUTHCHANGE		
UINT32	PCRInfoSize	This SHALL be set to 0		
TPM_DIGEST	pubDigest	This SHALL be the hash of the public key being certified.		
TPM_NONCE	Data	This SHALL be set to antiReplay		
TPM_KEY_PARMS	info	This specifies the type of key and its parameters.		
BOOL	parentPCRStatus	This SHALL be set to FALSE.		

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## 622527.4.2 TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymFinish

### 6226Start of informative comment:

6227The TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymFinish command allows the owner of an entity to change the 6228AuthData for the entity.

6229The command requires the cooperation of the owner of the parent of the entity, since 6230AuthData must be provided to use that parent entity. The command requires knowledge of 6231the existing AuthData information and passes the new AuthData information. The 6232newAuthLink parameter proves knowledge of existing AuthData information and new 6233AuthData information. The new AuthData information "encNewAuth" is encrypted using the 6234"tempKey" variable obtained via TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart.

6235A parent therefore retains control over a change in the AuthData of a child, but is prevented 6236from knowing the new AuthData for that child.

6237The changeProof parameter provides a proof that the new AuthData value was properly 6238inserted into the entity. The inclusion of a nonce from the TPM provides an entropy source 6239in the case where the AuthData value may be in itself be a low entropy value (hash of a 6240password etc).

#### 6241 End of informative comment.

## 6242Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Tuno	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymFinish
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	The keyHandle of the parent key for the input data
5	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	ephHandle	The keyHandle identifier for the ephemeral key
6	2	3S	2	TPM_ENTITY_TYPE	entityType	The type of entity to be modified
7	20	4s	20	TPM_HMAC	newAuthLink	HMAC calculation that links the old and new AuthData values together
8	4	5S	4	UINT32	newAuthSize	Size of encNewAuth
9	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	encNewAuth	New AuthData encrypted with ephemeral key.
10	4	7S	4	UINT32	encDataSize	The size of the inData parameter
11	<>	8S	<>	BYTE[]	encData	The encrypted entity that is to be modified.
12	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	Authorization for parent key.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
13	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
14	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
15	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

## 6244Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	Time	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymFinish
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	outDataSize	The used size of the output area for outData
5	<b>\$</b>	4S	<b>\$</b>	BYTE[]	outData	The modified, encrypted entity.
6	20	5s	20	TPM_NONCE	saltNonce	A nonce value from the TPM RNG to add entropy to the changeProof value
7	<b>\$</b>	6S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	TPM_DIGEST	changeProof	Proof that AuthData has changed.
8	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
9	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
10	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

## 6245 Description

6246If the parentHandle points to the SRK then the HMAC key MUST be built using the TPM 6247Owner authentication.

#### 6248Actions

- 62491. The TPM SHALL validate that the authHandle parameter authorizes use of the key in parentHandle.
- 62512. The encData field MUST be the encData field from TPM STORED DATA or TPM KEY.
- 62523. The TPM SHALL create e1 by decrypting the entity held in the encData parameter.
- 62534. The TPM SHALL create al by decrypting encNewAuth using the ephHandle ->
- 6254 TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE private key. a1 is a structure of type
- 6255 TPM CHANGEAUTH VALIDATE.
- 62565. The TPM SHALL create b1 by performing the following HMAC calculation: b1 = HMAC
- 6257 (a1 -> newAuthSecret). The secret for this calculation is encData -> currentAuth. This
- 6258 means that b1 is a value built from the current AuthData value (encData ->
- 6259 currentAuth) and the new AuthData value (a1 -> newAuthSecret).
- 62606. The TPM SHALL compare b1 with newAuthLink. The TPM SHALL indicate a failure if the 6261 values do not match.
- 62627. The TPM SHALL replace e1 -> authData with a1 -> newAuthSecret
- 62638. The TPM SHALL encrypt e1 using the appropriate functions for the entity type. The key
- 6264 to encrypt with is parentHandle.
- 62659. The TPM SHALL create saltNonce by taking the next 20 bytes from the TPM RNG.

1460

626610. The TPM SHALL create changeProof a HMAC of (saltNonce concatenated with a1 -> n1) 6267 using a1 -> newAuthSecret as the HMAC secret.

626811.The TPM MUST destroy the TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE key associated with the 6269 authorization session.

## 6270**27.5** TPM Reset

#### 6271Start of informative comment:

6272TPM\_Reset releases all resources associated with existing authorization sessions. This is 6273useful if a TSS driver has lost track of the state in the TPM.

#### 6274End of informative comment.

6275Deprecated Command in 1.2

## 6276Incoming Parameters and Sizes

PA	PARAM HMAC		IAC	Type Name		Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Reset.

## 6277 Outgoing Parameters and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_Reset.

## 6278 Description

6279This is a deprecated command in V1.2. This command in 1.1 only referenced authorization 6280sessions and is not upgraded to affect any other TPM entity in 1.2

#### 6281Actions

- 62821. The TPM invalidates all resources allocated to authorization sessions as per version 1.1
- 6283 extant in the TPM
- a. This includes structures created by TPM SaveAuthContext and TPM SaveKeyContext
- 6285 b. The TPM MUST invalidate OSAP sessions
- 6286 c. The TPM MAY invalidate DSAP sessions
- 6287 d. The TPM MUST NOT invalidate structures created by TPM\_SaveContext
- 62882. The TPM does not reset any PCR or DIR values.
- 62893. The TPM does not reset any flags in the TPM STCLEAR FLAGS structure.
- 62904. The TPM does not reset or invalidate any keys

# 629127.6 TPM\_OwnerReadPubek

#### 6292Start of informative comment:

6293Return the endorsement key public portion. This is authorized by the TPM Owner.

## 6294End of informative comment.

## 6295Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Turne	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerReadPubek
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authentication. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

# 6296Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_OwnerReadPubek
4	<b>\$</b>	3S	<b>♦</b>	TPM_PUBKEY	pubEndorsementKey	The public endorsement key
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

# 6297Description

6298This command returns the PUBEK.

## 6299Actions

6300The TPM\_OwnerReadPubek command SHALL

63011. Validate the TPM Owner AuthData to execute this command

63022. Export the PUBEK

# 630327.7 TPM\_DisablePubekRead

#### 6304Start of informative comment:

6305The TPM Owner may wish to prevent any entity from reading the PUBEK. This command 6306sets the non-volatile flag so that the TPM\_ReadPubek command always returns 6307TPM\_DISABLED\_CMD.

6308This command has in essence been deprecated as TPM\_TakeOwnership now sets the value 6309to false. The command remains at this time for backward compatibility.

#### 6310End of informative comment.

## **6311Incoming Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC				
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisablePubekRead
4	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for owner authentication.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
5	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	ownerAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and owner authorization. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

## 6312Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	ARAM HI		AC	Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_DisablePubekRead
4	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
5	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
6	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: ownerAuth.

### 6313Actions

63141. This capability sets the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> readPubek flag to FALSE.

#### TPM\_LoadKey 6315**27.8**

#### 6316Start of informative comment:

- 6317Version 1.2 deprecates TPM\_LoadKey due to the HMAC of the new key handle on return.
- 6318The wrapping makes use of the handle difficult in an environment where the TSS, or other
- 6319management entity, is changing the TPM handle to a virtual handle.
- 6320Software using TPM\_LoadKey on a 1.2 TPM can have a collision with the returned handle as
- 6321the 1.2 TPM uses random values in the lower three bytes of the handle. All new software
- 6322must use LoadKey2 to allow management software the ability to manage the key handle.
- 6323Before the TPM can use a key to either wrap, unwrap, bind, unbind, seal, unseal, sign or
- 6324perform any other action, it needs to be present in the TPM. The TPM\_LoadKey function
- 6325loads the key into the TPM for further use.
- 6326The TPM assigns the key handle. The TPM always locates a loaded key by use of the handle.
- 6327The assumption is that the handle may change due to key management operations. It is the
- 6328responsibility of upper level software to maintain the mapping between handle and any
- 6329label used by external software.
- 6330This command has the responsibility of enforcing restrictions on the use of keys. For
- 6331example, when attempting to load a STORAGE key it will be checked for the restrictions on
- 6332a storage key (2048 size etc.).
- 6333The load command must maintain a record of whether any previous key in the key
- 6334hierarchy was bound to a PCR using parentPCRStatus.
- 6335The flag parentPCRStatus enables the possibility of checking that a platform passed 6336through some particular state or states before finishing in the current state. A grandparent
- 6337key could be linked to state-1, a parent key could linked to state-2, and a child key could be
- 6338linked to state-3, for example. The use of the child key then indicates that the platform
- 6339passed through states 1 and 2 and is currently in state 3, in this example. TPM\_Startup
- 6340with stType == TPM\_ST\_CLEAR indicates that the platform has been reset, so the platform
- 6341has not passed through the previous states. Hence keys with parentPCRStatus==TRUE
- 6342must be unloaded if TPM\_Startup is issued with stType == TPM\_ST\_CLEAR.
- 6343If a TPM\_KEY structure has been decrypted AND the integrity test using "pubDataDigest"
- 6344has passed AND the key is non-migratory, the key must have been created by the TPM. So 6345there is every reason to believe that the key poses no security threat to the TPM. While there
- 6346is no known attack from a rogue migratory key, there is a desire to verify that a loaded
- 6347migratory key is a real key, arising from a general sense of unease about execution of
- 6348arbitrary data as a key. Ideally a consistency check would consist of an encrypt/decrypt
- 6349cycle, but this may be expensive. For RSA keys, it is therefore suggested that the
- 6350consistency test consists of dividing the supposed RSA product by the supposed RSA prime,
- 6351 and checking that there is no remainder.
- 6352End of informative comment.

## 6353Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKey.
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	parentHandle	TPM handle of parent key.
5	<b>\\$</b>	2S	<b>\</b>	TPM_KEY	inKey	Incoming key structure, both encrypted private and clear public portions.  MAY be TPM_KEY12
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for parentHandle authorization.
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	parentAuth	The authorization session digest for inputs and parentHandle. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

# **6354Outgoing Operands and Sizes**

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Туре	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	18	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_LoadKey
4	4	3S	4	TPM_KEY_HANDLE	inkeyHandle	Internal TPM handle where decrypted key was loaded.
5	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
6	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
7	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: parentKey.usageAuth.

#### 6355Actions

- 6356The TPM SHALL perform the following steps:
- 63571. Validate the command and the parameters using parentAuth and parentHandle -> 6358 usageAuth
- 63592. If parentHandle -> keyUsage is NOT TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE return 6360 TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 63613. If the TPM is not designed to operate on a key of the type specified by inKey, return the error code TPM BAD KEY PROPERTY
- 63634. The TPM MUST handle both TPM\_KEY and TPM\_KEY12 structures
- 63645. Decrypt the inKey -> privkey to obtain TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY structure using the key 6365 in parentHandle

- 63666. Validate the integrity of inKey and decrypted TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY
- 6367 a. Reproduce inKey -> TPM STORE ASYMKEY -> pubDataDigest using the fields of
- 6368 inKey, and check that the reproduced value is the same as pubDataDigest
- 63697. Validate the consistency of the key and it's key usage.
- 6370 a. If inKey -> keyFlags -> migratable is TRUE, the TPM SHALL verify consistency of the
- 6371 public and private components of the asymmetric key pair. If inKey -> keyFlags ->
- 6372 migratable is FALSE, the TPM MAY verify consistency of the public and private
- 6373 components of the asymmetric key pair. The consistency of an RSA key pair MAY be
- 6374 verified by dividing the supposed (P\*Q) product by a supposed prime and checking that
- 6375 there is no remainder.
- b. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, verify that inKey->keyFlags->migratable
- 6377 is FALSE. If it is not, return TPM INVALID KEYUSAGE
- 6378 c. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_AUTHCHANGE, return TPM\_INVALID\_KEYUSAGE
- 6379 d. If inKey -> keyFlags -> migratable equals 0 then verify that TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY
- -> migrationAuth equals TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA -> tpmProof
- e. Validate the mix of encryption and signature schemes
- 6382 f. If TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS -> FIPS is TRUE then
- i. If keyInfo -> keySize is less than 1024 return TPM\_NOTFIPS
- 6384 ii. If keyInfo -> authDataUsage specifies TPM\_AUTH\_NEVER return
- 6385 TPM NOTFIPS
- 6386 iii. If keyInfo -> keyUsage specifies TPM KEY LEGACY return TPM NOTFIPS
- 6387 g. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE or TPM\_KEY\_MIGRATE
- i. algorithmID MUST be TPM\_ALG\_RSA
- 6389 ii. Key size MUST be 2048
- 6390 iii. exponentSize MUST be 0
- iv. sigScheme MUST be TPM\_SS\_NONE
- 6392 h. If inKey -> keyUsage is TPM KEY IDENTITY
- i. algorithmID MUST be TPM ALG RSA
- ii. Key size MUST be 2048
- 6395 iii. exponentSize MUST be 0
- iv. encScheme MUST be TPM\_ES\_NONE
- 6397 i. If the decrypted inKey -> pcrInfo is NULL,
- 6398 i. The TPM MUST set the internal indicator to indicate that the key is not using any PCR registers.
- 6400 j. Else
- i. The TPM MUST store pcrInfo in a manner that allows the TPM to calculate a composite hash whenever the key will be in use

- ii. The TPM MUST handle both version 1.1 TPM\_PCR\_INFO and 1.2 TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG structures according to the type of TPM\_KEY structure
- 6405 (1) The TPM MUST validate the TPM\_PCR\_INFO or TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG 6406 structures for legal values. However, the digestAtRelease and 6407 localityAtRelease are not validated for authorization until use time.
- 64088. Perform any processing necessary to make TPM\_STORE\_ASYMKEY key available for operations
- 64109. Load key and key information into internal memory of the TPM. If insufficient memory 6411 exists, return error TPM\_NOSPACE.
- 641210. Assign in Key Handle according to internal TPM rules.
- 641311.Set InKeyHandle -> parentPCRStatus to parentHandle -> parentPCRStatus.
- 641412.If parentHandle indicates it is using PCR registers, then set inKeyHandle -> 6415 parentPCRStatus to TRUE.

# 641628. Deleted Commands

## 6417Start of informative comment:

6418These commands are no longer active commands. Their removal is due to security concerns 6419with their use.

## 6420 End of informative comment.

64211. The TPM MUST return TPM\_BAD\_ORDINAL for any deleted command

# 642228.1 TPM\_GetCapabilitySigned

#### 6423Start of informative comment:

6424Along with TPM\_GetCapabilityOwner this command allowed the possible signature of 6425improper values.

6426TPM\_GetCapabilitySigned is almost the same as TPM\_GetCapability. The differences are 6427that the input includes a challenge (a nonce) and the response includes a digital signature 6428to vouch for the source of the answer.

6429If a caller itself requires proof, it is sufficient to use any signing key for which only the TPM 6430and the caller have AuthData.

6431If a caller requires proof for a third party, the signing key must be one whose signature is 6432trusted by the third party. A TPM-identity key may be suitable.

6433End of informative comment.

#### 6434 Deleted Ordinal

6435TPM\_GetCapabilitySigned

# 643628.2 TPM\_GetOrdinalAuditStatus

## 6437Start of informative comment:

6438Get the status of the audit flag for the given ordinal.

## 6439 End of informative comment.

## 6440Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Typo	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4			TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_GetOrdinalAuditStatus
4	4			TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinalToQuery	The ordinal whose audit flag is to be queried

# 6441 Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HMAC		Type	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Type	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4			TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
4	1			BOOL	State	Value of audit flag for ordinalToQuery

## 6442 Actions

64431. The TPM returns the Boolean value for the given ordinal. The value is TRUE if the 6444 command is being audited.

#### **TPM CertifySelfTest** 6445**28.3**

#### 6446Start of informative comment:

6447TPM\_CertifySelfTest causes the TPM to perform a full self-test and return an authenticated 6448 value if the test passes.

6449If a caller itself requires proof, it is sufficient to use any signing key for which only the TPM 6450 and the caller have AuthData.

6451If a caller requires proof for a third party, the signing key must be one whose signature is 6452trusted by the third party. A TPM-identity key may be suitable.

## 6453End of informative comment.

## 6454Incoming Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	HM	AC	Type	Name	Decembrish
#	SZ	#	SZ	туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of input bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifySelfTest
4	4			TPM_KEY_HANDLE	keyHandle	The keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures.
5	20	2S	20	TPM_NONCE	antiReplay	Anti Replay nonce to prevent replay of messages
6	4			TPM_AUTHHANDLE	authHandle	The authorization session handle used for keyHandle authorization
		2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	authLastNonceEven	Even nonce previously generated by TPM to cover inputs
7	20	3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
8	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	The continue use flag for the authorization session handle
9	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	privAuth	The authorization session digest that authorizes the inputs and use of keyHandle. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

## 6455Outgoing Operands and Sizes

PAF	RAM	НМ	AC	T	Name	Description
#	SZ	#	SZ	Туре	Name	Description
1	2			TPM_TAG	tag	TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
2	4			UINT32	paramSize	Total number of output bytes including paramSize and tag
3	4	1S	4	TPM_RESULT	returnCode	The return code of the operation.
		2S	4	TPM_COMMAND_CODE	ordinal	Command ordinal: TPM_ORD_CertifySelfTest
4	4	3S	4	UINT32	sigSize	The length of the returned digital signature
5	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	4S	<b>&lt;&gt;</b>	BYTE[]	sig	The resulting digital signature.
6	20	2H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceEven	Even nonce newly generated by TPM to cover outputs
		3H1	20	TPM_NONCE	nonceOdd	Nonce generated by system associated with authHandle
7	1	4H1	1	BOOL	continueAuthSession	Continue use flag, TRUE if handle is still active
8	20			TPM_AUTHDATA	resAuth	The authorization session digest for the returned parameters. HMAC key: key.usageAuth

# 15146456**Description**

6457The key in keyHandle MUST have a KEYUSAGE value of type TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING or 6458TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY or TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY.

6459Information returned by TPM\_CertifySelfTest MUST NOT aid identification of an individual 6460TPM.

#### 6461 Actions

- 64621. The TPM SHALL perform TPM\_SelfTestFull. If the test fails the TPM returns the appropriate error code.
- 64642. After successful completion of the self-test the TPM then validates the authorization to use the key pointed to by keyHandle
- 6466 a. If the key pointed to by keyHandle has a signature scheme that is not
- 6467 TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA1, the TPM may either return TPM\_BAD\_SCHEME or
- may return TPM\_SUCCESS and a vendor specific signature.
- 64693. Create t1 the NOT null terminated string of "Test Passed", i.e. 11 bytes.
- 64704. The TPM creates m2 the message to sign by concatenating t1 | | AntiReplay | | ordinal.
- 64715. The TPM signs the SHA-1 of m2 using the key identified by keyHandle, and returns the signature as sig.
- 6473

#### 6474**28.4** TPM\_GetAuditEvent

6475

6476Start of informative comment:

6477Deleted

6478End of informative comment.

6479 Deleted Ordinal

6480TPM\_GetAuditEvent

# 648128.5 TPM\_GetAuditEventSigned

6482

## 6483 Start of informative comment:

6484Deleted

6485 End of informative comment.

## 6486 Deleted Ordinal

6487TPM\_GetAuditEventSigned

6488

6489